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1INTRODUCTION
This thesis originated from an observation I made jn  1985 when writing a paper on the 
1984-85 British miners' strike. At the time, a dispute was taking place in Queensland 
between the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) and the South-East Queensland Electricity 
Board (SEQEB). I was struck by some of the similarities between the two strikes. 
Foremost was the way in which the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was 
framing laws in the aftermath of the miners' strike to combat what she saw as excessive 
union power. In Queensland, the Premier Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson was following suit 
with a range of legislation that was distinctly reminiscent of the British model.
Based on that original observation, I was led to question the ways and extent to which law 
is a factor in dealing with industrial conflict in Australia. With a centralised collective 
bargaining system based in law, the conduct of industrial relations in Australia has been 
regulated by industrial tribunals since the late nineteenth century.1 Embedded in the 
various federal and state acts have been processes and penalties for dealing with 
industrial disputation and non-conformism to the system.
Since the O'Shea case in 1969 the penal sanctions contained in the various industrial 
Acts, have remained in abeyance, while the earlier Boilermakers' case had found that it 
was unconstitutional to invest judicial functions to a body whose primary functions 
related to conciliation and arbitration.2 That being so what laws relevant to direct 
industrial action existed in the civil law, the criminal law and the common law? Were 
they used in the absence of effective penal sanctions and arbitral powers of enforcement 
in the Commonwealth and states?
There was ample evidence that such laws existed (and always had). Furthermore, even 
as I researched, the whole framework upon which industrial relations rested in 
Australia was changing, for what appeared to be a number of reasons. Not least amongst 
those was the way in which the law was beginning to be used.
1 Statutory provisions for voluntary arbitration were made in Victoria in 1891 and New South 
Wales in 1892. The principles of compulsory submission of disputes and their resolution by 
binding awards were adopted in the South Australian Conciliation Act of 1894. Legislation to 
establish wage-fixing authorities had been enacted in all of the States by 1911. Commonwealth 
involvement in arbitration was foreshadowed by the insertion of the arbitration power in the 
draft Constitution at the 1898 federal convention. W B Creighton, W J Ford, R J Mitchell, 
Labour Law Materials and Commentary, Sydney, 1983, p.8.
2 R. v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 and (1957) AC 
288 .
2Before proceeding further with the inquiry, I thought it would be prudent to ask another 
question: What are the causes of industrial conflict in Australia? No easy answer was 
forthcoming from the available data. The most comprehensive statistics on Australian 
industrial disputes are compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). These I 
rejected because the seven categories of 'Causes' could not answer my question 
adequately. From media reports over the past few years, it was clear to me that job 
security had become a major cause of industrial disputation, and yet no category in the 
ABS statistics isolated such disputes. This gave rise to the hypothesis upon which I 
decided to compile my own set of data. Central to the hypothesis was the assertion that 
industrial relations in Australia is not static, and the question of what causes industrial 
conflict can only be answered by a flexible set of data that is comprehensive enough to 
portray the complexities and trends that exist in a dynamic situation.
When I embarked on this task, my only concern was for collecting data on the causes of 
strikes. Examination of the Weekly Reports3, a weekly documentation of industrial 
disputes compiled by the then Department of Industrial Relations (DEIR)4, awakened me 
to the prevalence of bans in industrial conflict. It was not that I had been unaware of 
alternate forms of industrial action; rather, I was surprised by the number of bans in 
proportion to strikes that were evident. Thus, the next question presented itself. What 
proportion of direct action is attributable to bans, and is there a relationship between 
their frequency and the trends in strike activity?
The enormous scope presented by both those questions, and the degree of research 
involved in arriving at the answers has, as it turns out, provided the underpinnings of 
this thesis. Whereas I had originally viewed these questions as peripheral to the central 
concern of the thesis, they became the axis upon which all other issues revolved.
To understand the causes of industrial disputation, we need to look much more closely at 
the information available in the Weekly Reports. The data collected by ABS is quite 
extensive. For example, the 'Trade Unionism', category covers "disputes concerning 
employment of non-unionists, inter-union and intra-union disputes, sympathy 
stoppages in support of employees in another industry, recognition of union activities, 
etc" .5 ABS clearly recognises that demarcation disputes are qualitatively different from 
disputes over non-union labour, yet published material does not reflect such 
distinctions. The aggregated statistics are those upon which estimates, analysis and 
prediction are based. Some analysts have used the Weekly Report to reach a clearer
3 Department of Employment and Industrial Relations, Weekly Reports, Canberra, 1973-87.
4 Now Department of Industrial Relations.
5 ABS, Explanatory Notes.
3understanding of industrial disputation and its causes. For example, P R Hay's 
comparison of two six-month periods consisted of thirteen categories, several of which 
had sub-categories.6 Such research is of great value. Unfortunately, detailed 
compilations of this kind have not been made over a sufficiently long period to enable 
analyses of a more complex nature. The other criticism is a reiteration of one of the 
central arguments of this thesis; that is, that the whole spectrum of industrial action is 
reduced to strike analysis.
The industrial officer of the Master Builders' Federation (MBF) in Canberra has said 
unequivocally that bans are the most disruptive and economically costly form of 
industrial activity in the building industry today.7 Three years into the Accord, the 
changes in the characteristics of industrial disputation had become evident in some 
quarters, even if those changes remained unacknowledged in others. The following 
statement was included in the Confederation of Australian Industry’s (CAI) submission to 
the National Wage Case hearing in 1986.
Industrial disputation has changed its character over the last two years 
so that while the number of strikes has been on the way down, bans and 
limitations which do not cost a day’s wage for most employees, and do 
not show up in the statistics, have been on the way up. This different 
sort of disputation is now the way that many trade unions operate so that 
they can get the maximum gain for the least cost of wages foregone. In a 
sense, industrial disputation has become more efficient.q
Unsupported by empirical evidence as the statement was at the time, it is perhaps not 
surprising that it received little attention in an industrial relations climate which was 
singing the praises of the Accord loudly and for the most part, uncritically.
A public relations officer with the CAI confirmed this view, and added, that 
representations had been made to the ABS in the past few years requesting the addition of 
bans in statistical data on industrial disputes. The ABS response was, predictably, that 
the data on bans is not susceptible to measurement in the same way as strike statistics.
Statistics undoubtedly contribute a great deal to our understanding of the events taking 
place in all areas of our social and political lives. What we do have to question is 
whether statistics are adequate to the task of describing those events merely on the basis 
of what is measurable. Bans are measurable in the simple sense that we can measure
6 P R Hay, 'Political Strikes: Three Burning Questions', in Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol.20, No.1, March 1978, pp.27-28.
7 MBF industrial officer, Interview, March 1987.
6 Confederation of Australian Industry, Submission to the National Wage Case, Melbourne, 
November 1986, p.89.
4how many occur. Hopefully, this thesis will indicate that such a measure is of value. I 
can offer no suggestions as to how the severity of bans could be quantified. They are 
impossible to measure in terms of working days lost or impact on productivity. Some 
bans are more effective as an industrial lever than others; some bans operate for lengthy 
periods with very little or no impact at all. Notwithstanding these considerations, the 
non-inclusion of bans in dispute analysis on the grounds that they are measurable only 
to a limited extent may render the discussion of industrial disputes in a dynamic and 
complex industrial environment almost meaningless.
The notion that industrial conflict is 'bad' underpins much of the discussion which takes 
place on the subject. When there is an increase in strikes, for example, the focus for 
analysis not infrequently becomes one of measurement, such as the number of working 
days lost or declines in productivity. Industrial peace is therefore regarded as 'good'. 
Judged as it is by the same formulae, we have industrial peace when disputes are at a 
minimum and productivity is high. This simplistic notion was challenged as far back as 
1927 by a conservative Attorney-General in the Bruce-Page Government. John Latham, 
who subsequently became Chief Justice of the High Court surmised:
It is frequently said that the object of industrial legislation should be to 
promote peace in industry. A good deal depends on what is meant by that 
term. The absence of strikes and lock-outs is merely a negative ideal. It is 
a mistake to approach this subject merely from the point of view of 
endeavouring to avoid something, instead of trying to attain something, 
industrial peace, if regarded merely as the absence of strikes and lock­
outs, is but accidental and precarious. Viewed only from that angle, 
industrial peace is not sufficient....g
It was from Latham's perspective that I conducted my research. While this thesis 
contains no broad theoretical analysis of the nature of industrial conflict, it does rest on 
two theoretical propositions. The first is that the law can be a two-edged sword in the 
prevention and resolution of industrial conflict. It both protects and penalises. It 
provides justifications to act, and remedies against action. The law is frequently used 
with the aim of maintaining 'law and order' while in practice producing the opposite 
effect. The second proposition is that industrial peace and the absence of industrial 
conflict are not necessarily contemporaneous. The absence of measurable or identifiable 
manifestations of industrial conflict may be due to a number of reasons, including the 
existence of laws which proscribe it as an activity. A further dimension is added when 
we consider the political and economic climate in which industrial relations is 
occurring. It is reasonable to assume that there are correlations between, for example,
9 J Latham, M.P., quoted by R JL Hawke in The Resolution of Conflict, 1979 Boyer Lecture, 
Sydney, p.50.
5levels of unemployment, the political colour of the government of the day and the degree 
and nature of industrial disputation. In the case of the latter, (the nature of industrial 
disputation) there are a number of factors to consider, primarily:
• the form the disputation takes;
• the type of response from employers, eg resolution through the system or 
recourse to other avenues such as the common law; and
• the commitment of all parties, including government, to the maintenance of 
dispute resolution through the centralised bargaining system.
These factors and others contribute to the patterns of industrial relations. A strike on 
its own is not such a remarkable thing, but if we consider that action in the light of how 
it is responded to, in contrast to how it would probably have been responded to at a 
different time, it is possible to come to some understanding of the climate in which the 
strike is taking place. What is more difficult to ascertain is whether the industrial 
climate has prevented a strike from taking place and an alternative form of industrial 
action has been used.
Data on industrial disputes is collected only for collective direct action such as strikes, 
bans, lockouts, secondary boycotts and work-to-rules. Indivfdual acts, while also a 
manifestation of industrial unrest, are not recorded. For example, absenteeism is 
sometimes an individual expression of conflict, and it can on occasion be a form of 
collective action. As these are difficult to identify as industrial conflict, they are not 
included in the Weekly Reports, nor do they come to the attention of the industrial 
tribunals. Their existence, however, is acknowledged as representing another dimension 
to industrial disputation.
The impact of the Accord in the changing patterns of industrial relations since 1983 
cannot be denied and its existence is integral to the analysis in this thesis. While the 
focus in the latter part is on how the law has become a factor in the changing climate, it 
must be acknowledged that to a large extent the Accord was creating the climate. For 
example, the Government's and the Australian Council of Trade Union’s (ACTU) 
responses to action taken during the pilots' dispute in 1989 were driven by their 
commitment to the Accord. The Prime Minister, Bob Hawkes’s advocacy of the use of 
common law by the airlines early in the dispute reflected a marked change in personal 
and stated Accord policies.
Chapter One presents a review of the literature used. It provides in the first part a 
cursory overview of some of the literature from the United States (US), United Kingdom
6(UK) and Australia on systems theory and collective bargaining. While comparative 
analysis has not been a factor in my research, from a theoretical viewpoint the 
international literature is illuminating and useful particularly in relation to attitudes, 
approaches and rule-making. The second part of the chapter looks at the analysis of 
industrial disputes, including some of the econometric models that have been constructed 
on a comparative basis, and the efficacy of using the Weekly Reports as a source of data. 
The third part on labour law looks first at the development of labour law in the US, UK 
and Australia followed by a review of attitudes towards industrial conflict. It is 
contended that attitudes are largely based on two principal themes: that industrial 
conflict is either a 'bad thing' or it is 'not a bad thing'. The final section overviews the 
legal literature that was used and includes a resume of the historical disputes that were 
looked at, particularly those which had relevance to law outside the range of Australian 
industrial relations law.
A theoretical framework for the anlaysis of industrial disputation is posited in Chapter 
two. While drawing on the basis for analysis established by J E T Dunlop and others, a 
simple model is devised for the analysis of industrial conflict in contrast to the larger 
subject of industrial relations. The framework consists of six elements: background, 
the climate, the legal framework, proximate parties, contingent parties; and dispute 
resolution.
In the first part of Chapter Three I explain the methodology used for researching and 
selecting the data, and look at some of the problems associated with the task. Included are 
definitions for some of the terms which appear frequently in the thesis including strike, 
ban and secondary boycott. As well, the eighteen categories of causes are listed with 
some examples of the disputes to which they are related in my analysis. The second part 
of the thesis focuses on the prevailing industrial climate, with particular emphasis on 
the legal situation which has developed during the Accord period. The final section of 
Chapter Three outlines the research methods I adopted for this analysis and some of the 
problems I encountered in the process.
The forms and levels of industrial disputation between 1973-87 are considered in 
Chapter Four, using the data from the Weekly Reports. Claims that levels of industrial 
disputation in Australia have declined since 1983 are tested on a state and industry basis 
to see whether such a general statement applies across-the-board. The graphs showing 
state trends have ABS data included for comparison. The relationship between strikes 
and bans is considered at length, once again through particularities. Both are 
represented numerically and as percentages of overall disputation.
Chapter Five tests the proposition that Pay disputes dictate the rise and fall of strike
7activity. Allowances is included as a separate issue as well as Log of Claims (which will 
include to varying degrees both these issues). The inclusion of Allowances was 
precipitated by gossip. There have been many reports that the decline in claims for Pay 
increases brought about by the Accord had resulted in increased demands for Allowances 
as a means of obtaining increases in pay without breaching the national wage guidelines 
or overtly challenging the Accord. Anecdotal evidence confirmed this, although there has 
been little statistical evidence to substantiate the claims.
Chapter Six seeks to identify the dominant trends in issues that emerged in each state and 
territory during the survey period. In addition to Log of Claims, the two (or more) 
major issues in each year, in terms of their numerical dominance over other issues, are 
extracted.
Chapter Seven provides a composite picture from the results of the preceding three 
chapters. The trends in levels, forms and issues which have been identified over the 
survey period are summarised. Results from additional analysis of the data on an 
industry basis are also included, although not in any great detail. The results of the data 
in Chapters Four, Five and Six provide a background to the ensuing chapters on the 
political and industrial climate.
Having established that changes in the patterns of industrial relations have occurred, it 
is necessary to consider factors which have contributed to change. Certainly the Accord 
has played a significant part; however, to explain the change merely in terms of an 
agreed policy between the Government and ACTU is inadequate. The decline in industrial 
disputation and changes in the trends of forms that direct action takes, is evident. So too 
are other changes, and to some extent at least, they are causal.
The second part of this thesis looks at the changing industrial climate and concentrates on 
the Accord period since 1983. Chapter Eight looks at the political climate. The Prices 
and Incomes Accord provides the primary focus. The Accord represented more than an 
agreement on wages and prices. It also contained a number of supportive policies in the 
area of:
Industrial Relations Legislation;
Industrial Development and Technological Change; 
Immigration;
Social Security;
8• Occupational Health and Safety;
• Education;
• Health; and
• Australian Government Employment.
The agreement held that, "the objective of policy on industrial relations should be to 
improve industrial relations in Australia to the benefit of workers, employers and the 
public in general". A number of specific measures were spelt out as a matter of 
priority, the first of which stated:
The Government will endeavour to create a better industrial relations climate by 
itself adopting and encouraging other employers to adopt a rational and less 
confrontationist approach to industrial relations. The Government will encourage 
the settlement of disputes between employers and unions by conciliation and 
without recourse to legislative or common law penal sanctions.-jQ
Greater emphasis is given to this period because it is the period when changes are most 
apparent, both from the survey data and the legal aspects of this thesis. As a force that 
has contributed to the upsurge in legal activity, the New Right is also considered in this 
chapter, with some assessment of their role in the changes that have taken place.
Chapter Nine looks at the industrial climate. The first section considers some of the 
reasons why Job Maintenance has become an increasingly prominent source of industrial 
conflict. A cursory examination of some disputes in the various industries is made, 
although space does not permit an Australia-wide perspective. The following sections 
outline how the law has been used during this period. With a dispute involving airline 
pilots making daily headlines as the chapter was being written, change was manifestly 
taking place. The notion that there is a fundamental ’right to strike' is now subject to 
challenge in a way that had previously been regarded as inconceivable. Managerial 
prerogative has become a crucial issue for many employers who see their perceived 
rights to make managerial decisions eroded by law and union power. The use of the 
common law, previously available but for the most part unused, has implications for the 
future conduct of industrial conflict.
Three case studies are the subject of the final three chapters. They are the SEQEB, the 
Mudginberri and the Robe River disputes. All have for various reasons been factors in 
the changes that have taken place. Each dispute features a number of common features
10 Statement of Accord, reprinted in F Stillwell, The Accord...and Beyond, Sydney, 1988,
p.1 66.
9although their circumstances are quite different. There are two features of the disputes 
which are most important for the purposes of this thesis. The first is the way in which 
the law was used in each dispute, particularly in terms of the challenges made to the 
industrial relations system; and the consequences when either party decides to 'opt-out' 
of the system. Considered also are the roles of the New Right and the ACTU. The second is 
the issue which precipitated the disputes; that is, an overriding concern on the part of 
the unions involved to resist contract labour. It might appear that Robe River could be 
exempted from the above claim but, as the case study will reveal, contract labour was, 
(quite justifiably as it turned out) a major concern for the unions involved.
The two parts of the thesis are meant to complement each other and hopefully there is no 
"leap of faith" involved here. It is, in any case not a unique approach. For example, M 
Waters in his study of strikes and industrial conflict analysed strike trends along with 
their historical development and the societal structure. He observed that:
Thirty years of analysis of strike incidence have produced a bewildering 
battery of trends and counter-trends and an even more extensive range of 
explanatory variables to account for them. This bespeaks not only 
differences of discipline and ideology among those who seek to analyse 
strikes, but also the complexity of the phenomenon itself: industrial 
conflict is a central aspect of industrial society and a complete account of it 
would require a thorough analysis of societal structure.•) i
The findings from the data analysis provide a strong indication that some of the 
assumptions on which discussions of industrial disputation are based are open to critical 
examination. The decline in strikes since the Accord is not questioned. Clearly, on all 
available evidence this has been the case. Why this has happened though has, in my 
opinion been oversimplified. Looking at the legal responses to industrial conflict in a 
changing political and industrial environment is only one aspect of change, but an 
important one. In a letter to Peter Costello, a barrister (and now a Liberal Party 
Member of Parliament) who was involved in some of the cases mentioned on behalf of 
employers, I asked: "have torts, in the absence of penal sanctions come to be regarded as 
an efficient remedy to industrial disputation? Have torts increased since 1983? He 
replied in the affirmative, adding:
The interesting feature is that after six years of Labor Government, when 
the Labor Government originally proposed to repeal Section 45D and later 
to modify common law rights, the use of these remedies is stronger than 
ever before, and, I believe, open to use with the tacit approval of the 
Government itself. To a degree this reflects the changing industrial 
environment and the success of those who advocated the use, in appropriate
11 M Waters, Strikes in Australia, Sydney, 1982, p.33.
cases, of such remedies some four or five years ago.12
Chapman and Gruen point out that the marked decrease in strike activity since 1983 is 
not explainable by changes in measured economic variables.13 They also suggest caution 
in interpreting the underlying causal mechanism at work: "The increased commitment 
of the trade union movement to the maintenance of the ALP in government...may have 
decreased disputation to some extent independently of the consensual incomes policy".14 
They further note that the greater willingness of employers to use legal actions against 
unions in times of conflict may also have had effects on strike activity.15
My findings suggest that these two statements bear some relevance to the situation. The 
decline in strike activity and concomitant increase in bans, the increased concern over 
managerial prerogative and job security issues, the Accord and the developing legal 
climate are all inextricably linked. To understand the patterns of industrial relations 
which have developed, particularly since 1983, consideration must be given to all these 
factors (along with others), not as separate subjects, but as part of a whole picture.
Notes on style
There may appear to be some inconsistency in the way I have used capital letters when 
denoting causes. My rule has been to use all lower case in general discussion. When, 
however, the causes are being discussed within the context of the data analysis, capitals 
have been used: for example Contract Labour.
Finally, the terms used in the data analysis which designate issues as major or main are 
interchangeable. There is no qualitative distinction between them.
12 P H Costello, letter, 1.12.1989.
13 B Chapman and F Gruen, An Analysis of the Australian Consensual Incomes Policy: The 
Prices and Incomes Accord, paper presented to the "The Art of Full Employment" conference, 
University of Limburg, The Netherlands, September 28-30, 1989, p.25.
14 Ibid., p.32.
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Chapter One
THE LITERATURE
The international (including Australian) literature pertaining to industrial relations 
and the wide range of associated issues, is formidable. Because this thesis is solely 
concerned with the practice of industrial relations in Australia, I have made only a 
limited attempt to cover the literature from other countries, and in this endeavour 
have concentrated on the US and UK.
The first part of this chapter looks at some of the literature on industrial relations 
with the principal aim of developing a theoretical framework for analysis in the 
Australian environment. It covers systems theory and collective bargaining. It 
should be noted that while recognising the importance of these elements and others 
such as labour and organisations, their relevance to this thesis is contextual, not 
subject.
In the second part, the literature on industrial dispute data is considered. This is 
pertinent to the chapters in the thesis which focus on the original research 
undertaken on nine thousand industrial disputes in Australia over a ten year period.
The third part looks at the literature on labour law. It is not intended to be a 
comprehensive overview of law. As the chapters dealing with law in the thesis are 
mainly concerned with attitudes and how the use of law has been one of the factors in 
changing patterns in industrial relations in Australia, my interest is not so much in 
the 'black letter' analyses, as in the socio-political scenario.
1 . 1 . 1 . industrial relations theory
While it may be possible to arrive at generic non-legal definitions of industrial 
disputation that are applicable in countries other than Australia, the question begged 
is the extent to which the system is a factor in determining how conflict is managed? 
In his review of attitudes and approaches to industrial relations which have been 
influential, M P Jackson considered three approaches to the analysis:
( i ) Systems theory, an attempt to provide a general explanation of social 
behaviour;
1 2
( i i ) the social action approach, which aims to show how a search for an
explanation should be made (but does not try to provide that explanation); 
and
( i i i ) the attempt to distinguish different frames of reference, based on the belief 
that it is important to try to 'demystify' industrial relations. 1 23
Jackson's discussion of systems theory as applied to industrial relations centres on 
the work of its pioneer, J E T  Dunlop who believed that the industrial relations 
system was held together by an ideology or a common set of ideas and beliefs. It held 
that while actors may have their own ideology,
an industrial relations system requires that these ideologies may be 
sufficiently compatible and consistent so as to permit a common set of 
ideas which recognise an acceptable role for each actor. 2
Dunlop’s theory has attracted criticism from a number of sources who, while not 
rejecting it, advocate some modifications to it. Jackson, noting the criticisms, 
concludes that the reason why systems theory has remained so influential is because 
it appears to have held out the prospect of academic respectability. 3
The origin of the Social Action Approach is attributed to Weberian sociology in which 
an 'actor' owns definitions of the situations in which they are engaged. This is taken 
as an initial basis for the explanation of their social behaviour and relationships. 
Jackson maintains that one of the most important features of the social action 
approach is the way in which it stresses that the individual retains at least some 
freedom of action and ability to influence events. 4
A Fox, a chief proponent of the Frames of Reference Approach defines two frames, the 
unitary and the pluralistic. Those who subscribe to unitary ideology he says, will 
tend to define transgressors as aberrants:
The manager who firmly believes in the unitary ideology will find it 
difficult because of his conviction of the rightness of management rule, 
not only to acknowledge the legitimacy of challenges to it, but also to
1 M P Jackson, [a)Industrial Relations, 3rd edition, London, 1985, p.7.
2 J E T Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems, Southern Illinois UP, Carbondale, 1958, p. 17, 
quoted by Jackson, Ibid., pp.8-9
3 Ibid., p.14.
4 Loc.cit.
grasp that such challenges may at least be grounded in legitimacy for 
those who mount them. 5
The pluralistic frame on the other hand accepts that an enterprise contains people 
with a variety of different interests, aims and aspirations. Clegg, an adherent of the 
pluralist frame of reference in industrial relations, considers conflict to be normal 
and expected. 5 *78 Another adherent, Kelly argues that old human relations theories 
which assume that conflict is harmful should be avoided because they do not square 
with facts. He argues that, if it is handled properly, conflict:
can lead to more effective and appropriate arrangements...The way 
conflict is managed - rather than suppressed, ignored or avoided - 
contributes to a company's effectiveness. 7
The major source of criticism of pluralist ideology, says Jackson, is that while it 
recognises the inevitablity of conflict, it also implies a degree of equality between the 
conflicting parties. 8
The first and last of these approaches are relevant to the practice of industrial 
relations in Australia. The system, which explicitly accepts the existence of conflict, 
operates on a consensus basis in that the parties (who may be in disagreement with 
each other) at least agree that the system provides a means of conciliation and 
arbitration with an ultimate remedy. There is therefore a common set of ideas or 
beliefs in the system although the ideologies of participants may differ greatly. It is 
when one or both of the parties opt out of the formal system that the difference in 
ideology will surface as a major factor in the conduct of a dispute and its outcome. 
Two of the case studies later in this thesis, the SEQEB and Robe River disputes serve 
to illustrate this point as does discussion on the pilots' dispute.
As for the Frames of Reference Approach, both unitary and pluralistic, I would 
contend that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Again I refer to the 
disputes mentioned earlier where under normal circumstances a pluralism of views 
was tolerated, and conflict managed, within the system. At the same time, persons 
subscribing to a unitary ideology, for example, Charles Copeman in the Robe River 
dispute, may also operate within the pluralist framework, and once again, it is
5 A Fox, 'Industrial Relations: A Social Critique of Pluralist Ideology' in J Child (Ed.), The 
Business Enterprise in Modern Industrial Society, London, 1969, p. 189, quoted by Jackson, 
Ibid., p.20.
8 H A Clegg, 'Pluralism in Industrial Relations', in British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol.13, no.3, Nov. 1975, pp.309-16, cited by Jackson, Ibid., p.21.
7 Kelly, quoted by Fox in Child (Ed.) op.cit., p.215.
8 Jackson, op.cit., p.22.
usually at the time that they opt out of the system that the unitary ideology will 
become their modus operandi. Needless to say, a unitary ideology may well have been 
a major factor in their approach to management and staff relationships even while 
working within the system and accepting the tenets of pluralism.
Another dimension has been offered by M Shalev in his discussion of Ingham's 
Marxist approach whereby, "in order to explain variations in both institutional 
structures and levels of conflict institutionalisation, it is desirable to adopt a 
Marxist rather than a functionalist approach". 9 The question posed by Ingham is 
"under what conditions ’centralised institutions for the regulation of conflict' will 
develop - it being accepted that these are the proximate causes of low strike levels - 
and essentially, the answer is that such institutions will be found in societies where 
each sector of the economy is dominated by a small number of large-scale 
employers". 10 This approach is far too simplistic to apply to the Australian model 
of industrial relations despite the institutionalisation of conflict resolution that is a 
product of the system.
To what end then does comparative analysis serve the study of industrial relations? 
According to Dunlop's model, "the attention to rule-making in industrial relations 
systems provides a common denominator for the comparative analysis of different 
forms”. Comparisons reveal the differences between systems which in many other 
respects are similar and vice versa.11
A M Ross developed a model for analysing industrial relations systems for 
comparative purposes which has enduring value. Most of its features are also 
relevant to the analysis of individual systems:
Principal Features of an Industrial Relations System Used For Comparison
1.
(a )
Organisational Stability 
Age of labour movement
(b ) Stability of membership in recent years
2.
(a )
Leadership Conflicts in the Labour Movement 
Factionalism, rival unionism and rival federations
(b ) Strength of communism in labour unions
3. States of Union-management Relations
9 M Shalev, 'Industrial Relations Theory and the Comparative Study of Industrial Relations 
and Industrial Conflict’, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.18, No.1, 1980,
pp. 26-41.
10 Ibid., p.30.
R Bean, Comparative Industrial Relations, Sydney, 1985, p.3-4.
(a) Degree of acceptance by employers
(b ) Consolidation of bargaining structure
4. L a b o u r  P o lit ic a l A c t iv i ty
(a) Existence of Labour Party as a leading political party
(b ) Labour Party governments
5. R o le  o f  S ta te
(a ) Extent of government activity in defining terms of 
employment
(b ) Dispute settlement policies and procedures^
This leads inevitably to the comparison and analysis of collective bargaining and law 
between systems. Inevitably, because systemically it will be these two functional 
factors which will detemine the interplay of the various actors, their roles, and at 
the most fundamental level, the day-to-day practice of industrial relations.
1.1.2.  Collective bargaining
Various models of collective bargaining have been developed which seek to provide a 
theoretical framework for analysis. It should be noted that in all industrialised 
countries some legislation exists on wages and working conditions. There are, 
however, significant differences between countries on the scope of statutory 
regulations. As the International Labour Office noted:
Whereas the North American countries have generally adopted only a 
minimum of legislation on substantive working conditions, social legislation 
in many European countries covers a broad spectrum of issues which might 
also be subjects for collective bargaining. •) 3
Begin and Beal combine an open systems theory with Dunlop's theory to overcome the 
limitations they see in Dunlop's approach, namely:
( i ) it did not articulate well between levels of the industrial relations 
system;
( i i ) it did not articulate the dynamic behavioural processes by which rules 
are changed;
12 A M Ross, 'Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict', in G G Summers (Ed.), Proceedings 
of the 12th Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1959.
1 3 Collective Bargaining in Industrialised Market Economies, International Labour Office, 
Geneva, 1973, pp.11-12, quoted by D Plowman, S Deery & C Fisher, Australian Industrial 
Relations, Sydney, 1981, p.68.
( i i i ) it did not, with the exception of technology, give adequate attention to 
possible organisational-level influences, eg organisational size or 
personality variables; and
( i v ) it did not adequately set out a taxonomy of outputs that was 
operationally useful.
Begin and Beal's analysis of industrial relations systems consists of three sets of 
participants and actors: managers and their hierarchy; workers and their hierarchy; 
and "regulators" - agents of government who play specific roles and non­
governmental agents and agencies. While granting Dunlop's institutional framework, 
Begin and Beal also emphasise the role of the actors.14 They define collective 
bargaining as "interactions between unions and managers. It takes place within 
limits set by formal rules, accepted practices, laws, and conventions".1 6
This framework allows for substantial variations within the US industrial relations 
system despite factors which are mostly constant across the system, or at least 
subsets of the system. When the perspective is expanded to include other countries, 
Begin and Beal find even greater variations in the design and operation of industrial 
relations systems.16 Significantly, it is the factors which they identify as constant 
across the US system (the political system and the power distribution within that 
system; labour laws; and ideologies) which provide the greatest variations with 
other countries. Furthermore, their definition of collective bargaining could be 
construed as somewhat rigid. One British perspective for example is that from the 
union viewpoint, collective bargaining is, in addition to a means of defending and 
improving members' wages and conditions, a rule-making process. A Flanders 
argues that one of the principal purposes of trade unions in collective bargaining is 
regulation and control. In this scenario, the effect of rules is to establish rights 
along with corresponding obligations: Rules are seen to:
limit the power and authority of employers and to lessen the dependence of 
employees on market fluctuations and the arbitrary will of management 
these rules provide protection, a shield, for their members. And they 
protect not only their material standards of living, but equally their 
security, status and self-respect - in short their dignity as human 
beings.-) 7
14 Begin & Beal, The Practice of Collective Bargaining, 8th edition, Boston, 1989
15 Ibid., p.7.
16 Ibid., p.523.
17 A Flanders, 'What are Trade Unions For?', in W E J McCarthy, Ed, Trade Unions, second 
edition, Middlesex, 1985, p.29.
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Herman, Kuhn and Seeber observe that most bargaining theories make two basic 
assumptions. The first, is that each side to the bargain has an incentive to deal with 
the other; and the second is that there is a disagreement over the level at which the 
exchange can take place.18
According to Bacharach and Lawler, bargaining theory models have other common 
elements: (i) the existence of bilateral monopoly, that is, in order that the 
transaction takes place, the two parties must reach an agreement; (ii) that 
negotiations may take place over clearly defined issues noting that there is a general 
assumption amongst bargaining theorists that in each negotiation there is a winner 
and loser; and (iii) the existence of a contract zone which sets the outer limits for 
negotiation. Under the convergence model, parties through offers and counter-offers 
move closer toward each other gradually converging toward a point of potential 
agreement.19 This model, while identifying general aspects of collective bargaining 
fails to account for systemic factors. In collective bargaining in Australia for 
example, the role of the industrial tribunals and arbitration may negate some of 
these assumptions.
Herman et aI concentrate on two distinct theories for their analysis. The first is the 
Walton and McKersie model in which labour-management negotiations are not a 
single process, but four different sub-processes, each distinguished by its own 
function for the interacting parties, its own internal logics, and its own identifiable 
set of instrumental acts or tactics:
( i ) Distributive bargaining - where the parties bargain over division of a 
particular pie under which the gain by one party is a direct loss to the 
opponent.
( i i ) Integrative bargaining - where both sides search for solutions that 
would increase the size of the pie, and where the objectives of both 
parties need not necessarily be in conflict as is the case in distributive 
bargaining.
( i i i )  Attitudinal structuring - which defines the quality and type of
relationship between labour and management, and encompasses the 
efforts, intended and unintended by parties to shape their opponents' 
behaviour.
18 E E Herman, A Kuhn, R L Seeber, Collective Bargaining & Labor Relations, New Jersey, 
1981.
19 Ibid., pp.233-235.
( i v )  Intraorganisational bargaining - which refers to the internal 
negotiations taking place within each party.20
Herman et al believe that Walton and McKersie's theoretical and tactical framework 
represents an important contribution to the literature of bargaining theory.21 I am 
inclined to agree with them notwithstanding their failure to include a contextual 
framework which allows for institutional arrangements. Of particular interest is 
their assertion that, under the attitudinal structuring subprocess, the history and 
past behaviour of negotiators can influence the success of current bargaining. As 
Herman et al point out, "a conflict-prone relationship may embody a set of attitudes 
which would make it difficult for the parties to move to a more cooperative 
relationship".22 This is relevant to the case studies presented later on in this thesis 
where the history, past relationships and personalities of the main actors are crucial 
factors in the conduct of the disputes. Although this may have been an important 
factor in the conduct and character of the disputes, it is clear that in terms of the 
outcomes, institutional factors - the industrial relations system and law - were 
ultimately the chief determinants.
The second model outlined by Herman et al is the Kuhn model which concentrates on 
the basics of transactions and of power. By way of introduction they explain that the 
study of power is not the same as the study of negotiations. Power deals with the 
basic capacity to achieve desired results while negotiations deals with the actual use 
of that capacity in a given situation 23
Kuhn's model maintains that the things people affirmatively want are goods and, the 
things they wish to avoid or get rid of are bads. Power is concerned with the kinds 
and quantities of goods and bads involved in interactions between parties. It resides 
in the ability to grant or withhold things wanted by others. Herman et al believe this 
statement holds for power based on bads, like strikes, threats or violence.24
By way of summary, Herman et al argue that a union as an agent of protest and not of 
management, is a sort of permanent opposition party that never comes to power. 
Although it may have a peripheral influence on matters affecting employees, it will 
not normally participate in management decisions. A union has no means of
20 Ibid., pp.235-236.
21 Ibid., p.236.
22 Loc.cit.
22 Ibid., p.237. For further discussion on the interconnections between power, strike 
behaviour and wages, see L Perrone, 'Positional Power, Strikes and Wages, in American 
Sociological Review, 49, June 1984, pp.412-421.
24 Ibid., p.238.
exercising power on an employer except by being dramatically unpleasant and it will 
achieve this mainly by the strategic bad of a strike. Accordingly, management 
behaviours towards unions take two distinct forms:
( i ) to try to prevent or eliminate the existence of the union; and
( i i ) to raise management’s bargaining power in dealing with unions, but
without challenging its existence.
They conclude that "in analysing the devices used by employers, it is therefore 
crucial to understand whether they are directed against the existence of the union or 
merely against its bargaining power”.25 Like the previous model described by 
Herman et a/, the Kuhn model pays no heed to the system. It does not provide a useful 
model for the analysis of industrial relations in Australia where the power to 
determine the outcome of a dispute may reside, not with the parties, but with an 
industrial tribunal.26 It does not recognise the commitment that both parties may 
have to the system, and by implication, a union's place within that system. Nor does 
the use of language such as goods and bads enable more than a perfunctory explanation 
of behaviour. While I would not discount the use of such language just because it is 
value-laden, in its simplicity it ignores other values which may have good or bad 
labels attributed to them such as freedom, collective rights or exploitation and 
repression.
P L Quaglieri points out that the overwhelming majority of labour-management 
agreements negotiated in the US are routinely settled with strikes being an 
uncommon phenomena. It has been estimated that strikes account for far less (one- 
tenth) of the time lost in the workplace than that resulting from industrial 
accidents.27
Another factor which distinguishes collective bargaining in the US from that of 
Australia is the prevalence of single-employer bargaining in the US. Along with 
employers and the unions, an additional influence favouring single-employer 
bargaining structures in the US has been the provision of government support for 
collective bargaining.28 While there is a movement towards enterprise bargaining
25 Ibid., pp.250-251.
26 That is not to argue against its validity in the United States. For a discussion of the 
decline in labour's strength and its relationship to management in the collective bargaining 
process, see R Wrenn, The Decline of American Labor', in Socialist Review, vol. 15, July- 
Oct. 1985, pp.89-117.
27 P L Quaglieri, America's Labor Leaders, Massachusetts, 1989 p.22.
28 R Bean, op.cit.,p.80.
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in the Australian system, because it still works within the framework of a 
centralised bargaining system it is does not in this respect parallel the American 
single-employer bargaining structures.
Collective bargaining in the UK has been traditionally the principle means by which 
unions and employers negotiate issues. In an article on the relationship between 
unemployment and industrial relations in Britain, L Hunter argues that collective 
bargaining is a process which both reflects relative power between an employer and 
the workforce and determines how power is exercised in the conduct of work. He is 
critical of standard economic literature which fails to appreciate the wide range of 
issues apart from wages that are covered, including procedural matters. As such the 
predictive and explanatory power of simplified models must give grounds for 
concern. Hunter's argument raises an important point about the analysis of 
industrial disputation in Australia where, like the UK, economic literature on 
industrial relations tends to concentrate on wage issues.
Hunter further points out another element which is also missed, in that much 
bargaining is about mutual concession:
To get improved pay, unions may relax rules about working practice: to 
introduce change in organisation, employers will be willing to improve pay 
and conditions. Particularly in the last two decades, a great deal of 
collective bargaining has been in part a productivity bargain of some 
description, in the course of which changes have been wrought in manning
levels, job structures and work organisation, etc..........In short, the
production function or production relationship of the enterprise or plant will 
be conditioned in part by the bargaining process, which may in itself be a 
dynamic factor in the behaviour of output and costs.2 g
The above reflects the Australian experience over the Accord years, however such 
outcomes usually occur on a more formal basis, that is, within the centralised 
system. Productivity gains have become linked to pay rises that are handed down by 
the Industrial Relations Commission in its National Wage Case decisions. As such, 
unlike Britain, they are subject to scrutiny on a number of levels, including the 
economic. Award restructuring in Australia has also seen unions and management 
involved in collective bargaining over non-pay issues such as classifications and 
manning levels. Indeed, as my data reveals, the widening scope of issues has led to a 
change in the major causes of industrial disputation over the research period.
From a comparative viewpoint, Chapman and Gruen point out that there are at least 
two conceptual problems in relating macroeconomic outcomes to government policy
29 L Hunter, 'Unemployment and Industrial Relations', in British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, July 1988, pp.202-227.
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changes. The first is that judgements concerning policy effectiveness are necessarily 
relative and counter-factual assessments. Collective bargaining under the existing 
Australian institutional framework serves as an example where definitive data are 
not available to undertake a fair evaluation and postulate outcomes associated with 
alternative scenarios. The second is that economic variables change continually so 
that in no two periods of time are enough factors sufficiently similar to allow 
confident judgements through aggregated comparisons.30
1.2.1.  Analysing industrial disputes
The interests of the researcher will of course determine the type of inquiry he or she 
will pursue. Where mine, initially at least, has been concerned with causes, others 
have investigated industry, the conciliation and arbitration system, dispute 
settlement procedures or longevity, to name but a few. The problems associated with 
analysis will therefore depend largely on the interests of the individual researcher 
and the adequacy of available data. That problems exist with official statistics was 
recognised many years ago by D W Oxnam, whose study of industrial disputes on an 
industry basis led him to conclude that the statistical convenience in classifying 
certain industries led to inappropriate units for the analysis of industrial strife.31 
Oxnam was critical of the exclusion of industrial disputes involving work stoppages 
of less than ten man days (sic) from official collections, as well as the reliability of 
the statistics themselves. There is, he says, an element of personal judgement that 
enters into the collection of strike statistics which can produce quite different 
results from different agencies. He cites as an example the strike statistics compiled 
by the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (now ABS) and the State 
Statistical Office in Sydney. "In none of the fifty years since their commencement in 
1913 do these estimates coincide, and in some years the divergence between them is 
substantial".32
The need for caution in the use of official data has also been expressed by Dabscheck 
and Niland. Their research, which sought an explanation of why Australia has so 
many "short sharp" strikes and what are the causes of industrial disputes, was based 
chiefly on ABS statistics. Although the data may be a reliable indication of trends 
over time, Dabscheck and Niland are wary of setting too much store on data that 
purport to group strikes into discrete categories of stated cause. Where a dispute can
30 B J Chapman and F Gruen, An Analysis of the Australian Consensual Incomes Policy: The 
Prices and Incomes Accord, Labour Market Analysis and Employment Planning, Working 
Paper No.37, May 1990, p.19.
31 D W Oxnam, The Incidence of Strikes in Australia', in J E Isaac & G W Ford (Eds.), 
Australian Labour Relations Readings, Melbourne, 1966, p.18.
32 Ibid., p.20.
22
be traced primarily to a particular issue, they say, "analysis would require more 
than just the seven categories used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics".33 As 
Dabscheck and Niland point out, the decline in one category of stated cause as a 
problem area leads to an automatic increase in other categories, even when there may 
have been little or no increases in disputes in those areas.34
Several limitations in the use of ABS statistics have also been noted by Plowman, 
Deery and Fisher. They itemise their reservations thus: the limit of ten working 
days lost may well understate the incidence of strikes because those of short duration 
involving small establishments are not included: statistics relate only to 
establishments where stoppages actually occur; effects such as unemployment and 
production lost in other associated places are not recorded: the industry 
classifications are not detailed enough; strike statistics include lockouts which could 
give a distorted view of worker militancy or intransigence; subjectivity enters into 
the collection and classification of data so that marked variations occur, (for example 
ABS and NSW Department of Labour Statistics); and, strikes may be multi-causal yet 
are recorded as having only one cause.35 The last two criticisms were noted earlier 
by Oxnam.
Problems can also arise from competing sections within the one recording agency. 
Don Rawson in his study on trade union membership outlines the discrepancies which 
exist between the annual series of Trade Union Statistics’ and another ABS series 
called Trade Union Members' which were produced in 1976, 1982, 1986 and 
1988.36 Although the second series provides valuable information about the 
composition of unions since 1976, Rawson points out that they also give a different 
impression on union density from the first series.37 The older Trade Union 
Statistics’ suggest that union membership has remained fairly static at around 55- 
56 per cent, while those from the Trade Union Members' series point to a decline in 
union density over the same period. Rawson concludes it is legitimate to say that both 
series have value, however, "one cannot escape an uneasy feeling that each casts some 
doubt on the validity of the other".38
33 B Dabscheck & J Niland, Industrial Relations in Australia, North Sydney, 1981, p.74.
34 Loc.cit.
35 D Plowman, et al, op.cit., p.45.
36 ABS Catalogue Nos. 6230.0 and 6325.0.
37 D Rawson,(a) Is Unionism Everywhere In Decline, paper presented at Australian Political 
Studies Association Conference, University of New England, Armidale, 26-28.8.88
38 Loc.cit.
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Ironically perhaps, no criticism of ABS figures is registered in the Report of the 
Committee of Review into Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems 
(hereinafter called The Hancock Report). The aim and purpose of the Committee was 
to develop a more effective and practical industrial relations system. To this end the 
Committee was given broad terms of reference, which included specifically the 
direction to examine, report and make recommendations on "all aspects of 
Commonwealth law relating to the prevention and settlement of industrial 
d isputes".39 A review of the available evidence about industrial disputes in 
Australia was undertaken in regard to strikes and lockouts. "Because of their 
comprehensiveness and their availability for a long period of time", the Committee 
reported, "the ABS data are the most suited to our needs and we rely on them 
below".49 The tables of statistics which follow are accepted uncritically as the basis 
for the Committee's inquiry. There is no mention of bans as a feature of industrial 
disputation in Australia. This aspect of the Hancock Report will be discussed later 
within the context of the Report itself.
Beggs and Chapman tested the proposition that the Accord has had no independent 
effect on Australian strike activity. Using working days lost per unionist from 
strikes over the period 1959 to 1983, econometric models using a range of 
variables were used such as price inflation, profits, inventories and measures of 
labour demand. They concluded that the variables influencing strikes were changes 
in the Consumer Price Index, overtime, inventories and profits as a proportion of 
Gross Domestic Product, the job vacancy rate, and a number of political and 
institutional factors.41
An identical exercise was carried out by Chapman and Gruen for the period 1986 to 
1989. Working days lost per unionist from strikes were predicted from the 
parameters of the earlier equations with the outcomes being compared with actual 
working days lost. The results showed that strike activity had decreased markedly 
from the beginning of 1983 in Australia in a way not explainable by changes in 
measured economic variables. Chapman and Gruen held that the difference between 
the projected and actual working days lost "can be interpreted reasonably as the
39 Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems. Report of 
the Committee of Review, Vol.2, Canberra, 1985. p.1.
40 Ibid., p. 125.
41 Beggs and Chapman, cited by Chapman and Gruen, (b)op.cit., p.28. See also J W Duncan 
& W E J McCarthy, 'What is Happening to Strikes?', in New Society, 22, 526, Nov.2.,
1972, pp.267-269.
effect of changes in the industrial relations environment, holding constant the 
influence of macroeconomic variables on strike activity".42
Beggs and Chapman in their earlier study had also examined the proposition that 
decreases in Australian strike activity were part of an international phenomenon 
and, by implication, unrelated to changes in the Australian institutional 
environment. Using a model in which annual strike data from thirteen OECD 
countries over the period 1964 to 1985 were used, Beggs and Chapman found the 
Australian experience of decreases in strike activity to be unique in an international 
context at that time 43 Chapman and Gruen further tested the model and results 
using data from 1964 to 1987. In brief they concluded that:
• decreases in Australian strike activity after the beginning of 1983 are most 
unusual; and
• that while decreases in strike activity are a world-wide phenomenon for the 
1983-87 period, the fall for the rest of the world is about 40 per cent while 
the Australian diminution is around 70 per cent.44
Aside from the conclusions that can be drawn on the uniqueness of the Australian 
experience over the Accord years, these results have considerable relevance to this 
thesis. They show that the inclusion of data on working days lost from strikes may 
not have made any significant change to the research results. It is clear that both 
sets of data, that is on working days lost and on the incidence of industrial 
disputation, show a marked change in the pattern of activity during the Accord years. 
In this context it is worth mentioning the three caveats that Chapman and Gruen note 
in relation to their conclusions.
The first is that the models provide a very simple representation of influences on 
strike activity. The results therefore are indicative only.
The second is that conflicts between employers and employees can manifest 
themselves in less covert activity than work stoppages and that bans, go-slows and 
work to rules may have become different since the beginning of the Accord. They cite 
empirical evidence that there has been a change since the early 1980s in the form of 
industrial disputation towards the use of bans.43
42 Ibid., p.29.
43 Ibid., p.30.
44 Ibid., p.32.
45 Loc.cit. They are referring here to the research that was undertaken for this thesis and 
make the point that the bans data have not yet been subjected to econometric analysis.
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The third counsels caution on interpreting the underlying causal mechanisms at 
work:
The increased commitment of the trade union movement to the maintenance 
of the ALP in government....may have decreased disputation to some extent 
independently of the consensual incomes policy. Further, the apparent 
greater willingness in recent times of employers to use legal action against 
unions in times of conflict may also have had effects on strike activity....45
The latter point is one that is taken up in the second part of this thesis. Having made 
these qualifications, Chapman and Gruen nevertheless maintain that the Accord has 
gone an important way to achieving its objective of a dimunition in industrial 
disputation, at least measured by strike activity. As a result, they say, the incomes 
policy has contributed to greater industrial harmony.47
M P Jackson, in discussing the similarities between strike trends in the US, UK and 
Australia points to the rise in the number of strikes recorded during post World War 
Two years which reached a height in the 1960s and early 1970s. Each country also 
saw a rise in the number of working days lost through disputes in the 1970s. Such 
similarities, however, need to be tempered by a recognition of significant differences 
in experience between the three countries. Jackson believes the most important 
difference is probably in the area of duration. In the UK and Australia, the average 
duration of strikes declined after World War II while no such trend is evident in the 
US.48
Another difference noted by Jackson is that in the US and UK, wages have dominated 
the causes of strikes while in Australia, working conditions and managerial policy 
have been the most important causes as far as the number of stoppages, and in a 
number of periods the same has been true as far as the number of days lost is 
concerned.49
While noting Jackson's work in this area, I would add that although all three 
countries operate under collective bargaining procedures, there are systemic 
differences which are important. Ross and Hartman argue that distinctive strike 
patterns identified in their comparative study were associated with particular kinds 
of industrial relations systems and with firm and stable union memberships.50
48 Loc.cit.
47 Ibid., p.33
48 M P Jackson, (b) Strikes, Sussex, 1987, p.94.
49 Ibid., pp.94-94
50 Ibid., pp.100-101
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Further, the explanation for differences in duration of strike trends may also lie in 
the level of trade union membership. In the US for example during the 1970s, 
membership of trade unions was proportionately far below that of the other two 
countries, a situation which continues to this day.
I have found that for the purposes of my analysis it was necessary to develop yet 
another framework, one which contains significant elements of other models, but has 
a different focus - industrial conflict. A model devised by Kohan, Katz & McKersie 
proved useful. They developed a revised theoretical framework which seeks to 
address some of the anomalies they perceive in industrial relations theory and 
practice. Their framework derives from the integration of traditional theories of 
industrial relations systems and the literature on corporate strategy, structure and 
decision making. The model incorporates the roles of the environment, values, 
business strategies, institutional structures and history in the analysis of industrial 
relations processes and outcomes.51 Kochan et al explain that just as "management 
strategies and values play a more important role in explaining industrial relations 
outcomes than received theory has recognized, so too do the values and strategies that 
influence the behavior (sic) and policies of unions and government policy".52 I will 
be taking up this theme in the next chapter which outlines the theoretical framework 
I have used for analysis in this thesis.
1.2 .2 .  The Weekly Reports
The Weekly Report is a weekly documentation compiled by DEIR of industrial 
disputes reported during the previous week. The name Weekly Report is something 
of a misnomer. Within the department it is referred to as the ’strike report', 
although the word 'strike' never appears in the report itself. Officers at DEIR varied 
in their opinions as to the accuracy of the Report. One claimed that it was 80 per 
cent accurate while another said that 65 per cent was a more likely figure. There 
was general agreement that accuracy had increased over the "past few years" in line 
with more stringent procedures for collecting information.
The methods used by DEIR in obtaining information are varied. Reports may be 
lodged by employers, unions or, in some cases, the media. Within the department, 
officers with a network of contacts seek out information on the basis that it will 
remain confidential in detail. These reports are finally contained within the Weekly 
Report in adherence to a formula that in its minimum form requires the following
51 T A Kochan, H C Katz, R B McKersie, The Transformation of American Industrial 
Relations, New York, 1986, p.11.
52 Ibid., p. 12.
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details: the industry and state; workers involved and the union if known; the name 
of the employer; the stated issue; when the dispute began; and type (stoppage, 
lockout or ban). The numbers involved are included if known, together with whether 
the dispute had ended or was continuing. It is not unusual for notification of a dispute 
to an industrial tribunal also to be included, although its omission in the report does 
not necessarily mean that the dispute has not been notified. There is quite often much 
more detailed information included than has been outlined above. Also, where a 
dispute is widespread and involves a large number of employees, a single report will 
sometimes cover the lot.
Valuable though the Weekly Report is as a source, there are some problems which 
should be noted. Alice Coolican in her appraisal of the Weekly Reports draws 
attention to some of the criticisms that have been raised about the use of official 
statistics.53 She points out that their relevance and usefulness have been queried by 
some sociologists, while phenomonologists have argued that they measure the 
activities of the recording agencies and not the subject under scrutiny. Such views 
are in turn criticised by Barry Hindess who maintains that such arguments 
ultimately lead to "the denial of the possibility of rational knowledge".54
Problems arising from definitions, reporting and measurement which affect the 
validity and reliability of statistics can also occur. As a result, says Coolican, it is 
necessary to be aware of the imperfections in methods of collecting and constructing 
statistics so that corrective measures can be taken. Nevertheless, there are 
limitations on the uses of quantitative data. Coolican agrees with Hyman's assertion 
that the qualitative attributes of strikes, for example the meaning of the action for 
the participants, cannot be gauged from dispute statistics, and should not be 
attempted.55 She concludes that research into the qualitative aspects of industrial 
relations does not negate the need for quantitative analysis; the two can co-exist.
There are three major advantages identified by Coolican in the use of the Weekly 
Reports : First, they provide some information in greater detail than the ABS
Industrial Disputes publication; second, the additional data enables the construction 
of statistics using different classifications from the ABS; and third, the detailed 
nature of the Weekly Reports permits the exploration of hypotheses which cannot be 
tested using published Bureau data.55
53 A Coolican, 'Using Dispute Data: A Critical Discussion of the Weekly Reports' in The 
Journal of Industrial Relations, June 1980, p.225.
54 B Hindess quoted, loc.cit.
55 R Hyman quoted, loc.cit.
56 Ibid., p.227.
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Although the usual source for data on industrial disputes is ABS, some analysts 
(including Niland, whose criticisms have been noted earlier), have used the Weekly 
Reports for various reasons. "In evaluating the relative merits of arbitration and 
bargaining" Niland maintains that "the nature of strikes typical of each process is of 
greater relevance than the level of time lost through them".57 To this end, Niland is 
critical of the data published by ABS because it does not permit a very precise 
analysis of causes and other characteristics of strikes. Using the Weekly Reports as 
an alternative source, Niland's study of the first six-month periods of 1975 and 
1976 provides a detailed breakdown of cited causes and the various negotiation 
procedures followed. The Weekly Reports permitted a close analysis of the 
relationship between certain types of strikes in regard to their cause and duration, 
and the characteristic form of negotiation that was likely to take place. Niland's data 
includes Black bans but not other types of bans where normal work was carried out. 
His study also includes stoppages taken to consider further action.
The Weekly Report provided the data for Hay's article on the prevalence of political 
strikes. Comparisons were made for the periods January-June 1975 and March- 
August 1976 of the incidence and causes of industrial disputes. Hay followed Niland's 
procedure in Collective Bargaining and Compulsory Arbitration by including Black 
bans. Unlike Niland, Hay did not include stoppages taken to consider further action, 
hear reports on negotiations or attend quarterly meetings. Brief stoppages were only 
included in Hay's study if they were an end in themeselves; that is, they were 
actually in protest at something.58 Hay shares with Niland some reservations about 
the use of the Weekly Reports. First, there is the subjective nature of the allocation 
of disputes to various categories. "Certainly, no two researchers", says Niland,
”....would produce identical tables. Indeed, a single researcher, repeating his effort
would not necessarily produce identical tables" 59 Second, there is the reliability of 
the Weekly Reports which are acknowledged by the DEIR itself to be incomplete. 
Notwithstanding these inadequacies, Hay upholds the basic reliability of the total 
picture obtained from his and Niland's researches. Hay mistakenly concludes that the 
figures of the Bureau are more inclusive than his or Niland's because they also 
include overtime bans and go-slows.89 This is not the case. Bans are entirely 
disregarded by ABS unless a stoppage also occurs: "The statistics relate only to
57 J Niland, Collective Bargaining and Compulsory Arbitration in Australia, Kensington, 
1978, p.45
58 P R. Hay, op.cit., fn.10, p.29.
59 Niland, quoted by Hay, loc.cit.
80 Loc.cit.
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disputes involving stoppages of work of ten working days or more at the 
establishments where the stoppages occurred.61
Two chapters in Industrial Action, edited by Stephen Frenkel, contain research based 
on the Weekly Reports62 These industry based studies also consider bans as a factor 
in industrial disputation although no detailed statistical analysis is undertaken.
While the Report is compiled to a formula, a number of inconsistencies occur in the 
documentation. I mentioned earlier, the possibility that when a large number of 
disputes occur, only one report may be included to cover the lot. The disputes may be 
for example industry based, and described as one dispute involving various workers 
and employers. On other occasions, co-ordinated widespread disputation may be 
reported on an individual basis. This creates some difficulties in accurately 
assessing levels of disputation. ABS acknowledge that this is also a problem for them 
in calculating working days lost. When follow-up procedures are unproductive, 
guess-work is the final resort.
It is in the area of causes that the main problems arise. Bias in recording and 
analysing industrial disputation is unavoidable. The subjective nature of these 
activities make it very difficult to arrive at totally objective findings.
1.3.1.  Labour law
The development of labour law in the US and UK has not been without influence in the 
development of labour law in Australia. Some analysts of the American system look 
to the legislative history as a basis for discussion. Quaglieri believes that the 
significant force in the shaping of the labour movement in the US has been the 
direction of the courts, legislative bodies and the National Labor Relations Board.63
According to Wilson, the vast array of law governing industrial relations in the US 
has not worked consistently to the advantage of either unions or employers, although 
as he points out, the earliest National Labor Relations Acts in the 1930s were clearly 
designed to help unions, for example, the Wagner Act. Given their parallel to some of
61 ABS, Explanatory Notes. I verified this with an officer at the Bureau who confirmed 
that bans are never included in any statistics.
62 V G Taylor, 'Sectionalism, Solidarity and Action in Shipbuilding and Repair, and S J 
Frenkel and A. Coolican, 'Competition, Instability and Industrial Struggle in the New South 
Wales Construction Industry', in S J Frenkel (Ed.) Industrial Action: Pattens of Labour 
Conflict, Sydney, 1980.
63 Quaglieri, op.cit.,, p.12.
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the developments in Australian law (for example section 45D of the Trade Practices 
Act), it is worth noting briefly some of the later amendments to the National Labor 
Relations Act which were clearly designed to weaken the unions. The Taft-Hartley 
Act 1947 extended the concept of an unfair labour practice to the unions. Features of 
the Act were prohibition of secondary boycotts, an 80-day cooling-off period, 
restriction on picketing and unionising supervisory staff, and section 14(b) which 
provided for the states to adopt legislation prohibiting the closed shop.64
By 1979, 19 states had availed themselves of section 14(b), all in the South rural 
midwest with some industries moving South to escape union shops common in the 
North. Section 14(b) is regarded as an important restraint on the development and 
position of unions in the US. Attempts to repeal it have been unsuccessful even with a 
clear Democratic majority in Congress. The Landrum-Griffin Act 1959 further 
weakend the positions of unions.65
The State has an historical involvement in industrial matters in the UK where 
industrial relations has been to some extent controlled by statute since the fourteenth 
century. The Ordinance of Labourers 1349 directed against combinations of workers 
to raise or alter wages in a system where wages were fixed by justices of the peace. 
This was continued by the Statute of Labourers 1351 and consummated by the Statute 
of Artifices 1562. These laws which set maximum, but not minimum rates of pay, 
remained in force until the eighteenth century. In the meantime further statutes 
were enacted which reinforced prohibitions on strike action and all associations 
directed to altering working conditions. Thus, the existence of trade unions was 
rendered legally impossible while it appears, that there was no general prohibition 
of employer combinations until the Combination Acts 1799 and 1800. It was under 
the latter of these two statutes that prosecutions became frequent. The Combination 
Acts were repealed in 1824 and 1825 by Acts66 which removed from the purview of 
the criminal law all combinations to alter wages, hours, quantity or conditions of 
work or to induce persons to depart from work or to refuse to enter into work.67
64 G K Wilson, Unions in American National Politics, New York, 1979, p.96.
65 For a description of laws regulating collective bargaining for public employees in the 
United States see B Miller & W Canak, The Passage of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
Laws: Unions, Business and Political Competition in the American States', in Political Power 
and Social Theory, Vol.7, 1988, pp.249-292; and A A Peterson, 'Deterring Strikes by 
Public Employees: New York's Two-for-one Salary Penalty and the 1979 Prison Guard 
Strike', in Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 34, July 1981, pp.545-562. For 
implications of law specifying strikes as legal under defined circumstances, see H J 
McCammon, 'Legal Limits on Labor Militancy: U.S. Labor Law and the Right to Strike since 
the New Deal', in Social Problems, 37, May 1990, pp.206-229.
66 5 Geo IV 1824 and 6 Geo IV 1825.
67 E I Sykes, Strike Law in Australia, Second Ed., Sydney, 1982, p.105.
Following a Royal Commission in 1874 which considered the whole doctrine of 
criminal conspiracy, the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 was 
passed. Its introduction along with the Trade Disputes Act 1906 paved the way for 
collective bargaining, and to a recognition by governments of all political 
complexions of the role of the trade unions as an "estate of the realm".68
Legal support for collective bargaining continued up to the election of the Thatcher 
Government in 1979 following which, there has been an erosion of the power and 
influence of trade unions. While there have been a number of reasons for this, 
Creighton and Stewart note that it can be attributed to economic factors; deliberate 
government policy of by-passing unions; and to a series of major legislative changes, 
the most significant being:69
• the severe curtailment of statutory wage-fixation;70
• the removal of a substantial part of the protection provided by "truck" 
legislation;71
• the erosion of many of the standards embodied in the so-called "floor of 
rights" legislation;72
• the narrowing of statutory protection against legal liability for industrial 
action;73
• greatly increased legal regulation of the internal affairs of trade unions;74
• legislative erosion of union security arrangements, notably the "closed 
shop”;75 and
68 Creighton & Stewart, Labour Law An Introduction., Sydney, 1990, p.19. For discussion 
of organizational perspectives and theory on trade unions and governments in the U.K. see J 
Hartley, 'Leadership and Decision Making in a Strike Organization', in International Social 
Movement Research, 2, 1989, pp.241-265.
69 Ibid., p.21.
70 See Employment Act 1980 and Wages Act 1986.
71 See Wages Act 1986.
72 See for example Unfair Dismissal (Variation of qualifying Period) Order 1985\
73 See Employment Act 1980; Employment Act 1982; Trade Union Act 1984.
74 See Trade Union Act 1984\ Employment Act 1988.
75 See Employment Act 1988.
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• minimalist legislation to honour European Economic Community 
obligations.76
As will be seen later in the discussion on the New Right and case studies, many of 
these innovations have provided the inspiration and models for conservative thinking 
in Australia. This has been overtly the case. The Thatcher Government's handling of 
the miners' strike in 1984-1985 and the Wapping dispute in 1985-1986 have 
been lauded by prominent actors in the industrial relations arena. Legislation passed 
in Queensland during the SEQEB dispute was acknowledged to be the inspiration of the 
British line.
English common law and statutory law accompanied European settlement of Australia. 
Early attempts at combination in Australia were potentially subject to the same 
range of common law and statutory liabilities as their British counterparts.77
The colonial Master & Servants Acts were passed in 1747, 1765, 1823 and 1828.78 
These were Acts for the better regulation of servants, labourers and work people and 
it would seem that the earliest ones were passed without displacing British 
legislation.79 In a desire to keep in touch with developments in Britain, colonial 
legislatures adopted their own version of the British Trade Union Act 1871 and the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875. The result was that at the time of 
federation, Australian unions were in very much the same legal position as their 
counterparts in the United kingdom.
There are two aspects of the law which are central to this thesis.
1 . 3 . 2 .  Att i tudes
The first aspect and in some ways the most important, is about the attitudes held by 
actors in the industrial relations community towards law in the context of industrial 
disputation.
The sheer volume of material on attitudes towards conflict precludes anything but the 
most cursory exposition of the subject here. Some of the attitudes have already been 
canvassed in the earlier section on theories of collective bargaining.80 What follows
76 See for example Transfer of Undertaking (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981; 
Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983; Sex Discrimination Act 1986.
77 Creighton & Stewart, op.cit., p.22.
78 20 Geo. 11 c19 1974; 6 Geo. Ill c25 1765; 4 Geo. IV c34 1823; 9 Geo. IV  9, 1828.
79 A Merritt, 'The Historical Role of Law in the Regulation of Employment', in Australian 
Journal of Law and Society, Vol.1, No.1, 1982.
80 See, for example, earlier discussion on unitary and pluralistic approaches.
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is not so much a review of the literature as an overview of some of the attitudes that 
exist, bearing in mind that all are but subtle variations of two principal themes - 
that is, industrial conflict is either a 'bad thing' or it is 'not a bad thing'.81 This is 
distinct from the civil libertarian notion that the freedom to strike is a good thing. It 
should be noted also that within these schema lie varying propositions on the nature 
of the relationship between employers and employees as to whether it is intrinsically 
and inherently one of conflict. Of course not all theorists and commentators place a 
value on industrial conflict, (although I would argue that even the most deliberately 
objective observations are rarely value-free).
Views supporting the first category that industrial conflict is a 'bad thing' are 
supported from a number of perspectives. A good starting point is the statement 
made by H B Higgins in A New Province for Law and Order in 1915:
...the process of conciliation, with arbitration in the background, is 
substituted for the rude and barbarous processes of strike and lockout. 
Reason is to displace force; the might of the State is to enforce peace 
between industrial combatants as well as between other combatants; and all 
in the interest of the public.g2
It is apparent, as Dabscheck and Niland observe, that, Higgins' refusal in his role as 
President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to arbitrate in 
the face of strike action, meant that he saw a direct connection between enforcement 
of the arbitration system and the prohibition of strikes and lockouts.83 This 
historical view of the role of a conciliation and arbitration system is still prevalent 
today. As some of the case studies will show, an employer's commitment to the 
system may reside in the capacity of the system to forestall or control conflict.
Industrial conflict is also regarded by many employers as a bad thing because it is 
perceived to be an attack on managerial prerogative. N W Chamberlain, writing in 
1948 said:
The determination of the appropriate subjects for collective bargaining, and 
the definition of the spheres of company policy-formation which are of sole 
concern to management is one of the burning problems of industrial 
relations.g4
81 I readily acknowledge that there are some, who for mainly ideological reasons argue 
that industrial conflict is a 'good thing’, and that view is different to the attitude that while 
industrial conflict is 'not a bad thing', it is not a 'good thing' either. Generally, I believe 
that attitudes fall within the scope of the two mentioned above.
82 29 H.L.R., 1915, 13 at 14.
83 Dabscheck and Niland, cited by Creighton, et al, op.cit., p.469.
8^ N W  Chamberlain, The Union Challenge to Management Control, New York, 1948, p.2.
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These words remain relevant today and transgress national boundaries and systems. 
In Australia, issues of managerial prerogative have been generally regarded in law as 
being outside the ambit of "industrial matters" as defined in federal and state laws. 
This position has been eroded in recent years somewhat, most notably by the decision 
in Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors' Association Ltd.85 The High Court's 
refusal to accept the Association's argument that "managerial decisions stand wholly 
outside the area of industrial disputes"86 specifically rejected a dictum to that effect 
by Barwick C J in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex 
parte Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board87 The Court's view on the 
danger of the arbitration tribunals' power "being extended to the regulation and 
control of business and industries in every part", merits close attention:
That statement probably echoes in some respects what was received 
doctrine at an earlier time - that it was the prerogative of management to 
decide how a business enterprise should operate and whom it should 
employ, without the workforce having any stake in the making of such 
decisions. In that climate of opinion, disputes about the making of such 
decisions, despite their impact on working conditions and work to be done, 
might not necessarily be regarded as industrial matters susceptible of 
resolution by industrial arbitration. Over the years that climate of opinion 
has changed quite radically....No doubt our traditional system of industrial 
conciliation and arbitration has itself contributed to a growing recognition 
that management and labour have a mutual interest in many aspects of the 
operation of a business enterprise. Many management decisions once 
viewed as the sole prerogative of management, are now correctly seen as 
directly affecting the relationship of employer and employee and 
constituting an "industrial matter".gg
It is difficult to estimate the impact that the changes referred to by the High Court 
have had to the nature of industrial disputation. Certainly, issues which would not 
previously have been considered "industrial matters" are now considered by 
industrial tribunals. But, my research indicates that generally, Managerial Policy 
has been a consistent cause of industrial disputation since the mid-1970s. In this 
respect, the High Court's decision may only have legitimised an entrenched issue and 
paved the way for it to be conciliated and arbitrated upon. The decision, I believe, has 
had greater impact on the philosophies and practices of employers, with different 
reactions producing different results. For example, some have initiated industrial
85 (1987) 72 ALR 161; 61 ALJR 401.
86 (1987) 72 ALR 161 at 170; 61 ALJR 401 at 406.
87 (1966) 115 CLR 443 at 451-2.
88 (1987) 72 ALR 161 at 169; 61 ALJR 401 at 405. For further discussion on the 
significance of Cram see, A Stewart, 'Federal Jurisdiction over Industrial Matters; The 
Demise of Managerial Prerogative', in Australian Journal of Labour Law, Vol.1, No.1., 
1988; and B Creighton and A Stewart, Labour Law An Introduction, Sydney, 1990, pp.82- 
83.
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democracy programs with consultative mechanisms between themselves and unions; 
others have devolved responsibilities and created more flexible workplaces; and 
many employers have invested greater financial and human resources into examining 
better management practices. These would all be regarded as positive developments 
in avoiding industrial conflict. It would be too simplistic to attribute all these 
changes to the Cram decision, however, the decision as a factor in the changing 
industrial climate cannot be ignored. One last employer reaction that needs 
mentioning is that of, a hardening of views against the system, and thus, against 
unions and militant union members. Managerial prerogative provided the basis for 
many of the exponents of New Right philosophy.
As will be discussed later in the thesis, another view of industrial conflict as a 'bad 
thing' derives from the notion that unions have too much power, and industrial action 
is a weapon used unfairly against employers to gain demands. Another view, and one 
that is supported by the law, is that industrial action in some forms, namely strikes, 
secondary boycotts and in some cases, picketing are illegal. The 1989 Brooking 
judgement in the pilots' dispute reaffirmed this legal fact.
Mitchell and Rosewarne argue that recent political responses to trade unionism 
reflect a changed economic and social environment - one that has revived an ideology 
which challenges the compatability of strong trade unionism and the free-enterprise 
economy. They cite the Liberal-National Country Party's industrial relations policy 
of 1975 which was premised upon the assumption that there are no irreconcilable 
conflicts between capital and labour at the place of work. The policy defined the 
processes of industrial relations as possible within the framework of a partnership 
between employers and employees.89
Views supporting the latter category (that industrial conflict is 'not a bad thing') 
generally see a strike, or the threat of a strike as part of the bargaining process. For 
example, collective bargaining "is a process of reaching agreement, and strikes are 
an integral and frequently necessary part of that process".90 Waters, in his 
analysis of strikes in Australia approached the subject from the stance that strikes 
are viewed as located in the structure. His analysis, which he unashamedly remarked 
was one-eyed, avoided "personality, anarchy, immediacy, intention, uniqueness, 
meaning and blame".91 In describing the social and political environment in which
89 R Mitchell & S Rosewarne, 'Individual Rights and the Law in Australian Industrial 
Relations', in K Cole (Ed.), Power Conflict and Control in Australian Trade Unions,
Ringwood, 1982, p.207.
90 Labour Relations and the Law, Mathews (Ed.), quoted by E I Sykes, op.cit., p.5.
91 Waters, op.cit., p.xii.
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industrial conflict occurs, Waters further asserted that "there is a relatively high 
commitment among the Australian population to engaging in industrial action".92
Underpinning these views is the notion that industrial conflict is an inevitability. 
Creighton makes two basic assumptions:
( i ) that conflict between the forces of capital and labour is an inevitable 
incident of the capitalist mode of production; and
( i i ) that conflict has the potential seriously to impair the efficient 
functioning of the system and perhaps even to destroy it.
He maintains therefore that the real objective of devising mechanisms for the 
regulation and institutionalisation of conflict "is to try to confine the outward and 
visible signs of the underlying conflict, such as strikes, work-to-rules, picketing 
and go-slows to 'acceptable' levels and to minimise the disruptive effects of such 
activity as and when it does arise".93
Mitchell and Rosewarne's approach to the Liberal-National Party Government's 
Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Bill 1977, is worth noting. They conclude 
that there cannot be an eventual harmonisation between capital and labour within the 
social relations of capitalist production. One of their criticisms of the Bill was that, 
"if the government's {sic) policy is to reduce the level of industrial conflict, it is 
inconsistent with this objective to introduce provisions protecting individual rights 
when it is obvious that those provisions will themselves generate  industrial 
conflict".94
Returning to Cram momentarily, Stewart remarks that "if there is a bombshell in 
Cram, this is it” :
We should also express a caveat at the suggestion made in argument that a 
dispute between an employer and employee about a matter which lies 
outside the concept of "industrial matters" as defined can never develop 
into an industrial dispute. If such a dispute escalates to a point that there is 
a threatened, impending or probable dispute involving a withdrawal of
92 Ibid., p.2. For attitudes towards direct action and conflict see A Carter, Direct Action 
and Liberal Democracy, London, 1973; T Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence, 
Oxford, 1976; J G Murphy (Ed), Civil Disobedience and Violence, Belmont, 1971; H L 
Nieburg, Political Violence, New York, 1969; I Turner, In Union is strength, (Revised Ed.) 
Melbourne, 1983; and P. Hain, Political Strikes, Middlesex, 1986.
93 B Creighton, ’Law and the Control of Industrial Conflict', in K Cole (Ed.), Power, Conflict 
and Control in Australian Trade Unions, Ringwood, 1982, p.121.
94 R Mitchell & R Rosewarne, op.cit., p.208.
labour it is possible that a dispute about an industrial matter may come into 
existence, notwithstanding its origins.95
Stewart ponders what can be made of this. Is it merely a reiteration of the dynamic 
nature of the subject matter of industrial relations, or, in its widest interpretation, 
is any matter capable of being "industrial" so long as it excites a strike?96
1 . 3 . 3 .  Application
The second aspect is the way in which law is used, by whom, and to what purposes. As 
the earlier sections in this chapter indicate, the systemic and institutional features 
of industrial relations in Australia are critical factors in academic analysis. 
Australia has a history of regulation and arbitration dating back to the nineteenth 
century. Other factors are also important, notably the evolvement of labour law 
from the UK, both statutory (dating from the Ordinance of Labourers 1394) and the 
common law tradition; and developments in labour law in the US. Nevertheless, 
while the more recent laws (that is, twentieth century) of the UK and US may well 
have provided the inspiration or model for laws that have been enacted in Australia, 
it is the practice of law within the context of the Australian system that is the focus 
of attention here.
My initial approach to this subject was to examine some of the historical information 
on industrial disputes with particular reference to disputes where the law had been a 
critical factor. I was particularly interested in cases where picketing had 
specifically been mentioned as an offence.97 I looked also at disputes where 
prosecutions had taken place for intimidation under the Commonwealth and State 
Criminal Law codes. For picketing and arrests, see D Coward on the Great Strike of 
1 91 7 ;98 T Cutler on the Townsville Meatworkers Strike 1918-1919;99 M Dixon 
on the Northern NSW Miners' Lockout 1929-30;100 M Cribb on the Queensland 
Railway Strike 1949;101 G Sheldon on the Mt Isa Mines Dispute 1964-1965;102 T
95 (1987) 72 ALR 161 at 171; 61 ALJR 401 at 406.
96 A Stewart, op.cit., p.74.
97 Examples of cases in Australia where picketing is specifically mentioned include Lyons v 
William (1896) 1 CH.811 at 834; Ward, Lock & Co. v Operative Printers (1906); City of 
Melbourne v Barry (1922) 31 CLR at 196, 206-7; Ex parte Farrell, re Fongold (1936) 36 
SR (NSW), 386 and (1937) ALR 91; Re Van der Lubbe (1949) NSW 309; ans Williams and 
Anor v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30.
98 D Coward, 'Crime and Punishment' in J Iremonger, J Merritt & G Osborne, Strikes, 
Sydney, 1973, p.57, 62 77. See also Police Department Annual Report, NSW, Vol.3, 
pp.669-770.
99 T Cutler, 'Sunday, Bloody Sunday', Ibid., pp.91, 93-96.
100 M Dixon, 'Stubborn Resistance', Ibid., pp.133-135,140.
101 M Cribb, 'State of Emergency’, Ibid., pp.225, 245.
1 G Sheldon, Industrial Siege, Melbourne, 1963, p.96.
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Sheridan on the Steel Strike 1945;103 and P Deery on the Coal Strike 1949;104 On 
dismissal and reinstatement, see G Osborne on the Broken Hill dispute 1908- 
1 909;105 J Templeton on the Melbourne Police Strike 1923;106 J Hagan on the 
Sydney Newspaper Strike and Lockout 1944;107 T Sheridan on the Victorian Metal 
Trades Dispute 1946-1947 and the Steel Strike 1945;108 R Clarke on the EZ 
Industries Rosebery Mine dispute 1983;109 and G Sheldon on the Mount Isa Mines 
Dispute.110 These and other histories provided a background to, not only industrial 
conflict and the law, but also the evolvement of industrial relations. They provided 
some insight into how disputes are dramatically affected by the political and economic 
climate which prevails at a given time.
In respect of the application of law during the period of my research, my main legal 
references were Creighton, Sykes, Stewart, and Sykes and Yerbury.111 As the legal 
situation in relation to industrial disputes was subject to so much change over this 
period, additional sources were also necessary. In addition, legal theorists and 
commentators on law were used.* 112 Trade union and ACTU publications were 
consulted along with published and unpublished material from employer 
organisations. Commentaries from the The Australian Industrial Law Review and the 
various statutes were consulted, particularly in the cases of those disputes which 
occurred during the time when the thesis was being written. When Justice Brooking 
delivered his ruling in the Victorian Supreme Court in the pilots' dispute I obtained 
the full judgement. In addition a number of articles were used, however, one of the 
problems I encountered was that with such recent disputes there was a scarcity of 
literature on the subjects in question. There is in any case only a limited amount of 
research undertaken in Australia on industrial conflict. R Mitchell's survey of
103 T Sheridan, Mindful Militants, Melbourne, 1975, p.89.
104 P Deery (Ed), Labour in Conflict, Sydney, 1978, pp.14-16, 51-54, 58.
103 G Osborne, 'Town and Company', Iremonger, et al, op.cit., pp.34,39-43, 47.
106 J Templeton, 'Rebel Guardian’, Iremonger, et al, op.cit., p.126.
107 J Hagan, 'Craft Power’, Iremonger, et al, op.cit., pp. 169-70.
108 T Sheridan, 'Labour v, Labor', Iremonger et al, op.cit., pp. 199-200, 202. and The 
1945 Steel Strike'. Iremonger et al, op.cit., pp.104-105.
109 R Clarke, The Picket, Chippendale, 1984.
110 G Sheldon, op.cit., pp.48-50.
111 Creighton, op.cit., (1982); Creighton, et al, op.cit., (1983), Creighton & Steward, 
op.cit., (1990), Sykes, op.cit., (1982); Sykes & Yerbury, Labour Law in Australia, Vol. 1., 
Individual Aspects, Sydney, 1980.
11  ^ For example P Kahn, N Lewis, R Livock & P Wiles, Picketing: Industrial Disputes, 
Tactics and the Law, Melbourne, 1983; Lord Wedderburn, R Lewis & J Clark, Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations: Building on Kahn-Freund, Oxford, 1983; M Sexton & L W Maher, 
The Legal Mystique, Sydney, 1982; and A Merritt, 'The Historical Role of Law in the
Regulation of Employment', in Australian Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 1, No.1., 1982.
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labour law research revealed that for the survey period 1975-1985, only 5.4 per 
cent of articles in industrial relations journals were concerned with industrial 
conflict. Articles on structures and systems predominated accounting for 71.3 per 
cent.113 For this reason, personal interviews, newspapers and to some extent the 
electronic media were principal sources for researching the case studies. The same 
was true for discussion of the New Right which, although having an ideological 
presence prior to the Accord period, did not become a force until the mid 1980s.
113 R Mitchell, 'Labour Law Research in Australia: A Review of the Literature 1975- 
1985’, in Labour & Industry, Vol.1, No.1, October 1987, p.102.
40
Chapter Two
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Given the number of analytical frameworks that exist for the analysis of industrial 
relations, and just a few of these were covered in the previous chapter, a further 
model for analysis might appear superfluous.
It appears that most theorists approach conflict from within parameters set by 
frameworks that have been constructed for the anlaysis of either industrial relations 
in general or industrial relations systems in particular. Although these have great 
value they ultimately lack specificity in some key areas which are characteristic of 
conflict situations. The framework I have developed seeks to incorporate those 
aspects from other models which are intrinsic to all studies in industrial relations, 
while also providing a structure for examining industrial conflict. Set out below are 
five key components.
Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Industrial Disputes
( 1 ) Background
( 2 ) The climate
political
industrial
( 3 ) The legal environment
industrial relations law
other law, ie civil, criminal and common law
( 4 ) Proximate parties
employers 
unions 
rank and file
( 5 ) Contingent parties
Executive Government
industrial tribunals
peak union and employer bodies
( 6 ) Dispute resolution
by determination or decision 
by capitulation 
by agreement
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2.1.1.  Background
This first element in the framework is orientated towards the analysis of individual 
disputes although it is adaptable for general analysis. Every dispute, particularly 
major disputes, will have a history. Conflict does not erupt out of a vacuum. Even in 
instances which appear to be spontaneous, there will be a history; maybe of only five 
minutes, but there is always a catalyst to direct action.
It may be that there has been a period of frustration on the part of one or both 
parties. This frustration can take many forms. For example:
• a long-standing inability to resolve differences through regular dispute 
settling procedures within the workplace;
• a sense of 'always losing' at the hands of the industrial tribunals;
• prolonged disagreement over particular issues upon which the parties have 
unalterable views; or
• an inability on the part of either party to understand or accommodate 
opposing views.
Needless to say, the background to a dispute will be a critical factor in its conduct and 
ultimate resolution. In instances where, for example, there is a high degree of 
personal animosity between the protagonists, the road to dispute resolution may be 
hindered by factors which have more to do with their relationship than with the issue 
under dispute. Alternatively, where there is a relationship which is based on mutual 
respect and an ability to see the other side, the road to agreement may be shorter and 
less encumbered by hostility and other extraneous factors. Hence it is not merely the 
fact of the dialogue that is important, but its quality.
Another historical feature of industrial disputation which belies analysis on systemic 
or statistical grounds is the 'straw that broke the camel's back' syndrome. This will 
most often occur following a period of frustration over one or a number of issues, 
when a dispute occurs over an issue which otherwise would not necessarily have 
provoked conflict. To all intents and purposes though, the reported issue is the one 
which will be listed as the cause in the Weekly Report. That is not to say that the 
other issues which precipitated the conflict will not arise in a log of claims and 
provide the focus for negotiation. Disputes which occur for this reason can begin in a 
variety of ways. Some examples are:
the rank and file or union leaders may call a precipitous strike over an issue
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(usually working conditions) which has arisen in the workplace and is outside 
the immediate capacity of the employer to accommodate;
• the employer following a period of unsuccessful negotiations with the 
union(s) over, for example, work practices will impose a new working 
condition which he/she knows will be unacceptable to the union and initiate a 
dispute, thereby bringing the issue to the industrial tribunal for conciliation 
and possible determination.
Disputes of this nature are characterised by long periods of discontent on the side of 
at least one of the parties. The catalyst issue may be quite minor and even 
deliberately mischevious.
Another historical factor which figures in some major disputes, is when there is a 
history of success; an historical imbalance in bargaining power. This situation 
emerged during the pilots’ dispute and the SEQEB dispute. Both unions involved had a 
long history of winning disputes which had created the expectation of continuing to 
win, especially by using the same tactics. It is particularly important to identify 
when this has been the case because it is likely to seriously affect the conduct of the 
dispute, for two reasons:
( i ) the party with the winning history may not recognise signs which
indicate that their demands will not be met and negotiations should be entered 
into at a different level; for example, striking workers may miss the point at 
which they should return to work with minimal damage to themselves; and
( i i ) the party with the losing history, may be more determined and recalcitrant in 
pursuing their ends and refuse to compromise or enter into genuine 
negotiations.
There are also disputes, where, although direct action has been taken, there is a 
history of successful conciliation and arbitration within the industrial relations 
system and few, if any of the above-mentioned characteristics are evident.
Whatever the situation, and I have mentioned only a few, traditional methods of 
industrial relations analysis frequently ignore the relevance of the background to 
disputation. As the discussion and case studies later in this thesis will reveal, the 
key to understanding any of these disputes lies in an understanding of their 
background.
Although this element has an individual orientation, the provision of general
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background material on any period is of course, useful. Industrial disputation in a 
particular state or industry, for example, may have a history that explains a surge 
of activity. There are periods when unions or employers appear more successful in 
obtaining their demands than others. There are also events which explain widespread 
industrial action, an example of which would be the resurgence of strike activity 
associated with the de facto removal of the penal provisions in the arbitration system 
in 1969.1
2.1.2.  The climate
Industrial conflict has many shades. Industry sectors may behave quite differently 
according to external political and economic factors. The mining industry unions for 
example may believe that their position is quite strong due to Australia's balance of 
payments situation. Consequently, there may be a confidence in pressing demands 
which is lacking in other industry sectors at that time. All conflict occurs within 
prevailing political and industrial climates.
The political climate includes the full spectrum of social life, including the economic. 
For the purpose of analysing industrial conflict it will be characterised by a number 
of factors, including:
• the political colour of the government in power, both federal and state:
• the government's relationships with the peak trade union and employer 
bodies;
• the government's ideology and policy on industrial relations, and in particular 
industrial conflict;
• economic variables such as unemployment and inflation;
• community attitudes towards, and tolerance of, industrial conflict; and
• the social welfare apparatus.
All these factors will vary from one period of time to another and will affect, not only 
the attitudes of the parties in dispute, but also the decisions that they make, the type 
of actions they will undertake, and the way they will respond to actions made by other 
parties in the dispute.
The research period covered in this thesis extends from the Whitlam Labor
1 Plowman et al, op.cit, p.50.
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Government in 1973 to the Hawke Labor Government in 1979; and, between 1975 
and early 1983, the Fraser Liberal/National Party Government. All three 
governments had quite different political complexions, notwithstanding that the 
Whitlam and Hawke Governments were both Labor. Whitlam's Government was 
reformist, Fraser's conservative and Hawke's consensual. Prices and incomes 
policies changed dramatically over the period for ideological and economic reasons. 
The government's relationships with the peak trade union and employer bodies were 
all different, with the Accord reached between the Labor Party and the ACTU in 1983 
providing one of the pivotal points of departure. The industrial relations policies of 
all three governments have been different and, in the case of the Fraser Government, 
diametrically opposed to those of Whitlam and Hawke. Unemployment and inflation 
have 'waxed and waned' over the period and have been responded to in different ways 
by government, unions and employers. Policies on tariffs and trade have changed, 
resulting in sectoral change.
Community attitudes are perhaps the most difficult to assess, particularly as very 
little in the way of longtitudinal research exists.2 During the course of individual 
disputes, surveys are often conducted to gauge reactions from the community, but 
these serve little analytical purpose, especially in the wider context. This is an area 
which calls for greater methodological research and analysis.
The ingredients that go to making up the political climate are too numerous to relate, 
and they change from period to period in their relative importance. In the discussion 
and case studies, the emergence of the New Right and its philosophy will be discussed 
within this context.
The industrial climate. Factors which characterise the industrial relations climate 
are:
the industrial relations policies of executive government; some factors which 
figure in the current political climate are:
industry reform and restructuring;
the national training reform agenda;
the structural efficiency principle and productivity bargaining;
2 I note that there were a number of questions asked in the National Social Science Surveys 
on attitudes to trade unions, trade union membership and a variety of related subjects. As 
far as I am aware this data has not been published as yet.
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enterprise bargaining; and 
industry-based unionism.
The drive by the present Government to make Australia a more efficient and 
competitive player in international markets has wrought many changes in the 
workplace. Industry reform and rationalisation have been supported across the 
industrial spectrum, but not without cost. As the data indicates, Industrial conflict 
over the above issues has been largely concerned with job security, retrenchment 
packages and redundancy pay. During this period restrictive work practices have 
provided a focus for workplace reform. Another Government in another period would 
undoubtedly be characterised differently. Such differences may include;
• the relationship between executive government and peak union and employer 
bodies, particularly in respect of:
their commitment to the industrial relations system;
prices and incomes policies; and
political and ideological differences.
The agreement between the Hawke Government and the ACTU (representing other 
peak labour bodies such as Trades and Labour Councils) to the Accord embodies their 
commitment to the industrial relations system. The ACTU is viewed in many quarters 
as a policy-making arm of Government; though some allege the reverse! Thus far, 
most peak employer bodies have tacitly supported the Accord and maintained their 
commitment to the industrial relations system. Given this tacit support of an 
incomes policy which acts as a restraint on wages, the employer bodies have a vested 
interest in maintaining their commitment. Historically, however, the relationship 
between these organisations has been at times fragile. The nexus between a Labor 
Government and the ACTU may be contrasted with that between a Liberal/National 
Party Government and the Confederation of Australian Industry. At other times, 
political and ideological differences have created confrontation between the parties 
which have tested the forebearance of industrial tribunals.
• the relationship between the peak trade union and employer bodies and their 
constituents, especially:
within the constraints imposed under corporatist models;
where interests and loyalties diverge; and
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where political interests and affiliations come into conflict.
The success of the Accord rests on the ability of the ACTU to control its constituent 
unions, and, on the ability of those unions to satisfy their rank and file that their 
interests are being protected. Peak employer bodies are faced with a similar 
problem in that not all employers are convinced that the industrial relations system 
best serves their interests. This is evidenced by support, particularly from small 
business, for the Opposition Liberal/National Party's policies which are geared 
towards deregulation. The peak trade union and employer bodies must maintain the 
confidence of their constituents at a time when political interests and affiliations are 
sometimes confused. (There was a joke going around for a while that Hawke was the 
best conservative prime minister there has been.)
• the pattern of industrial disputation in the workforce.
This will encompass a number of areas. The major causes of disputation will reflect 
to a large extent the principal concerns in the workplace; the level of disputation 
will provide an indication of the degree of conflict that exists in overt expressions of 
direct action; and the forms of disputation will show if there are any trends towards a 
favoured type of collective action in the workplace at a given time. These will vary 
from state to state and from industry to industry so that Australia wide trends may be 
distinguished from more discrete trends. Trends identified in data analysis will also 
provide some indication of the attitudes of the proximate parties to the political 
agenda. For example, an increase in job security issues as a proportion of industrial 
conflict may be viewed not only as a concern over job losses, but also as an industrial 
response to microeconomic reform.
Other factors which feature as part of the industrial relations climate include the 
industrial relations system; labour law; the influence of ideological forces from 
within and outside the industrial relations arena, (for example, the New Right); and 
the industrial relations policies of opposition parties (alternative governments).
2 .1 .3 .  The legal environment
Analysis of the legal environment will reflect attitudes to law, its application and its 
role in the political and industrial climate. These will be determinants of how labour 
law will be used in a given area of dispute analysis and provide contrasts with its use 
in other periods.
Industrial relations law consists of the body of law that exists for the specific
purpose of regulating labour, including the various federal and state Industrial 
Relations Acts for the conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes, essential 
services legislation and other acts which are specific to employment conditions.
Other law consists of any law whether civil, criminal or common law which has 
provisions which may be used in the industrial relations arena, for example, section 
45D of the Trade Practices Act 1977 which sets out restrictions on secondary 
boycotts; and provisions within the various federal and state Crimes Acts.
2 .1 .4 .  Proximate parties
In their modified version of the Kochan et al model, Niland and Spooner have devised a 
framework which allocates the players in industrial relations into the activities of 
four tiers.3 Their analysis was concerned with pressures for reform toward 
greater flexibility in Australia's industrial relations. The top tier consisted of peak 
employer and union bodies, government and central government authorities; the 
upper middle tier consisted of corporate and union leadership; the lower middle tier 
consisted of management and union officials; and the bottom tier concerned the 
workplace and its relationships.4
Niland and Spooner's model provides a realistic framework for analysing the actors 
in the industrial relations arena which is cognisant of the system and other factors. 
For my purposes, I have further adapted the model for analysing industrial conflict 
into two sets of parties.
As the instigators of industrial conflict, it will be the proximate parties who 
determine what the causes are and why they cannot be resolved without conflict. The 
proximate parties are those for whom industrial conflict has the most direct 
meaning. They are the parties who have initial involvement in industrial conflict and 
will bear the benefits or otherwise of the dispute's denouement:
• the employers;
• the unions as corporate bodies; and
• the rank and file.
2 .1 .5 .  The contingent parties
The contingent parties are those who have a secondary interest and who may or may
3 J Niland and K Spooner, 'Australia', in J Niland and O Clarke, Agenda for Change: An 
International Analysis of Industrial Relations in Transition, Sydney, 1991, p.147.
4 Loc.cit.
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not be drawn into a dispute:
• executive government;
• the industrial tribunals; and
• peak union and employer bodies.
In the case of the industrial tribunals, their involvement is regulated by law and 
prescribed. The interest and involvement of government and peak union and 
employer bodies in conflict may be for reasons outside the concerns of the workplace 
in question, and will be strongly influenced by the political and industrial climate. 
Matters of corporate policy, intra-organisational relationships and ideology are 
some of the reasons why the contingent parties become involved. Their involvement 
may also be at the request of the proximate parties - in the case of the industrial 
tribunals to conciliate and arbitrate, and in the case of the union and employer peak 
bodies to lend support and provide intermediary roles. It is not unusual, however, 
for the parties to be at 'loggerheads'. For example, the ACTU is reluctant to lend 
support to unions which seek pay rises outside the wage fixing principles set down in 
the Accord; likewise, the Confederation of Australian Industry frowns upon 
agreements reached between individual employers and unions for the same reason. 
One of the aspects considered in the context of the political climate is the policy of 
members of the New Right towards deregulation of the industrial relations system.
Once the contingent parties become involved in disputation (in the case of executive 
government and the peak union and employer bodies), their interests and 
relationships may assume prominence over the original causes. This is also the case 
for different reasons for the industrial tribunals whose interests are reflected 
chiefly in the law they administer and to some extent government policy. Like all 
other institutions, their members have an interest in their preservation and, in 
demonstrating their 'success' to those on whom this depends, who may include 
governments, some or all of the parties and electoral opinion more generally.
2.1.6.  Dispute resolution
Broadly speaking, the resolution of industrial conflict will come within three 
categories:
( i ) by determination or decision, whereby a matter is decided by an industrial 
tribunal or judicial body;
( i i ) by capitulation, whereby a party to the dispute withdraws from their
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position; and
( i i i ) by agreement, whereby negotiations between parties arrive at a resolution 
which is acceptable to the disputing parties.
2 . 1 . 7 .  Conclusion
As will be evident from the outline, the components in the framework overlap. 
Clearly, the legal environment and the relationships between the proximate and 
contingent parties will be major factors and determinants in the political and 
industrial climate. The importance of the background in the analysis of either 
individual acts or periods of industrial conflict is difficult to estimate. Where for 
example the data analysis reveals a change in the trends (be it levels, causes or 
forms) of industrial disputation, some explanation will be provided by the situation 
leading into the change. Of course trends in the level and forms of industrial 
disputation are only identifiable against an historical background of comparable data. 
The same is true for identifying other changes in the pattern of industrial conflict. 
The use of the common law, for example, only becomes a new trend if it is a 
departure from previous practice.
The relationships that exist between the proximate and contingent parties are key 
elements in industrial conflict in Australia. Their points of departure in policy and 
ideology will be critical to the dominant and emerging patterns in industrial 
relations. While there may be many areas in which disagreement between parties is 
tolerated and managed, situations in which this does not apply are of vital 
importance. One example which is illustrated in the case studies in Chapters Ten, 
Eleven and Twelve, is the commitment of the various actors in the arena to the 
industrial relations system.
By drawing all of these components into my analysis, the patterns of industrial 
conflict in Australia become more evident. They are discernible in the statistical 
data which is presented on levels, causes and forms of recorded industrial 
disputation; in the political and industrial climate which has undergone significant 
changes during the research period; in the relationship of the parties both to each 
other and in the case of the contingent parties, their constituents.
Finally, all disputation comes to an end at some stage. All the parties may not be 
happy. There may be festering issues which will erupt again at a later time and with 
renewed vigour and determination. But how the dispute ends will to a large extent be 
determined by its character and conduct. These are discernible in the first five 
components of this framework.
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Chapter Three
THE METHODOLOGY
As two distinct areas of research are covered in this thesis, it has entailed the 
accumulation of data by the use of two quite different methodologies. The first section, 
which deals with statistical data on the forms and causes of industrial disputation, was 
taken from the Weekly Reports compiled by DEIR. The first part of this chapter 
explains the basis on which data was selected for inclusion in the study, the criteria for 
categorisations and definitions.
The second section relates to the legal and political responses to industrial disputation, 
including its prevention. Research was conducted through books, articles, newspapers 
and personal interviews.
2.1. THE DATA
2.1 .1 .  Aims
The aim of the study has been to identify trends in the causes of industrial disputes as a 
prerequisite to analysing the various attitudes and responses to industrial conflict. For 
these purposes the seven categories of 'Causes' provided by ABS figures (Wages; Hours of 
work; Managerial Policy; Physical working conditions; Trade unionism; Other) proved 
inadequate, being of a too general nature and therefore lacking the detail required. The 
survey covers the years 1973-1987, representing an equal number in years of Labor 
and non-Labor governments. Details on some nine thousand industrial disputes over the 
survey period were recorded.
2.1 .2 .  Methodology
The methodology differed from the ABS compilation in two ways, although the source 
material (the Weekly Reports) was the same. The first difference arose out of accepted 
data. Where ABS includes only stoppages (those involving the loss of ten working days or 
more), my survey included disputes where bans were a part or all of the action taken. 
The second difference involved the criterion for identifying whether a dispute had 
actually occurred. A stoppage lasting ten working days or more is automatically included 
in ABS figures. This is the case even where there is no dispute involved. For example, 
an unauthorised stop work meeting lasting two hours and attended by forty people would
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be included by ABS on the basis that the stoppage had resulted in ten working days lost.1 
The question of whether there is a dispute between an employer and employees is not a 
criterion for ABS inclusion. Workers who are uninvolved but have been stood down at 
the establishments where the stoppage occurred are also included by ABS. For ABS the 
fact of a stoppage, numbers involved and duration are the critical factors. Because my 
interest was more inclined towards the issues,‘ my survey included occasions where 
stoppages have resulted in a loss of one day's work (or one full shift) regardless of the 
numbers of employees involved; and also the imposition of bans. It does not include stop 
work meetings of short duration unless they resulted in a strike or bans being applied. 
To make the task practicable, I have examined only every eighth week.
By adopting this method, a more comprehensive picture of the issues surrounding 
industrial disputation emerges. Instead of the seven categories used by ABS, I have used 
eighteen. They are: Pay; Allowances; Superannuation; Conditions; Hours; Health and 
Safety; Job Maintenance; Manning/Staffing; Contract Labour; Union; Demarcation; 
Managerial Policy; Classifications; Dismissals; Work Practices; Political/Social/ 
Environmental; Log of Claims/Awards; and Other.
Another difference in compilation of the data was the allowance that I made for 
repetition. Where ABS would include a strike as a once only figure and derive from that 
details of working days lost and duration, my survey included a dispute on each occasion 
that it was mentioned. As my study looked at one week in eight, a dispute which was 
included more than once would have to be at least eight weeks in duration, and involve 
continued activity (whether a strike, lockout or bans). It is most unusual for a strike to 
be of eight weeks duration. Once again, bans are likely to be included more than once, 
these, being the activity which will most likely be repeated from one report to the other.
2 . 1 . 3 .  Limi tat ions
My research technigue has precluded the inclusion of dispute duration in the survey, 
although commencement date is recorded. Where the dispute ended during the week of the 
report, both dates are included. While this has no consequence in determining the types 
and causes of industrial disputes, it places some limitations on the types of analysis that 
can be achieved. It is usual for statistics on causes to be compared with statistics on 
working days lost. For example, the "major cause of disputes which ended in 1985 were 
managerial policy and wages which accounted for 24.6 per cent and 23 per cent
1 There appears to be some divergence of opinion here between ABS and DEIR. Authorised 
stoppages, i.e. paid stoppages are not included in ABS statistics whereas the department's 
attitude (according to an officer I spoke to), is that a stoppage whether authorised or 
unauthorised is regarded as a dispute.
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respectively of total working days lost".2
Working days lost are not counted at all in the survey for three reasons: First, the 
number of workers involved is not always shown on the Weekly Report. When this 
occurs the Bureau sends out follow-up forms to state branches, and if this is 
unsuccessful, to the unions and employers involved.2 3 While the response is not 100 per 
cent, the Bureau nevertheless has the resources to compensate for some of the 
inadequacies of the Weekly Report. Further, statistics on the number of workers 
involved would be of little use if they could not be cross-referenced to days lost. Second, 
because the survey is concerned with why industrial disputes occur, bans are included, 
and these cannot be measured in terms of working days lost. Third, while there is a 
variation in data selection between my survey and ABS, the ABS statistics on working 
days lost are accurate enough to serve as a guide to the numbers involved. Chapman and 
Gruen have noted that the working days lost per employee from strike activity 
diminished considerably after the beginning of 1983, from .605 to .235 per annum.4 A 
graph showing working days lost by industry between 1973-1987 is at Appendix 1.
The absence of working days lost as a variable in the data means that all disputes have an 
equal value each time they are counted. This does present some problems. For example, 
a strike involving a large number of miners over a pay issue would be equal to a strike 
involving a small metal workshop over conditions as an issue. The results therefore 
cannot reflect the intensity of action taken over various issues in terms of time or 
productivity losses. This problem is partially countered by being able to cross- 
reference by industry, state or union those issues which require analysis either because 
they are prominent or represent a change in pattern. It is further countered by 
comparison with ABS statistics on working days lost and industry statistics.
As noted in the Introduction (see above, p.5), data consists of disputes recorded in the 
Weekly Reports so does not cover direct action by individuals or instances of concerted 
action in the form of go-slows or organised absenteeism.
2 .1 .4 .  Definitions
Perhaps the logical starting point is the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
definition of industrial dispute as a "temporary stoppage of work wilfully effected by a 
group of workers or by one or more employers with a view to enforcing a demand.... ".
2 ABS, Industrial Disputes, Australia, 1985, Catalogue No. 6322.0, Canberra, September, 
1986.
3 Interview with ABS officer.
4 Chapman and Gruen, op.cit., p.18.
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For the purpose of my analysis, this definition is inadequate as it fails to acknowledge the 
range of activities that industrial disputation embraces.
In his discussion of strikes in Europe and the United States, K Walsh argues against 
defining the term crudely for the sake of clarity. In his view, dispute could arise 
because of friction between two trade unions and in a situation where management has 
only a peripheral involvement; or from some wider cause beyond the employer- 
employee relationship such as a political protest issue. 5
Wallace Rubin & Smith's definition of working class militancy encompasses a broad 
range of activities from individual acts of insubordination and sabotage to work 
slowdowns and mass violence against employers or their property. They note however, 
that strike frequency measures "serve as barometers of working-class militancy since 
they display reasonable validity as indices of the ebb and flow of conflict in the 
industrial sphere and are presumed to approximate movements in other, less 
quantifiable expressions of militancy".6
While agreeing with the notion that industrial disputation includes a broad range of 
activities, my research indicates that strike activity does not necessarily serve as a 
barometer of conflict, and in fact, quite the reverse is true, at least part of the time. 
This would appear to be true for places other than Australia.
Walsh discusses research in the United Kindom which has provided some idea of 
interchangeability between different forms of industrial action. The results of two 
separate studies undertaken between 1977-78 and 1972-79 indicate that the 
relationship between strikes and other forms of industrial action, including bans, is 
complementary rather than one of substitutability (sic). Walsh believes there is a 
problem with these conclusions because, though other forms of action are acknowledged, 
apart from the occasional workplace survey, only a small number of those types of 
action are systematically measured. This is "partly a reflection of the difficulties of, 
firstly, defining and, secondly, measuring such apparantly obscure forms of action as a 
work-to-rule for example". 5 67 He concludes therefore that of the most common types of 
action taken, only three are measured regularly - strikes, lockouts and absenteeism.
5 K Walsh, Strikes in Europe and the United States, London, 1983, p.3.
6 Wallace, Rubin & Smith, 'American Labor Law: Its Impact on Working-Class Militancy, 1901- 
1980' in Social Science History, 12, 1, Spring, 1988.
7 Walsh, op.cit., pp.3-4.
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At least for definition purposes, an industrial dispute can be described in much the same 
way whether it is in the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia or elsewhere. This 
may be the case only as far as description is concerned. In Australia, for example, 
where industrial relations is operated through a centralised bargaining system, the 
point at which an industrial dispute reaches one of the industrial tribunals may call for 
a more rigid definition, given that industrial dispute has statutory definitions.
Described as the most dramatic and most effective form of industrial action, a strike is a 
"temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees in order to express a grievance or 
enforce a demand".8 It has five key elements: (i) a stoppage of work; (ii) by employees; 
(iii) acting in concert’, (iv) with the purpose of promoting some perceived interest of 
the strikers, and (v) which is intended to be temporary in character. Creighton et al 
distinguish between two types of strikes: The first and most usual is when "the
’interests' sought to be protected relate to the terms and conditions of employment of the 
strikers themselves, or of fellow workers employed by the same, or a different 
employer". The other, less frequent variety occur when the 'interests' relate to broader 
political, social or environmental issues.9 Industrial disputes which satisfied the above 
definition were placed in the 'Strike' column for the purposes of the survey.
Bans are difficult to quantify or even define. For the most part, a ban or limitation is 
applied to a work function, while elsewhere in the workplace normal procedures are 
followed. This type, the most common and straightforward, were consigned to the 'Bans' 
column. Others were not so easy. Bans for example which were placed on a function (or 
piece of machinery) that had the effect of stopping production altogether, and as a 
consequence closing the workplace, were consigned to the 'Strikes' column. Those 'Black 
bans' which had the same effect, were also counted as strikes. In other words, when a 
ban was imposed on a workplace that would normally be operative, but was rendered 
inoperative because of the ban, then, for the purposes of my survey, it was a strike.
Another variety was the environmental or 'Green bans'. Unlike other forms of direct 
action, the closure of the workplace or project is, in itself, the objective of the ban. 
Generally speaking, environmental bans are aimed at preserving something, such as an 
historic building or an area where development would be hazardous to the ecosystem. In 
this sense they differ from other forms of industrial action because they are temporary 
to the extent that they are only lifted once their objective has been permanently 
achieved.
8 J I Griffin, cited by Creighton, et al, op.cit., p.709.
9 Loc.cit.
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I have distinguished these types of environmental bans according to whether the ban 
affected a project that was already in existence, with infrastructure in place, including 
employees. If that was the case and the project ceased altogether as a result of the ban, it 
was placed in the 'Strikes’ column. When environmental bans were placed prior to the 
beginning of a project, with no infrastructure in place, then it was placed in the 'Bans' 
column.
Distinctions also need to be made for boycotts. This was also necessary for later in the 
thesis, when legal prohibitions in relation to boycotts was considered. The first type is a 
primary boycott, and normally entails the picketing of a workplace by employees of that 
same workplace. Picketing is defined as "the attendance near the place of work with the 
object of disseminating information regarding an industrial dispute or persuading 
employees who desire to work or to remain working not to undertake work or to cease 
from working as the case may be, or to induce people not to have commercial or other 
dealings with the offending employer".10 Clearly, a number of situations are covered by 
the term 'boycott'. My criterion for allocation was whether those who were in 
attendance at a boycott or picket would normally be working in the target workplace. If 
so, the dispute was entered into the 'Strikes’ column.
The second type is a secondary boycott which is defined as "a combination by which 
certain persons in combination seeks to induce third persons not to deal with a person 
who is the real person with whom the economic quarrel exists and whom the boycotters 
intend to injure unless he agrees to grant their demands."* 11 I have applied the same 
criterion here as elsewhere; that is, if the target workplace was closed as a result of the 
boycott it was allocated to the 'Strikes’ column. Under normal circumstances however, 
this was not the case. Usually secondary boycotts occur when the normal workforce 
continues to work while pressure from outside interests is exerted to persuade them 
otherwise. In this case, the dispute is consigned to the 'Bans' column. It must also be 
pointed out that while secondary boycotts appeared infrequently in the Weekly Reports, 
each one had to be considered and assessed solely on the available information. 
Statistically, they were insignificant.
2.1.5.  Recording Disputes.
As I have outlined earlier, the DEIR obtains its information from a number of sources 
and it is stating the obvious to say that a report from an employer may vary markedly 
from that of a union. So while there may not be a departmental bias at the accumulation
10 E I Sykes, Strike Law in Australiat Second Ed., Sydney, 1982, p.55.
11 Sykes and Yerbury, Labour Law in Australia, Vol.1, Sydney, 1980, p.379.
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stage of the process (although a choice by the department as to which information to 
record might indicate otherwise), there may be a quite distinct bias in the material 
supplied.
It is not unusual to find in the Weekly Report a stated cause in the heading with details 
below that are contradictory. The researcher then has the problem of deciding which 
information to use. Even when the material is not contradictory, deliberate 
misinformation may be given. An officer in the department made the point that it is not 
unusual for the causes given by an employer or union to be knowingly wrong. He cited 
the example of a long-running dispute over various stated demands made to an employer, 
which was actually about a power struggle within the union. Another more typical case 
is that, after a period of dissatisfaction and unrest over a number of issues, industrial 
action might be taken over an issue that is merely the culmination of a great many 
things. In cases where 'a straw has broken the camel's back', the stated cause will not 
reflect the real nature of the problems.
Although the Weekly Reports are a rather clinical documentation of industrial disputes, 
occasional slips are made which could possibly be attributed to bias on the part of the 
recorder. An example in one of the reports I worked on was the stated cause of a dispute 
as a "petty grievance". The bias need not be deliberate; rather it is likely to be quite 
unconscious. Also the staff at the various offices where the data is collected vary 
considerably in expertise and experience.
2.1.6.  The Categories
Trying to place disputes into categories is a very subjective process. For example a 
Manning dispute may be considered a Safety or Job Maintenance issue by unions, and a 
Restrictive Work Practices issue by employers. ABS designates Manning as Managerial 
Policy. A number of entries in the Weekly Reports have Log of Claims as a stated cause. 
These are allocated to the Wages category by ABS unless the Report has specifically 
stated that another cause is considered more important. Because ABS only lists one cause 
per dispute, this means that the statistics on wages are higher percentage wise than they 
are in reality. It also involves a value judgement on the part of ABS in regard to the 
automatic selection of wages as the most important claim. My research reveals this to be 
a misleading assumption.
Even with a larger number of categories, placement of a particular dispute into one, was 
sometimes difficult. The cause may either have fitted into more than one or did not 
properly fit into any. In the former case, which thankfully did not occur with great 
frequency, I placed it into the one I thought most likely to be correct. This occasionally
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involved an unavoidable value judgement on my part. When the latter occurred, the 
Other category was used. Space does not permit a full expose of all the causes of disputes 
over a fourteen-year period, but the following provides some indication by actual 
examples of what each category comprises.
Pav: Disputes where the cause was stated as: pay,award rates or bonuses. Basically, 
Pay encompassed anything that could be regarded as part of a normal pay entitlement.
Allowances: Included dirt money, industry allowance, unavoidable risks allowance, call­
out payments, overtime/shift alowance, redundancy package, site allowance, injury 
insurance and penalty rates. This category generally contained a number of causes which 
would normally be included in the Pay category, but have been kept separate so that 
disputes which were purely over Pay could be isolated.
Superannuation: Self-explanatory
Conditions: Any issue which affected working conditions was included except for Health 
and Safety. Amenities, relocation of work area, invasion of privacy, waiting time, work 
pressure, and call backs are just a few of the causes of disputes in this category.
Hours: Disputes where Hours of work was the cause, fall into this category. It should be 
noted that not all disputes over Hours were concerned with reduced working hours: 
sometimes the reverse was the case.
Health and Safety: All disputes where Health or Safety issues were involved, including 
negotiations over Occupational Health and Safety.
Job M aintenance: Those disputes which were primarily concerned with job losses 
whether on an individual, collective or industry basis. For example, redundancy (not 
negotiations for payments but protests), retrenchments, new technology, 
manning/staffing levels (but not disputes over Manning).
Manning: Disputes over Manning were generally concerned with an employer’s decision 
to reduce the manpower on, for example a work-gang or the operation of a piece of 
machinery. When information supplied indicated that the dispute over Manning was 
concerned with a reduction in safety, then it was included in the Health and Safety 
category. Some employers regard Manning as a Work Practice issue.
Contract Labour: Where the introduction of labour on a contract basis was involved, or 
independent contractors to take the place of the regular workforce, disputes were placed 
in this category.
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Union: This category contained any issues which were specifically related to unions, 
such as membership, payment for delegates, payment during industrial disputes, or 
support actions in solidarity with other unions. In the last instance, the unions who 
were being supported may well be in dispute about any of the other issues. Included also 
in this category were disputes over staff labour which usually involved the use of white 
collar workers to perform the duties of striking unionists. Internecine disputes 
involving union members/officials are also included here.
Demarcation: Disputes between unions, usually on a common work-site.
Managerial Policy: A wide variety of issues are included in Managerial Policy. As a 
rule, I have assigned all issues which involved decisions by management which did not 
fall into one of the other categories. Some examples are, rostering arrangements, 
authority to give orders, overtime (not entitlements), use of imported materials, 
protest at standdowns, management attitudes and changes to organisational and 
operational arrangements. Whether some of the issues were included in Managerial 
Policy or elsewhere would often depend on the circumstances of the dispute.
Classifications: I included this category on the advice of a First Assistant Secretary of 
DEIR. He suggested that it would increase in importance over the next few years. Issues 
such as re-classification of job, career structure and seniority were relevant.
Dismissals: Issues in this category were quite distinct from Job Maintenance. Disputes 
over Dismissals usually involved a decision taken by management to dismiss a worker 
for some aspect of his/her behaviour. Not included are dismissals which occurred due to 
a reduction in productivity (they would be regarded as retrenchments).
Work Practices: Not a popular term with trade unions, Work Practices would normally 
be quoted as the cause of a dispute from an employer's report. I have only included those 
disputes which were so designated in the Weekly Report.
Political: This category contained not only Political, but Social and Environmental
issues as well. Some of the causes were Employer support for BLF de-registration, 
Green bans, protest at Trade Practices legislation (S 45D), support for country 
students' accommodation and privatisation of health care.
Log of Claims: If Log of Claims was stated as the cause of a dispute and the issues of 
concern were not itemised, it would be included in this category. The same applied for 
Award matters.
Other: This was a 'last resort’ category for causes which could not be placed in any of
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the above; for example, jurisdiction. The most frequent use of this category was for 
disputes which did not contain enough information, such as 'various unspecified claims'.
2.1 .7. The Forms
Research into industrial disputes generally falls within the ambit of those definitions 
which enable the utilisation of ABS statistics or similar data. That is, the wider 
interpretation given, for example in the Industrial Relations Act 1988 is ignored in 
favour of particularities. It is not that the existence of other forms of action are not 
acknowledged. Plowman et al for example, state: "Though strikes are only one
manifestation of industrial conflict their amenability to measurement and their public 
interest make them the most used index of industrial conflict".12 Analysis therefore, 
appears to be limited to what is measurable. Strikes are measurable in terms of 
working days lost and duration, while the extent and effects of bans are considerably 
more difficult.
Before discussing bans further in this regard, it is worth looking at the measurability of 
strikes as a means of determining the effects of industrial disputation. Loss of 
productivity, giving rise to loss of contracts, dimunition of profits, lack of 
competitiveness and standdowns are some of the frequently stated consequences of strike 
action. There is no argument here at the general level that this is often the case. It is 
the general nature of the argument itself which is at issue. For example, working days 
lost can at times be quite easily made up through increased overtime or additional shifts 
after the strike has ended. Sometimes it is the case that only a section of the workforce 
takes strike action and the work is re-arranged so that a minimal impact on production 
levels occurs. Some manufacturers use the time for overdue maintenance work. The 
above instances are particular to strikes of short duration and of course depend on the 
industry involved as to whether such managment action will work. The point is, loss of 
productivity is not per se an automatic outcome; it is contingent upon a number of 
factors.
Strike statistics do not measure loss of productivity. There is however an underlying 
assumption that loss of productivity will be the result of strike action. When we look at 
strike statistics, therefore, we are assuming that working days lost are an indication or 
prediction of the effects of disputation in terms of loss of production. The obvious 
conclusion to be drawn here is that fewer strikes will result in increased productivity.
Is this the case in reality? Turner et al cite the case of a major motor company which
12 Plowman et al, op.cit., p.45.
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dismissed a number of shop stewards as 'trouble makers'. The result was a temporary 
fall in strike figures, but absenteeism, accidents and turnover all rose sharply.13 The 
economic situation and levels of unemployment may produce a change in preferred forms 
of industrial action. An industry which normally has a high labour turnover rate, for 
example, may be subject to an increase in strikes where unemployment has induced 
disgruntled employees to remain in uncongenial jobs.14 The economic situation may also 
influence the type of organised conflict that is used. An increase in the use of "cut price" 
industrial action such as overtime bans, working to rule or going slow may be a 
reflection of the economic situation "in which workers have been stimulated to growing 
self-assertiveness, but because of mortgage and HP commitments are perhaps less 
willing than previously to lose earnings through strike action" .15 A study into the 
American rubber industry, where severe disciplinary penalties for unofficial strikes 
were introduced, found that workers turned from stoppages to go-slows with 
considerable success: "management has found go-slows more difficult to
combat...Moreover, they do not carry the opprobium of walkouts in the eyes of the 
public" .16 Other American studies have drawn the same conclusions. Hyman has this to 
say about the British experience:1 7
The predominant view of those British managers who have had experience 
of both is also that other sanctions are more effective than strikes. It may 
be predicted that if anti-strike legislation in Britain does reduce the number 
of stoppages, this is likely to accelerate the growth of alternative forms of 
collective action...the very structure of work in industry generates 
conflict...the strike is only its most manifest form of expression.
The situation in Australia is not markedly different to overseas experience. Creighton et 
al in reference to the Australian context, nominate as alternatives to strike action 
partial work-to-rule campaigns, go-slows, 'withdrawals of co-operation', work-ins 
and co-ordinated acts of industrial sabotage as prominent means of expressing 
grievances or enforcing demands, the most highly effective of these being partial work- 
bans and secondary boycotts.18 According to an officer at DEIR, a number of alternative 
forms of industrial action to strikes and bans exist and are quite prevalent. He 
mentioned one dispute in Queensland where police had a co-ordinated campaign of sick 
leave. They also issued parking and traffic tickets to excess so that accounting in the
13 H A Turner, G Clack, G Roberts, (1967) cited by R Hyman, Strikes, 3rd Ed., Gt. Britain, 
p.58.
1 4 Loc.cit.
1 5 Ibid., p.59.
16 J W Kuhn, quoted, loc.cit.
1 7 Loc.cit.
18 Creighton et al, op.cit., p.710.
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department became completely overloaded.19 Of course actions like these do not find 
their way into any official statistics.
One of the central arguments of this thesis is that bans have become an important feature 
in the Australian industrial relations scenario. A study conducted by Muller into 
Telecom Australia revealed that bans have been the predominant industrial weapon used 
by unions for a number of years. On strike statistics, Telecom (Queensland) appears to 
be a realtively dispute-free organisation. When bans are taken into account the picture 
is reversed. Indeed, by 1973 bans had become sufficiently important for Telecom to 
begin collecting data on the activity. Tables 1 and 2 are Muller's findings based on 
Telecom's internal records.20
Table 1
Number of stoppages and 
1975-78 by
Cited Issue
bans in Telecom 
cited issue.
StODDaaes
Queensland,
Bans
Wages 1 1
Hours of work 3 2
Leave, pensions, compensation 
provisions etc. 1 4
Managerial policy and behaviour 5 44
Physical working conditions 1 7
Trade unionism - 2
Political 2 .
Other - 3
Total 1 3 63
Table 2
Number of stoppages and bans in Telecom Queensland, 
1975-78 by Union
Union
Stoppaaes Bans
Employees in respective 
skill groups
% % %
ATEA 42 54 31
Others 58 46 69
1 00
Total number 
of disputes and
1 00 1 00
employees 1 9 63 12,189
19 T Michener, DEIR Officer, Interview, 1.6.87.
20 B Muller, 'Bureaucracy, Job Control and Militancy: The Case of Telecom Australia', in S J 
Frenkel (Ed.), op.cit., pp. 109-110.
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These figures suggest that among Telecom employees the members of the Australian 
Telecommunications Employees' Association (ATEA), the technicians, are 
disproportionately likely to be involved in industrial action; and more particularly, in 
the use of bans.
2. 1 . 8 .  The Hancock Report
It would seem appropriate for any inquiry into industrial relations in Australia to 
consider the variety of activities that exist. As Creighton et al point out, "the increasing 
use of these more sophisticated forms of industrial action in recent years has some 
important implications for the role of the law in relation to industrial conflict".21 The 
history of industrial relations law as outlined in the Hancock Report acknowledges the 
place of bans in the development of awards and legislation, particularly in regard to 
sanctions. The section of the Report which outlines the history of conciliation and 
arbitration traces the origins of awards where bans and limitations became subject to 
orders. Starting with the 1947 40-hour week case, the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Court in granting the award specified:
No organization party to this award shall in any way whether directly or
indirectly be a party to or concerned in any ban limitation or restriction
upon the working of overtime in accordance with the requirement of this
sub-clause . 2 2
Yet in Chapter 3, Part III, the section of the Report dealing with industrial disputation, 
there is not a single mention of bans or limitations. "In this Part", the Report states, 
"we review the available evidence about industrial disputes in Australia. This evidence 
refers to strikes and lockouts".23 Given the ample evidence that industrial disputation 
is not confined to strikes and lockouts this is an omission of some note. The 
determination by the Hancock Committee to rely entirely on ABS statistics on industrial 
disputes must be seriously questioned in this regard. Certainly, the Telecom
(Queensland) data provided in Tables 1 and 2 are too specific and not comprehensive 
enough to be used in the same way as ABS statistics. Nevertheless, it is questionable 
whether a lack of statistical evidence justifies ignoring the fact that alternative forms of
industrial disputation exist. The failure of the Committee to come to terms with
industrial disputation as it exists in its entirety is reflected in the Report's
Recommendations. For example R.109 which deals with grievance procedures suggests:
21 Creighton et al., ibid., p.710
22 Hancock Report, op.cit., p.59.
23 Ibid., p.123.
that normal work be continued throughout the steps in the process (except 
for bona fide safety issues) and that the status quo at the point at which the 
grievance was lodged prevail until the process is completed.2 4
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Apart from the fact that some difficulty will probably arise between the parties in 
agreeing on what is a "bona fide safety issue", it may well be the case that the status quo 
at the time of lodgement is one where bans are in force. What then constitutes normal 
work?
Important changes are taking place in industrial relations. Explanations for those 
changes require analysis of a broad range of political, social, economic and legal issues. 
The Accord, industrial democracy, unemployment, the New Right and high interest rates 
are only a few of the factors that need to be considered. My purpose is to show that 
current statistics do not adequately reflect the changes which are taking place.
2 . 2 .  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Where the first part of this thesis is concerned with the causes of industrial disputation 
and its forms, the second part looks at some of the legal responses to disputation. As I 
have already suggested, in a dynamic environment fluctuations in the forms and levels of 
disputation are attributable to a number of reasons. The same applies to the legal 
responses.
2 . 2 . 1 .  Aims
My inquiry is concerned with two fundamental and related questions. The first, what 
changes have been evident in the use of law as a preventative of or antidote to disputation 
over the survey period? The second, to what extent has the law been a factor in a 
changing industrial climate?
2 . 2 . 2 .  Methodology
For the purposes of the first question there are sufficient law books of quality to draw 
upon in terms of most of the existing laws.
Answering the second question met with the last-mentioned problem. Existing literature 
referred mainly to the situation that existed prior to the changed climate in industrial 
relations. Although quite a lot of printed material was available on the SEQEB dispute, 
there was very little on the other landmark disputes which occurred. Indeed, the pilots’ 
dispute in some respects remains unresolved. The chief sources for material were the
24 Hancock Report, op.cit., Vol.1, p.34.
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media, mostly newspapers and personal interviews. Wherever possible in using 
newspapers, I double-sourced the information; that is, rather than accepting something 
as factual, I looked elsewhere for confirmation. The attitudes of the media, although 
important are not included in the analysis and for the most part are used because they 
imply factual information. Where an opinion is used, I note the editorialisation of the 
comment.
2.2.3.  Access and Interviews
With a topic concerning industrial relations, obtaining interviews or even getting 
replies to letters was frequently difficult and sometimes impossible. A number of 
problems arose for me after I presented a seminar paper in April 1987 at the 
Australian National University which outlined some of my preliminary findings in 
relation to strikes and bans. Following an unauthorised article in Australian Business, 
and a mention of my findings in The Age, the Liberal Party requested a copy of the paper 
which I supplied on the condition that it was "for information only", and not to be cited 
or quoted. One outcome of my 1987 paper has been the recognition that bans, as a direct 
form of industrial action, need to be taken into account when discussing industrial 
disputation. When in 1988, the then Leader of the National Party, Ian Sinclair, used my 
preliminary data in parliament, the Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) undertook 
its own research on the subject (using the same data but a different method of counting to 
mine). Since then, statistics on bans have been kept regularly by the department 
although the ABS still confines itself to strike data. In the first place, the department's 
research was reactive as evidenced by the Ministerial Minute, dated 16 December 1987, 
accompanied by my 1987 seminar paper.25 While it disputed my findings, I have no 
doubt that the current collection of bans data is a clear recognition that information on 
industrial disputation is incomplete without the inclusion of bans and limitations, 
however difficult they are to measure and compare.
Prior to the 1987 federal election, a request was also made by the Queensland National 
Party for the paper. This I refused. (Industrial relations and union power were election 
issues, particularly in Queensland.) A consequence of my refusal became apparent the 
next year when I visited Brisbane with the purpose of conducting interviews and doing 
research on the SEQEB dispute. I was refused any access to the Department of 
Employment and Industrial Affairs (DEIA) by an apologetic officer who, without
25 At the time I was working in the Department gathering data for my research from the 
Weekly Reports. I was vaguely flattered that a number of people had been assigned the task of 
disproving my findings and was not surprised when they ultimately did so. It was a salutary 
lesson in how research can be 'rewarding' when you supply the required answers at the outset.
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explanation, informed me that I was "black-listed". Several attempts to speak to 
someone in the Minister's office were also unsuccessful. I was, however, granted an 
interview at SEQEB by an Industrial Officer, who on hearing my request set aside ninety 
minutes for the purpose. The interview was terminated after fifteen minutes by the 
Chief Industrial Officer who had been listening without comment to my questions and the 
answers. He told me to return in two days which I did, only to find that the Industrial 
Officer was unavailable. John Wilkinson, another Industrial Officer who saw me 
instead, was guarded in his responses although he was very open in his opposition to 
unions, and was unqualified in his admiration and support for the "GM" (Wayne Gilbert).
While the two unions in Queensland, the ETU and Municipal Officers' Association (MOA) 
were very generous with their time and resources, their attitudes were not necessarily 
representative of other unions I attempted to see. The Miners' Federation were very co­
operative with their time, resources and people. (I interviewed four research officers 
at the Federation). The Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union (AMIEU) were 
frank and helpful. The Building Workers Industrial Union (BWIU) and Federated 
Ironworkers Association (FIA) declined to return my calls, and apparently no-one was 
ever 'in' who could speak to me on the phone. This was also my experience with the 
Victorian Trades Hall Council, despite repeated phone calls and the promise of return 
calls when the 'appropriate' person was available.
On another level unions were more forthcoming. A survey l conducted during 1986 
seeking details of any legal actions which involved criminal proceedings, obtained a good 
response. Some unions provided me with detailed accounts that went back several years 
in the union's history.
Perhaps my most memorable experience was in an encounter with a research officer at 
the ACTU in December 1989, who did little to disguise his apprehension on the basis of 
my 1987 paper. Although he became more relaxed as the interview proceeded, it was 
made quite clear to me that the type of research I was doing was not welcomed by the 
union movement and could only do it harm. He was referring not only to the research I 
was doing on bans and limitations, but also the proposition that a spate of legal actions 
over the past few years bear some responsibility for the changing industrial climate and 
the concomitant decline in industrial disputation. The official ACTU and Hawke 
Government position is that the decline in industrial disputation is due entirely to the 
success of the Accord. Therefore, the introduction of other possibilities undermines the 
Accord, the central plank in the Government's industrial and economic policy. While I 
would not describe the ACTU research officer as unco-operative, he was not very 
forthcoming in answering my questions; mainly, I think, because they were questions he
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regarded as better left unasked. (He would probably argue that the questions were 
irrelevant and inappropriate to the subject of industrial relations during the enlightened 
Accord period.)
Employer groups were generally willing to provide documents such as National Wage 
Case submissions and independent reports, which would in any case have been available 
through other sources. They were not so co-operative when it came to responding to 
letters which sought answers to questions on specific, and sometimes controversial 
issues. This was especially the case where a particular dispute was in question but 
applied also to questions of a more general nature. For example, having regard to my 
research findings on pay and allowances (see Chapter Four), I wrote to a number of the 
larger employer groups and asked whether they had any findings based on their 
research, which indicated that there had been an increase in claims for allowances and 
bonuses during the Accord period. Not one of them responded.
From the legal fraternity, I canvassed the opinions of Keith Marks and Jim Staples, both 
former deputy presidents of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission who provided 
invaluable insights into the Commission's workings. I questioned Breen Creighton on the 
ACTU's attitude towards the Hancock Committee's findings on independent contractors (at 
the time he was the ACTU legal officer). Peter Costello who was a lawyer in the Dollar 
Sweets case and an adviser to the company during the Robe River dispute, provided a 
detailed written response to a series of questions about the influence of the New Right 
(whose existence he denied) and the role of the common law in industrial disputation. 
The solicitors acting for the ETU also provided material relevant to their defence of 
arrested demonstrators. In addition, I sought advice on complex legal questions from 
Phillipa Weeks, a lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the Australian National University.
It is perhaps understandable that I should encounter problems. For many of the people I 
spoke to, the subject in question was still very sensitive. On occasions candor was 
forthcoming only with guarantees of anonymity and that certain information would not be 
revealed.
2. 3 .  CONCLUSION
Separate though the two parts of the thesis are in research and methodology, the findings 
are relevant, one to the other. I mentioned in the Introduction that one of the first 
hypotheses that I considered was that Job Maintenance had become one of the most 
important issues in contemporary industrial relations. It is no coincidence that the 
landmark legal disputes which have been responsible for the radical changes in the 
industrial arena, have all to some extent been concerned with that very issue, and more
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specifically, Contract Labour. Bans have also been a factor in some of the disputes and 
have attracted legal consequences. The two parts of this thesis therefore, despite their 
technical differences, are not discrete entities but complementary bodies of research 
which aim to inform each other.
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Chapter Four
FORMS OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTATION
My research has concentrated on two aspects of industrial disputation. The first is 
concerned with the preferred forms and levels of industrial action. My analysis will be 
chiefly concerned with strikes and bans; their incidence and relationship to external 
factors. As Figures 1A-1H indicate each state is different, some differing more than 
others from the overall pattern. The second is concerned with the issues that precipitate 
or discourage industrial action, how they relate to the forms and to what extent they 
reflect contemporary political conditions.
Because each state appears to be different in all these aspects, they will be analysed 
separately. It may be possible from this to draw some conclusions as to why they are 
different, and what the differences mean. Ultimately, the research seeks to provide an 
explanation of what causes industrial conflict and to identify factors which bring about 
change. The following section is concerned only with identifying the immediate results of 
the research.
4 .1 . THE FORMS
A number of cogent arguments can be put forward against the inclusion of bans in dispute 
data, none of which I would disagree with if my aims were more ambitious than they are 
in fact. In regard to my particular methodology it could be argued for instance, that 
quite different numbers may have resulted if, instead of counting one week in eight, I had 
counted one week in six (or any number from one to fifty). On a more general basis, 
bans present a problem because of the difficulty of assessing their impact on 
productivity. Some bans have little effect and may not even be noticed in the workplace. 
The latter problem I have dealt with elsewhere. As to the former argument, it is 
acknowledged that the choice of one week in eight plus the decision to count a ban on each 
occasion it is mentioned means that the results cannot be considered an accurate 
measurement of the number of discrete bans. Any attempt to use them in that way would 
be invalid.
The measurement of bans is justifiable from a comparative standpoint. Because they 
have been measured one week in eight consistently throughout the survey, the increases 
and decreases shown are genuine reflections of the altering trends in preferred forms of
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industrial action. While counting, for example, one week in six, may have produced 
different results numerically, the results indicating changes in forms is unlikely to 
have been substantially different. The trends would be evident despite the unit of 
measurement.
Figures 2A-2H indicate the percentages of industrial action that involved strikes and/or 
bans. Because some disputes involved both forms, and some neither (for example 
lockouts and secondary boycotts), the yearly columns do not necessarily add up to 100 
per cent. It is immediately apparent from looking at these graphs together that each 
state and territory is different except for one important feature. With the exceptions of 
South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory 
(NT), from 1984 onwards the incidence of bans increased, in most cases to 
unprecedented levels proportionate to strike activity. In South Australia and the ACT, 
bans have been the favoured form of industrial action in most years. Although they were 
also high after 1984, no change in trend is reflected.
While Figures 2A-2H provide an indication of what percentage of the industrial action, 
involved strikes or bans, Figures 1A-1I show the actual levels of industrial action. The 
ABS figures are included on this graph for comparison. As Figure 11 demonstrates my 
data shows strikes as being higher than ABS on a national level, although the trends are 
almost identical.
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West Australia Industrial Disputes - 1973-87
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ACT Industrial Disputes -1973-87
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The numerical difference is grounded in the methodology. At periods when strikes have 
tended to be more prolonged, (that is lasting for eight weeks or more), they have been 
counted more than once in my data. The effect of multiple counting in the case of strikes 
is minimal, since very few last so long. The main reason for the difference is the 
selection criterion. In my survey a strike was included if it involved the loss of one 
working day, regardless of the number of working days lost. ABS figures only include 
disputes where ten working days or more were lost. I have discussed the reasons why I 
did this in Chapter One. As for the results, they will be discussed separately, so that the 
variations that occur between states, and the divergences that occur within states, can be 
explained.
The application of bans will also be looked at in context. While distinctions are not 
always clear, I have attempted to define bans in three categories.
Additional bans: Those that are applied at a period when strike activity is the preferred 
form of industrial action and the imposition of bans is purely supplementary.
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Alternative bans: When bans do not reach the level of strike activity but represent a 
significant percentage of industrial action. In these instances a choice is likely to have 
been made as to whether strike or bans are preferable.
Preferred bans: Occasions when bans were either the main form of industrial activity
or equal to strikes, meaning that out of the forms of direct action considered here, bans 
were chosen most often. (I do not mean necessarily to infer a positive enthusiasm for 
bans or, indeed for any form of direct action.)
4 . 1 . 1 .  New South Wales
As Figure 2A demonstrates, Strikes were the predominant form of industrial action 
during the survey period except for 1986 where there was a preference for bans.
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100
80 - 
60 - 
40 - 
20 -  
0 mills
i i *n 
1 f
7 3 7 4 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 C 8 1 8 2 8 3 8 4 8 4 8 6 8 7  
Figure 2A
■  STRIKES 
Eg BANS
From 1983 onwards there was an increase in the percentage of bans and a slight 
decrease in strike percentages. In 1981, the year when strikes are at the highest 
percentage as a preferred form, the number of strikes is also at its highest level for the 
period as indicated in Figure 1A. After 1981, there is a marked decline in the strike 
numbers, while from 1982 until 1986 the number of bans increased steadily.
The above provides an overall picture of what was happening in NSW during the survey 
period. In order to grasp the similarities and differences that may have generic 
significance, I compare the data broken down into five industries. They are Mining, 
Manufacturing, Construction, Transport and Storage and Other Industries.1
1 Other Industries largely consists of the Public Service and government authorities. The only 
way of making some kind of identification is by looking at union frequencies. They have been 
included in the analysis because of the high number of disputes they represent and significant 
differences in forms and levels of disputation.
As far as the rise and fall of strikes and bans are concerned, while there appear to be 
overall trends in strike activity such as a decline after 1981 (Other Industries is an 
exception here) the relationship between strikes and bans varies considerably from 
industry to industry.
In the Mining and Manufacturing industries, bans occur at a steady rate over the period 
while strike rates fluctuate sometimes quite dramatically. (See Figures 3A and 3B)
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In both Mining and Manufacturing, bans as a percentage of industrial action increased 
after 1983 mainly due to a decline in strike numbers. In Mining, strikes are clearly 
the preferred form of industrial action, even allowing for the narrowing of the gap 
between strikes and bans that occurred from 1983. The situation in Manufacturing is 
not so clear. Although strikes are the preferred form of industrial action for the entire 
period, bans appear to be an alternative rather than an additional form of industrial 
action from 1985 onwards.
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Strikes and bans in the Construction industry between 1975 and 1982 are almost 
identical. (See Figure 3C) From 1983 onwards, bans easily predominate until parity is 
achieved again in 1987.
NSW Construction Industry - 1973-87
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It seems from the Construction industry graph that there is no dominant form of 
industrial action. The changes can probably be attributed to specific events in a number 
of cases. The situation is similar in the Transport and Storage and Other industries (see 
Figures 3D and 3E). Unlike Construction, bans do not increase at a marked rate from 
1983. Like Construction, bans and strikes in Transport and Storage appear to be 
interchangeable, with no clearly, preferred form.
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NSW Other Industries -1973-87
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Peak activity also varies from industry to industry. In the Mining, Manufacturing and 
Construction industries, 1981 was a year when strikes were at their highest, followed 
by declines. In the Mining and Manufacturing industries, the decline was very marked. 
In Transport and Storage and Other Industries, the decline had begun earlier, in 1980 
and 1979 respectively. As neither the wage freeze nor the Accord could be responsible 
for these early declines, factors unique to the industries may be responsible. Because 
the number of disputes involving the Mining, Manufacturing and Construction industries 
are greater than Transport and Storage and Other Industries, the advent of the declines 
could be easily overlooked.
4 . 1 . 2 .  Victor ia
Between 1973 and 1983, strikes were clearly the preferred form of industrial action 
in Victoria, although strikes and bans were very close in 1975 and 1976. (See Figure 
2B) From 1984-1986 the number of bans as a percentage of industrial action 
increased quite dramatically and were the preferred form of industrial action. In 1987, 
strikes and bans were equal.
Victoria Strikes & Bans -1973-87: Percentages
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As Figure 1B demonstrates, the increase in bans as a percentage also reflects a marked 
increase in actual numbers of bans A gradual decline in strike numbers according to my 
data began in 1980, with a sharp decrease in 1982.2
Four industries have been chosen in Victoria to identify similarities and differences that 
may have generic significance. They are Manufacturing, Construction, Transport and 
Storage and Other. As far as the rise and fall of strikes and bans are concerned, unlike 
NSW there does not appear to be an overall trend in strike activity, and like NSW the 
relationship between strikes and bans varies considerably from industry to industry. 
(See Figures 4A-4D) Bans in Manufacturing and in Construction increased during the 
period although only slightly in the latter. In the Transport and Storage and Other 
Industries, bans remained almost level.
In the Manufacturing industry, after a sharp increase in bans in 1975, there was a 
steady decline until 1985 when bans began to increase. They do not appear to be an 
alternate form of industrial action. At their highest point in 1975, strikes are also at 
their highest point, so the increase in bans would seem to indicate an acceleration in 
overall industrial disputation. In 1986, the only year when bans overtook strikes, the 
difference is only slight. It appears to be the case that from 1984 onwards, the 
relationship between strikes and bans changed. While bans did not become a preferred 
form of industrial action (with the questionable exception of 1986), they could by this 
time be considered an alternate form.
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A different picture emerges for the Construction industry where the incidence of strikes 
also declined at fluctuating levels during the period, with some significant differences. 
(See Figure 4B) The first difference can be seen in the year of peak activity. Where
2The ABS curve shows the decline starting in 1982 after a slight increase in 1981. My data 
and ABS are in agreement about the lowest point.
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1975 had been the peak for Manufacturing, in the Construction industry strikes 
declined. The second and more important difference is seen in strike levels from 1984. 
Although they increase slightly in 1986, strike numbers drop very markedly in 1987. 
This is counter to state and national trends. It is also contrary to the Construction 
industry trend in other states except for South Australia and the Northern Territory 
where strike levels have never been particularly high. (See Figures 6C and 9C)
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The Transport and Storage industry graph (Figure 4C) suggests that industrial activity 
in this industry is subject to influences that have immediate and short-term impact on 
levels of disputation. There were marked fluctuations during the survey period in levels 
and preferred forms that are characteristic of the industry in other states and 
uncharacteristic of state and national trends.
Victoria Transport & Storage Industry -1973-87
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Between 1973 and 1979 bans were generally the preferred form of industrial action. 
This was most noticeably the case when strike activity was at its highest. In 1980 there 
was a change. With strike activity at its very highest for the survey period, bans 
decreased markedly. They rose sharply again in 1982 after a decline in strike numbers,
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fell again between 1983 and 1984 and overtook strikes again in 1985 and 1987. The 
fluctuations in strike and ban numbers provide a contrast to fluctuations in bans as an 
additional, preferred or alternative form of industrial action.
In Other Industries (See Figure 4D), strike activity over the period was, comparatively 
steady. Strikes were generally the preferred form of industrial action. However in 
1975, when strike activity was at its highest level for the period, bans increased to an 
unusually high level, overtaking strikes and then declining from 1976 until 1982.
Victoria Other Industries -1973-87
400 
300
1  200 
3z
100
o
7 3 7 4 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 0 3 1 8 2 8 3 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7  
Figure 4D
o
♦
STRIKES
BANS
In the years 1973-75 and 1976-77, bans appear to have been an alternate form of 
industrial action. Between 1978 and 1984, they were an additional form and from 
1984 onwards an alternate form again. 1975 is an exception, when bans rose sharply, 
this time during a period of low strike activity, and became the preferred form.
4.1.3.  Queensland
Until 1981 strikes were clearly the favoured form of industrial action in Queensland. 
(See Figure 2C) From then until 1986, bans increased to the extent that they were 
either the outright preferred form of industrial action (1982-83), the equally 
preferred form (1985-86) or the alternate form (1981 and 1984). The change is 
even more marked than that in Victoria. In 1987 strikes reverted to being the outright 
preferred form.
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Queensland Strikes & Bans - 1973-87: Percentages
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As Figure 2C indicates, Queensland peak strike activity is contrary to most other states 
and the national trend. Disputes in the Mining and Transport and Storage industries over 
a variety of issues account for the high number but do not explain why, at a period when 
activity in most states was at relatively low levels, Queensland should be so high. The 
high incidence of bans in the Mining, Construction and Other Industries in 1984 is 
attributable to the dispute between electricity workers and the SEQEB which will be the 
subject of a later case study. Strike activity in the aforementioned industries will also 
be considered in that context.
Five industries are used to identify the similarities and differences that may have 
generic significance in Queensland. They are: Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, 
Transport and Storage and Other Industries.
Bans in the Mining industry appear to be an unusual occurrence. 1975 and 1984 are 
very notable exceptions accounting for 40 per cent and 46.2 per cent of industrial action 
in those years respectively. 1984 is of particular interest because of the high level of 
strike activity. (See Figure 5A) In all other years, bans are negligible or non-existent.
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With the exceptions of 1982 and 1985-1987, bans in the Manufacturing industry 
were an additional form of industrial activity. (See Figure 5B) It should be noted that 
the level of bans in 1982 is in marked contrast to an abnormally low degree of strike 
activity and represents only a small rise in actual numbers. In 1985 bans and strikes 
were equally the preferred form; in 1986 bans were clearly the preferred form by a 
small number at a time when strikes were on the increase; and in 1987, bans seem to 
have emerged as an alternative form of industrial action. Whether this is aberrational 
or reflects a change in the pattern of industrial action is difficult to assess. While strike 
numbers over the period declined, bans, while fluctuating moderately, remained 
relatively even in numbers overall.
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The Queensland Construction industry was subject to changes in levels and patterns of 
industrial conflict. From 1973-1980 bans were only small in number while during 
the same period strike activity as the preferred form varied considerably. (See Figure 
5C) Although in 1979, the numbers of bans and strikes were equal, strikes were 
unusually low at the time, while bans were about average in number. From 1981 there 
was a quite dramatic change when bans by a narrow margin became the preferred form 
of industrial activity, and continued to increase in number until 1984 declining rapidly 
thereafter. Between 1982 and 1986 the number of strikes was also high, and counter to 
the national trend.
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Strike activity was predominant in the Transport and Storage Industry from 1973 until 
1981 with bans playing only an additional role. (See Figure 5D) In 1982 there was a 
sharp increase in the number of bans to the extent that they became the preferred form. 
At the same time strikes were on the increase and reached an unprecedented high in the 
years 1983-1984. In 1984, bans also reached an unprecedented high, followed by a 
gradual decline. Strikes however decreased very rapidly over 1985 and 1986. 
Although in 1987 they increased, it was only to the 1985 level; alternatively bans in 
1985 were by far the preferred form of industrial action and in 1987, an alternative.
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In Other Industries in Queensland, strikes and bans were very close in numbers from 
1975 until 1981. (See Figure 5E) While strikes occurred on a fairly even level 
throughout the survey period, from 1981 until 1983, bans increased to exceptional 
levels. Manufacturing is the only other Queensland industry which saw a decrease in the 
number of bans in 1984. From that time, industrial disputation in Other Industries 
appears to have settled back to the pre-1981 situation, with bans between 1981 and 
1983, the only alteration in trend.
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Queensland Other Industries - 1973-87
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4.1.4.  South Australia
Bans in South Australia have been the predominant form of industrial action since 1976. 
Prior to that (1973-1975) they had accounted for high percentages of disputation. 
(See Figure 2D) Only the ACT can make a similar claim, placing both outside the norm 
as far as preferred forms are concerned.
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The Four industries chosen for comparison in South Australia are: Manufacturing,
Construction, Transport & Storage and Other Industries. Unlike all the other states, 
bans are the major form of industrial action in each of these industries despite sharp 
fluctuations in the levels of both strikes and bans.
From 1976, bans in the Manufacturing industry, with the exception of 1979, are 
clearly the preferred form of industrial action. (See Figure 6A) In 1982, following a 
year of high disputation involving strikes and bans there was a very sharp decline in 
both forms. An increase in strikes and bans from 1983 onwards led to parity in 1987.
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Figure 6A
From 1974, bans in the Construction Industry are clearly the preferred form of 
industrial action with the exception of 1983 where there are slightly less in number. 
(See Figure 6B) Although the number of bans had decreased from 1982, this does not 
presage any radical shift in trend. Strike numbers did not increase greatly, which 
signifies an overall decline in industrial disputation that is consistent with the national 
trend. From 1985 until 1987, bans increased to pre-1982 levels and are inordinately 
high in comparison to all other years.
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With the exceptions of 1973, 1975 and 1978, bans were the preferred form of 
industrial action in the Transport and Storage industry. (See Figure 6C) In 1982, at a 
time when strikes were relatively low, bans soared to an unprecedented level, declined 
sharply in 1983 and increased again in 1984. These fluctuations were matched in 
pattern by strikes. Both fell, bans dramatically, in 1985.
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Figure 6C
In keeping with the Manufacturing, Construction and Transport and Storage industries, 
bans in Other Industries predominated. Unlike the preceding industries however, strike 
patterns in Other Industries remained fairly level, (see Figure 6D) Bans, on the other 
hand are subject to fluctuation, with 1979 representing the greatest number. Other 
Industries exceeded all three previously mentioned industries in levels of disputation 
from 1979 onwards notwithstanding a constancy in strikes from 1979-1985.
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4 . 1 . 5 .  Western Australia
Until 1984, strikes were clearly the preferred form of industrial action in Western 
Australia, with bans featuring mainly as an additional form. In 1977 however there was 
a distinct change: While strikes remained the predominant form accounting, for 54.3 
per cent of all industrial action, 51.4 per cent of industrial disputes also involved bans. 
From 1984 onwards, the number of bans had increased to unprecedented levels. (See 
Figure 1E) This also represented a marked increase in bans as a percentage of industrial 
action. (See Figure 2E) In the years 1984-1986, bans were involved in over 50 per
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cent of industrial disputes. By 1987, bans had overtaken strikes by a ratio of 65.5 per 
cent to 43.1 per cent.
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Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, Transport and Storage and Other Industries are 
used to compare the generic similarities and differences in Western Australia.
Strikes have always been the major form of industrial disputation in the Mining 
industry. Bans have been negligible both in terms of numbers and as a percentage of 
direct action. (See Figure 7A). During the survey period, strike activity was at its 
highest between 1978 and 1981, having peaked in 1980. A decline between 1982 and 
1984 was followed by a steady increase in numbers. As Figure 7A demonstrates, there 
is an almost symmetrical pattern to industrial disputation in Mining over the survey 
period.
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Strikes were also the predominant form of industrial action in the Manufacturing 
industry, although in the period 1973-1977, bans had represented a significant share, 
and were equally preferred in 1973 and 1977. (See Figure 7B) From that time on, the
use of bans was sparse. In 1978 strike activity peaked, and was followed by a very 
sharp decline with numbers only once, in 1986, regaining pre-1977 volume.
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Between 1973 and 1986, strikes in the Western Australia Construction industry were 
mostly the preferred form. (See Figure 7C) Bans occurred irregularly over the period, 
and were either equal or only slightly fewer in number than strikes when they did. In 
1987 strike and ban numbers peaked for the period, with bans having soared to a 
remarkable height in comparison to the preceding years.
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Strikes and bans in the Transport and Storage industry appear to have been virtually 
interchangeable between the years 1973 and 1984. (See Figure 7D) During those 
years, strike activity peaked in 1974, 1976 and 1980; bans peaked in 1977 and 
1979. The peaks do not coincide. After 1984, there was a definite change in trend. 
While both bans and strikes increased steadily, bans clearly predominated, removing the 
element of interchangeability from direct action in the Transport and Storage Industry.
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There is also a suggestion of interchangeability in Other Industries between the years 
1974 and 1984. Strike activity peaked in 1978 and 1979, while bans peaked in 1977 
and 1980. (See Figure 7E) Unlike Transport and Storage, years when one activity was 
high were not necessarily complemented by relatively high (even though a decline may 
have occurred) activity in the other. After 1984, however, the increase in bans to 
become the preferred form of industrial disputation, mirrors the trend identified in 
Transport and Storage, and to some degree in Construction.
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4.1.6.  Tasmania
1986 was the only year when bans were the preferred form of industrial action in 
Tasmania. Counter to the national trend, strikes peaked in 1982 and 1984, (See Figure 
1F) Bans steadily increased in number and as a percentage of disputation from 1984. 
(See Figure 2F) The only comparable, earlier year was 1975, when bans were involved 
in 50 per cent of disputes, and strikes, 62.5 per cent. The number of disputes however 
was not as high as during the later period.
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The five industries chosen for comparison in Tasmania are : Mining, Manufacturing, 
Construction, Transport and Storage and Other Industries.
Bans in the Mining industry in Tasmania, as in all the other states, were mostly an 
additional form of industrial action, although in 1974 and 1975 when strikes were very 
low in number, bans were preferred equally and outright respectively. (See Figure 8A) 
From that time, bans were negligible in numbers. Strikes peaked in 1979-1980 and 
1983-1984. Both periods were followed by steep declines.
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Figure 8A
Strikes were also predominant in the Manufacturing industry from 1973-1986. (See 
Figure 8B) Bans occurred intermittently over the period 1975-1987, and were varied 
in their degrees of prominence. In 1978 when strikes were comparatively low, bans 
were equal in number; again in 1980 following a decline in the number of strikes, bans 
were the preferred form of industrial action; in 1987 where no strikes have been 
recorded, bans are the only form. During the years when strikes were at their highest, 
(1979, 1982 and 1984) bans were either very low in number or non-existent.
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Up until 1985, bans were not a feature in Construction industry disputes, with the 
exception of 1979. (See Figure 8C) Strike activity between 1973 and 1975 was 
intermittent and varied in number, followed by an increase in 1986 and 1987 when 
they reached unprecedented levels. During the period 1985-1987, bans appear to have 
become a feature of the Tasmanian Construction industry, especially in 1986 when they 
rose sharply.
Tasmania Manufacturing Industry - 1973-87
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Between 1976 and 1984, strikes in the Transport and Storage industry were generally 
predominant, (See Figure 8D) Bans were not a feature until 1979, a year when no 
strikes were recorded. From 1985-1987 however, bans became the preferred form of 
industrial action in Transport and Storage being either equal (1985, 1987) or 
preferred outright (1986).
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Industrial disputation in Other Industries was also irregular, and consisted chiefly of 
strikes until 1985. (See Figure 8E) In the peak strike years, 1980 and 1984, bans 
are also recorded. In 1985 following a decline in strike numbers, bans were equal to 
strikes, and in 1987, a year when no strikes have been recorded, bans increased to an 
unprecedented level.
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4 .1 .7 .  Northern Territory
A reversal of the national trend in strike and ban patterns is evident in the Northern 
Territory, as Figure 2G demonstrates. Bans in the earlier years of the survey were 
more prevalent as a percentage of industrial action than in the later years, The post- 
1984 period in particular, runs counter to the other states, where bans as a percentage 
of direct action increased. (The ACT is a nominal exception) Strike activity was also 
anamolous in the Northern Territory, comparable only to Queensland. Strikes were at 
their lowest number between 1978 and 1979, and reached their peak in 1984. (See 
Figure 1G) Tasmania and Queensland were the only other states to have shared this 
experience.
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The five industries chosen for comparison in the Northern Territory are Mining, 
Manufacturing, Construction, Transport and Storage and Other Industries.
Between 1973 and 1980 strikes in the Mining industry were few and intermittent. (See 
Figure 9A) From 1981 until 1986 strike activity increased and was constant, if not 
consistent in degree. There were very few bans recorded over the period, and those, 
during 1981 and 1983, when strike activity was relatively high.
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Very little industrial disputation was recorded for the Manufacturing industry, and none 
at all for the period 1981-1984. (See Figure 9B) Bans do not feature in any year.
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The Construction industry in the Northern Territory shows no clear patterns of 
industrial disputation. Between 1973 and 1979, strikes and bans were either low or 
non-existent. (See Figure 9C) In 1981, the number of strikes rose, then fell again the 
following year to pre-existing levels. In 1984, there was a very steep increase in 
strikes, accompanied by a small number of bans which had not figured in disputation in 
the Construction industry since 1975.
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As Figure 9D suggests there was an element of interchangeability in the Transport and 
Storage industry. After the 1973-1975 period when strike numbers were small but 
regular, there were no further strikes recorded until 1981. In the intervening years, 
industrial disputation when it occurred, took the form of bans. Strike activity peaked in 
1984, then dropped to the levels of early seventies. Bans, after 1984, ceased to feature.
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Strike activity was the predominant form of industrial action in Other Industries from 
1976 onwards. 1977 was an exception when bans having increased, were the only form. 
(See Figure 9E) Prior to 1976, bans had either been preferred equally or outright. 
Following a marked decrease in strike numbers in 1981 and 1982, pre-existing levels 
were reached in 1983. Peak activity for the survey period occurred in 1987.
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4.1 .8 .  Australian Capital Territory
Since 1974, bans have generally been the major form of industrial action in the ACT. 
1978 and 1977 were exceptions when the ratios were 75 per cent strikes to 25.per 
cent bans and 61.5 per cent strikes to 46.2 per cent bans respectively. (See Figure 2H) 
While strike numbers have remained relatively even over the period, the number of 
bans have fluctuated. From 1978, at their lowest point since 1974 (none were recorded 
in 1973), bans rose steadily to peak in 1981 and 1983. (See Figure 1H) Although bans 
were the dominant factor in industrial disputation in the ACT, from 1984 they were 
contrary to the national trend insofar as they declined as a percentage of involvement 
against strikes which increased.
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Three industries have been selected for comparison in the ACT. They are: Construction, 
Transport and Storage and other Industries.
Bans were clearly the preferred form of industrial action in the Construction industry 
up until 1986. Even when they were at their lowest levels (!976 and 1979), strikes 
numbers were also very low and did not replace them. (See Figure 10A) Following a 
peak in 1983, bans declined sharply until 1986. During this period, strikes remained 
static then increased to an unprecedented level in 1987, a year in which no bans were 
recorded. This may well augment a change in the pattern of industrial activity in the 
Construction industry.
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Probably because the Transport and Storage industry is small in the ACT in comparison 
to other states, there is very little industrial disputation recorded for the period. It has 
been included however because of the unusual degree of strike activity in 1978. (See 
Figure 10B) Bans would appear to be the major, if slight, form of industrial action in 
Transport and Storage.
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Bans have dominated the industrial scene in Other Industries in the ACT. Strike numbers 
were generally low and relatively even. (See Figure 10C) In 1981 when they rose 
sharply, they did so as an adjunct to bans which had also increased to a record level. In 
1978, 1982 and 1986 when strikes were the preferred form, the marginal difference 
was very slight. This suggests that the pattern of industrial activity in the ACT had not 
changed. Bans, between 1974 and 1987 have tended to rise and fall over two to three 
year periods, with peaks in 1981 and 1987.
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4.2.  CONCLUSION
To summarise, the national trends as depicted in Figure 11 are not indicative of the 
situations, state by state. While 1975 and 1981 were the years that recorded the 
highest number of strikes nationally, only NSW and South Australia actually experienced 
both these years as peaks. In each case the Manufacturing industry accounted for the 
high numbers, aided in NSW by Mining in 1981. In Victoria and Queensland, 1975 was 
also a peak year, with Manufacturing once again responsible. Mining industry strikes 
created peak activity in the Northern Territory in 1981.
Peak strike activity in the other states varied considerably: In Queensland 1973 and 
1984 were peak years with Mining and Transport & Storage industry strikes added to 
Manufacturing in 1984. Western Australia experienced peak activity in 1978 and 
1980. Added to Manufacturing was Other Industries in 1978 and Mining in 1980. In 
Tasmania, Manufacturing was again the prime determinant in peak years, 1982 and 
1984, with Mining a factor in 1984. The Northern Territory also saw peak activity in 
1984 with Transport and Storage and Mining, the responsible industries. Strike 
activity in the ACT peaked in 1980 and 1987 with Construction industry disputes.
Where Manufacturing was the industry responsible for the most number of strikes, 
Other Industries was responsible for the majority of bans. Once again, the national 
trend towards peak activity in 1986 as shown in Figure 11 is not representative of all 
states. NSW and the Tasmania were the only states where this was the case. 1979 was 
also a peak year in NSW. In Victoria, bans were at their highest in 1975 (also a peak 
strike year) and 1985; in Queensland, 1983; in South Australia 1979 and 1981 (also 
a peak strike year); in Western Australia, 1987; in the NT, 1974; and in the ACT, 
1981 and 1983. Added to Other Industries, the Transport & Storage Industry accounted 
for peak activity in NSW, Victoria, Western Australia, and Tasmania. The Construction 
industry was also a factor in Western Australia, Tasmania, the Northern Territory and 
ACT.
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the above. First, it is unusual in periods of 
the highest disputation for both strikes and bans to feature. Victoria in 1975 and South 
Australia in 1981 were the only instances of coinciding peak activity. Nor does it 
appear to be the case that when strikes are at their highest, bans are necessarily at their 
lowest despite the national trend suggested by Figure 11, Queensland in 1973 provided 
the only such occurrence.
Secondly, although figures on industrial disputes point to an overall decline in strike 
numbers since 1984, Queensland, Tasmania the Northern Territory and ACT have all 
experienced periods of peak activity while NSW, Victoria, Western Australia and 
Tasmania have reached peak ban activity.
Thirdly, the number of disputes involving bans as a percentage of industrial action 
increased in most states over the latter stages of the survey period. This indicates a 
changed trend in the pattern of industrial disputation. In Queensland, from 1981; in 
NSW from 1983; and in Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania, from 1984. Bans in 
South Australia and the ACT have been predominant throughout most of the survey 
period. The Northern Territory was the only exception, where bans having been 
prevalent in the early period, account for minimal involvement in the eighties.
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Chapter 5
CAUSES OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTATION: 
Pay and Allowances
This chapter will examine the proposition that trends in levels of direct action are 
reflected primarily in the rise and fall of disputes over Pay and Allowances. It further 
raises the question of whether a decline in Pay issues coincides with an increase in 
Allowances issues. There has been no empirical evidence to suggest that this is the case 
due to the issues being treated as one in ABS statistics. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, 
particularly during the Accord period, one way that unions and employers managed to 
avoid the strictures of the Accord was to reach agreements at the enterprise level over 
increased Allowances. The extent to which this has occurred is impossible to estimate. 
Many Allowances are included in industrial awards and agreements that are ratified by 
the industrial tribunals, and it is assumed that these would have to be determined within 
the national wage guidelines. The anecdotal evidence to which I refer suggests that a 
number of agreements have been reached on an extracurricular basis.
Three issues are included in the analysis: Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims. These will 
be shown separately and also in aggregated form. Log of Claims has been included because 
it is reasonable to assume that a number of items in the category included Pay or 
Allowances claims. It is not possible to indicate how many, particularly as Log of Claims 
included award variations that would also have related to other categories of issues. An 
assumption can also be made that the intensity of disputation over most of the issues will 
to some extent be reflected in Log of Claims.1 Unless otherwise specified, the analysis 
will consist of results taken from strike data. Once again, each state and territory will 
be examined discretely.
The data is presented in two ways. For each state, the number of strikes over the three 
issues is shown in the graph series A. In this way the level of strike activity can be 
ascertained. In the graph series B, the data are shown as a percentage of overall strike 
activity so that, for example , we can see that the three issues accounted for 50 per cent 
of the number of strikes in 1973 in contrast to less than 20 per cent in 1986.
1 Disputes that involved political, social or environmental issues are unlikely to be included in 
Log of Claims.
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5 .1 .1 .  New South Wales
As Figure 11A shows, until 1983, Pay accounted for more disputes than the other two by 
substantial amounts.
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In the data presented in Chapter Four, the rise and fall of strikes over the survey period 
in each state was shown. When the curve for NSW shown in Figure 1A is compared with 
the curve for strikes over Pay in Figure 11 A, they appear almost identical. This is true 
when pay is viewed separately or in aggregation. While this would tend to support the 
theory that pay demands dictate levels of disputation, Figure 11B indicates that even 
when Pay is combined with Allowances and Log of Claims, they only once amounted to 50 
per cent of all strike action.
There are two variations in the curve which should be noted. The first, in 1978 shows 
overall strike activity to be almost level with the previous year, while strikes over 
Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims increased from 30.1 per cent in 1977 to 44 per cent 
in 1978. The second is 1987, when a very slight increase in the number of strikes over 
the three issues corresponded with a slight decrease in the number of strikes overall.
In 1981, when strikes overall were at their highest (see Figure 1A), Pay, Allowances 
and Log of Claims accounted for only 39.4 per cent, of which 21.8 per cent were over 
Pay issues. By way of contrast, in 1987 when strikes overall were at their lowest 
point, the three issues accounted for 33.4 per cent, a difference of only 6 per cent 
between the periods of highest and lowest strike activity.
After 1983, the number of strikes over Pay remained low, while the number of strikes 
over Allowances, was only slightly lower. This represented a change in the relationship 
between Pay and Allowances. As Figure 11B shows, while it had not been unusual in the
earlier period for Allowances to represent roughly the same percentages of overall 
disputation, the surpass of Pay was unprecedented.
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Between 1973-82 when overall strike numbers were high, the three issues accounted 
for 30 per cent or more of all strikes. From 1982-86, the decline in overall strike 
numbers also saw a decrease in Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims as a percentage of 
strikes. The figure cited above for 1987 was a reversal of this trend.
Notwithstanding the observation that, in aggregation, the three issues only once 
represented more than 50 per cent of overall strike activity, the decline in numbers of 
strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims, corresponded with an overall decline in 
strikes from 1983.
5 . 1 . 2 .  Victoria
Except for 1985, Pay represented the highest number of disputes out of the three 
issues, throughout the survey period. (See Figure 12A)
In terms of rise and fall, the curve for the period 1975-87 is almost the same as for all 
industrial disputes, when the three are aggregated. (See Figure 1B) As a percentage of 
involvement in industrial action, Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims represented higher 
proportions of all activity than in NSW.Between 1973 and 1977, the three issues in 
combination, accounted for well over 50 per cent of disputation, with Pay being the 
predominant issue. (See Figure 12B) While there was an overall decline in the number 
of strikes after 1977, Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims accounted for between 30 and 
50 per cent of disputation.
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Figure 12A
Two variations in the curve occurred: In 1974, my data points to a small decline in 
overall strike numbers and an increase in disputes over Pay, Allowances and Log of 
Claims.2 This difference is explained by the change in intensity of the three issues. 
Whereas in 1973, they had accounted for 60.3 per cent of all strike action, in 1974 
they were involved in 84 per cent of strikes. The same is true for 1981 where overall 
strike activity declined slightly, while Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims increased from 
41.3 per cent in 1980 to 52.9 per cent in 1981.
Between 1983 and 1986, the proportion of Pay disputes declined. Allowances, while 
remaining relatively consistent numerically, increased as a percentage. This indicates 
that, as in NSW, Pay demands declined but claims for Allowances were unimpeded.
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2 Here, as elsewhere I am using my data unless otherwise specified. For these years, 1974 
and 1981, it should be noted that the ABS curve is consistent with the three issues.
The overall decline in strike activity in Victoria from 1983 included a decline in Pay 
and Log of Claims disputes. Allowances, on the other hand, remained static and even 
increased marginally in some years.
5.1.3.  Queensland
In Queensland, Pay disputes exceeded Allowances and Log of Claims in most years. (See 
Figure 13A) Log of Claims represented a greater number in the years: 1977 (Pay, 
15.1 per cent and Log of Claims, 24.5 per cent); 1980 (10.4 per cent and 25.0 per 
cent); 1981 (both 18.8 per cent); 1982 (4.9 per cent and 19.5 per cent) and 1984 
(2.9 per cent and 10.1 per cent).
The rise and fall curve between the years 1974 and 1982 follows that for all strikes 
with the exception of 1983. (See Figure 1C). Unlike NSW and Victoria, the curve would 
diverge without the inclusion of Log of Claims. Even though the curves for these years 
are consistent, the number of disputes that were concerned with the three issues is not 
very high. Only in 1974 and 1975 did they exceed 50 per cent of all disputation.
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The variation in 1983 shows overall strike activity on the increase, while Pay, 
Allowances and Log of Claims declined, from 29.3 per cent in 1982 to 10.5 per cent in 
1983.
From 1982, the number of strikes over Pay declined markedly, and remained low until 
1987 when there was a sharp increase. In 1983 there was an overall increase in 
strikes, which peaked in 1984. Both Pay and Allowances remained low. It was not until 
1987 that Pay again reflected the curve for all industrial disputes in Queensland.
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Queensland appears to differ significantly from NSW and Victoria as far as trends in 
strike activity are concerned. From 1983-84, strike activity overall increased in 
contrast to a definite decline in disputes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims. 
Queensland was in keeping with the other states insofar as the three issues declined as a 
percentage of direct action, but it was inconsistent insofar as (i) there was increased 
strike activity during a period of decline elsewhere, and (ii) there was a decline in Pay, 
Allowances and Log of Claims during the same period.
5.1.4.  South Australia
Allowances were equal to Pay in numbers in 1977; and in 1982 and 1986 Log of Claims 
was the only issue of the three recorded. Otherwise, Pay issues were greater than the 
other two during the period. (See Figure 14A)
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Between 1973 and 1982 the curve for all disputes is much the same as for Pay, 
Allowances and Log of Claims. (See Figure 1D) This is also true for Pay in isolation. 
During that period, the aggregated issues accounted for a higher percentage of strike 
action than was evident in the other states looked at so far. Only 1976-77 and 1980 fell 
below the 50 per cent level. (See Figure 14B) While a slight increase in overall strike 
numbers is recorded in 1983, the opposite was recorded for Pay, Allowances and Log of 
Claims. The curves however, do not diverge dramatically during the latter period, 
1983-87. One other noticeable difference between South Australia and the previous 
states lies in the falling off of Allowances as an issue from 1983-87. The only year in 
which Allowances featured is 1985, when Pay and Log of Claims disputes had also 
increased.
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It should also be remembered that bans over most of the survey period, were 
considerably more frequent than strikes. From 1976 onwards they were the major 
form of industrial activity. There were more bans than strikes on Pay and Allowance 
issues from 1980, although as Table 3 illustrates, the higher number of bans did not 
necessarily represent a higher percentage of disputes over one or all of the issues.
As Figure 1D and Table 3 also indicates, the level of bans was not a factor in the 
percentage of Pay, Allowance and Log of Claims. In 1973-75, for example, when Pay 
alone accounted for a high proportion of bans, the level of bans was at its lowest for the 
entire survey period, and less than strikes. In contrast, strikes during these years were 
at their highest for the survey period, and Pay alone, again constituted high proportions 
of activity.
Table 3
YEAR
South Austra lia Strikes and Bans - 1973-87
STRIKE ACTIVITY 
Pav Allowances LOC*
BAN ACTIVITY 
Pav Allowances LOC
% %
1 973 66.7 13.3 . 55.6 11.1 11.1
1 974 66.7 7.4 3.7 27.3 4.5 4.5
1 975 57.1 2.9 8.6 53.1 9.4 12.5
1 976 17.9 14.3 1 0.7 24.4 4.4 26.7
1 977 1 5.4 1 5.4 7.7 4.5 • 6.8
1 978 31 .6 5.3 1 5.8 18.5 7.4 1 1.1
1 979 38.5 7.7 7.7 5.8 9.6 7.7
1 980 1 6.7 5.6 1 6.7 8.3 12.5 10.4
1 981 34.6 7.7 1 5.4 25.0 1 1.7 6.7
1 982 33.3 22.2 22.2 18.4 31.6 2.6
1 983 - - 1 1.8 5.1 12.8 15.4
1 984 13.3 - 6.7 8.6 5.7 2.9
1 985 16.7 11.1 11.1 23.7 15.8 1 0.5
1 986 - - 1 0.0 19.0 9.5 -
1 987 10.0 - - 26.5 5.9 2.9
*LOC = Log of Claims
Strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims, notwithstanding the number of bans, 
show the same change in trend as NSW and Victoria from 1983. At a time when strikes 
overall were low, the issues either singly or in aggregation, accounted for a reduced 
number and percentage of total strike action.
5 . 1 . 5 .  Western Australia
Out of the three categories, Log of Claims represented the highest number of disputes in 
1979-81, and Allowances in 1986. In all other years Pay was clearly the major issue 
of the three. (See Figure 15A)
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The rise and fall curve varies in some years to that for all strikes.3. (See Figure 1E). 
The issues either singly or in aggregation do not represent very high proportions of all 
strikes; At no time during the survey period did the combined issues exceed 50 per cent 
of the total and in most years they were below 30 per cent. (See Figure 15B) Overall 
peak strike activity in Western Australia occurred in 1980 of which Pay, Allowances 
and Log of Claims accounted for only 13 per cent. Alternatively, the issues in 
aggregation were at their highest levels in 1974 and 1978, which were also periods of 
high strike activity. The period of lowest strike activity (1984-85) also experienced 
the fewest disputes over Pay, and Log of Claims (no Allowances). That small number 
represented a very small percentage of overall strikes.
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While Pay and Log of Claims fluctuated, the level of Allowances remained fairly static 
numerically. As a percentage, Allowances were higher in 1982, 1983, 1986 and 1987 
than they had been at any time in the preceding period. In 1984 and 1985 there were no 
disputes over Allowances recorded and very few for the other two issues.
As Figure 1E reveals, there are some difficulties in drawing conclusions from the 
Western Australia data set. When my data is used, it appears that West Australia 
followed the same trend as NSW, Victoria and South Australia, with a reduction in 
strikes from 1984-85 over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims.4 This corresponded to a 
decrease in the overall number of strikes, according to my data. If the ABS data is used, 
the same conclusions would be drawn as those for Queensland.
3 The ABS curve is closer in Figure 1E than the curve in my data for some of the period. This 
is particularly noticeable because of the divergence that occurs between the two sets of data 
for West Australia.
4 The trend was evident earlier, in 1983, in the other States.
5 . 1 . 6 . Tasmania
While Pay was the predominant issue of the three, Allowances and Log of Claims 
accounted for a comparatively greater number of strikes in Tasmania than in the other 
states looked at to date. (See Figure 16A) From 1985 onwards, Allowances was the 
outstanding issue.
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The curve for the period in terms of rise and fall is almost the same as for all strikes in 
Tasmania. (See Figure 1F) Peak strike activity for the issues in aggregation occurred in 
1984, and represented 77.3 per cent of strike involvement. (See Figure 16B) This 
situation was unique to Tasmania. Over the entire survey period, Pay, Allowances or Log 
of Claims were often responsible for high percentages of strike activity. Their 
involvement however, was somewhat erratic on a year to year basis.
The above largely explains the variations in curves: For example, in 1975, strikes 
declined overall, followed by an increase in 1976. The curve for the three issues shows 
the reverse. In 1975, in aggregation they accounted for 100 per cent of all strikes, an 
increase from 57.2 per cent the previous year. In 1976, they fell from 100 per cent to 
only 12.5 per cent. The same reason applied for the variations that occurred in 1981- 
82 and 1987.
A decline in the number of strikes due to Pay and Log of Claims from 1985-87 was 
accompanied by unprecedented numbers of disputes where Allowances was the issue. 
Apart from 1975, this also represented an increase in Allowances as a percentage of all 
strikes. In doing so, Allowances either alone or in aggregation maintained, (and even 
increased in some years), pre-1984 proportions.
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Tasmania reproduced the Queensland trend in the latter period. Strikes overall were 
high in 1984 and despite a decline thereafter, remained higher than in the 1973-78 
period. Unlike the other states, Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims continued to 
represent substantial proportions of overall activity from 1984, particularly 
Allowances.
5 . 1 . 7 .  Northern Terri tory
In the Northern Territory, Pay disputes were marginally higher overall than Allowances 
and Log of Claims. (See Figure 17A)
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The rise and fall curve is the same with the exceptions of 1980 and 1983. (See Figure 
1H) In both years, the number of strikes overall increased. While in 1980 Pay, 
Allowances and Log of Claims remained static in numbers, as a percentage of overall 
strikes they declined from 50 per cent to 20 per cent. In 1983, no strikes involving
the three issues were recorded. The rise and fall of one or more of the issues appears to 
roughly reflect the rise and fall of percentage shares. (See Figure 17B)
Strikes which were attributed to the three issues, either singly or in combination, 
accounted for 50 per cent or more of overall strikes in only three years: in 1976 and 
1979, (50 per cent); and in 1981, (54.6 per cent). The Northern Territory reflects 
the situation in Queensland. Contrary to the national trend, peak strike activity 
occurred in 1984, with Allowances and Log of Claims accounting for only 16.7 per cent 
of all strikes.
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The trend in other states towards a decline in overall strike activity did not occur in the 
Northern Territory, although the decline in the aggregated three issues as a percentage 
of overall strike activity was consistent with elsewhere. Nor was the trend towards a 
decline in the number of strikes involving one or more of the issues evident after 1984. 
As Figure 17A indicates, apart from 1981 where there was a sharp increase in Log of 
Claims disputes, the numbers for the period 1984-87 were not significantly different 
to 1973-82.
5.1.8.  Australian Capital Territory
Strikes over Pay were the major issue of the three in the ACT between 1975 and 1985. 
No strikes that were due to Pay, Allowances or Log of Claims were recorded in 1973-74 
and 1986. Pay and Allowances in 1980 and 1981 provided the only examples of more 
than one issue occurring simultaneously. (See Figure 18A)
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As Figure 1H indicates, the rise and fall curve for all strikes in the ACT is not in overall 
agreement with Figure 18A. While overall strike activity was quite moderate in its 
fluctuations, strikes recorded over Pay and Allowances tended to rise and fall 
dramatically, (Log of Claims were recorded only once, in 1985.) In 1978, when 
overall strike activity had declined slightly, there was an increase in the number of 
strikes over Pay. This also represented a marked rise in the percentage of strikes over 
Pay, from 28.6 per cent in 1977 to 66.7 per cent in 1978. (See Figure 18B)
In 1981 when strikes over Pay and Allowances were at their highest, for the survey 
period, they also accounted for 66.7 per cent of all strikes. An increase from 45.5 per 
cent in the previous year. Alternatively, in 1976 when the number of strikes overall 
were low, Pay, represented 50 per cent of their number.
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As in South Australia, bans were the major form of industrial disputation in the ACT. 
Except in 1973, 1978 and 1987, bans exceeded strikes. As Table 4 demonstrates,
strike activity appears to have been supported by bans every year that Pay was an 
issue.5 From 1981-86, bans in relation to Allowances became a regular, (if not 
significant in terms of percentages) issue; in contrast there was an absence of strikes 
over Allowances between 1982-86.
Table 4
ACT Strikes and Bans - 1973-87
YEAR STRIKE ACTIVITY BAN ACTIVITY
Pav Allowances LOC* Pav Allowances LOC
1 973
% %
1 974 - - - - - -
1 975 - - - - - -
1976 50.0 - - 14.3 - -
1 977 28.6 - - 6.7 - 6.7
1978 66.7 - - 50.0 - -
1979 20.0 - - 66.7 - .
1 980 18.2 27.3 - 15.8 - -
1981 33.3 33.3 - 20.0 16.0 8.0
1 982 33.3 - - 17.6 11 .8 -
1 983 - - - 3.8 11 .5 -
1984 50.0 - - 9.1 13.6 -
1 985 - - - - 1 1.8 -
1 986 - - - - 14.3 14.3
1987 - 25.0 - 16.7 - -
LOC = Log of claims
The two peak years in terms of ban activity make for interesting comparison: In 1981, 
Pay and Allowances accounted for 66.7 per cent of all strikes which at the time were 
relatively high in number; bans over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims accounted for 
44.0 per cent in the same year. Just two years later in 1983, strike numbers fell and 
none were recorded that involved any of the three issues. Despite the marked increase in 
bans that year, there was still a drop in the number that were concerned with Pay and 
Allowances. They accounted for a mere 15.3 per cent of all bans.
The trend as regards strikes which has been identified in most of the other states, 
generally manifested itself in the ACT. Between 1983-86 a change can be seen in terms 
of the numbers of strikes over the three issues, although there was an increase in 1984, 
with Pay accounting for 50 per cent of all strikes.
The use of bans on the other hand, tended to compensate for the reduced use of strikes as 
far as Allowances were concerned, and to a lesser extent, Pay. Nevertheless, despite the
5 The extent to which bans were supportive cannot be determined from the Table. On some 
occasions it can be assumed that strikes and bans were discrete activities.
clear preference for bans, Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims represented only a small 
proportion of overall activity, so that they too, followed the trend identified elsewhere.
5 . 2 .  CONCLUSION
The trend towards a decline in industrial disputation after 1981-82 and a coinciding 
decrease in the number of strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims was common to 
most states. There was not however a common pattern to that decline: In NSW, South 
Australia and West Australia, the decline for both had started in 1982; when the three 
issues started to decline in Victoria, overall strike numbers were already on the 
decrease from the previous year; and in the ACT, there was a coinciding decline from 
1983 with strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims increasing in 1984. In 
Victoria, Western Australia and the ACT, the trend was reversed in 1987, when strikes 
overall began to increase with a concomitant increase in disputes involving the three 
issues.
In keeping with the other states, disputes involving Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims 
declined in Queensland in 1982. The number of strikes overall however, increased in 
1983. Queensland also experienced an increase in strikes and the three issues in 1987. 
In the Northern Territory, both were subject to fluctuations from 1981 with generally, 
a comparatively high level of strikes overall. The three issues did not necessarily 
coincide with the overall trend.
It is to be expected that an overall decline in the number of strikes would result also in a 
decline in the number of disputes over a given issue. Nevertheless, the survey revealed 
that the downward trend in most states from 1981-82, also resulted in a reduction in 
Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims as a percentage of strikes.
Without exception, the percentage share of the three issues was higher in the period 
1973-81 and in some states, it was still high in 1982. The variations between states 
was quite considerable. For the period 1973-81, strikes involving Pay, Allowances and 
Log of Claims in NSW ranged between 30-50 per cent and in 1982, 21.6 per cent; in 
Victoria, 41.3-84 per cent and 50 per cent; in Queensland, 30-61 per cent and 29.3 
per cent; in South Australia, 38.5-80 per cent and 77 per cent (bans were 38.5-80 
per cent and 52.6 per cent); in Western Australia, 13-42.1 per cent and 48.1 per 
cent; in Tasmania 12.5-100 per cent and 25 per cent; in the Northern Territory, 0- 
54.6 per cent and 20 per cent; and in the ACT, 0-66.7 per cent and 33.3 per cent (bans 
were 13.4-44 per cent and 16.7 per cent).
From 1983-86, notwithstanding the variations in the trend as outlined earlier, every 
state experienced a decline in these percentages. As was the case during the earlier
period, the variations were considerable. In NSW, the three issues were involved 
between 17.3-20.7 per cent and in 1987, 33.4 per cent; in Victoria, 30-43.2 per cent 
and 47.3 per cent; in Queensland, 10.5-15.9 per cent and 43.4 per cent; in South 
Australia, 10-38.9 per cent and 10 per cent (bans were 11.3-77.8 per cent and 35.3 
per cent); in Western Australia, 5-25 per cent and 40 per cent; in Tasmania, 14.3- 
55.5 per cent and 50 per cent; in the Northern Territory, 0-30 per cent and 20 per 
cent; and in the ACT, 0-50 per cent and 25 per cent (bans were 11.8-28.6 per cent and 
15.7 per cent).
The percentage increases in Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia in 1987 
coincided with the increase in overall strike levels. NSW was the only state where the 
increase occurred in contrast to a continued decline in overall strike numbers. Although 
there is no instance of the maximum percentage from the earlier period being achieved, 
the increases indicate that a reversal to the earlier trend may have begun, at least in 
these states.
Bearing in mind that Log of Claims will include some issues unrelated to Pay and 
Allowances, it is reasonable to assume that, as the two issues declined in relative 
importance to other issues from 1982 and 1983, the percentage of Log of Claims that 
included either, would also decline. It remains to be seen then, whether the relationship 
between Pay and Allowances changed with the overall downturn in strike activity
In NSW and Victoria , while Pay declined in numbers and as a percentage from 1983- 
1986, Allowances maintained pre-existing levels and percentages. In both states, there 
was an increase in Pay disputes in 1987. In Queensland, where peak strike activity 
occurred during the latter period, Pay and Allowances remained low. There was however 
a difference proportionately given the former relationship. Allowances, between 1982- 
86 were much the same as a percentage as they had been earlier, while Pay showed a 
marked decline. Strikes over Pay and Allowances fell in South Australia between 
1983-87, with Allowances featuring only once. Conversely, bans over both issues 
remained, more consistently in the case of bans and somewhat reduced as a percentage in 
each case. In Western Australia, Pay declined in number and as a percentage between 
1982-87, while Allowances increased to a higher level and proportion than they had 
ever been. Between 1983-87, in Tasmania, Allowances attained higher levels than in 
any year during the earlier period, and generally higher percentages. Pay on the other 
hand, declined, with the exception of 1984 when, like Queensland, peak activity 
occurred. The Northern Territory experienced a decline in Pay and Allowances as far as 
numbers and percentages were concerned. Even so, there was a change in the 
relationship. From 1982-87 (with no strikes for either issue recorded in 1983),
Allowances were generally higher than bans both in number and as a percentage of 
strikes. There were no strikes recorded for Allowances between 1982-86 in the ACT, 
while Pay featured in 1982 and 1984. Alternatively, bans were applied consistently 
from 1981-86 although they represented only small percentages. In contrast, bans 
over Pay were applied only once, in 1984, the same year that strikes were recorded. In 
1987, strikes were recorded over Allowances, but not over Pay.
It can therefore be concluded that while both Pay and Allowances suffered a decline from 
1982, Allowances retained a greater percentage of overall strike action. There was a 
decided change in the relationship between the two from 1982 onwards that extended to 
1986 in some states and 1987 in others.
The variations in the degree to which Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims changed in 
relation to overall trends has been outlined above. In the following section, I will 
analyse a wider range of issues with a view to identifying the extent of change that 
occurred in other areas, and the concerns they expressed.
When I spoke to the research officer at the ACTU, I indicated to him that my research 
based on both data and anecdotal evidence suggested that in some industries there had 
been an increase in disputes over Allowances. He was reluctant to comment, although he 
acknowledged that the ACTU was aware of such claims. He further added that the resort 
to income maintenance through increased Allowances was discouraged by the ACTU as 
being outsided the Accord guidelines.
Chapter Six
MAJOR CAUSES OF DISPUTATION
To ascertain the dominant trends in issues and their divergences, the following data is 
comprised of the two most prominent issues that precipitated industrial action during 
each year. Log of Claims has been an added where it was not itself one of the two major 
issues. The analysis will, like the previous section, concentrate on strike data unless 
otherwise specified.
From the outset it is clear that 'two issues' is something of a misnomer. Indeed it is 
most frequently the case that even where there is a clear first issue, a number of other 
second issues may combine to equal or surpass the first issue. So although one issue may 
represent a greater percentage than any other single issue, in terms of overall 
disputation it may not amount to a significant proportion.
6 . 1 .1 .  New South Wales
For the period 1973-82, Pay, Dismissals and Managerial Policy were the issues at the 
forefront of industrial action in NSW. The only year that Pay was not one of the first 
two issues was 1980. As figure 11C indicates, notwithstanding the primacy of these 
issues over that period, in only one of the years, 1973, did they account for over 50 per 
cent of all strikes.1 From 1983, there was a distinct change in the issues. At a time 
when strike activity was at its lowest in NSW (See Figure 1A), Managerial Policy 
dominated. Until 1987, Pay was not one of the two major issues, although Allowances 
featured in 1984.
Along with Managerial Policy, issues associated with security of employment, appeared 
as first or second issues: in 1983, Job Maintenance and Manning; and in 1985,
Dismissals. Health and Safety featured in 1986 and 1987 for the first time.
1 Not including Log of Claims which, with the exception of 1975, did not represent first or 
second issues.
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The curve for strikes overall (see Figure 1A), generally reflects the curve for the main 
issues. (See Figure 11D) While this would seem to be a predictable result of combining 
the two or more major issues, this was not necessarily the case as analysis of other 
states and Territories will show.
The number of strikes overall did not necessarily reflect the primacy of the major 
issues. In 1981, when strikes peaked for the period, Pay, Allowances and Hours 
represented only 47 per cent of all strikes although as Figure 11D shows there was a 
marked increase in the number of disputes over major issues. Even so, the numbers 
were not as high as they were in 1973 when strikes overall were almost as high as 
1981, and the major issues accounted for 60.5 per cent. In both instances it should be 
noted that there were two second issues rather than one, which was the norm.
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By way of contrast, in 1987 when strikes overall were at their lowest, the major issues 
accounted for 69 per cent of all strikes. With Pay, Allowances and Union equally the
first issues, and Health and Safety and Managerial Policy the second issues, it appears at 
first glance that a greater diversity of issues had emerged. In fact, these issues had 
always been features of industrial disputation in NSW. What had changed was the 
proportions.
6 . 1 . 2 .  Victor ia
As in NSW, strikes in Victoria were dominated by three issues between 1973-1982. 
They were Pay, Conditions and Log of Claims. The only exceptions were 1973, when 
Union replaced Conditions and 1981, when Hours was equal to Log of Claims and 
Conditions as second issues. Unlike NSW, these issues in aggregation accounted for high 
percentages of overall strikes. In these years, only 1978 and 1980 did not amount to 
more than 50 per cent. (See Figure 12C) From 1983, Allowances, Job Maintenance and 
Managerial Policy started to feature with a decline in Log of Claims.
The only year throughout the entire survey period when Pay did not feature was 1985. 
In every other year Pay was the first issue, and only once, in 1983 was that position 
shared (with Job Maintenance).
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The curve for strikes overall (See Figure IB), varies between 1977-81. Otherwise it 
is roughly similar to the curve of the main issues. (See Figure 12D)
As was the case in NSW, the number of strikes overall did not necessarily reflect the 
primacy of the major issues. For example, in 1978 and 1980 when strike activity was 
high, Pay and Log of Claims accounted for 42.3 per cent and 29.3 per cent respectively. 
Alternatively, in 1986 when overall strike activity was relatively low, Pay, 
Superannuation and Conditions, accounted for 50 per cent of strikes.
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Both NSW and Victoria display distinct trends in their patterns of industrial action: 
There was a concentration of issues between 1973-82, followed by a decrease in levels 
of disputation and a corresponding introduction of a range of other issues that had not 
hitherto featured in first or second place. Although Pay was a major issue in both states 
between 1973-82, only in Victoria did it persist, while in NSW, its place was taken 
until 1987 by other issues.
6.1.3.  Queensland
Pay, Conditions, Dismissals, Managerial Policy and Log of Claims were the issues at the 
forefront of industrial action in Queensland between 1973-82. From 1973 until 1978, 
and in 1981, various combinations of these issues accounted for 50 per cent or more of 
all strike activity. (See Figure 13C) In each of those years Pay was a major issue.
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Pay ceased to feature as a main issue from 1982-1986, and Log of Claims from 1983.
Conditions, Managerial Policy and Dismissals remained. In addition, there were Hours 
in 1983-84, Contract Labour in 1985 and Health and Safety in 1986.
Comparison of the curves in Figures 1C and 13D shows that they are almost identical in 
terms of rise and fall (but not peaks). Over the early part of the period, between 
1973-81, the number of strikes tended to reflect the primacy of issues. From 1982 
until 1986, (years incidentally when Pay had ceased to feature), the major issues 
accounted for less than 50 per cent of all strike action. This was the case even in 1984, 
when strike activity overall was at its highest since 1973.
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Figure 13D
Although the pattern of strike activity in Queensland is similar to NSW and Victoria in 
showing a distinct change in the pattern of industrial action from 1982, it differs 
significantly otherwise. Where overall disputation had decreased over that period in the 
other two states, in Queensland, it remained high until 1985. In addition, Queensland 
appears to have had a more dynamic situation as far as second issues were concerned 
particularly over the earlier period.
Over the latter period, there was a change in trend insofar as, when strike activity was 
high, the major issues were not responsible for the majority of disputation as they had 
been during the earlier period.
6.1.4.  South Australia
Between 1973-82, Pay was the first issue in South Australia with Allowances and 
Conditions as the predominant second issues. There were however a number of other 
issues which assumed secondary importance in some years, in particular 1977, where 
Pay, Allowances and Dismissals were equally first with a range of other issues equally 
second. As Figure 14C indicates, the major issues during each year of the survey
accounted for at least 50 per cent of all strikes, and usually considerably more.
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In keeping with the other states, a change in trend is evident from 1983. Job 
Maintenance became the major issue in 1983 and 1984. Security of employment was 
again prominent in 1986 with Contract Labour and Manning disputes accounting for 
first issues and Job Maintenance as a second issue. 1986 also saw the emergence of 
Superannuation as a first issue. By 1987 it had become the outstanding issue.
The curve for the number of strikes overall between 1973-82 (see Figure 1D) reflects 
the rise and fall of first and second issues in Figure 14D. For the period 1983-86, the 
curves are almost opposite, although the degree of rise and fall is minimal.
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During the years of peak strike activity (1973, 1975 and 1981) there were clear cut 
first and second issues. Pay was first in each case with Allowances and Manning as 
second in 1973, Dismissals in 1975 and Demarcation in 1981. While this was also
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true for non-peak years as well, it was by no means the rule. In 1977, 1984, 1986 
and 1987 when overall strike numbers were low, a large number of second issues 
reveal wide-ranging concerns.
Between 1973-75, strikes were the major form of industrial disputation in South 
Australia. From 1977, bans became the major form, and as such, the discussion of 
issues would be incomplete without some appraisal of their role.
As Figure 14E(i) indicates, in the years 1973-78, bans generally reflected the 
concerns of strike activity. Strikes over Pay were accompanied by bans, and Union as a 
second issue was prominent.
In 1979, bans reached an unprecedented high level for the 1970s, in contrast to a low 
level of strikes. Health and Safety as first issue and Demarcation as second, accounted 
for 59.7 per cent of all bans, whereas strikes had been concerned with Pay and 
Conditions. In that year at least, the nexus between strikes and bans appears to have 
broken with two quite distinctive sets of concerns operating.2
In only one year, 1977, did the two major issues fail to account for at least 50 per cent 
of all bans (34.1 per cent). An interesting corollary to this lies in the multitude of 
second issues that 1977 saw in strikes.
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2 This is borne out by the complete data. Pay and Conditions in 1979 accounted for only 5.8 
per cent and 1.9 per cent respectively, of bans. There were no strikes recorded over Health 
and Safety, and Demarcation accounted for 7.7 per cent.
From 1980-82, Pay continued to dominate as first or second issue, with a marked 
increase in the number of disputes over allowances. As Figure 14E(ii) indicates, in 
1982 there was a decline in the number of strikes and bans, the same year in which Pay 
and Allowances ceased to simultaneously be responsible for the majority of disputes. 
While strikes from 1983, became increasingly concerned with security of employment 
and conditions, bans continued to be applied over Pay as well as issues for which strike 
action had been taken. Although strike activity was low between 1983-87, bans 
remained relatively high. In 1987, when Superannuation was an outstanding first issue 
for strikes, an equal number of bans placed Superannuation second to Pay.
Between 1973-79, the first and second issues accounted for the majority of bans, with 
the exception of 1977, when they accounted for only 34.1 per cent. From 1980, there 
was a definite change. Notwithstanding the high number of bans, the major issues ceased 
to occupy more than half in each year, with the exception of 1982 (50 per cent), 1985 
(55.3 per cent) and 1986 (52.4 per cent). An interesting aspect to these exceptions is 
that in each of those years, Pay disputes were a major issue (in 1982 and 1985 
Allowances also), while in 1977, Pay had not been an issue. It should be noted however 
that in 1979, Pay was not an issue, and in the latter period, Pay was an issue in 1987.
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Since 1976, the pattern of strike action in South Australia has tended towards a 
diversity of issues. No change in respect of that pattern is evident during the survey 
period. In keeping with the other states, there was however a change from 1983 
onwards as far as the issues were concerned. Bans were generally more numerous, and
more concentrated. In the period 1973-78 they reflected the concerns of strikes while 
in most of the following years (1981-82 and 1987 being notable exceptions) there 
appears to be little relationship between the two activities.
6 . 1 . 5 .  Western Australia
Between 1973-85, Managerial Policy was the issue at the forefront of industrial 
disputation in Western Australia, with Pay, Conditions and Union most frequently, the 
additional issues.3 (See Figure 15C) Western Australia differs from the other states 
looked at so far in two respects: First, between 1978-81, Pay is not either the first or 
the second issue. Secondly, it was not until 1984 that an alteration in trend as far as 
issues are concerned, is identifiable.
In only three years, 1978, 1981 and 1986 did the major issues not account for at least 
50 per cent of all strike activity. These were also years incidentally, which did not see 
Pay as a major issue. There does not appear to be any pattern to the relationship 
between strike levels and issue intensity. As was the case elsewhere, periods of high 
disputation did not necessarily reveal a prominent issue. In 1978 when overall strike 
activity was high, Managerial Policy and Conditions accounted for only 35 per cent.
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The curve for strikes overall in my data4 (See Figure 1E) reflects the curve for main 
issues. (See Figure 15D) In 1984, the number of strikes was at its lowest for the 
entire survey period with a corresponding increase in the number of issues which were 
of importance. While Conditions and Managerial Policy retained their previous status, 
issues such as Dismissals, Demarcation, Contract Labour, Union and Job Maintenance
3 Their status as first or second issues was interchangeable.
4 But not the ABS curve.
appeared. Although the status quo returned to some extent in 1985, Dismissals 
remained, and by 1986, Health and Safety and Dismissals accounted for first and second 
issues. Conditions and Managerial Policy on the other hand, declined to 7.5 per cent 
each, the lowest that either had been up until that time. In 1987, they declined even 
further to 4.0 per cent each.
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Despite differences in the major issue over the earlier years, Western Australia follows 
the same trend as most of the other states: Following a decline in the number of overall 
strikes from 1983, there was a distinct change in the issues which predominated in 
strike action. As in the other states, issues that were concerned with security of 
employment and the maintenance of existing conditions, achieved importance.
6.1.6.  Tasmania
Between 1973 -82, Pay, Dismissals and Managerial Policy were, like NSW, the issues 
at the forefront of industrial action in Tasmania. Again, like NSW, 1980 was the only 
year when Pay was not one of the first two issues. Unlike NSW, as Figure 16C indicates, 
these issues accounted for the majority of all strikes. In only one year, 1981 (and that 
includes the whole survey period) did the major issues not predominate.
There was a partial change in trend from 1983 onwards. Pay as a first or second issue 
featured in 1984 and 1987, but appears to have been replaced by Allowances in the 
other years. As for the other issues that had been prominent in the earlier period, they 
continued to hold their place. From 1984-87, overall strike levels in Tasmania were 
relatively high, (see Figure 1F) which suggests that apart from the decline of Pay as an 
issue, concern over the other issues had heightened.
Tasmania Strikes - 1973-87 
Main Issues and Log of Claims
</>
®
CD
05
c
®o
®
Q -
150
100 -
50 -
7 3 7 4 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 0 8 1 8 2 8 3 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7  
Figure 16C
13 Log of Claims 
Q  Dismiss.
□  Man. Pol.
□  Demarc.
Ö  Union
0  Cont. Lab.
■  Mann.
□  Job maint.
E3 Hours
E l Conds.
0 Allow.
■  Pay
The curve for strikes overall (see Figure 1F) reflects the rise and fall curve for the 
main issues, but not necessarily the peaks. (See Figure 16D) While this is readily 
explainable in states like NSW where frequently, the major issues did not account for 
the majority of strike action, in Tasmania where the opposite was the case, it would be 
expected that the peaks would coincide. In fact, the deviations are caused by variations 
in the percentages. For example, in 1981 when overall strike numbers showed a slight 
increase, a decline is registered for main issues. 1981 was the only year when the 
percentage of main issues dropped below 50 per cent. In 1985-87 where overall strike 
activity is fairly static, there was a decrease in 1986 followed by a sharp increase in 
1987. The percentage involvement of main issues for these years was 63.7 per cent, 
55.5 per cent and 100 per cent respectively.
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Tasmania resembles Queensland in its pattern of strike activity in respect of increased 
numbers in 1984, followed by a decline. There is a difference however insofar as the
numbers in Tasmania did not fall below the 1970s level. In terms of issues, there was a 
discernible change in trend that was not as distinctive as the change that occurred in 
other states.
6 . 1 . 7 .  Northern Territory
Pay, Allowances and Managerial Policy were the major issues in the Northern Territory 
between 1973-82. There were no strikes recorded in 1977. As Figure 17C 
demonstrates, the major issues accounted for more than 50 per cent of all strikes 
during the entire survey period.
From 1983, a change in trend is discernible. While Managerial Policy retained its 
position as a first or second issue, Pay featured only once, in 1985 and Allowances once, 
in 1987. Issues concerned with security of employment attained greater emphasis than 
in the earlier period, along with Health & Safety in 1983 and 1984. (These issues had 
also been prevalent in 1982 along with Pay and Allowances.)
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The curve for strikes overall (See Figure 1G) generally reflects the curve for main 
issues, although the peaks do not always coincide. (See Figure 17D) The reasons why 
are the same for the Northern Territory as they were for Tasmania. That is, there were 
marked variations in the percentages, even though the major issues always accounted for 
over 50 per cent of strikes. In 1981, for example, the three major issues accounted for 
63.7 per cent, down from 100 per cent in 1980. Again, in 1984 when strikes overall 
peaked, the major issues represented only 50 per cent, a drop from 91.8 per cent in the 
previous year.
t/>
5
E©
2
Northern Territory Strikes - 1973-87 
Main Issues and Log of Claims
5  Other
□  Hlth&Saf.
H] Log of Claims
□  Political
■  Dismiss.
□  Man. pol.
□  Union
□  Cont. Lab.
§  Mann.
■  Job maint.
□  Hours 
0  Conds.
HI Super 
E3 Allow.
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 ■  Pay
Figure 17D
The Northern Territory, like Tasmania ran counter to the national trend, in respect of 
strike activity remaining relatively high from 1984-87. Nevertheless, despite the 
increased strike activity, the trend in the states towards a decrease in Pay as an issue 
from 1983 was evident also in the Northern Territory.
6 . 1 . 8 .  Australian Capital Territory
Pay was the most frequent major issue between 1976-82. Even so, for the period 
1973-82, a number of other issues, concerned mostly with job security were 
prominent and, if aggregated, more prevalent than Pay even when combined with 
Allowances. No strikes were recorded in 1974. As Figure 18C shows, the major issues 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of strike activity during the entire survey period.
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There was some change in trend from 1983. Pay and Allowances featured only once in
1984 and 1987 respectively; Union and Dismissals disappeared as first or second 
issues. The emphasis on security of employment that had been evident in the earlier 
period, was undiminished. The aggregation of Job Maintenance and Contract labour would 
be sufficient to make job security the major issue for the entire period. In addition, 
Political as an issue arose in 1983, and Superannuation in 1987.
The curve for the number of strikes overall (see Figure 1H) reflects the rise and fall of 
first and second issues in Figure 18D, except for 1982. The same reasons for the 
deviation in the ACT apply here as elsewhere. In 1981 major issues had accounted for 
88.8 per cent of all strikes, and dropped to 66.7 per cent in 1982.
ACT Strikes - 1973-87 
Main Issues and Log of Claims
<5
- O
E
z
150
100 -
50 -
7 3 7 4 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 0 8 1  8 2 8 3 8 4 8 5 8 6 8 7  
Figure 18D
□ Other
m Political
□ Super.
□ Log of Claims
□ Dismiss.
a Man. Pol.
□ Demarc.
□ Union
■ Cont. Lab.
m Mann.
m Job Maint.
□ Hlth & Saf.
□ Hoursm Conds.
Allow.
■ Pay
In 1973, 1978 and 1987 strikes were the preferred form of industrial action in the 
ACT; in 1975 strikes and bans were equal. In all other years, bans were the preferred 
form. Consequently an appraisal of their role will be included in the analysis.
As Figure 18E(i) shows, in the years 1973*79, strikes and bans were concerned with a 
variety of issues. In a less structured way, the pattern reflects the situation in South 
Australia. Meaning that bans tended to reflect the concerns of strike activity, albeit, not 
necessarily at the same time.
Two issues alone were confined to a particular activity: Only strikes occurred over 
Contract Labour (in 1977 and 1978). In both cases, Contract Labour was a second issue 
and accounted for only 16.7 per cent and 14.3 per cent respectively, of all strike 
activity. It should be recalled though, that strikes were the preferred form of industrial 
action in 1978 accounting for 75 per cent in a year when overall disputation was low. 
The second issue, Political, occurred in 1974, 1976 and 1977, and involved only bans. 
In contrast to Contract Labour, Political was the first issue on each occasion and
responsible for sizeable proportions of ban activity. In 1974 and 1976, 57.1 per cent 
and in 1977, 46.7 per cent. In each of those years, bans were the preferred form of 
direct action accounting for 100 per cent in 1974 (there were no strikes recorded for 
that year); 57.1 per cent in 1976, when overall disputation was low; and 46.7 per cent 
in 1977, a year of increased levels of overall disputation.
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In 1980, bans increased to unprecedented levels and remained high until 1985. During 
the same period, strikes were comparatively low, despite increased activity between 
1 9 8 0 - 8 2 .
As Figure 18E(ii) indicates, strikes and bans were concerned with a variety of issues in 
the years 1980-87 as they had been in the seventies. Only one issue, Dismissals has 
been deleted as a major issue, while Superannuation, Health & Safety and Demarcation 
disputes are added. Once again, bans tended to reflect the concerns of strike activity, and 
from 1985 were more structured in the sense that strikes and bans occurred over the 
same issues simultaneously.
One issue was confined to a particular activity: Only strikes occurred over
Superannuation as a major issue (in 1987)5. It was a first issue equal to Allowances, 
Hours and Health and Safety and accounted for 25 per cent of all strikes. 1987 was a 
peak year for strikes in the ACT, and for the first time since 1978, the preferred form 
of industrial action, accounting for 61.5 per cent of disputation.
5 There were a number of bans applied over Superannuation in 1984 however they accounted 
for only 9.1 per cent, and did not qualify as a first or second issue.
Peak years for both activities occurred during the eighties and were accompanied by 
several changes in the pattern of disputation. In 1980-81, bans peaked and strikes 
were relatively high (in comparison to the seventies). Pay and Allowances were the 
issues that dominated strike action, while bans favoured Demarcation disputes with 
Allowances in 1981 in support of strike action6 . While strikes increased slightly in 
1982, the number of bans fell sharply. Pay was a first issue for strikes and second 
issue for bans; no other issues were shared.
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Strike activity declined in 1983, while bans rose to a peak level. There were no 
common issues. From 1984-86, strikes remained low and increased to their peak in 
1987. During the same period, bans had started to fall. Over this latter period, there 
was a much greater tendency for strikes and bans to reflect the same concerns, with 
emphases on Conditions, Manning, Hours and Contract Labour in contrast to the early 
eighties when Pay and Allowances had dominated. In this context it should also be noted 
that between 1985-87, although there was a decline in bans, and until 1987, strikes 
were low, both activities involved a greater number of issues (that qualified as first or 
second) than normal.
Between 1974-80, first and second issues occupied the majority of bans. From 1981- 
84, this trend was reversed. In those years 1982 was the exception: major issues 
accounted for 64.6 per cent. However, 1982 was also a year when the number of bans 
fell quite markedly. In 1985, when the number of bans decreased, the major issues as a
6 Note earlier reservation about support.
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percentage of total bans, increased. This was also the period when a more structured 
relationship between strikes and bans emerged.
6. 2 .  CONCLUSION
States which experienced the highest numbers of strikes were more likely to show clear 
cut first and second issues.7 That is not to say that those states had a narrower range of 
issues which was not the case. Rather, the larger number made for clearer 
identification of the issues involving the highest disputation. As the analysis indicated, 
in NSW for example, the major issues only once accounted for half the total number of 
strikes. While the percentages share varied amongst the high strike states, it was rare 
for them to attain the same levels as the states in which fewer strikes were recorded.8
Notwithstanding the differences mentioned above, a change in trend was identified in all 
states, usually from 1982 or 1983 onwards. As far as the larger strike states were 
concerned, in NSW, from 1973-82, Pay, Dismissals and Managerial Policy dominated, 
while from 1983, Managerial Policy, Allowances and issues concerned with security of 
employment were prominent. Pay, Conditions and Log of Claims occupied the 1973-82 
period in Victoria with Pay, Allowances, Superannuation and in one year only, Job 
Maintenance in the latter period. In Queensland, Pay, Conditions, Dismissals, 
Managerial Policy and Log of Claims were at the forefront between 1973-82. With 
Conditions and Managerial Policy remaining, Dismissals, Hours, Contract Labour and 
Health & Safety became major issues. Western Australia, between 1973-83 was 
dominated by Managerial Policy and Conditions. Pay was also a major issue although it 
did not feature between 1978-81, and in some years, Union was prominent. From 
1984, Conditions, Managerial Policy and security of employment became the major 
concerns.
In respect of the smaller strike states, Pay, Allowances and Conditions, plus an 
assortment of other issues accounted for first and second issues in South Australia 
between 1973-82. From 1983 onwards, Superannuation and issues concerned with 
security of employment became dominant. Between 1973-82 in Tasmania, Pay 
Dismissals and Managerial Policy were the major issues. From 1983 onwards, Pay (to 
a lesser extent), Allowances and Contract Labour featured. In the Northern Territory, 
Pay, Allowances and Managerial Policy were the main issues between 1973-87, while 
Managerial Policy, Health and Safety and issues concerned with security of employment 
occupied the 1983-87 period. Pay and job security issues dominated the 1976-82 
years in the ACT, with Superannuation added to job security between 1983-87.
7That is, NSW, Victoria, Queensland and West Australia.
8 South Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory and ACT
In conclusion, Pay and Managerial Policy were the two issues that were most often the 
major cause of strikes in the period 1973-82. This was the case, to a greater or lesser 
extent, in all states. From 1983, coinciding with the downturn in strike levels in most 
states, there was a change in trend. This was the case even in those states which did not 
have an overall decline in strike numbers. Pay ceased to be a major issue in all states 
except Victoria and Tasmania where, even so, it declined in importance. Managerial 
Policy continued to be a major issue in NSW, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, 
the Northern Territory and ACT. The most significant feature of the trend between 
1983-87 however, was the upsurge in issues associated with security of employment. 
Although these issues (including Job Maintenance, Manning and Contract Labour) had 
been the cause of strike action in the earlier period (particularly in the ACT), they 
achieved much greater prominence from 1983 onwards.
In Chapter Four, the levels of strikes and bans were looked at to identify trends that 
occurred in each state. With the exceptions of Queensland, Tasmania, the Northern 
Territory and ACT, an overall decline in strike numbers was noted in the remaining 
states from between 1980-82. The decline in strike numbers was accompanied by an 
increase in bans as a percentage of industrial action, and in some states represented an 
increase in numbers. This trend was evident also in those states in which strike activity 
did not experience an overall decline, except for the Northern Territory. In Chapter 
Five, the trend was identified in terms of changes when Pay, Allowances and Log of 
Claims were the issues. This chapter has sought to identify trends as far as the whole 
range of issues were concerned. The analysis in both parts has not concerned itself with 
bans except in South Australia and the ACT where they were generally the preferred 
form of industrial action.
A further dimension was added when the causes on a state and industry basis were 
considered. In summary the overall decline in strikes during the 1980s was 
accompanied by a decline in the number of disputes over Pay. While the initial 
observation of these two facts may lead towards the conclusion that a decline in Pay 
disputes is causative, the concomitant reduction of Pay as a percentage of disputes 
suggests that such a conclusion may be an oversimplification. During this period, 
particularly after 1983 when a much more decided change is evident in the level and 
forms of industrial disputation, the issues which were classified as major issues, 
underwent a transformation that, although not uniform in each state, nevertheless 
indicated a changed industrial climate. One of the factors which arose in regard to 
Pay, was the increase in Allowances as a percentage of disputation, and its relative 
stability in terms of numbers. Another pronounced feature at this point was the 
overall increase in job security issues in both numbers and as a percentage of
strikes and bans.
Further analysis of these two coinciding trends revealed traits that were characteristic 
of individual states or industries. A picture emerged whereby basic trends were 
identified that constituted a set of issues which were shared in each state and industry. 
They were Pay, Allowances, Job Maintenance, Union, Demarcation, Managerial Policy, 
Conditions and Log of Claims. In addition, a further set of issues that were relevant to 
particular states or industries were also identified. While the former set of issues 
remained relatively constant throughout, their status as major issues was affected by 
changes in levels of disputation and the emergence of issues from the latter group to 
positions of prominence. Variations were most noticeable upon appraisal of the issues 
which gained prominence in individual states and industries while being almost non­
existent in others. Similarities, apart from the core set, were also identifiable from 
individual analysis. The Hours campaign between 1979-81 for example, was of national 
significance.
134
Chapter Seven
TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTATION
This final section will coordinate the data from the last three chapters in an attempt to 
explain the trends that were revealed. The underlying premise is that industrial 
disputation in Australia is subject to dynamic, often discrete, forces. It is characteristic 
of most areas of disputation that, despite the emergence of trends, divergencies will 
arise; that there will be similarities and differences which are not always explicable; 
and that an instrumentalist mode of analysis may not always reveal the answers to 
questions asked. Nevertheless, the attempt to provide explanations must be attempted 
not in spite of, but because of, the esoteric nature of conflict in Australian industrial 
relations.
7 . 1 .  THE FORMS
7 . 1 . 1 .  State Trends
In Chapter Four it was ascertained that a distinct change in trends was evident in 
industrial disputation during the 1980s. This was born out (at least where strikes were 
concerned) by statistics from ABS. Be that as it may, the analysis from this point on 
will concentrate on the results from my data and research.
On a national basis, as Figure 11 shows, there was a decline in strike numbers from 
1982 which was accompanied by a gradual, albeit slight, increase in bans from 1983. 
Strikes were the preferred form of industrial action on a national basis, being surpassed 
by bans in one year only, 1986 (and then only marginally). Looking at strikes alone, 
the national trend towards a decline is unmistakable. Even when bans are included the 
reduction in disputation on a national level is still evident.
As the state breakdowns have revealed, however, the national trend was not necessarily 
reflected in state trends. NSW, the largest state in terms of disputation, was the only 
state to replicate the national curves. Strikes were the preferred form of industrial 
action apart from 1986 when bans overtook strikes, due to many bans in the 
Construction, Transport and Storage and Other Industries. This coincided with a decline 
in strikes and an increase in bans in the Mining and Manufacturing industries. Although 
there was a marked decline in strike numbers from 1982, a steady increase in bans
from 1983, resulted in peak ban levels during the final survey years despite (or 
perhaps to compensate for) the decline in strikes.
Victoria, the second largest state, was the next closest to the national trend towards a 
decline in disputation in the 1980s, notwithstanding a distinct difference overall in 
gradations. 1 Strikes were the preferred form in Victoria except for 1984-86 when 
they were exceeded by bans in every industry.
Leaving aside for the moment South Australia and the ACT, where bans were the usual 
preferred form, industrial disputation in the remaining states frequently ran counter to 
the national trend. In Queensland, strikes were the preferred form until 1981, when 
bans increased dramatically in number so that, until 1987, they were equal to or 
greater in number than strikes. Even so, Queensland would not have deviated greatly 
from the national trend had it not been for 1984 when peak strike activity was
experienced. This was almost entirely the result of a dispute between electricity
workers, the state Government and SEQEB which will be dealt with in greater detail 
later. Suffice now to say that in terms of levels and forms of disputation, Queensland
differed from the national trend for reasons that were grounded in the internal political,
legal and industrial situation in that state. 2
Western Australia also partially reflected the national trend, although the decline in 
strike numbers during the 1980s lasted only until 1985 when, counter to the national 
trend, they started to increase. Strikes were the preferred form until 1984 at which 
time bans increased to an almost equal number, and by 1987, were the preferred form. 
1987 was also the peak year for bans. The increased strike activity from 1985 in 
Western Australia was an industry-wide phenomenon and, unlike Queensland, not 
attributable to a specific dispute. It can be argued that the increase in bans was in 
accordance with the national trend if their relationship with strikes is discounted.
At first glance Tasmania appears to reflect the national trend during the 1980s. This 
however is true only as far as the rise and fall of the curves and the prominence of bans 
in 1986 are concerned. Closer scrutiny reveals that during the 1970s, the curves had 
been divergent, with the level of disputation well below the national trend. Therefore, 
while the 1980s appear consistent, as Figures 1F and 11 show, peak strike activity 
during 1982 and 1984 was actually counter to the national trend. Strikes in the
1 For example, where the national trend in strikes peaked in 1981, the decline was already in 
progress in Victoria. (See Figures 1B and 11)
2 In the case study, as well as demonstrating the significance of the political, legal and 
industrial situation in Queensland, I will also mention the impact that weather had during the 
conflict and its ramifications.
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Manufacturing, Construction and Transport and Storage Industries accounted for the 
upturn in 1982; and in 1984, Mining, Manufacturing and Other Industries strikes 
were responsible.
Strikes were the preferred form of industrial action in the Northern Territory apart 
from 1977 when bans in the Transport and Storage industry increased to the point 
where they emerged as the preferred form. As in Tasmania, an increase in strike 
activity during the 1980s ran counter to the national trend. The years 1983 and 1984 
recorded the highest number of strikes for the entire survey period. In 1983, Mining 
and Other Industries were responsible; while in 1984 Construction and Transport and 
Storage industry strikes accounted for the peak levels.
South Australia and the ACT deviated from the national trend in that bans were the 
preferred form of industrial activity throughout most of the survey period. In South 
Australia the national trend is reflected to some extent by the decline in strikes during 
the 1980s. However, with bans clearly the preferred form throughout, the similarity 
is limited. The same could be said of the ACT, but once again the relationship with 
strikes limits the parallel considerably. An interesting comparison can be made between 
South Australia and the ACT in that the shared decline in strikes was matched by 
completely different behaviour as far as bans were concerned. (See Figures 1D and 1H)
It can be concluded from the above summary that to speak of 'a trend' in Australian 
industrial relations disputes is fraught with difficulty. The higher levels of disputation 
in NSW and Victoria combine to dominate aggregated statistics so that patterns elsewhere 
remain hidden and unidentified. With NSW and Victoria the only states to broadly reflect 
the national trend, divergences in the remaining states appear to be unique and various. 
At this stage it appears that Queensland was the only state where divergence from the 
national trend was grounded in a single dispute (SEQEB). In this regard, Queensland 
could be considered aberrational rather than unique. That is, if SEQEB had not occurred, 
Queensland may well have reflected the national trend. As far as the remaining states 
were concerned, it seems that divergences, particularly when increased strike activity 
was involved, occurred in a number of industries. This suggests prima facie that 
divergence from the national trend was subject to forces unique to a state, but not 
particular to a single industry. Whether or not a common state interest was being 
expressed is something that will be addressed presently.
The most readily identifiable national trend, and in some respects the most significant, 
was the increase in bans as a percentage of industrial action during the 1980s. This 
phenomenon occurred in NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania. In 
South Australia and the ACT, bans had always been responsible for a high percentage of
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disputation. Only the Northern Territory was exempt from this trend. (See Figures 2A- 
2H) While the starting point varied from state to state, (as did the percentages) the 
trend is unmistakable. Furthermore, the 1980s trend is in contrast to the 1970s when, 
although bans generally represented a smaller percentage of industrial action, there 
were manifest differences in the relationship of strikes and bans between the states.
Although national trends may emerge from the statistics, it seems appropriate for a time 
to dispense with a notion of Australian industrial relations when considering the data, 
other than as a broad summary term. In the final analysis of course, external factors of 
national import such as the Accord will be included. For now, industrial conflict will be 
looked at discretely in terms of states and industries.
In Chapter Four, as well as looking at the forms and levels of industrial disputation on a 
state basis, the data was further broken down into individual industries. An additional 
perspective was thus revealed which demonstrated the diversity of disputation within 
each state as well as trends that were sometimes unique to a given industry or state.
In NSW the decline in strikes from 1982 was common to all industries, although in 
Transport and Storage and Other Industries it was the continuation of a trend that had 
already begun. The Mining, Manufacturing and Construction industries all experienced 
peak strike activity in 1981. 3 Prior to 1982, trends in strike activity varied 
considerably with no two industries experiencing identical patterns. The incidence of 
bans also varied considerably. As Figures 3A and 3B show, while the trend and the 
relationship of bans to strikes in the Mining and Manufacturing industries were almost 
identical, in the three remaining industries bans appear to have been used in quite 
different ways. (See Figures 3C-3E) In a recapitulation of the argument used earlier in 
regard to 'national' trends, the two largest industries (in terms of disputation), Mining 
and Manufacturing, were the only ones to reflect the state trends.
In Victoria, the decline in strikes during the 1980s was common to Manufacturing, 
Construction and Other Industries. Generally, the decline was not as marked as it had 
been in NSW. The Transport and Storage industry was subject to fluctuating strike 
activity which rose to a peak in 1984. Bans in Manufacturing, Construction and Other 
Industries reflected the state trend to varying degrees. The years of peak ban activity on 
a state basis were 1975 and 1985. In the first instance, bans in Manufacturing and 
Other Industries were responsible; in the second, bans were relatively high in all
3 They were not necessarily years though, when strike activity was at its highest over the 
survey period.
Victorian industries. Manufacturing, the largest industry, most closely reflected the 
state trend.
The industrial patterns of Queensland industries are extremely varied, and no single 
industry reflects the curves overall in the state trend. Strike activity between 
industries altered significantly with peaks being achieved in different, often alternate, 
years. While as a general rule strike activity in Queensland appears to have been 
subject to the circumstances in individual industries, a notable exception was 1984, 
when increases to a greater or lesser extent occurred in every industry except 
Construction (where they were in any case relatively high). Bans in most industries 
also increased during 1984; in the Mining and Construction industries, quite 
disproportionately. The state trend was reflected more closely in relation to bans, 
particularly in the 1980s.
Bans were the preferred form of industrial action in all industries in South Australia. 
Strike numbers were highest in the Manufacturing industry and were most closely 
aligned to the state curve, although by no means identical to it. Peak years as far as both 
strike and ban activities were concerned differed from industry to industry and hence 
were variously responsible for the peaks in the state trend. In 1976 and 1981, bans in 
the Manufacturing industry were responsible; in 1979 it was Other Industries; and in 
1987, the Construction industry.
In Western Australia, the decline in strikes during the early 1980s and the increase 
from 1985, was common to the Mining, Manufacturing and Other Industries. The 
Construction industry is included in the latter period. The state trend for strike activity 
in Western Australia was almost identical to that in the Mining industry, although peak 
activity in the Manufacturing industry in 1978, contributed largely to the state picture. 
Otherwise, strike activity varied considerably from industry to industry, with Mining, 
the largest industry, determining the state trend. Quite a different story emerges where 
bans are concerned. The state trend shows bans well below the level of strikes until 
1984 at which time they increased steadily. The only industry to come close to 
replicating this trend was Construction. In the Mining and Manufacturing industries, 
bans remained low and almost level throughout the period, while in Transport and 
Storage and Other Industries, strikes and bans alternated up until 1984 as the preferred 
form. From 1984, bans in Transport and Storage and Other Industries increased, 
combining with Construction to create an upward state cun/e.
No industry in Tasmania was identical to the state trend in strikes. Increased activity in 
different industries at various times was responsible for the state curves. In 1978, the 
decline in strikes was evident in all industries, while the increase the following year
was attributable to Mining and Manufacturing. Manufacturing and Transport and Storage 
were responsible for peak activity in 1982 and Mining and Other Industries in 1984. 
Although Manufacturing also contributed in 1984 in terms of numbers, there was 
actually a decline which was counter to the state trend. The increase in bans during the 
1980s was limited to Construction, Transport and Storage and Other Industries. 
According to the state trend, bans were well below strikes during most of the period, 
with 1986 the only year when they were the preferred form. Bearing in mind that bans 
were, in any case, few in number in Tasmania, no industry mirrors exactly the state 
trend.
In the Northern Territory, a combination of industries contributed to the state trend at 
different times. Peak strike activity, in 1984, was experienced in Mining, 
Construction, Transport and Storage and (to a lesser extent) Other Industries. During 
the earlier period, Manufacturing and Other Industries were responsible for the 
majority of strikes and thus, were the determinants of the state trend. No industry 
reflected the trend in bans. Transport and Storage in particular ran counter to the state 
trend, with bans the preferred form during those years when they were used.
Construction and Other Industries were jointly responsible for the state trends in the 
ACT in both strikes and bans. They did however alternate at times, so that at any 
particular time the trend was dictated by one rather than the other. The third industry, 
Transport and Storage, experienced negligible levels of disputation throughout the 
period.
State trends in strike and ban activity fell into three categories. The first was where one 
industry was responsible for the most disputation, either in strikes or bans. It was not 
necessarily the case that one industry would dominate both. For example, where 
Manufacturing dictated strike trends, Construction may have dominated the trend in 
bans. In the second category, shifting levels of disputation between industries meant that 
the responsibility for the state trend changed from one period to another. The third 
category was comprised of those states where a more equal distribution of disputation 
occurred. This resulted in a trend that was a combination of some or all of the 
industries, without any one standing out as a determinant.
7.1.2.  Industry Trends
In this final analysis of the data from Chapter Four, I will consider whether trends 
existed on an industry basis. As the preceding section has demonstrated, there was 
frequently no appearance of shared trends between industries within a state. While this
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was not always the case, there was enough diversity to justify a brief industry 
comparison.
One immediately noticeable aspect of the Mining industry in each state is the prominence 
of strikes as the preferred form, and the negligibility of bans. There appears to be an 
identifiable trend starting in the early seventies, with low strike numbers in each state, 
followed by the late 1970s and early 1980s, when each state experienced high levels of 
strike activity at some time during that period. The trend disappears from 1983 when 
each state displays quite different patterns of industrial disputation.
In the Manufacturing industry, with the exception of South Australia, strikes were the 
overall preferred form of industrial action. The curves over the first five years were 
the same in NSW, Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania. Peak strike activity after 1977 
varied considerably. Western Australia was the only state to peak in 1978; NSW and 
South Australia in 1981; and Tasmania in 1982. Otherwise, despite fluctuations an 
overall decline over the survey period was evident in NSW, Victoria, Queensland, South 
Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. While this might point to a 
general industry trend, it was- only during the first five years that there appeared to be a 
distinct industry trend.
No clear trends emerged in the Construction or Transport and Storage industries. Apart 
from a tendency in both for bans to increase during the 1980s, each state appears to 
have functioned independently. One feature of the Transport and Storage industry which 
bears mention was the apparent interchangeability of strikes and bans. However, while 
this may be regarded as an industry feature, there is no evidence on comparison, of a 
coordinated pattern between states.
The relationship between strikes and bans varied considerably in Other Industries. In 
NSW and Victoria they were close in numbers, with strikes usually the preferred form 
until the mid-1980s. The same applied to Queensland until 1980. Elsewhere, the 
patterns of industrial action differed widely. The only identifiable industry trend was 
the prominence of bans as the preferred form during the 1980s (the Northern 
Territory was an exception). Nevertheless there were variations in the starting point to 
this trend, as well as the levels of activity each state experienced relative to the earlier 
period.
At this stage it is not possible to draw definite conclusions about industry trends. 
Certainly there were a number of features which were shared by some industries that 
set them apart from other industries. The relationship between strikes and bans was the 
most prominent. Common periods of peak strike activity was another. Furthermore, the
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industry similarities were sometimes greater than the state similarities. Even so, all 
this may suggest is a practical or pragmatic approach to industrial disputation relevant 
to the concerns and industrial capacities of a particular industry. It does not necessarily 
imply coordination on an inter-state basis or a communality of industrial objectives.
In the following section these questions will be addressed within the context of the issues 
involved. First of all, on a state basis using the data from Chapter Four; then on an 
industry basis with the data from Chapter Five.
7.2.  THE ISSUES
7.2.1.  Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims
Chapter Five considered the proposition that trends in levels of direct action are 
determined by the incidence of wage disputes. Clearly implied was the notion that Pay is 
the single most important issue, and the one most likely to initiate industrial 
disputation. Concentrating on strikes (except for South Australia and the ACT)4 the data 
was considered in two ways. Firstly, by looking at actual levels of Pay disputes in 
contrast to Allowances and Log of Claims. Secondly, by considering all three as a 
percentage of total strikes.
As far as the first perspective was concerned, it appears that as a general rule, the rise 
and fall of overall strike levels mirrored the rise and fall of Pay, Allowances and Log of 
Claims. The decline in strikes between 1981-82 coincided with a decrease in the 
number of strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims. This was common to all states 
despite variations in the time at which the decline began. An increase in strike numbers 
in Victoria, Western Australia and the ACT in 1987 coincided with an increase in the 
number of strikes over the three issues, while in NSW, the three issues increased 
during a period of overall decline in strike numbers.
As far as the second perspective was concerned, the nexus between strike levels and Pay, 
Allowances and Log of Claims becomes more complex when subjected to percentage 
comparisons. It was the case that there was some relationship between the level of 
strike activity and the number of strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims. The 
decline in strikes overall was accompanied by a general decrease in the three issues 5 as 
a percentage of strikes, although there were considerable variations between states in 
the extent of the percentage decline.
4Where bans were also included because they were the preferred form.
5 Unless otherwise specified, I am referring to Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims in 
aggregation.
Between 1973-81 (when overall, strike numbers were high) the percentage share of 
Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims was relatively high. There were considerable 
variations between the states with, for example, NSW ranging between 30-50 per cent, 
Victoria 41-84 per cent and Queensland, 30-61 per cent.6 Then between 1983-87, 
although strike levels varied between the states (with some actually experiencing 
increases) every state underwent a decline in the percentages of strikes over Pay, 
Allowances and Log of Claims.
If the proposition that Pay is a chief determinant of industrial action is to hold, the 
logical pattern would be one where, despite movements in overall levels, Pay maintained 
at the least, a constant percentage of activity. Indeed, an increase in Pay as a percentage 
of direct action could be envisaged during periods of overall decline. Except for minimal 
deviations, this was not the case. What the data suggests is that a trend developed from 
1982-83 whereby the three issues ceased to occupy the importance in disputation that 
had existed previously. There was a drop in the aggregated issues as a percentage of 
strikes regardless of increases or decreases in actual numbers during that period. 
Because the decline in the percentage of Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims disputes 
happened against a background of the wage freeze and then the Accord, the explanation of 
the trend appears to be obvious. Is it plausible, though, to argue that the overall decline 
in strike levels can be attributed to the same sources?
Another dimension is added when the three issues are disaggregated. The decline of Pay 
as a major issue during the 1980s is unquestionable. However, no such decline is 
noticeable for Allowances, which in most states maintained or increased previous levels. 
Furthermore, Allowances continued to occupy at least the same percentage of overall 
disputation as before. Clearly, if the wage freeze and Accord account for the decline in 
Pay disputes, then the maintenance or increase of Allowances may well be attributable to 
the same sources. While the legislative and quasi-legislative power of the freeze and the 
agreement reached between the Government and ACTU over the Accord regulated Pay 
demands more strictly, claims for Allowances continued, in all probability outside the 
centralised wage-fixing procedures. The relative stability of Allowances as an issue 
suggests that the restrictions on Pay demands dictated by the Accord were, to some extent 
at least, compensated for by claims for Allowances. Whether this was confined to 
particular industries will be considered in due course.
6These are genuine examples. The same holds true for the other states.
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7.2 .2 .  The major issues
Chapter Six considered the two most prominent issues annually in each state in addition 
to Log of Claims (where it was not itself a major issue)/
There was a great deal of variation between states in the percentage of strikes accounted 
for by the the major issues. NSW was the only state where they accounted for less than 
50 per cent throughout the survey period, though 1973 and 1987 were exceptions even 
in NSW. In Victoria and Queensland during most years between 1973-82, the major 
issues accounted for over 50 per cent with a reversal during the 1983-87, period when 
they fell below 50 per cent. In all other states, the major issues accounted for over 50 
per cent during most or all of the years during both periods.
From 1973-82, Pay was a major issue in every state. The next most prominent issue 
was Managerial Policy which was a major issue in NSW, Queensland, South Australia, 
Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory. Other issues which achieved 
major status were Dismissals (NSW, Queensland, Tasmania), Conditions (Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia), Log of Claims (Victoria, Queensland), 
Allowances (South Australia, Northern Territory) and in the ACT, job security issues. 
Industrial concerns therefore, were concentrated on a fairly narrow set of issues that in 
various combinations, were indicative of a national trend, with Pay and Managerial 
Policy the most prominent.
In 1983, the pattern of industrial disputation changed in most states. As the earlier 
part of this chapter has shown when summarising the data from Chapter Four, industrial 
disputation declined in most states, even those where bans increased. In the previous 
section it was noted that Pay disputes declined during the 1980s in line with a general 
decline in disputation. The only states where Pay continued to be a major issue were 
Victoria and the ACT.* Managerial Policy on the other hand, continued to be a major 
issue in NSW, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, and the Northern 
Territory. Otherwise the predominant trend Australia-wide was towards issues 
associated with security of employment. In addition, Health and Safety (Queensland, 
South Australia,* Western Australia, Northern Territory, ACT), Allowances (Victoria, 
South Australia, Tasmania), Conditions (Queensland, Western Australia), Demarcation 
(Western Australia, ACT*) were also major issues between 1983-87. As well, in some
7 As the introduction to this section points out, 'two issues' is something of a misnomer; also 
the reasons for including Log of Claims is explained elsewhere.
Denotes bans
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states issues achieved major status in isolation; for example, Hours in Queensland and 
Union in Western Australia.
Clearly, the changes in trends in levels and forms of disputation, were accompanied by 
significant changes in the issues. Although Managerial Policy remained a constant 
throughout, Pay declined in numbers and, in most states, in status, during the 1980s. 
At the same time, issues associated with security of employment achieved major 
significance. In general there was an expansion of issues that in some cases had always 
existed on a minor level, in addition to the emergence of new issues that were indicative 
of a changed industrial climate. The concentrated formulae of the earlier period were 
greatly reduced. Two questions immediately arise from these findings. The first is: is 
there a causal link between the decrease in Pay as an issue, and the increase in job 
security issues? This needs to be considered within the context of the prevailing 
political situation. For example, allowing for the impact of the wage freeze and Accord 
on Pay demands, would their absence have forestalled the increase of job security issues, 
or would they have occurred in any case? The second question bears some relation to the 
first: To what extent were the changes a general reflection of industrial disputation, 
rather than a picture of the larger industries? As the data has shown, the trends were 
evident in all states. However as earlier analysis has shown, conclusions drawn on that 
basis tend to disintegrate when industries are examined individually.
7 . 3 .  CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the complexities involved in identifying trends in Australian industrial 
relations, the existence of trends is evident. The examination of different aspects of 
industrial disputation has been useful in identifying certain broad trends. As well, 
variations to those trends and aberrational behaviour have been exposed. Of greater 
value though, has been the opportunity to submit the various trends to comparative 
analysis. Thus, following Chapter Four where changes to the forms and levels of 
disputation were discussed on a state and industry basis, the results from Chapters Five 
and Six showed trends in issues by state.
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Chapter Eight
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
The period covered by my research has witnessed a number of changes, not least in the 
industrial relations arena. A range of anti-union legislation, legal actions in the civil 
courts, a decline in union membership, the New Right, the Prices and Incomes Accord 
and changing trends in the level and forms of industrial disputations, are just some of 
the factors which have contributed to a dynamic political and industrial situation.
8 . 1 . 1 .  Governments and the labour movement
The notion that a harmony of interests may exist between employers and employees is 
part of the labourist (as distinct from the ’revolutionary') trade union tradition in 
Australia. 'Defence, not Defiance' was the slogan adopted by some of the first Australian 
trade unions, who, holding labourist aspirations, worked towards the election of Labor 
Governments. They held the belief that working class emancipation would be achieved 
through the ballot box; that a Labor Government would legislate in ways that would 
benefit workers.1 Certainly by the time the Whitlam Government was elected in 1972, 
there was a positive expectation that there would be meaningful consultation between the 
Labor Party in and out of Parliament and the ACTU. With these expectations in mind, the 
increase in industrial disputation during Labor's term may be be considered in two 
ways. First as a manifestation of the perceived breakdown in this relationship by the 
union movement. Secondly as a failure on Labor's part to convince the unions that real 
benefits had accrued to them as a result of the Government's tenure. While it is not 
intended to address these issues here, they are raised as background.
Although there were high levels of disputation in 1980 and 1981, it would be false to 
suggest that there was no co-operation at all between the Fraser Government and the 
ACTU. Indeed, Prime Minister Fraser, in describing the negotiations that had taken 
place during a major transport workers' dispute, conceded the positive spirit from all 
quarters. Nevertheless, there was distrust on both sides, combined with uncertainty 
about the stability of a centralised wage-fixation system. The introduction in 1977 of
1 R Castle & J Hagan, 'The ACTU and the Accord. Labourists Hold the Day’, Current Affairs 
Bulletin, March 1987, p.4.
legislation aimed at curbing industrial activity remained a contentious issue between the 
Government and ACTU.2 3Sheahan has summarised the situation thus:
The Fraser years have seen a disturbing growth of bitterness in industrial 
disputes. Explicit attempts to cut real employee incomes, tax changes 
designed to favour those on high incomes and anti-union legislation have 
aggravated the conflict on the union side. Unless arrested, this growing 
bitterness will destroy the possibility of an incomes policy.3
When wage indexation did go, it was not at Fraser's instigation. The decision was taken 
while he was overseas by a Full Bench of the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. 
Sir John Moore, President of the Commission, criticised both the Government and the 
ACTU: It seemed that the commitment of the participants to the system was not strong 
enough to sustain the requirements for its continued operation.
By November 1982, the threat of a wage freeze was real. Industrial disputation had 
declined during the year against a background of continuing job losses and an embittered 
union movement. Both my data and ABS statistics confirm that most states had 
experienced some decline in industrial action during 1982 (see Figures 1A-1H) prior 
to the imposition of the freeze. The decline nationally in strikes and bans is marked (see 
Figure 11). There was an increased tendency towards the four day working week, a fact 
that was born out by a survey conducted by forty Metal Trades Industry Association 
(MTIA) affiliates. Fourteen of the companies had instituted a reduced working week, 
and, commented the executive director of the MTIA, "this was probably only the tip of 
the iceberg".4 5 Added to this was the increased number of retrenchment notices being 
issued. In this climate, unions were diverting greater energy towards redundancy pay 
cases than overall wage rises.
Unions were particularly incensed by the large number of retrenchments that were 
taking place in companies which were recording large profits.6 In their view, some 
companies were using the recession to "rationalise" their workforces. The ACTU 
believed the Government had actively encouraged this trend.6 Confrontation between
2  See Chapter Seven for details of the legislation.
3  P Sheahan, Crisis in Abundance, Ringwood, 1980, p.166.
4  Financial Review, 5.11.82.
5  For example, BHP had retrenched 6,250 workers over the past 16 months with an additional 
2,200 planned for the following two months. An overall profit of $360million had been 
recorded: Qantas, with plans for 1,000 retrenchments over the next 5 months had announced 
a profit of $61 million; and Australian Paper Manufacturers with 400 retrenched workers had 
recorded a profit of $63million. Sydney Morning Herald, 8.11.82.
6  Loc.cit.
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Government, employers and the unions seemed inevitable in this unfavourable 
atmosphere.
It was against this background that the Hawke Government was elected in March 1983. 
With the perceived failure of the Whitlam Government's reformist policies and the 
hostilities created by Fraser's confrontationist attitude, the catch-cries of "consensus" 
and "national reconstruction" heralded new hope to a labour movement beleagured by 
high unemployment, a wage freeze and steadily increasing inflation.
8 . 1 . 2  The Prices and Incomes Accord
The Accord agreement was entered into in February 1983. The document was not 
confined to wages and policy issues. It covered a wide range of economic policy areas 
including industrial relations, industry development, immigration, social security and, 
health and education. In the central area of wages and prices, the agreement lists a 
number of "fundamental" features of effective prices and incomes policies "essential to 
its acceptance and continued viability". Chapman and Gruen note the following three:
( i ) policy should ensure that living standards of wage earners and of the non-income 
earning sectors of the population requiring protection are maintained and 
through time increased with movements in national productivity:
( i i) government policy should be applied to prices and income groups rather than...to 
wages atone; and
( i i i ) the policies should be designed to bring about an equitable and clearly discernible 
redistribution of income.7
One of the first initiatives of the Labor Government elected in March 1983, was the 
calling of an economic summit. Prime Minister Hawke, while acknowledging the wage 
freeze as incomplete and unfair, had prior to the summit floated the possibility of 
extending the freeze until the end of the year. The ACTU had undertaken not to proceed 
with any wage claims until the summit had taken place.
A change in union attitudes had clearly taken place since the Whitlam Government's 
demise in 1975. Labor's expenditure programs aimed at increasing the 'social wage' did 
not convince the unions, who, according to Whitlam behaved as if Labor's great advances 
did not exist.8 The union movement had refused to support referendums on prices and
7 B J Chapman & F Gruen, op.cit., p.3.
8 G Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, 1972-75, Ringwood, 1985, p.201.
1 48
incomes in 1973. Ironically, Hawke who was then Federal President of the Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) and President of the ACTU, had campaigned against the incomes 
power, which was intended to achieve a prices and incomes agreement with the union 
movement. Such an agreement would have been somethin akin to the agreement reached 
before Hawke became Prime Minister in 1983.
Having regard to Whitlam's statements about the union movement’s inability to accept 
the 'social wage' concept, the Accord appeared to be, at first glance, aberrational. 
Whitlam's opinion was shared by others. Dabscheck has observed:
With respect to broader matters which concern the welfare of unions and 
unionists, the ACTU and its affiliates more often that not react to events, 
rather than shape them. They are usually not in a position to trade off 
wage restraint for something else.g
The policy represented a change on the part of the ACTU whereby the focus of wage 
bargaining shifted from the money wage to the social wage based on real wages after 
taxation and Government expenditure, together with the development of superannuation 
schemes. A return to full wage indexation was one of the key features.9 10 It is worth 
bearing in mind, that the Accord had been negotiated while the ALP was still in 
opposition.
Since the Accord there has unquestionably been a continued decline in industrial disputes 
with a concomitant reduction in pay demands. To say however that the first (the 
Accord) is entirely responsible for the second and third (decline in disputes and pay 
demands) is to adopt a simplistic approach which fails to recognise the political, 
industrial and economic climate in which change has occurred. It would also be to ignore 
the existence and evolution of a wide range of issues that point to a dynamic rather than 
static industrial relations situation.
By 1985, from the ACTU perspective, the union movement had continued to be subjected 
to various anti-union strategies which had served to undermine workers' living 
standards in Australia. Many of these had been as a result of actions taken by state 
governments and private companies, since the election of the Hawke Government in 
1983. At the ACTU Congress in October 1985, a strategy statement entitled Anti-Union 
Attack, identified these strategies, which included:
• the use of legislation to punish unions and individuals;
9 Dabscheck, op.cit., p.404.
10 Castle & Hagan, op.cit., p.7.
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• employer actions under the Trade Practices Act (TPA) or at common law against 
unions;
• discouragement of union membership;
• efforts to destroy the centralised wage fixation system;
• encouragement to individual employers and employees to opt out of the 
conciliation and arbitration system;
• the promotion of small business with special exemptions from general award and 
employment standards;
• privatisation; and
• use of anti-union propaganda to isolate the union movement from the general 
community and union leaders from union members.11
The document also claimed that anti-union employment practices play a key role in 
undermining unionism in Australia. These include:
• employees being required to enter into individual contracts of employment 
without reference to unions or industrial tribunals; and
• the severance of ordinary employment relationships through the use of certain 
forms of self-employment, sub-contracting and outwork.
Apart from threatening award coverage, sick leave, annual leave, workers 
compensation, apprenticeship, training schemes and safety standards these practices, 
according to Anti-Union Attack, seek also to "replace union organisation and solidarity 
with individualism and competition between workers".12 Concern for these issues is 
manifested in the results of my data on causes which also demonstrates the diversity of 
interests that exist within the trade union movement.
ACTU involvement in economic and industrial planning and decision-making through the 
processes of the Prices and Incomes Accord are an acknowledged response to these 
perceived anti-union practices. Congress took the view that union response should be 
based on the following:
11 Australian Council of Trade Unions, Strategy Statement on Anti-Union Attack, ACTU 
Congress, October 1985, p.2.
12 Ibid., p.3.
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(i) Prices and Incomes Accord. Continued support for the Prices and 
Incomes Accord which ensures the active involvement of the Union 
Movement {sic) in the development of economic and industrial relations 
policies. Demonstration through the mechanisms of the Accord of the 
important role that the Union Movement may place in the representation of 
workers' interests and in creating a, constructive environment for 
economic growth and industrial relations in which unnecessary conflict is 
minimised and negotiated solutions to problems are facilitated.
Anti-Union Attack further suggested the union response be based on the political input of 
the union movement in policy making; education in respect of anti-union strategies and 
their consequences; the need to improve public perception of unions; improving the 
industrial relations environment through implementation of the Hancock Report; a 
concerted attack on anti-union employment practices; and legislation encouraging union 
membership. In addition, strategies aimed at recruitment, workplace organisation and 
international support were also outlined.1 3
The Accord has been renegotiated several times since the original. Award restructuring 
has become an integral part of the process which recognises the nexus between the 
economy and wage restraint. In 1989, in response to a question on what the agenda 
would contain after the current award restructuring had been achieved, ACTU secretary, 
Bill Kelty, replied:
...if we can cement the award restructuring and we lay the basis for change 
in this country, we will have started to create a framework for a cultural 
change in our society, in the terms of the workforce...You can't legislate 
for goodness, you can't legislate for happiness, you can’t legislate for co­
operation. All you can do is to provide a framework to enable those 
employers and unions for workers to co-operate with. 1 4
One of the errors that is sometimes made in discussing or analysing industrial conflict is 
grounded in the assumption that direct action can be automatically linked with a desire 
for gain. Dabscheck, for instance says:
Unions are self-seeking organisations. They will always pursue improved 
wages and working conditions for their members. This is a constant of 
union life and action. 1 5
In fact, the Accord has demonstrably been responsible for unions not pursuing wages and 
working conditions. While the ACTU's 1987 Future Strategies document confirmed that 
wages and conditions were still central to the objectives of trade unions, it pointed out
1 3  Ibid., pp.3-6.
1 4  Financial Review. 24.4.89.
15B Dabscheck, 'Unions and Wages Policy' in B Ford & D Plowman, Australian Unions An 
Industrial Perspective, South Melbourne, 1983, p.403.
that the welfare of union members cannot be protected or advanced by money wage 
increases alone: "Bargaining with Government on issues of taxation, social wage and 
general economic policies remain (sic) an essential ingredient of the collective response 
of the trade union movement"."16 Of course, quite often gain is the motivation, but 
theories that are based on such generalised assertions must be questioned. To suggest, 
for example, that agreements reached between the Government and the ACTU on prices 
and incomes policy provide a coherent explanation for a decrease in industrial disputes, 
is to ignore several political and industrial realities. One such reality is that retention 
of the status quo in some economic and political situations has been responsible for an 
increasing proportion of industrial conflict in Australia. Another reality, one that is 
more difficult to substantiate, is that the degree of industrial conflict cannot necessarily 
be measured statistically. While collective action such as strikes, bans and work-to- 
rules are amenable to measurement, other forms such as absenteeism, sabotage or go- 
slows are not. This is particularly the case where individual direct action is concerned. 
Nor is it credible to automatically attribute gain as a factor in industrial action that has 
occurred over social, political and environmental issues. In the latter case for example, 
some element of sacrifice on the part of unionists may have willingly and collectively 
been conceded.
The Accord has developed through its various stages with some difficulty at times. It is
the central most important platform on which the present Government stands. Without 
it, lack of control of the union movement could become a problem leading to an election 
loss. This, at least is the view of the ACTU. The extent to which the Accord is viewed as a 
responsible, progressive and economically viable concept very much depends on the 
degree to which it is held accountable for the positive achievements of the Labor 
Government. As such it is something held up as almost a panacea for curing all the ills 
that may occur, particularly in the industrial relations environment.
To what extent has it been successful in fact? The positive achievements are 
impressive. Since the first Accord in 1983, unemployment levels have dropped, 
inflation has decreased, industrial disputation has declined and a series of innovative 
wages policies have created real wage restraint. As well, productivity and efficiency in 
a number of industries have increased alongside a greater awareness and practise of 
industrial democracy. The concept of a social wage has become a manifest reality. 
Benefits like Medicare, superannuation and reduction of income tax have been introduced 
to advance the quality of life for a great number of workers. Award restructuring has
16 ACTU, Future Strategies For the Trade Union Movement, Melbourne, September 1987, p.44.
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provided a blueprint for radical change in a number of industries where rationalisation 
together with improved technology have created greater productivity and profits. Many 
workers also have benefited by the gaining of new skills for which higher wages are 
paid.
But what are the negative aspects? While the ACTU claims that none exist, (an opinion 
which is probably shared by the Government) there do appear to be some undeniable 
unfavourable consequences of the Accord. Wage restraint has been accompanied by a fall 
in real wages. Arguably the accrued benefits from the social wage to some extent are 
compensatory, but the decline is nevertheless real in terms of disposable income. A 
dramatic rise in interest rates has placed an acute burden on home-owners, especially in 
the middle-income groups. Although interest rates fall into the fiscal policy arena, the 
broad claims made by exponents of the Accord, must accept at least some de facto 
responsibility. For unions, the Accord period has witnessed a decline in union 
membership according to Labour Force statistics. Although the same trend is not revealed 
by other ABS statistics, union leaders generally acknowledge that a decline has taken 
place. Moreover the Accord does not have the approval of all sections of the trade union 
movement. Several hundred rank and file unionists and some union officials attended a 
conference in Canberra during July 1986 called 'National Fightback'. One of the reasons 
given for calling the conference was that since the Fraser Government, anti-union 
propaganda had been effective in making people responsive to anti-union ideas. Add to 
this,
a trade union bureaucracy which has become unresponsive to the rank and 
file, and you have a recipe for disaster. As the ALP is being'remodelled, 
so too is the ACTU, with that body adopting a corporatist approach to 
unionism, attempting to amalgamate the needs of labour and capital, 
attempting a social contract with a ruling class so rapacious that 
appeasement is impossible.
It has become clear that the Accord is an instrument for disarming working 
people rather than a rallying point for the exploited. The bankruptcy of the 
'prices' element of the Accord is a standing joke against working people.i 7
V
The projected increase in investments has not occurred. With deregulation of the
7.
Australian dollar and banking system, overseas investment from Australia has 
increased while investments from overseas have decreased. Meanwhile imports have 
risen as export markets have declined. The failure of business in Australia to invest or 
re-invest profits has meant that growth in industry and productivity have not increased 
at the projected level. One of the fundamental tenets of the Accord was that wage
The National Fightback Conference, Background papers/Perspectives, 4-6 July, 1986, 
pp.8-9.
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restraint would lead to greater profits which in turn would be re-invested in Australian 
industry.
ACTU participation in the Accord cannot be seen as a capitulation to economic pressures 
for wage restraint. It was clearly a reaction to* a political and industrial climate that 
required a broad response; one that would lift the union movement out of an increasingly 
defensive position. Co-operation in the Accord was a vital part of that process in that 
the emphasis on consensus removed the confrontationist element from a volatile 
industrial relations environment.
8 . 1 . 3 .  The political arena
To speak of a national trend in industrial disputation is, as the data has shown, replete 
with difficulty. Nevertheless, that some changes have taken place since 1983 is 
unquestionable. The election of a Labor Government and the almost simultaneous Accord, 
have been held chiefly responsible for these changes, which were manifested in two 
ways: firstly, the overall decline in industrial disputation, and secondly, the reduction 
(both in numbers and percentages) of Pay disputes. While I would not dispute the 
proposition that the Accord had a significant impact on the incidence of disputation, to 
suggest that it alone was responsible would be to ignore the climate in which these 
changes took place. There were problems associated with writing this chapter which are 
largely attributable to the point that I am making. In particular, the pilots' dispute was 
in progress, and each development was a critical signature of change taking place. While 
it is not intended that the pilots' dispute should form a case study in this thesis, many of 
the developments as they occurred have been noted, primarily because of their legal 
ramifications. Also, and by no means insignificantly, the conduct of the dispute by all 
parties has marked a dramatic change in the industrial climate; one that, with benefit of 
hindsight, should probably have been foreseen.
At the time when I commenced writing this chapter (October 1989), the dispute between 
pilots and Australia's domestic airlines had been in progress for eight weeks. During the 
first week of the dispute, Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke advocated the imposition of 
common law writs on the pilots. He was motivated by the economic necessity of confining 
wage movements within the bounds of agreements reached between the Government and 
ACTU. The 29.7 per cent increase sought by the Australian Federation of Air Pilots 
(AFAP) was well outside the acceptable amount of six per cent under the national wage­
fixing guidelines. As such it threatened the Accord, with the foreseeable result of a 
nationwide push for wage increases that would unbalance the economy and destabilise the 
restructuring process favoured by Labor and the ACTU. With the mass resignation of the
pilots, largely to avoid common law actions, the Government and airlines have held firm. 
The airlines advertised widely for pilots to fill the vacant positions on an individual 
contract basis and declined to negotiate with the pilots' union. They received support 
from the Government in this endeavour as well as financial relief towards the payroll 
costs of avoiding standdowns of other airline personnel. In addition, the Government 
provided military aircraft and personnel for the airlines' use, and cleared the way for 
international aircraft to carry passengers on domestic flights within Australia.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the pilots' dispute being conducted in the 
same way back in 1983. The issuing of common law writs, individual employment 
contracts and non-recognition of the pilots' Federation would not have been entertained 
as viable means of settling a dispute. For a Labor Government particularly to have 
advocated such measures would have been anathema. Between 1983 and 1989, the 
climate has changed to the extent that a Labor Government has responded to conflict in a 
way that conservative parties have frequently prescribed; common law writs are 
regarded as a legitimate course of action; and individual employment contracts have been 
recognised as a successful measure for achieving rationalisation of industries. The ACTU 
has been placed in a somewhat curious dilemma. On the one hand, the Congress of the 
ACTU condemned the tactics that have been used:
Congress expresses its total opposition to the tactics useo against
individual pilots and their union in the current industrial dispute. These
tactics include:
(i)  The cancellation of their awards.
(ii) Threats by employers to invoke common law action against individual 
pilots and their Federation.
(iii)  The recruiting of overseas pilots, during the dispute.
( iv)  The introduction of individual contract labour.
(v ) Threatened appropriation of pilots' superannuation funds.
(vi )  The use of military aircraft.
(vi i )  Attempts to destroy the pilots legitimate organisation.i g
On the other hand, the ACTU has remained firmly committed to the wage fixing principles 
set out in the Accord, despite the above reservations about the conduct of the dispute. The 
ACTU role has largely been confined to protecting those workers in the airline industry 
who may have been stood down as a result. As such, support for the pilots has been 
limited to the congress resolution. It would be clear to even the most casual observer 
that the ACTU entertains little sympathy with the pilots’ plight. Without prejudice I 
note here that the pilots' organisation is not affiliated to the ACTU.
18 ACTU, Pilots Dispute 1989 Resolution, D251-89.
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There were a number of steps along the way which created this climate. Some involved 
disputes which have become watersheds in Australian industrial relations: The SEQEB 
dispute in Queensland; the successful litigation by Mudginberri Station Pty. Ltd. with 
substantial damages awarded against the Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union 
(AMIEU); the Robe River dispute in the Pilbara region of Western Australia; and the 
Dollar Sweets dispute in Victoria. There has been the growth of the New Right, including 
the H R Nichoils Society, the membership of which includes many of those people who 
have been responsible for the conduct of the abovementioned disputes. The Accord 
between the Government and the ACTU has been implemented with constant change, and 
geared towards recognition of economic necessity as a priority, sometimes in place of 
long-held union principles. There has been a (reported) reduction in the proportion of 
workers who are unionised; a decline in employment in the manufacturing industry 
alongside a growth in technology and overseas investment; privatisation; and 
deregulation. The maintenance of jobs has become a major concern of many unions while 
in some industries, negotiations for the best redundancy package possible has been 
paramount where failure to maintain job levels has occurred. Against this background, 
the legal avenues available to employers in particular, have been increasingly 
canvassed. Unions are no longer regarded as inviolable.
8 . 1 . 4 .  The New Right
During the Accord period, the influence of the New Right ideology has grown markedly. 
Although the ideology had been in existence for some considerable time, it manifested 
itself overtly during the disputes mentioned previously. The New Right represents more 
of a collection of ideas than an organised entity. It is not a political party although its 
adherents are strongly inclined towards the conservative side of politics, and some are 
members of conservative political parties. Nor is it an organisation founded upon a 
constitution and regulated by a set of rules. There are no 'paid-up' members of the New 
Right although media commentaries frequently refer to New Right members. The phrase 
is to be understood as one which depicts adherents who hold a set of beliefs which have 
come to be identified as New Right doctrine. Although no formal infrastructure exists on 
an institutional level, members of the New Right maintain intellectual cohesion through 
an informal network that operates in a number of ways. For example several adherents 
of the New Right meet on an ad hoc basis irregularly to discuss ideas and are known 
collectively as the H R Nichoils Society. The inaugural meeting of the society in early 
1986 represented a coming together of like-minded people who had been espousing their 
philosophy on an individual basis for some time and as such was more of a culmination 
than an origination. The H R Nichoils Society has to some extent become the symbol of
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New Right thinking. But other mouthpieces also exist such as the Institute of Public 
Affairs, a right-wing think tank which contributes regularly to media discussion on 
industrial relations; and the New Right Report, a publication of the Conservative Action 
and Victory Fund.
Adherents of the New Right are an amorphous collection of people, some of whom are 
prominent in their professional capacities. Their personal and business interests, are 
diverse. As such their views are often given as individuals, and frequently as actors in a 
particular situation in a manner that excludes identifications with New Right thinking. 
For example, a regular column in The Australian newspaper by John Hyde, the executive 
director of the Australian Institute for Public Policy, actively promotes New Right 
precepts without acknowledging their influence. Gerard Henderson, a director of Sydney 
Institute, formerly the NSW Institute of Public Affairs also makes regular contributions 
to The Sydney Morning Herald along the same lines.
In some respects the use of the term New Right is inadequate. On the one hand it 
embraces an ideology which is not fully shared by all its adherents. For example, 
aiihougn the notion that trace unions have too much powei is a basic tenet, concepts such 
as "a woman's place is in the home", are not shared by all New Right proponents. 
Another shared tenet opposes the centralised wage-fixing system while attitudes towards 
de-regulation are mixed. Furthermore, the tag 'New Right', perhaps because it has often 
been uttered with derision, is not one that has overwhelming acceptance. Costello is of 
the following opinion:
I do not find the label New Right helpful to analysis. As far as I can 
ascertain it is used in the Australian political context principally by union 
officials to describe any one they don't like from time to time. I have heard 
it applied to people as diverse as the Prime Minister, Mr. Keating, Paul 
Hogan, John Howard, the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, and many more 
as well.
What we have seen since 1983 is groups of employers who have broken
away from the Confederation of Australian Industry.....They were followed
by employer associations which principally had small businessmen as 
members, such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and now even the 
MTIA and ACM have broken from the Confederation.
Those organizations that broke away at an early date were often described 
as New Right because they by and large opposed centralised wage fixing.
While Costello's brief resume is correct up to a point, it negates the groundswell of 
adherents who have willingly become identified as New Right thinkers. The New Right 
Report is proudly dedicated to traditional conservatism. Perhaps one reason why some
19 P Costello, Letter, 1.12.89.
individuals reject the New Right label is because of the media ridicule and criticism that 
has been levelled against the doctrine. The ideas therefore become more potent when 
they are projected as rational propositions and not as part of an ideology that is widely 
regarded as extremist. Another reason may be grounded in the divisions that exist 
between the intellectual and grass-roots members. For example, while there may be 
overall agreement between the two streams that trade unions have too much power, the 
former would not necessarily wish to be identified with the racist or sexist attitudes of 
some of the latter. Then too, there may be disagreements on how fundamental problems 
can be solved. As will be seen in the Robe River case study in Chapter Twelve, Charles 
Copeman, a prominent New Right spokesman (who at the time acknowledged his 
allegiance to the New Right20 ) attempted to opt out of the industrial relations system. A 
critic of his methods was Hugh Morgan, managing director of another Pilbara operation, 
the Western Mining Corporation (WMC). Morgan also has strong connections with the 
New Right. For the purposes of my discussion, I will continue to refer to the ultra­
conservative ideology that has evolved as New Right while acknowledging that the term is 
embryonic and has only limited acceptance from some of the people to whom I shall 
refer.
Despite a high public profile and the prominence of its members, the New Right has been 
the subject of much adverse comment. Criticism has come not only from the 'other' side 
of politics, but also from sections of the traditionally conservative business community 
and members of the conservative political parties. Notwithstanding the frequent scorn 
and derision which the New Right has attracted, its influence on industrial relations has 
been significant. With power disproportionate to its representation, its advocates have 
successfully promoted their views through the media and practice. Strictly speaking, it 
is without power in the structural or organisational sense but exerts considerable 
influence. One of the consequences has been that, the use of legal avenues has become an 
accepted and successful method of defeating industrial disputation.
Before broaching the legal ramifications, the question of how the ideas of the New Right 
achieved a position of influence needs to be addressed. According to Maddox and Hagan, 
the culture of debate (of democratic discussion) has been seriously eroded. Sloganeering 
has taken the place of genuine debate, while persuasion has degenerated into 
manipulation:
There is a certain sophistry in the rhetoric of the New Right which has
reduced an intellectual appraisal of supposed economic realities to a set of
20 He has since distanced himself.
1 58
maxims which 'everybody' including the Labor Government 'accepts'. It 
matters nothing that newspaper pollsters can report that the personnel and 
the explicit arguments of the New Right are little known among the general 
population.21
One of the maxims that Maddox and Hagan consider is, "Trade unions have too much 
power". They identify "too much" as the key words which carry an implication that as a 
quantitative qualification, trade unions have more power than they should have according 
to some theoretical standard. This has certainly been a catch-cry of the New Right. For 
example, Gerry Gutman, an economic consultant, maintained, "In the last two decades 
the trade unions have emerged as an institution whose power overshadows all others in 
our society and frequently contests the power of the State".22 . WMC's Morgan, 
commenting on the recommendations of the Hancock committee said, "The power of 
Australian trade unions is so great, so that committee argued, that the new Labour Court 
proposed in their recommendations will have exclusive jurisdiction in industrial 
matters, but will have no power to impose sanctions, except on employers" 23 John 
Hyde likened trade unions to sects like the Rajneeshi and illegal organisations such as the 
Cosa Nostra where "members feel it is a legitimate entity, and they defend it almost 
irrespective of the legitimacy of its actions in the eyes of others".24 Hyde cited Peter 
Scherer's description of unions:
Australian unions are part of the state, but in the sense of local 
governments with entrenched traditions and autonomy. They are creatures 
of the state yet not subservient to it - unruly principalities rather than 
vassals.25
Maddox and Hagan assume that at least one theoretical standard exists against which the 
relative power of trade unions is measured and is implicit in the theory of the free- 
market. From that, a subordinate series of inter-connected theoretical standards may be 
used separately to support the conclusion stated in the maxim. Linder the general free- 
market theory for example, it might be held "that individual workers should enjoy only 
a measure of power proportionate to their individual market labour-value". The 
argument can then be formulated in this way:
21 G Maddox and S Hagan, 'A New Sophistry: The Rhetoric of the New Right', in Politics, 
Vol.22, No.2., November 1987, p.31.
22 G O Gutman, 'Australian Industrial Relations: Revamping the System', in Quadrant, April 
1986, p.56.
23 H M Morgan, 'The Nature of Trade Union Power*, in Arbitration in Contempt, Melbourne, 
1986, p.24.
24 J Hyde, 'the Political Barriers to Changing Centralised Industrial Relations', in Arbitration 
in Contempt, Melbourne, 1986, p. 162.
25 P Scherer. 'Wages Wasteland', quoted by J. Hyde, ibid., p.161.
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(a) Any given group of individual workers should have a measure of power 
proportionate only to the arithmetic sum of their individual labour- 
values.
(b) In the collectivity of a trade union a group of individuals has more 
power than just the sum of their individual market-determined powers.
(c) Therefore trade unions have too much power.28
Another version using the key words 'too much', implies that trade unions have too much 
power vis-a-vis some other type of organisation, institution, collectivity or entity such 
as business corporations. The argument can then be supported by proposing that:
(a) Business corporations should have more power than trade unions.
(b) Trade unions have more power than business corporations.
(c) Therefore trade unions have too much power.27
Drawing from a different sub-theory concerned with the notion of individual freedom, a 
further argument can be formulated thus:
(a) Individual workers should be free to negotiate with their employees on 
an individual basis.
(b) Trade unions have the power to prevent this kind of bargaining and do in 
fact prevent it.
(c) Therefore trade unions have too much power.28
These, according to Maddox and Hagan are just some of the possibilities for advancing the 
maxim, and, they note, many others are either implied or made explicit in New Right 
rhetoric. For example, the notion that the excessive power of trade unions is destructive 
of family relationships and usurps the authority of *he State. (See for example, 
Morgan's depiction of a family torn asunder by the British coal miners' strike.)29 The 
highly emotive content of such claims expressed in simplistic and vague terms has a 
potential for wide appeal. "By not specifying the grounds on which the conclusions are 
drawn it is possible for different members of the audience to fill in the blanks in 
different ways, and thus appeal to a whole range of prejudices".20
This was borne out by a television debate on the programme Four Corners when opposing 
sides were asked to consider, "Do trade unions have too much power?".21 Andrew Hay, 
president of the Australian Chamber of Commerce (and a well-known spokesman for the
26 Maddox & Hagan, op.cit., p.32.
2^ Loc.cit.
22 Loc.cit.
29 H Morgan, op.cit., p.22.
30 Maddox & Hagan, op.cit., p.32.
31 Australian Broadcasting Commission, Four Corners, 8.6.87.
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New Right), in supporting the affirmative side maintained that 70-80 per cent of people 
believe that trade unions and their bosses exercise too much power. He then married 
this to a statement that Australia had the lowest productivity in the world. Hay went on 
to say that the trade union movement was prepared to subvert our democratic form of 
government and cited Fiji as an example.22 Hay also listed a number of privileges 
enjoyed by trade unions: they don't pay tax; they have monopoly status; they don't make 
financial statements; and they draw power from the Australian Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission. It is easy to see how statements of this kind, uttered as self- 
evident truths, have a considerable propaganda value if taken at face-value. On this 
occasion the claims were subjected to argument from the other side. John Halfpenny, at 
the time Victorian secretary of the Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union (AMWU), pointed 
out that all trade unionists pay tax. Jenny George, an ACTU Executive, said that 
Australian trade unions were circumscribed by more legal restrictions than any other 
country. They are bound by provisions in the CAA whereby trade union leaders are 
elected by secret ballots and accountable to their membership. "Trade unions", said 
George, "are not a power unto themselves". It should also be noted that trade unions are 
required to produce, and to distribute to their members, very detailed financial 
statements.22
More important perhaps than refuting some of the premises upon which the New Right 
formulated its assertion that trade unions have too much power, was the questioning of 
the maxim in the first place. Halfpenny agreed that unions have power - the power of 
3,000,000 individuals. There is nothing wrong or mystifying about that, he said. "Get 
away from the notion that power is sinister". It is the way in which power is exercised 
that is important. If used in a responsible way, choices are opened up. Collective trade 
union power makes choices possible. Now while this does not disprove the maxim it 
begins to undermine it by attacking some of the fundamental premises: that power in the 
hands of trade unionists is disproportionate; irresponsible; and sinister. Halfpenny 
proceeded then to pose his own questions based on the "dishonest prejudice that only 
trade unions exercise power". How much power are three million workers entitled to? 
Who measures? Owners? - for example "two brewery runners"? How much 
information are we given about prices? "Only what we read in the media", he concluded. 
According to Halfpenny, the past few years had seen a revolution in trade union power
22 I assume that Hay was referring to trade union support for the deposed democratically 
elected government in Fiji as the result of a military coup.
32 See Industrial Relations Act 1988, s.279. Similar provisions existed in earlier 
legislation.
which had resulted in positive achievements: wage restraint, industrial relations
restraint more generally, a social wage and social impact.
These are points which need to be addressed. The success of the Accord has very largely 
depended upon the existence of trade union powef. No compact could have been entered 
into without the ACTU's power to control the demands of the trade union movement. 
Employers and employer groups not associated with the New Right have supported the 
Accord and acknowledged its success in a number of areas, including wage restraint and a 
decline in industrial disputation. At least implicitly, they accept the legitimacy of trade 
union power when it plays a positive role in achieving their particular ends. Included in 
that acceptance is an acknowledgement that the present industrial relations system, 
flawed though it may be, is best suited to serve the interests of Australian enterprise.
While the concept of social justice was not a subject of the Four Corners debate, its 
introduction by Halfpenny defined another area of conflict between New Right and labour 
movement ideology. Lauchlan Chipman, writing for the Centre for Independent Studies in 
1981 defended the proposition that liberty, justice, and the free market are social 
notions that are mutually supportive.34 "It is not one of the proper tasks of the State", 
he said, "to redistribute part of the legitimately acquired wealth of those who have it 
amongst those who have not".35 This has been a fundamental tenet of New Right 
thinking, which has been severely critical of Labor's social welfare policies as well as of 
the industrial relations system. Consequently, the very nature of the Accord strikes at 
the heart of New Right doctrine. Both means and ends are anathema. Castle and Hagan in 
discussing the conflict point out that the ACTU has much more involvement now (because 
of the Accord) in the shaping of the Australian economy than at any time in its history:
Its policy influence is also far more pervasive than it has ever been. The 
adoption of social wage theory has meant that the ACTU's influence extends 
well beyond the economics of the work place, and affects non-workers as 
well, both young and old, via welfare and superannuation plans.35
Exponents of the Accord approve of the social policies it promotes. By accepting the 
original premise that the redistribution of income leads to greater social equity, the 
reality of wage restraint during the Accord period has been achieved. To Accord 
adherents, the means and ends are desirable and justified. New Right critics of the
34 L Chipman, Liberty, Justice and the Market, CIS Occasional Papers 6, St. Leonards, 1981, 
P-1-
35 Ibid., p.12.
36 Castle & Hagan, op.cit, p.10.
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Accord dispute the original premise because of its pernicious effect on the marketplace. 
For example:
Australia needs a new industrial relations system, not a {sic) Accord. 
Centralised wage-fixing is loaded against employers because it ignores the
international marketplace and ossifies ‘wage relativities.......The ACTU
package of tax cuts, wage rises and hand-outs amounts to exploitation of a 
weak Government losing its last grip on the economv.37
The Australian industrial relations system is a central subject of dispute between the 
two ideologies. On the one hand, the Labor Government in agreement with the ACTU 
strongly supports the maintenance of centralised wage-fixing and dispute settlement 
under the auspices of conciliation and arbitration tribunals. There has also been strong 
support for the system from within the business community.88
On the other hand, the New Right favours de-regulation of the system with a preference 
for collective bargaining between employers and employees on an enterprise basis. The 
conciliation and arbitration system it argues, lacks the power to force trade unions to 
accept its decisions and abide by its orders. A novel view of the commission was 
expressed by Paul Houlihan, Industrial Director of the National Farmers' Federation:
The one consistent feature of the Commission's behaviour has been that it 
always wants to find in favour of the side that it considers will win the 
dispute. Traditionally, and overwhelmingly, that has meant finding in 
favour of trade unions.3 g
Although the industrial relations system is a target for criticism from all sections of the 
New Right, there are a plurality of views as to what the alternative should be. The most 
extreme view has been expressed by Hay, who maintains that, "radical reforms" must be 
adopted if Australia is to prevent itself from "sinking into the mire of international 
indebtedness". One of the reforms he called for was the abolition of the trade union 
movement! Hay prescribed more politically active chambers of commerce, prepared to 
take direct action against "the industrial warfare waged by the trade union 
movement".40
The New Right Report, March 1, 1989, p.3.
38 Although not party to the Accord, prominent employer groups endorsed its major 
features at the Economic Summit which followed the original Accord.
39 P Houlihan, 'A Brief History of Mudginberri and its Implications for Australia's Trade 
Unions', in Arbitration in Contempt, September, 1986, p.100.
40 Canberra Times, 30.3.88.
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Gutman favours a revamped industrial relations system consisting of an Industrial 
Cooperation Commission which would be responsible for registering union and 
employers' associations, monitoring their rules and internal affairs, and maintaining a 
register of collective agreements (arrived at through collective bargaining). A Code of 
Industrial Conflict would embody the ground rules for industrial and basic obligations, 
some of which would be enshrined in legislation. Interestingly, Gutman implicitly 
accepts that strikes and lockouts may occur.41
Hyde sees the task as one of breaking down the legitimacy of trade union sovereignty in 
the eyes of rank and file unionists, "....bring unions under the law - by some means 
short of beating unionists up in a bloody skirmish."42 Governments, according to Hyde, 
should limit union excesses by lowering trade barriers, deregulation and privatisation. 
Union privilege should be changed a little at a time, fighting, like England's Margaret 
Thatcher, from "the high moral ground".43 Hyde's use of emotive language is a feature 
of his regular column in The Australian. Headlines such as "Time to get our house in 
order - for the sake of our children", and "Overprotected - and under the thumb", 
introduce articles which are populist critiques of government and the "monopoly power 
of trade unions".44 The latter is a term much favoured by Hyde which he uses in the 
way described by Maddox and Hagan.
Gerard Henderson argues that industrial relations reform requires that employers 
should be able to enter into productivity bargaining at the industrial workplace level 
with their employees (not unions). Agreements, says Henderson, should be subject to 
the common law with penalties on both sides for any breaches of contract. Essentially, 
"the principles of commercial freedom should prevail in industrial relations".45
Diverse though these views are (and others could be added), they all embrace the 
reduction of trade union power and the (at least partial) demise of the industrial 
relations system as a prerequisite to change. Many New Right adherents propose 
enterprise-based unions and/or individual employment contracts as a means to 
achieving this end. Paramount in the New Right strategy, is a concerted attack on trade
41 G Gutman, op.cit, p.66. I confirmed this with Gutman who said that it would be unrealistic 
to suggest that whatever system was adopted, some strikes, lockouts and bans would not 
continue to be a factor in industrial life.
42 J Hyde, op.cit., 1986, p.170.
43 Ibid., pp.171-2.
44 The Weekend Australian, 2-3.1.88., The Australian, 5.9.89.
45 The Australian, 28.8.89.
unions in their current form through the legal avenues available to them under the TPA 
and common law.
Shaun Carney described the inaugural meeting of the H R Nicholls Society as "one of the 
most important in the world of industrial relations during the 1980s". Even if the 
society dwindles to nothing, its role, he says, will have been important in shaping the 
public perception of unions, employers, the Arbitration Commission and governments 
through its provisions of a focus of disenchantment. Although the number of people 
calling for the non-Labor parties to adopt extreme policies was small, "the few had 
access to enormous resources and were actually using propaganda skilfully".4 6 
Carney's assessment is an accurate portrayal of the role played by the New Right over 
the past few years. It has been a remarkably successful campaign in two important 
ways. Firstly, it has placed trade unions in an acutely defensive position. As Maddox and 
Hagan suggest, with public debate distinctly one-sided, the logic of New Right arguments 
and the premises on which they are based, go virtually unchallenged. "May we ask", they 
say,
does big business have too much power? does business encroach on the 
freedom of the individual person? Does business ever coerce government 
or frustrate policy?4 7
A nd  it is true. While the New Right nas been sharply criticised and maoe the butt ol 
many jokes and cartoons, its message has nevertheless become part of political 
consciousness. Pervasive, and in many ways insidious, the rhetoric of the New Right 
prescribes a vision of a better society in the populist tradition.
Secondly, prominent "New Right' members have been directly involved in legal actions 
over the past few years which have changed the direction of industrial relations in 
Australia. The notion that regardless of legal impediments, a positive 'right to strike'
pyjct<» hopp cnhi^rfoH to tft© f*»jj fnrr^f? of the lew from outside the conciliation end 
arbitration system.
8.1 . 5.  Conclusion
The emergence of the New Right as a force in the political and industrial arenas was 
grounded in the Accord, in that the relationship between the Hawke Government and the 
ACTU was seen to bestow too much power on the labour movement. As an arm of 
Government, the ACTU's role in economic and industrial policy-making, sections of
46 S Carney, 'Australia in Accord', quoted in The Age, 5.8.88.
47 Maddox & Hagan, op.cit., p.34.
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business believed that the employers and their interests had been placed in an inferior 
position in terms of access to the Government and influence in policy input.
By the same token, not all unions have been happy with the Accord either. While the 
pilots's union could be regarded as a special case (it was not affiliated to the ACTU 
anyway), other unions have been critical of the ACTU's role.
It is my contention that, not one, but all of these factors have contributed towards the 
climate in which the pilot's dispute is being conducted. That it is a landmark dispute is 
beyond doubt; that it heralds an historic precedent in terms of a Labor Government 
response is also without question.48 In almost all respects, the pilots' dispute 
symbolises the changes which have taken place. As I will record later, these views are 
not shared by many of the people I talked to in the labour movement. For the most part, I 
met with scepticism but with little real argument against the propositions, although 
there was general acknowledgement that change had occurred. Without exception, the 
Accord was held responsible for any positive changes that had taken place.
48 While there have been other occasions when Labor Governments have reacted to disputation 
aggressively, there is no precedent of which I am aware for such an array of 'anti-union' 
responses at the very outset of a dispute.
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Chapter Nine
THE INDUSTRIAL CLIMATE
The elements that make up the industrial climate are numerous and their relative 
importance varies. This chapter emphasises the situation that developed over job 
security, particularly in respect of award restructuring and industry reform; and the 
legal framework and environment which developed during the Fraser Government and 
into the period of the Hawke Government.
9 .1 .1 .  Job Maintenance
It is appropriate here to consider why job security issues became so prominent during 
the 1980s. As Figure 19 shows, from 1982 there was an increase in levels of 
unemployment. 1 This coincided with an increase in Job Maintenance issues as a factor 
in disputation, the decline in strikes and the increase in bans.
Civilian Population aged 15 and over: Labour Force Status. 
Unemployment Rates
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Figure 19
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By the end of 1982, unions were in the situation of acknowledging that it would be 
difficult to proceed with a wage maintenance campaign when continued reports of 
retrenchments were being received. As well, the four-day working week was becoming
1 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Year Book of Australia, Canberra, ABS Catalogue 
Nos. 1300.00, No.60, 1974; No.61, 1975 & 1976; No.62, 1977 & 1978; No.64, 1980: No.68, 
1984; No.69, 1985; No.71, 1988; No.72, 1989.
a more common practice, the result of agreements reached during work-place deals. 
Both employers and union officials described as somewhat optimistic a confidential 
Federal Government Report which indicated there would be "no improvement" in the 
NSW job market before late 1983! This was at variance with other more pessimistic 
projections. 2 Against a background in which the wage freeze was being discussed, and 
job losses were occurring, it is not surprising that greater emphasis began to be placed 
on redundancy pay cases rather than wage issues. It is even less surprising that in those 
industries affected, disputes over job security began to escalate.
Industrial disputation over security of employment issues developed in two stages. 
From 1982 (and earlier in some places) the increase in job losses was met with 
resistance by the trade union movement. Although the ACTU had recognised that 
unemployment was a serious problem and that some changes would be needed, the 
emphasis during this first stage was to maintain current levels of job placements if 
possible. This, notwithstanding the imposition of a four-day working week in some 
areas. As Figures 11C-18E(ii) in Chapter Four indicates, Manning and/or Job 
Maintenance became major issues in all states during 1982-83.
From 1984, the Accord started to have an affect on attitudes. There was an implied 
acceptance that some jobs would have to be sacrificed if many industries were to 
survive. To that end, rather than opposing retrenchments or redundancy, a greater 
emphasis was placed by unions on negotiating the best possible package deals. Intrinsic 
to the ACTU’s participation in the Accord, was the recognition of economic realities. 
These were outlined in the Future Strategies document where, in acknowledgement of 
Australia's major economic challenges, the ACTU concluded:
These circumstances have in turn required that unions be more closely 
involved in the processes of production rather than just the distribution of 
the receipts of production. This means that unions must be interested and 
involved at company and industry level with issues such as training, 
investment, production methods and industry policy. 3
Employers and unions cooperated in the process of restructuring. Tripartite bodies 
consisting of representatives from Government, employers and trade unions, 
(principally the National Training Board) were formed to develop policies and 
implementation strategies for the national training reform agenda. With the 
introduction of modern technology into inefficient and non cost-effective industries,
2 Financial Review, 5.11.82.
3  ACTU, Future Strategies for the Trade Union Movement, (Revised), September 1987, pp.4- 
5.
unions became more open to multi-skilling and job redesign. While this was by no 
means universal, and indeed strongly opposed in some areas, a greater awareness of the 
need for consultative processes began to emerge. A number of companies introduced 
industrial democracy programmes with varying degrees of success. Others, while 
firmly maintaining the 'right to manage', embraced the tenets underpinning the Accord.
Award restructuring also included supposed trade-offs for the decline in 'real wages’ 
that followed the Accord. Superannuation, Workers’ Compensation and Hours moved to 
the forefront as issues of most concern. My data has not singled out Workers' 
Compensation, but as Figures 11C-18E(ii) show, Superannuation and Hours were 
major dispute issues over this latter period. An indeterminate number remain hidden 
in the data, as some disputes in the Weekly Reports simply specified 'Award 
Restructuring' as an issue and were included under Log of Claims. Presumably, a 
number of these would have been about Classifications.
The above gives a very broad interpretation of the changes which have taken place. Not 
surprisingly, these changes have met with a variety of responses in different 
industries. While it is not possible here to provide a detailed exposition of the 
individual industries, the following is an attempt to encapsulate by example what took 
place during this critical period of change.
Coal mining has undergone a period of intense political and industrial activity alongside 
the rationalisation of the industry. With approximately 65 per cent of annual coal 
production exported, Australia is the single largest exporter of black coal. 4 Coal is an 
important source of export revenue and changes in the industry were not without 
political repercussions. With the Hawke Government's acquiescence in the proposed 
deregulation of the coal industry, historic ties between the Labor Party and the 
Australian Coal and Shale Employees' Federation (Miners' Federation) were broken, 
culminating in the disaffiliation of the Miners' Federation from the ALP in New South 
Wales. 5 In 1986, the Federation predicted that the Government's decision "to cave-in
4 M. Lee & S. Draper, The Coal Industry: The Current Crisis and the Campaign for a National 
Coal Authority", in Journal of Australian Political Economy, No.23, August 1988, p.46.
5 I questioned Margaret Lee about the position the Miners' Federation is likely to take in the 
forthcoming federal election in the light of the Liberal/National Party policy on industrial 
relations. She said that no decision had yet been made however she did not anticipate that the 
election of a non Labor government would have any adverse effect on industrial relations in the 
coal mining industry. As she explained it, some lessons had been learned from the British coal 
miners' strike. For example, there are no huge stockpiles of coal in Australia. She also 
pointed out that with the current market situation, Australia was selling as much coal as it 
could produce, so that an industry-wide strike would have a very detrimental effect on 
Australia's export earnings and balance of payments. It was unlikely therefore that any
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to the multinationals demand to further deregulate the coal export industry through the 
relaxation of price controls, threatens thousands of mining jobs unless it is reversed". * 6 
By October 1989, a wave of mine closures, retrenchments and protracted disputes had 
occurred leaving the industry with 4000 less jobs, and 16 less mines.7 * Although the 
situation later stabilised with a current boom in investments, profits and jobs, Geoff 
Brown, President of the Northern District of the Miners' Federation, was critical of the 
Government's suggestion that a statement of common interest could be arrived at 
between producers and mineworkers. As for the notion that an improved perception of 
industrial relations is necessary:
...nobody could accuse unions of dragging their feet on modernising 
industrial relations in the coal industry. Award restructuring and 
amalgamation are at the top of our agenda. 3
In 1981-82, conflict in the mining industry had erupted over wages, which owners and 
miners sought to negotiate (unsuccessfully) through collective bargaining procedures. 9 10
During the following years, the source of conflict focussed on the very survival of the 
industry, with jobs the chief source of concern to mining industry unions. One dispute 
alone, a lockout at Broken Hill in 1986, was followed by the loss of 860 jobs (almost a 
third of the local mining industry's workforce). 1 0
Other metalliferous mines not covered by the Federation have also been involved in 
disputes since 1982, especially in the Western Australian iron ore industry. One, the 
Robe River dispute, will be the subject of a case study in Chapter Twelve. While the 
maintenance of jobs has continued to be a top priority, there has nevertheless been a 
qualified acceptance by unions that some job losses were inevitable if the various 
mining industries were to remain viable in the international market. Furthermore, 
there have been occasions when, in the interests of creating new jobs, unions have put 
forward proposals aimed at guaranteeing productivity. One such occurrence involved 
the oil exploration project on the North-West Shelf where unions offered a virtual 
strike-free contract to achieve a competitive edge over international competitors. The 
proposal put forward by the Western Australia Trades and Labor Council appeared to
government would be prepared to run the risk of enforcing legislation that would inevitably
result in an immediate and indefinite stoppage. Interview, 30.10.89.
6  National Liaison Committee, Coal industry deregulation, Sydney, November 1986.
7  G. Brown, paper presented at Singleton Coal Discussion day, 20.10.89.
QLoc.cit.
9  C. Fisher, 'The Coal Campaign', in Industrial Relations Papers, Canberra, 1982, p.1.
1 0 B. Flynn, 'Trade Unions and the Law: The Broken Hill Dispute', in The Journal of Industrial 
Relationsx Vol.30, No.1., March 1988, p.32. The Broken Hill miners are metalliferous, but the 
miners belong to the Federation.
offer limited indemnity against employers suffering any financial loss as a result of 
industrial action. The unions also committed themselves to a minimum number of 
unions on the assembly site and a single workers' authority to "exercise control of the 
industrial relations issues on site". 11
By the end of 1987, the impact of change in the mineral industry was evident. Record 
production figures in the final December quarter showed an increase of 14 per cent over 
the previous three months. The Australian Mining Industry Council (AMIC) attributed 
the upturn, in part, to more harmonious industrial relations. Lauchlan McIntosh, the 
executive director of AMIC also claimed that the figures "demonstrated what could be 
achieved by the minerals industry when wasteful strikes and work practices were 
controlled". 12
Job losses in the Australian manufacturing industry were severe by the end of 1982. In 
the metal industry alone, fifty thousand workers had been retrenched in 1982. 12 The 
four-day working week had also started to become widespread. MTIA affiliate companies 
in Melbourne had shown that fourteen of the forty companies represented at one meeting 
had initiated a reduced working week. Bert Evans, executive director of the MTIA 
suggested that thi^was probably only "the tip of the iceberg". 14 The MTIA has taken a 
leading role in embracing the fundamentals of the Accord. It has not aligned itself with 
other peak employer groups associated with the New Right who have advocated 
deregulation of the industrial relations system and the introduction of collective 
bargaining. With a view to increasing the industry’s efficiency and competitiveness 
with overseas markets, the MTIA in 1986 produced a document entitled MTIA Proposals 
For A Compact With The Metal Unions. In the introduction it stated:
This can only be achieved by a concerted effort by all who work in the 
industry: by a close working relationship based on mutuality of interest 
between management and employees in all the workplaces and between the 
Metal Unions and MTIA at the industry consultative level. It is with a view 
to fostering such relationships that this agreement has been prepared for 
consideration . 1 5
11 Weekend Australian, 18-19.6.88.
12 L Swansea, quoted in Financial Review, 24.2.88.
12 The Age, 27.11.82. This is a conservative estimate. Some have put it as high as 100,000. 
See, for example, Sydney Morning Herald, 1.10.88.
14 Financial Review, 5.11.82.
15 Metal Trades Industry Association of Australia, MTIA Proposals For A Compact With The 
Metal Unions, Melbourne, December 1986, pp.1-2.
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Intrinsic to the document was the acknowledgement that trade unions had a valuable role 
to play. It recognised that the relationship between employers and unions in the past had 
not been generally constructive. The prevailing "them and us" industrial attitudes were 
rejected, instead it advocated: "a more open-minded attitude to change on the part of 
managements and employees: more information sharing, greater employee participation 
in the workplace and closer identification by employees with the viability of the 
enterprise". 18 Training and career development were covered, as well as the removal 
of restrictive work practices, described as impediments to efficiency, productivity and 
competitiveness. In many ways, the proposal foreshadowed many of the features which 
have become recognised as 'award restructuring'. Although many sections of the metal 
industry have since closed down with major job losses as the result, some have re- 
emerged along the lines proposed by MTIA and award restructuring. Two outstanding 
examples are the old Genera! Motors Holden and Valiant plants which are now owned by 
Toyota and Mitsubishi respectively. While job levels are much lower than under the 
previous ownerships, productivity and efficiency have increased significantly. Job 
security is recognised as an important factor which Mitsubishi has actively encouraged 
by promising that no retrenchments would take place during bad periods. 17 Even so, 
acceptance on an industry-wide basis by employers has not been achieved, and in some 
cases, according to Laurie Carmichael, "the lead has been taken by unions with 
management lagging behind" .18
Major job losses have occurred in a number of places. For example, Broken Hill 
Proprietory Company Limited (BHP) Australia's largest manufacturing company, cut 
the workforce at its Newcastle and Whyalla steelworks by 40 per cent despite strong 
opposition from unions. 19 By March 1989, BHP and the unions had negotiated an 
agreement to restructure the steel industry and make it viable into the 1990s. A three- 
year agreement signed by BHP and the Federated Ironworkers' Association (FIA) 
guaranteed job security for 25,000 workers. The unions and BHP were committed 
under the agreement to employee involvement in improving all aspects of the business, 
including production, working environments and the marketing of steel. They also 
agreed to co-operate in quality and productivity improvements in order to make BHP 
more competitive internationally. One of the concessions gained by the unions was that 
no employees would be retrenched during the three-year period, and extended to eight 
years an arrangement whereby no jobs could be lost except through attrition. The
16 Ibid., Annexure 1, p.3.
17 Australian Broadcasting Commission, Overseas and Undersold, 30.11.89.
18 L. Carmichael, Loc.cit.
19 Sydney Morning Herald, 13.10.87.
Federal secretary of the FI A, described the agreement as historic because of the 
assurances on job security, marking also a dramatic improvement in relations between 
BHP and unions. Both sides agreed to take steps to avoid industrial disputes by 
observing settlement procedures. The agreement also aimed to bolster productivity by 
improving the reliability, availability and competitive price of high quality steel 
products. 20 just six months later, in September 1989, BHP announced that the Port 
Kembla steelworks was to shed 2,000 more jobs as part of a voluntary retirement 
scheme, bringing the total number of job losses to 14,000 since 1982. Despite the 
agreement over attrition, the decision was regarded critically by unions in the industry 
especially as the region (lllawarra) had been hit particularly hard by the closure of a 
power station and its feeder mine during the year, at a cost of five hundred jobs.
Job losses in other areas have represented a conflict of interests between government, 
environmentalists and unions. For example, the disputes in various areas of Australia 
over logging have been protracted and led to profound disagreement between the 
government and ACTU. On one such occasion in Tasmania, Bob Richardson, ACTU 
industrial officer said: "The decision (to limit logging) means that there are job losses, 
great uncertainty for industry and there will be a lot of suffering in local communities, 
so it won't get the support of the ACTU - in fact it will get implacable opposition". 21
While job losses in the manufacturing industry have met with opposition from the trade 
union movement, there appears to have been a concerted effort to 'turn the tide'. Evans 
has said, he "sometimes has to pinch himself to believe the change in attitudes, as both 
sides - employers and unions * show a willingness to work together". 22 Improved 
mechanisation and new technology have revolutionised some areas of manufacturing so 
that increased productivity has reversed the unemployment trend and provided greater 
job security. Nevertheless, the process has not been without criticism. John 
Halfpenny, secretary of the Victorian Trades Hall Council wondered why, if 
restructuring has been such a success, "how come we're not as popular now with 
unionists"? 23
The waterfront has been one of the transport and storage industries most susceptible to 
change. In early 1989, after more than two years studying the industry, an Inter-state 
Commission proposed some long-term strategies for reform. In February 1989 the
20 Sydney Morning Herald, 23.3.89.
21 Wesf Australian, 10.8.88.
22 B. Evans, Sydney Morning Herald, 1.10.88.
23 J. Halfpenny, 'State of the Nation’, Four Corners, 4.12.89.
prospect of reform by agreement was severely undermined when the Association of 
Employers of Waterside Labour (AEWL) brought a case before the arbitration 
commission which sought to implement new rostering arrangements. The principal 
waterfront union, the Waterside Workers' Federation (WWF) responded to the claim 
with overtime bans on the basis that a recruitment freeze had left five ports, 300 
workers short. 24 By June, the major issues remained unresolved. Waterfront unions 
and employers were given notice by the Government that they had three months in which 
to reach agreement on the reforms, or have the changes imposed on them. A central 
focus of disagreement was the retrenchment and redundancy proposals. Included in the 
reform proposal were recommendations on worker levels, employment arrangements 
and restrictive work practices. The 17-point plan involved the Government in 
contributing half the cost of a $290 million retrenchment package, whereby elderly 
wharfies would be given $100,000 'golden handshakes', with millions of dollars also set 
aside for retraining and restructuring schemes. 2^ Shipowners distanced themselves 
from the concept of 'golden handshakes' being suggested for the waterfront. They had 
already achieved substantial cuts in crews and increases in efficiency, and required the 
Government's help in further reductions in the number of crew berths on Australian 
ships. Clearly the recommended merger between the seamens' and wharfies' union 
would appear to threaten the 'improvements' already underway in the shipping industry. 
Despite the estimated elimination of a further 1000 jobs, the federal secretary of the 
WWF, Tas Bull, said he believed the Inter-state Commission's package could be 
implemented "pretty much as recommended". He welcomed the Government's decision to 
implement reforms by consultation instead of confrontation. 26
In October 1989, Cabinet approved the $154 million reform package despite the 
reservations of some departments about its lack of detail and accountability, and the 
objections of some ministers. The redundancy scheme would see 3,000 older workers 
paid off and no forced retrenchments would occur over the following three years. The 
remaining issues such as the principles to apply in the changeover, work practices, 
roster arrangements, demarcation and union coverage were still to be negotiated. 27
One notable aspect of the waterfront reform is comparable to the 1989 pilots' dispute. 
Both, albeit under quite different circumstances and for quite different reasons, 
involved substantial subsidisation by the Federal Government to the private sector. By
24 Financial Review, 22.2 . 89.
25 The A us tra lian 2 . 6. 89.
26 Loc.cit.
27 Sydney Morning Herald, 11. 10. 89.
way of contrast, rationalisation initiatives on the part of state governments in public 
sector transport have not received financial support from the federal purse. A decision 
by the Victorian Labor Government to introduce new ticketing arrangements on 
Melbourne trams provoked a strike lasting several weeks. The issue was bitterly 
contested by the union, especially after union members were arrested at ALP 
headquarters and charged with willful trespass. The union's secretary, Lou Di Gregorio 
described the ALP's actions in calling the police as disgraceful, and said the ALP had no 
right to have his members arrested simply because they were fighting for their jobs. 
He went on to say:
If the ALP behaves in this way, I can assure you they won't be in power for 
much longer. I am not very pleased, particularly given that I have been a 
member of the party for 25 years and worked hard to get them in
power. 2 8
While there may be nothing remarkable about a dispute over job losses becoming so 
acrimonious, in fact no mention had been made by the Victorian Government that any job 
losses would occur. Clearly, the Government's policy was regarded by tramway 
unionists sceptically, as the strength and intensity of their opposition can only be 
explained in terms of an anticipated and inevitable loss of jobs.
This strength of commitment to job maintenance has not always been reflected in other 
public sector Transport and Storage industry disputes. Or, it would be more accurate to 
say, widespread opposition to cutbacks has not always resulted in prolonged industrial 
disputation despite a commitment to job maintenance. The UNP Government in NSW 
instigated cuts in public sector transport within months of attaining government in 
March 1988. In August it announced that 1000 Urban Transit Authority (UTA) 
employees would lose their jobs.29 Even more drastic was the announcement in July 
1989, that 8000 jobs would be 'axed' by the State Rail Authority (SRA).30
In the latter two cases, although industrial action was certainly threatened, I can find no 
evidence of it actually taking place. Although railway workers participated in the 'Day 
of Outrage’ on the 26th July 1989 along with building workers, printers, teachers and 
others, no specific industrial campaign was mounted. 91 This raises a question as to 
why cutbacks in public transport systems appear less likely to provoke industrial
28 The Age, 13.12.89.
29 Sydney Morning Herald, 20.8.88.
30 Sydney Morning Herald, 14.7.89.
31 The "Day of Outrage" was in protest against NSW Government retrenchment policies in 
general.
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action when made by a conservative government. Obviously, the three examples used 
here do not provide a sufficient basis on which conclusions could be drawn, especially as 
political factors particular to those states have not been considered. Even so, the 
contrast is interesting. In Victoria, the Government had specified redeployment, not 
retrenchments of the tram conductors while in NSW very definite retrenchment 
objectives were announced. Yet it was in Victoria that a protracted and bitter dispute 
was waged. These examples raise interesting questions, but, there are too many 
variables to draw any conclusions without further research.
As Other Industries consists of a vast number of industries, I will concentrate here on 
the public sector, which represents the largest proportion contained in this category. 
The Commonwealth public service has repeatedly undertaken industrial action in 
response to Government initiatives to cut back public sector spending. This has taken 
the form of both strikes and bans. Against the background of a projected reduction of 
3000 staff, some departments have resisted the cuts with vigorous claims for even 
higher staffing levels. In this respect, the public service unions have behaved 
differently to unions in many other industries, where to maintain the status quo would 
have been considered an achievement. During 1987, in one such dispute at the 
Department of Social Security (DSS), a request for an extra 1026 staff based on the 
findings of a Joint Staffing Review (JSR) were rejected .32 Apart from disagreeing with 
the substance of the demand, the Minister, Brian Howe said in reply:
There is also the question of the unions claim for a 4% salary increase 
under the second tier provisions. You are aware the Government is 
insisting on genuine productivity and efficiency gains as offsets to granting 
this claim. I believe that this matter has the highest priority of those 
raised by the unions and that we should concentrate on seeking to achieve a 
satisfactory conclusion on it.33
The divisions that occurred between departmental officers and the Government over 
staffing cuts are exemplified by a Customs Department dispute in August 1988. In a 
Ministerial Minute T.P. Hayes, the Comptroller-General of Customs, asserted that 
Commonwealth public servants at middle and lower levels believed they had the right to 
express dissatisfaction with the Government by engaging in disruptive work practices 
and drawing their full pay at the same time. He held a "socially irresponsible ACOA" 
responsible for this attitude. Although Hayes said at the top of the minute that the 
dispute is "obstensibly" about staff numbers, he argued in conclusion:
32 g . McMorran & P. Robson, Letter to Secretary of DSS, 15.9.87.
33 b . Howe, Telex Message to P. Robson & G. McMorran, 17.9.87.
It would of course be very damaging to management in the ACS if the 
Government conceded anything on staff numbers (Notwithstanding that we 
disputed vigorously with Finance the application of the last round of 
reductions to the ACS). Instead, the Government should be seen to be 
backing its public sector managers to the hilt.34
A week later, in a letter to Peter Robson, national secretary of the ACOA, the Minister, 
John Button stated the Government's position clearly:
Customs has to contribute to the efficiency dividend directed by the
Government and pay for second tier salary increases.....Customs
management and staff have to work smarter, utilise technological change to 
advantage, develop more productive systems and deploy existing resources 
more effectively according to priorities. The Government is requiring this 
of Customs as it is of other agencies.35
The above two disputes are fairly typical examples of conflict in the Commonwealth 
Public Service over staffing cuts, particularly since 1987 when it became clear that 
any pay rises under the two tier system were contingent upon greater efficiency and 
productivity. There was understandably some cynicism about the notion that efficiency 
and productivity could be measured in job losses, a logistical problem which remains 
largely unresolved.
Another example of opposition to the Federal Government's policies occurred in May 
1989, following the proposed sale of the Cockatoo Island dockyard to property 
developers. 36 From May 10, 1500 workers occupied the island in Sydney Harbour on a 
roster system. In August, after fourteen weeks, the dockyard workers voted to end their 
strike during which six workers had been arrested on charges including assault, 
resisting arrest and hindering police. In the week prior, the Federal Industrial 
Relations Commission warned the workers they would face penalties and fines if they did 
not end their strike. The island's shop committee reluctantly recommended that 
workers accept the redundancy package and return to work. Committee president, John 
Panuccio complained that workers had not received support from the ACTU or the NSW 
Labor Council:
There's a lot of disgust at some of our leadership which did not lead the 
way. We were throwing our heads against a brick wall by trying to get 
them to support our campaign.37
34 T. P. Hayes, 'Industrial Disputes in ACS over Staffing Levels’, Minute Paper, 16.8.88.
35 J. N. Button, Letter to P. Robson, 23.8.88.
36 Cockatoo Island is a Defence facility and is the responsibility of the Minister for Defence, 
Kim Beazley.
3^ Canberra Times, 12.8.89.
The political or, more specifically, the electoral consequences of job losses has been 
significant. In January 1987, the NSW Labor Government issued a threat to close down 
the state dockyard at Newcastle unless unions agreed to radical reforms including the 
retrenchment of nearly half the workforce. Although there had been a considerable 
reduction in industrial disputes, and capital investment by the Government, the 
dockyard had incurred substantial losses since 1980. While the major dockyard union, 
the FIA, was unhappy at the prospect of retrenchments, they were regarded as the better 
of "two evils" as the closure of the dockyard would be "disastrous". The Newcastle 
secretary, Len Corrigan said, "We appreciate the dockyard has been losing money and we 
can't afford to keep backing it up with public funds, but Newcastle is in such a depressed 
state at the moment, there are no jobs to go to". 38 By February, the dockyard workers 
were in open conflict with the Unsworth Government. At a demonstration outside 
Parliament House in Sydney, violence erupted when workers were refused admittance. 
Two dock workers were arrested and charged with assault and offensive behaviour. 39 
Two hours later, a peace package was announced which agreed to keep the dockyards open 
providing the unions accept the retrenchments. One compromise the Government 
allowed was for increased redundancy payments under a scheme that would allow 
workers to volunteer for retrenchment. Final determination of those to be retrenched, 
however, would remain with the dockyard management. 40 The Government also agreed 
to introduce a system of arbitration and discussion with the unions to achieve the 
elimination of wasteful work practices and dismissals. One week later retrenchment 
notices were issued to 140 workers and delivered by special courier to their homes 
during the evening. Police were posted outside the dockyard the following morning to 
prevent any of the sacked workers from trying to enter the yard. Any who did so, 
according to the police, would be charged with trespass. The Newcastle Trades Hall 
Council secretary, Peter Barrack, described the management's actions as a "breach of an 
understanding with the Premier that unions would be consulted before any decision on 
retrenchments was made". 41 In early March, the Government announced it would 
decommission the dockyard operation and put it to tender. Premier Unsworth 
maintained that despite the prospect of conflict between the Government and left-wing 
sections of the labour movement, his policy of reviewing (and if necessary 
streamlining) public sector employment would continue in order to fund priority
3® Canberra Times, 10. 1.87 .
39 Sydney Morning Herald, 12.2 .87.
40 The Australian, 12.2 .87 .
41 Sydney Morning Herald, 19.2 .87.
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programs. 42 By July it was all over, despite the persistence of some workers in 
continuing to turn up for work. Most had agreed to accept the redundancy packages being 
offered. Barrack compared the actions of the Minister for Public Works, Laurie 
Brereton, with those of Charles Copeman from Peko-Wallsend. Copeman, the hero of the 
New Right came out better in comparison, said Barrack. 42
The NSW state Government election was held in March 1988 and resulted in a win for 
the Greiner L/NP Coalition. Although the swings against Labor varied considerably in 
individual seats, however, the largest occurred in traditional Labor strongholds. An 
independent won the seat of Newcastle with a swing of almost 22 per cent. 44 (The BHP 
steelworks in Newcastle had also implemented an extensive retrenchment programme.) 
As well, mining communities in Lithgow and Cessnock, power workers in Swansea, 
miners and steelworkers in the Wollongong area, all traditional Labor seats, all reacted 
similarly. Substantial retrenchments in each of these areas had resulted in high 
unemployment with little perceived prospects for the future. The community backlash 
against the Unsworth Labor Government was made clear in the ballot box.
As the research in the earlier chapters suggested, Job Maintenance is an issue which 
merits discrete attention. The limited examples I have supplied of disputes involving 
Job Maintenance provide some indication of the intensity with which this issue is viewed 
by sections of the union movement. They do not, 1 believe, indicate the full extent to 
which Job Maintenance has been responsible for increasing proportions of the conflict 
that has occurred during the 1980s. Ironically, while accounting for an increased 
proportion of the industrial disputation that occurs, Job Maintenance is probably also 
largely responsible for the overall reduction in the level of disputation. One important 
aspect which has not been discussed here has been contract labour.45 While space 
unfortunately does not permit a separate analysis, the significance of contract labour as 
an issue during the 1980s is highlighted in the case studies contained in Chapters Ten, 
Eleven and Twelve.
42 Financial Review; 5.3.87.
42 Charles Copeman was a central figure in the Robe River dispute which is the subject of a 
case study in Chapter Twelve. Barrack is referring here to his actions during that dispute and 
his identification with 'New Right’ ideology.
44 The Age, 21.3.88.
45 From a legal standpoint it is a very complex subject. Commonwealth and state laws vary 
considerably, even in definition and give rise to some confusion in distinguishing between 
contract labour (or 'independent contractors') and employees. For example, in NSW 
independent contractors are deemed employees for the purposes of some Acts and awards, but 
not others.
9 .1 .2 .  The legal environment
Industrial relations activities in Australia are subject to a wide range of legal 
strictures. In the first place, Commonwealth and state industrial tribunals are 
responsible for the making and variation of awards and for conciliation and settlement of 
industrial disputes as well as regulating the affairs of member organisations. Until 
1956, the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court was also responsible for 
the enforcement of orders and as such was empowered to impose sanctions for non- 
compliance; a combination of functions which the High Court then held to be 
unconstitutional.46 There are statutory provisions contained in the Commonwealth TPA 
as well as various state laws governing, for example, essential services. In addition, 
various actions associated with picketing are unlawful both by statute and common law. 
Finally, employers, trade unions and individual employees are subject to common law 
actions whereby damages may be sought and granted for a variety of reasons. To a 
greater or lesser degree all of these contribute to the industrial environment. The 
extent to which they have an impact on conduct is immeasurable. Their deterrence value 
is also non-quantifiable, (after all, it is difficult to assess the incidence of non-events). 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the increase in civil actions over the past few 
years has coincided with a decline in strikes, and there is some reason for believing that 
the two are not unrelated.
9 .1 .3 .  The common law
A substantial body of case law in Australia and Britain provides much of the legal arena 
in which industrial disputation occurs. Despite an array of legislation which confers 
legal status upon trade unions and protects their existence, effective industrial action by 
Australian workers nearly always involves a breach of their contracts of employment. 
Although damages can be sought at common law for inducing breach of contract, 
intimidation and conspiracy, employers in the past have rarely resorted to this 
recourse. According to Creighton et al, the reasons why are three-fold.
(i) an awareness that such actions are unlikely to be conducive of 
harmonious industrial relations, especially if the case comes to trial 
several years after the events which gave use to the cause of action;
(ii) the fact that on the available evidence the courts could be expected to
take a restrictive approach to the assessment of damages in such 
cases.......and,
(iii) a realization that even if a court did award substantial damages it is 
most unlikely that the average worker would have the money to pay 
them. 4 7
46 R. v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 C.L.R. 254.
47 W. B. Creighton, et al, p.770.
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It would be difficult to argue against the first reason. Litigation rarely leads to 
harmonious relationships in any sphere, and there is no reason why industrial relations 
should be an exception. But as far as the next two reasons are concerned, events over the 
last few years suggest that they may no longer represent the current picture. As Peter 
Costello, a barrister who represented Dollar Sweets says, the "potential to recover 
damages against trade unions at common law is of critical importance to employers".48 
He concludes that despite the cost and length of proceedings, the opportunity to regain the 
position that existed prior to a dispute allows the employer to negotiate on an equal 
footing with the union and to insist upon his rights.49
While it is difficult to estimate accurately the impact that Dollar Sweets and 
Mudginberri50 have had, it seems probable that their lessons have been assimilated. 
For a start, the issue or mere threat of common law writs has had the effect of forcing 
some unions to withdraw from industrial action. There are some notable examples. 
During a dispute in December 1988, an action was brought by Colonial Sugar Refining 
Co. Ltd. (CSR) in Victoria against individuals, including union officials and delegates. 
Injunctions were sought to remove strike and picket action as well as the payment of 
damages for the "multi-million dollar" losses suffered at CSR’s Yarraville refinery.51 
This was in addition to a legal action against three unions and fifty-five strikers in 
which the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission (ACAC) was being 
requested to issue a certificate to register breaches of an industry bans clause. If 
successful, the way would be cleared for Federal Court action to impose fines of up to 
$1000 per day. On the day before the actions at common law were set down for hearing 
in the Victorian Supreme Court, the strike ended and the CSR dropped all proceedings.52
A seven-week strike at BP Coal Australia’s Howick mine in the Hunter Valley ended in 
December 1988, when Miners' Federation officials gave an undertaking to the NSW 
Supreme Court, that Coal Industry Tribunal orders would be obeyed. This followed a 
common law action by BP seeking huge damages.53 The Miners’ Federation has 
acknowledged that the Howick incident has had some influence on how industrial action is 
now approached. They are far more cautious now. It was pointed out that the Howick
48 P. Costello, 'Legal Remedies Against Trade Union Conduct in Australia', in Arbitration in 
Contempt, Melbourne, 1986, p.146.
49 Loc.cit.
50 Mudginberri was not an action at common law but I mention it here as an important 
development in the situation which is being described.
51 The Australian, 21.12.88.
52 The Australian, 5.1.89.
53 The Weekend Australian, 31.12.88-1.1.89.
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dispute was not supported by union officials in the first place, and that in future lodge- 
led strikes would be more strongly discouraged.54
In September, 1989, Australia's domestic airlines sent letters to 1700 pilots, warning 
them of serious consequences unless they honoured their contracts of employment. Two 
days later the pilots resigned en masse after the companies began issuing termination 
notices and writs for damages. The Pilots' Federation has maintained throughout that the 
writs served against them, and further threatened writs,55 were their sole reason for 
resigning. That being the case, here at least is one example of the negative side of 
common law writs in dispute resolution. Arguably, the pilots may have been back at 
work at a relatively early stage had they not been pushed into resigning. I emphasise 
may because there is some reason to believe that the airlines had a hidden agenda based 
on the deregulation of the airline industry in 1990. The mass resignations of the pilots 
could aid in the rationalisation and streamlining of the industry, and as such, the 
airlines' actions may be regarded as provocative. Whatever the airlines' intentions 
were, there is every reason to believe that had the pilots agreed to negotiate during the 
first week of the dispute, a satisfactory settlement would have been reached.56 In any 
case, had they not felt coerced into resigning, there is some doubt that the dispute would 
have been so enduring. The history of the relationship between the Federation and the 
airlines, particularly Ansett, is a major factor here, as are the personalities and the 
attitudes of the individuals involved.
The above examples are not intended to suggest that the issue of common law writs have 
become an everyday practice in industrial relations. In each of these cases, the number 
of workers involved was high as were the potential damages payouts. Nor do I want to 
imply that common law in relation to breach of contract, intimidation or conspiracy 
relates only to industrial matters. The pertinence that it has in relation to industrial 
matters is that it does not grant immunity to trade unions, their officials or members. 
Furthermore, while actions have generally been confined to one of these three torts, the 
whole range of common law is available, when applicable. For example, a defamation 
action was brought against the National Secretary of the Australian Railways Union
54 M. Lee, Miners' Federation, Interview, 30.10.89.
55 Prior to their resignations, the tourism industries in Australia and the United States of 
America had publicly announced their intentions of pursuing class actions against the pilots.
56 This was the view of Keith Marks (Interview, Melbourne, 8.11.89.) who was the legal 
representative of the tourism industry and Grant Bellchamber, ( I n t e r v i e w Melbourne, 
9.11.89.) a research officer from the ACTU.
(ARU) when he spoke out on the "buy back" lease by the SRA from a company which the 
Chairman of the SRA was involved with as a director.57
It is far more usual for interim or interlocutory injunctions to be sought by employers 
to restrain strike action. In most cases they are obeyed by unions although interim 
injunctions are often granted ex parte, that is, "without notice of the application being 
given to the party sought to be restrained, in conditions of urgency where failure of the 
Court to act might involve irreparable injury".58 Nevertheless, the willingness of 
courts to grant an injunction will normally depend on the processes of conciliation and 
arbitration having been observed. Typically, an employer and union would have had 
their dispute heard in the industrial tribunal; a recommendation or order made to the 
effect that industrial action should cease; and the non-compliance by the union with 
such a recommendation or order. Usually, it is only when disputing parties step outside 
the industrial processes that common law actions occur. This has been the state of play 
to date; however, following a recent decision in the pilots’ case which will be discussed 
later, that situation may be subject to change in the future.
In April 1988, after protracted legal proceedings, the Federated Confectioners’ 
Association (FCA) in an out-of-court settlement paid damages of $175,000 to Dollar 
Sweets Pty. Ltd. It was the first action that had been mounted at common law since the 
early 1970s.59
The union had entered into a dispute with the Dollar Sweets company over a reduction in 
working hours which only half the company’s employees supported. A picket line was set 
up to prevent deliveries to the company's factory, a tactic which resulted in violence and 
threats against some of the drivers. Following notification of a dispute, the ACAC 
recommended that the picket be lifted. When the FAC failed to comply, an injunction 
restraining the picketing was obtained by Dollar Sweets from the Victorian Supreme 
Court. Murphy J found that the plaintiff had established an arguable case that the 
defendants were committing the torts of interference with the plaintiff's commercial 
contracts, intimidation (in so far as their threats had successfully turned drivers away) 
and conspiracy.60
57 J. Walshe, Secretary of ARU, letter, 5.9.86.
58 E. I. Sykes, Strike Law in Australia, Second Ed., Melbourne, 1982, p.14.
59 Dollar Sweets Pty. Ltd. v Federated Confenctioners Association of Australia, (1086) VR 
383.
60 Creighton and Stewart, op.cit., pp.235-236.
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The Victoria State Chamber of Commerce which had backed Dollar Sweets, welcomed the 
settlement as "a historic landmark in Australian industrial history...it would encourage 
other employers to take similar steps if faced with such industrial action.61 Whatever 
the merits of the Dollar Sweets case, its impact has been incalculable. It provided two 
crucial lessons. The first was that picketing under certain circumstances is illegal; and 
the second, and for these purposes, the most important, was that refusal to obey a 
Supreme Court injunction could lead to a potentially costly damages payout for unions. 
Although this was known prior to Dollar Sweets the disinclination of employers to 
embark on such a course of action was part of the industrial relations culture. Keith 
Marks, a former Deputy President of the Commission questioned the importance that has 
been placed on the Dollar Sweets case.62 He felt that under the circumstances, the 
outcome had been unremarkable in that the issuing of the injunction was in no way 
unusual and the tort of intimidation was already well established.63
I am inclined to disagree with him. While the law in the case may have been 
unremarkable, the ramifications have been considerable. Earlier, I outlined some of the 
cases where common law writs have either been threatened or issued in industrial 
disputes since Dollar Sweets. Much more pervasive, I believe, has been the way that 
employers are now thinking. The 'idea' that the common law is a recourse that is both 
acceptable and effective has gained ground. It is no longer a measure that employers 
necessarily regard as futile and too costly. This is in a large part due to the publicity 
given to Dollar Sweets, and also to the media attention given to members of the New Right 
who have widely endorsed use of the common law. Despite protestations from the ACTU to 
the contrary,64 it is difficult to see how a marked change in employer attitudes could not 
have some impact on how industrial disputation is conducted.
The Dollar Sweets case does not stand on its own. In addition, as the following section 
will outline, legislative initiatives in both the Commonwealth and state spheres have 
contributed to the changed legal environment.
9.1.4.  The legislative environment
In 1969 Clarrie O’Shea, the Victorian state Secretary of the Australian Tramways and 
Motor Omnibus Employees Association, was imprisoned for contempt of court because he 
refused to supply information about the union's funds. Demonstrations occurred
61 Sydney Morning Herald, 13.4.88.
62 K. Marks, Interview, 8.11.89.
63 See Rookes v Barnard, (1964) AC 1129.
64 G. Bellchamber, ACTU research officer, Interview, 9.11.89.
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throughout Australian until an anonymous donor paid the outstanding fines owed by the 
union. From that time the existence of sanctions against trade unions provided in 
conciliation and arbitration legislation have been acknowledged (grudgingly by some) to 
be an ineffective means of curbing industrial disputation.
In 1977, the then Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser enacted legislation aimed at curbing 
some forms of industrial activity. The most controversial in terms of its background and 
ramifications was the insertion of Section 45D into the TPA on the recommendations of 
the 1976 Report of the Swanson Committee. The Committee which had consisted entirely 
of representatives of business interests (no consumer or trade union organisations were 
represented), had been asked to examine the structure and operation of the TPA and to 
pay particular attention to anti-competitive conduct by employees, and employee or 
employer organisations.65 The legislation provided a severe restriction on 'secondary 
boycotts' and included sanctions to comprise pecuniary penalties against organisations, 
applications for injunctions and civil actions for damages:66
Whilst activities by persons or bodies other than trade unions and their 
members may be comprehended within its scope, there is no doubt that its 
main "bite" is likely to be directed against the industrial pressures of trade 
unions. As such it constitutes something of a reversal of a generally held 
view that labour unions should be exempted from the scope of restrictive 
trade practices legislation.
Two sets of further amendments to the TPA followed in December 1978 and May 1980. 
Both were introduced following particular disputes. The first was the 'live-meat- 
export' dispute of 1978 and the second, the 'Laidley dispute’ of March/April 1980.67
Not surprisingly, the trade union movement did not favour the legislation while 
employers and employer organisations welcomed it. This dichotomy was not resolved by 
the subsequent Committee of Review into Industrial Relations. The Hancock Report, made 
no recommendations on the basis that there were two conflicting views within the 
Committee. These views are worth quoting, because they succinctly represent the 
opposing views of the trade union movement and employers:
One is that the activities dealt with by sections 45D and 45E are essentially 
industrial and should be dealt with by tribunals which understand industrial 
relations processes and the requirements of dispute resolution. The 
contrary view differentiates sections 45D and 45E from other industrial 
laws as dealing with the interests of third parties. On this view, a party 
which is in 'no conflict over pay and conditions should have legal redress
65 Creighton, et al, op.cit., p.793.
66 Sykes and Verbury, op.cit., p.379.
67 B. Creighton, op.cit., p.134.
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for its grievance and should not be expected to rely upon the forms of 
discretion and compromise which are appropriate to industrial relations.qq
In time the Act provided the basis for damages awarded against the AMIEU in the 
precedent-setting Mudginberri case.69 The Labor Government on attaining office tried 
unsuccessfully to repeal Sections 45D and 45E of the TPA. (The Repeal Bill was defeated 
in the Senate by the Coalition and Australian Democrats.) They remain on the statute 
books today.
Fraser also enacted the Commonwealth Employees (Employment Provisions) Act, 1977. 
(CEEP) This gave government authorities the power to suspend or dismiss employees 
who took strike or work bans action. CEEP's purpose was to counter growing militancy 
amongst Commonwealth employees. Although the Act was used several times it had little 
impact on industrial relations in the public sector. An ILO Committee of Experts 
criticised CEEP as running counter to ILO Convention No.87 (para.28.3) They reversed 
their decision in the following year.70 This Act was later repealed by the Hawke 
Government although it retains some influence. It was cited by Justice Brooking in the 
pilots' case to define the sense in which he was using "industrial action".71
The Fraser Government was not only concerned with placing restrictions upon industrial 
activity. A fundamental tenet of Liberal and National Party philosophy is the primacy of 
the individual’s rights. To that avowed end, the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, 
(CAA) was amended to include the promotion of voluntary unionism and withdraw award 
rights for preference to unionists. Anthony Street, addressing the second reading of the 
Amendment Bill in March 1977, said:
Our industrial relations policy is based on certain fundamental principles 
which provide the cornerstones for the legislation...Those principles are: 
each member of our community has both rights and obligations: individual 
rights must be protected; equally, obligations must be met....we, as 
Government, accept that it is our responsibility to develop an industrial 
relations framework in which the rights of individuals are protected, for 
example the right to choose employment and to join, or not to join, 
industrial organisations. 7 2
6 6  Report of the Committee of Review, Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems, Vol. 
2., April 1985, p.643.
69 Mudginberri was a precedent in the sense that it was the first time that the TPA had been 
used to the limits.
7 0  Creighton, et al , p.813.
7 1  Justice Brooking, Judgem ent, Victoria, 23.11.89., p.40. Brooking did not deem it 
necessary to mention the Act’s repeal.
7^ C.P.D., Hansard, House of Representatives, 31.3.77, p.836.
Without casting doubts on the conservatives' sincere adherence to principles of 
individualism, there can be little doubt that the Fraser Government's extensive 
legislation was also aimed at curbing union power. The two premises go hand-in-hand 
notwithstanding that the Coalition's industrial relations policy was based on the 
assumption that there are no irreconcilable conflicts between capital and labour in the 
workplace. The 1975 policy defined the processes of industrial relations "as possible 
within the framework of the concept of a partnership between employers and 
employees".73
The ACTU response to the various legislative initiatives of the Fraser Government are 
adequately summed up by the titles to their Bulletins of 1980 and 1982: WORKERS 
BEWARE! FRASER’S LEGISLATION IS A CONCERTED ATTACK ON AUSTRALIAN UNIONISM, 
and New anti-union legislation.74
As well as the sanctions outlined above, other legislation already existed for use against 
trade unions and employees. These included laws in some states governing essential 
services, sanctions under state industrial legislation, plus special and general state 
laws. In addition, provisions in the Commonwealth and State's Crimes Acts outlawed 
certain activities associated with strikes and picketing. Notwithstanding their presence 
on the statute books, these laws were used infrequently. The Fraser innovations 
introduced a positive inducement to employers to take legal action against unions, and 
provided the impetus for a future tactical change in attitude.
The Federal Labor Government was elected in 1983 on a platform that promised national 
recovery, national reconciliation and national reconstruction. Just prior to the election, 
the Accord had been negotiated between the ALP and ACTU. Whatever the expectations the 
Hawke Government and the ACTU may have had, the consensus approach appears to have 
had minimal impact on the legal climate that had its origins during the Fraser years. 
Indeed, if anything, there has been an intensification. Since 1983, several major 
landmark disputes have occurred, all of which achieved significance because of the legal 
recourses that have been used. In Queensland, legislation introduced by the National 
Party Government was reminiscent of the nineteenth century. Amidst all this, an ultra­
conservative body of opinion often referred to as the New Right has emerged. With 
limited numbers and virtually no formal organisation, the New Right has exerted its 
influence in the industrial sphere on a number of levels. Not the least of those has been
73 The Liberal and National Country Party Employment and Industrial Relations Policy, 
Canberra, 1975.
74 ACTU, Bulletin, 1980, 1982.
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its active involvement in the use of all legal avenues to defeat industrial disputation 
whenever possible.
9. 1.5 The Brooking judgement
Since the matters discussed at the beginning of this chapter, there have been some 
further developments in the pilots’ dispute which have direct relevance to some of the 
issues raised herein. While I would not want to suggest that one dispute alone can be 
regarded as representative of industrial relations in Australia, I believe that the events 
which have taken place reflect the ambit of change.
On November 21 1989, a judgement was handed down by Mr. Justice Brooking in the 
Victorian Supreme Court which questioned the shibboleth that, despite legal 
restrictions, there exists a fundamental 'right to strike' in Australia, the airlines were 
seeking unspecified damages for losses incurred as a result of the six days of bans on 
pilots working outside the hours of 9.00 am to 5.00 pm, interference with contractual 
relations, inducing breach of contract, civil conspiracy, and intimidation.75
Brooking's landmark decision found that the pilots' Federation had conspired to injure 
the airlines by directing pilots to work only between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. The 
defendants (AFAP and twenty-three Federation officials) had put forward the argument 
that "it was an implied term of the contract that no strike or industrial action by a pilot 
could constitute a breach of his contract of employment".76 Brooking confessed to "some 
reluctance to imply a term whereby one party to a contract is not to be obliged to 
perform his main obligation to it."77 He also rejected the argument that a series of 
stop-work meetings provided a defence to the claim for "inducing breach of contract or 
interfering with contractual relations or to the claim for interfering with trade or 
business by unlawful means".78 In questioning the validity of resolutions taken at the 
stop-work meetings, Brooking raised two points:
In the first place, even on the assumption that the resolutions passed at the 
stopwork meetings were in some sense binding on all members of the 
Federation, it does not follow that the case can be treated, so far as 
inducement and procurement are concerned, as one in which all the alleged 
contract breakers are to be taken as having voted in favour of the 
resolution and so as not having been induced......
The second and distinct point concerns the question whether the resolution 
was valid or binding in any sense...... In the present case I am inclined to
75 The Australian Industrial Law Review, No.27, 1.2.90, p.31.
76 Justice Brooking, op.cit., p.30.
77 Loc.cit.
78 Ibid, p.58.
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think that no adequate notice was given of the business to be transacted at 
the meeting. 7 9
Without entering into the detailed legal arguments involved in the case, it is clear that 
the judgement has important implications for the conduct of industrial disputation in the 
future. In the first place, by stepping outside the conciliation and arbitration system, 
the AFAP lost any institutional protection that it may have had. Secondly, the findings of 
Justice Brooking express the common law and its tradition. They do not rely in the 
general sense on a knowledge of industrial relations and its practice in the Australian 
context. Brooking does cite the Industrial Relations Act, 1988 whereby the defendant's 
{sic) conduct was also unlawful because it constituted an offence against section 312 
which prohibits incitement to boycott an award.80 But generally, the judgement is a 
strictly legal interpretation by a member of the judiciary unpracticed in the 
complexities of industrial relations. No criticism of Justice Brooking is implied here. 
As a Supreme Court judge his sphere of action, not only entitles but obligates him to 
treat each case on its merits without regard to special circumstances. Consequently, he 
could only find on the facts and evidence presented, in the same way and by the same 
process as he would for any other litigants.
Consequences for the AFAP have not been confined to the possible damages payout which 
may ensue. During the course of the dispute, the airlines have signed up a number of 
pilots from Australia and overseas on an individual contract basis. Notwithstanding the 
Federation's willingness to negotiate now within the industrial tribunal, it can no longer 
claim to be representative of the pilots employed in the industry. Even if the AFAP were 
to accept the conditions set down by the tribunal for a return to work, it is doubtful that 
the majority of its members would be re-employed. Subsequent negotiations in the 
tribunal have revealed the Federation's lack of bargaining power. None of its conditions 
have been accepted by the airlines, while the Federation has been forced to capitulate on 
a number of claims. Prior to the judgement, in October, the Federation had attempted to 
resume negotiations within the Industrial Relations Commission. Justice Maddern, the 
Commission President ruled that the Federation would not be a party to a settlement and 
would have no say in the making of a new pilots' award. The Federation’s application for 
compulsory conciliation talks with the airlines was also dismissed.81 Even if agreement
7 9  Ibid., pp.47-51
8 0  Section 312(1 )(a) provided that an officer or agent of an organisation bound by an award 
shall not advise, encourage or incite a member to refrain from working in accordance with the 
award or certified agreement which by sec. 312(2) applied to advice, encouragement or 
incitement in relation to employment or work with or for a particular employer or of a 
particular kind. The Australian Industrial Law Review, No.27, 1.2.90., p.33.
8 1  Sydney Morning Herald, 11.10.89.
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was reached in the industrial tribunal there is every reason to believe that the 
Federation as a result of its actions early in the dispute, namely encouraging the mass 
resignations and opting out of the system, has rendered itself irrelevant to the industry 
as it is now operating.
The implications of the Brooking judgement were not lost on the Labor Government, the 
labour movement and employers. The Government's initial response was divided. The 
Minister for Industrial Relations, Peter Morris raised the possibility of enacting 
legislation to protect the right to withdraw labour.82 Other members of the 
Government, including Hawke, did not support Morris, a position that was described by 
some commentators as a "rebuff" for the Minister. A spokesman for Hawke said that 
while the Prime Minister's view had always been that the right to strike was enshrined 
in convention, it would not be given legislative force.83 Hawke did however, express 
some concern about the judgement. Damages, he said, were not "his cup of tea", a 
perplexing statement given his advocacy of common law action at the beginning of the 
dispute. Indeed, he admitted that his earlier language when he had talked about "war" had 
been provocative. His view now, was that the airlines would be wrong to collect damages 
against the unions and he recommended that they not attempt to do so. In an address to the 
National Press Club, Hawke said, he thought the airlines "almost had to take the action 
they did and they had our support, but not, from my point of view, to exact 
retribution " .84
How can the Prime Minister's about face be interpreted? His later statements (those 
made after the Brooking judgement) could suggest that his compliance with, and 
endorsement of the airlines' actions, were parts of a strategy adopted to defeat the pilots’ 
Federation. As such, the position of the Government was purely tactical and did not 
anticipate the airlines actually proceeding to the ultimate conclusion. I think that this 
explanation is highly unlikely. The Government was well aware that the possible and 
even probable outcome of a hearing for damages would result in a favourable decision for 
the airlines. Moreover, after the Mudginberri and Dollar Sweets cases, damages awarded 
against a union would not be unprecedented. The fact that the cases bore little 
resemblance to each other is quite beside the point. What the Government may not have 
anticipated however, was the substance of Justice Brooking’s findings against the 
Federation which called into question the 'right to strike' and consequently placed the 
Labor Government in an anomalous position with the labour movement.
82 Financial Review, 27.11.89.
83 Age, 28.11.89.
84 Age, 8.12.89.
The response from the ACTU on hearing the Brooking judgement was immediate and 
unequivocal. Apart from the resolution passed early on in the dispute, the ACTU had 
supported the Government’s attitude. In what can only be described as ’tunnel-vision’, 
the ACTU had proceeded on the basis that the Accord must be protected at any costs. Not 
only was the AFAP not affiliated to the ACTU, there existed an animosity between the two 
organisations that appears to have blinded the ACTU to the risks involved to unions in 
general. Because no sympathy could be extended to the pilots who were regarded as 
greedy and elitist, the conduct of the dispute aroused no theoretical criticism of the 
principles involved apart from the resolution taken at Congress. Once the judgement was 
made, the ACTU, aware of its ramifications, did an about face, and there can be little 
doubt that pressure at this point was exerted on the Government to modify the situation. 
This, I believe, provides the real explanation for the change in Hawke’s attitude. One 
week after the judgement was announced, the ACTU executive passed a resolution in 
support of the Federation on the damages issue.
The problem for the ACTU is difficult. While it wants to support the Government, the 
arbitration system and the Accord against the pilots, it also needs to side with the pilots 
because of the threat to basic trade-union rights. ACTU president, Simon Crean, 
announced that some consideration would also be given to appealing the decision. He said, 
that a meeting with the Government would be sought to discuss legislative changes to 
protect the rights of unions to take legitimate industrial action.85 Some indication of the 
defensive situation of the ACTU is indicated by the nature of the proposed legislation 
which would not seek to enshrine the 'right to strike'. The proposal, it has been 
suggested would be more likely to require employers to exhaust all other avenues of 
conciliation and arbitration before being able to resort to legal action.86 Nevertheless, 
tame though the ACTU proposal may have been, the threatened support by the ACTU for 
the Federation would not have been welcomed by the Government. There would be an 
added reason for nervousness should the ACTU provide support to the AFAP in an appeal 
to the High Court.
The judgement hailed as a "milestone" by employer organisations such as the Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and the NFF who said, "it (the court's decision) would encourage 
their members to take common law action against workers who took industrial action".87 
John Collins, president of the Australian Chamber of Commerce said the decision 
affirmed many of the principles of the Dollar Sweets case. He went on to say:
85 Age, 29 . 11. 89 .
86 Loc.cit.
87 The Weekend Australian, 25 - 26 . 11.89.
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In a short-sighted attempt to preserve the sanctity of the prices and 
incomes accord the ACTU has, perversely, become a party to shattering 
one of the pillars of trade unionism - the supposed right to strike.gg
It is hardly surprising that no reservations were expressed by employers. Not only had 
the 'right to strike' been challenged, the administrative and directive power of union 
officials had also been eroded. The decision has undoubtedly enhanced the prospect of 
success at common law in industrial disputes, and if, as the pilots' Federation 
anticipates, the judgement is appealed to the High Court, the whole basis of industrial 
disputation in Australia will undergo a rigid scrutiny.
Until the Brooking judgement, actions at common law in Australia had taken a particular 
form. Typically, the union involved would have ignored orders made by a tribunal and 
injunctive relief then sought by the employer. (This has also been the scenario under 
which sections 45D and 45E of the TPA have been invoked.) In the pilots' case, the 
action for damages at common law were sought without the prior issue of injunctions. 
Until the mass resignations, the airlines had not sought injunctions against the 
Federation’s '9 to 5' directive although the opportunity then existed for them to do so. 
Instead, the threat of a common law suit for damages was made, virtually from the onset 
of the dispute. Although there is no legal requirement for employers to initiate 
proceedings by seeking injunctive relief, the airlines have created a precedent by their 
action which could hardly go unnoticed by other employers. The extent to which they 
will follow the airlines suit in the future remains to be seen.
Another important aspect of the judgement has been the basis on which Brooking found 
against the Federation. The implications are as yet unclear and would no doubt be a 
central focus for attention should the case go the the High Court. As it stands at the 
moment, it appears that, as is the case with injunctive relief, a precedent has been 
created which could render certain functions of the conciliation and arbitration 
commissions irrelevant. It has nearly always been the case that when industrial 
disputes are in the process of arbitration, and both parties are acting in accordance with 
tribunal directives, no recourse to the external legal system is sought.89 Following the 
Brooking judgement, this may not continue to be the case. A possible scenario may be, 
that a union has organised stop-work meetings at which a resolution is passed in favour 
of taking industrial action. Even though no orders are made by the commission to cease 
the action, (and hence the union is not defying the commission), the process by which 
the stop-work meetings were called, may be actionable at common law based on the
88 Loc.cit.
89 The Robe River case study in the following chapter looks at an exception to this 'rule'.
precedent created in the pilots' case. It does not matter that the circumstances in the 
pilots' dispute were different,90 Brooking’s decision on an issue that has always been 
considered an "industrial matter", leaves the way open for employers in the future to 
pursue damages even when no breach of conciliation and arbitration law has occurred. 
While this has always been possible, employers have refrained from such action. 
Perhaps they will continue to do so, despite the precedent which as yet, remains untested 
in the form that I have outlined. Even so, the decision will remain as a 'sword of 
Damocles' to the union movement and will no doubt have a significant effect on how union 
officials perform their duties.
Considerable space has been given in the previous chapter to discussion of the New Right, 
and in this chapter, the pilots' dispute. Although members of the New Right openly 
endorsed the airlines actions, their involvement has been minimal. Ironically, the most 
outspoken member of the New Right about the dispute has been the then National Party 
Senator, John Stone who was critical of the Government and airlines, and openly 
advocated that negotiations with the Pilots' Federation be resumed.91 This was a decided 
retraction from his previously well publicised attitude towards unions and endorsement 
of contract labour. A member of Senator Stone's office commented that, apart from 
wanting an end to the dispute, and being highly critical of the Government's handling of 
it, "John was being political".92 That aside, it appears that a climate has been created 
whereby the policies of the New Right have become part of industrial consciousness, to 
the extent that the actual participation of individuals associated with the New Right is 
unnecessary. With the common law achieving widespread acceptance as a weapon against 
industrial action, other precepts favoured by the New Right, such as enterprise-based 
unions, continue to gain ground and are now being advocated in a limited way by the 
Federal Government and the ACTU. Significantly, they are no longer associated in the 
public mind with the New Right but form part of the discussion of industrial relations 
with a firm place on the political agenda.
In the following chapters I will be looking at three of the disputes which have played a 
prominent role in advancing industrial relations to its present state. One of the features 
of the pilots’ dispute which I have not discussed at any length, has been the introduction 
of individual contracts of employment by the airlines with the explicit approval of the 
Labor Government. The implications for trade unionism in Australia of this development
90 The pilots had placed themselves outside the industrial relations system.
91 Australian Broadcasting Commission, AM,
92 Senator Stone had been following Coalition policy which, his aide agreed, was at some 
variance with his personal philosophy.
are enormous. As the case studies will show, contract labour is, and will probably 
remain, one of the most important issues for trade unions in the foreseeable future.
Each in its own way, the following case studies are important indicators of the changes 
which have taken place in industrial relations during the 1980s. Different in detail and 
context though they are, the Mudginberri, SEQEB and Robe River disputes have all had a 
lasting impact on the industrial relations arena long after they have ceased to be active 
disputes.
Chapter Ten
THE SEQEB DISPUTE
Another [member of the audience] from an ACOA meeting was so 
horrified at the state of affairs in Queensland she suggested we 
have a revolution. We pointed out we were flat out trying to 
hold a picket *
10.1.1.  Background
Between June 1978 and February 1985 industrial relations in Queensland’s electricity 
industry had been, to put it mildly, troubled. There had been eleven major disputes 
which had cut power supplies. Since March 1980, the Government had declared a state 
of emergency three times (one did not result from a power strike) and had threatened 
union deregistration, publication of strikers' names and the fining of strikers and union 
leaders.* 1 Since 1977, when the industry was rationalised, electricity charges had 
soared at twice the rate of consumer prices in general.
In August 1984, Wayne Gilbert the newly appointed general manager, advised SEQEB 
staff that he intended to reduce the size of the organisation by 10 per cent, without 
introducing redundancies or contract labour.2 This was in contrast to a secret memo 
leaked in 1984 which outlined a scenario for the increased use of contractors. The memo 
outlined options aimed at minimising the board's costs by reducing the permanent 
workforce. SEQEB claimed the memo was merely a discussion paper which was "never 
acted upon".3 According to officials at the ETU and MOA, the memo also anticipated the 
strike and recommended taking the ETU on first.4
Since rationalisation, contract labour had been used during peak periods after 
agreements reached between the ETU and SEQEB. During this period there had been a 
decrease in the number of SEQEB employees. For example, in 1977 there were three 
line construction gangs with approximately thirty employees in each gang. By the end of
* Pam Gardiner in an address at Perry Park, Brisbane, 30.5.86., 'Time to Organise', in Papers 
Presented to the National Fightback Conference, 4-6 July, 1986, p.15. (ACOA was the 
Australian Clerical Officers' Association)
1 Courier-Mail, 17.2.85.
2 Business Review Weekly, 18.10.84., p. 15.
3 Financial Review, 17.1.85.
4 W. Randall, (ETU) & J. McGee, (MOA), Interviews. Both tried to locate the memo without 
success but assured me of its existence and content. Memo No.3934 was also referred to in a 
letter from N.D. Kane, the then secretary of the ETU.
1984 there were two gangs with approximately seventeen in each. "This staffing level 
was reflected right across all the Board Depots", according to Neal Kane, the then ETU 
secretary. "Continual approaches to SEQEB to upgrade their staffing levels over that 
period met with negative responses".5 Contractors, he points out, are mostly small 
businesses whose priority is profit rather than safety.
From early 1984 SEQEB and the ETU negotiated for an agreement on the use of contract 
labour. In August the proposed agreement was rejected by the ETU State Council. In 
September bans were imposed on three projects that SEQEB advised were to be let to 
contractors. In December, after a compulsory conference of the State Industrial 
Commission meetings between the ETU and SEQEB failed to resolve the matter. ETU 
members returned to work on 7 December for further meetings and conferences with the 
Commission. On the 17 January 1985, the ETU refused again to perform work on the 
banned projects and a general strike of members resulted. A severe storm hit Brisbane 
on the 18 January and ETU members obeyed the Commission's order to return to work, 
but resumed their strike on the 26 January, this time refusing to obey a Commission 
order. A state of emergency was declared on 8 February under which orders in council 
were made ordering the men back to work and ordering SEQEB to dismiss workers who 
did not return.
From this time the Government assumed responsibility from SEQEB management for 
making decisions (although SEQEB had been implementing Government policy all along). 
The issues became diverse. The right to manage versus opposition to contract labour 
became subordinate to the reinstatement of dismissed workers and law and order. 
Democracy itself became an issue which, in the conflict that ensued, had meaning that 
varied with concept and ideology.
No discussion of the SEQEB dispute could be considered adequate without some mention of 
the protagonists involved. Not only did the dispute illustrate the divisions that existed 
between the various actors in the dispute, but there was a strong element of personal 
crusading that emanated from the key characters.
10 .1 .2 .  Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson
While it is speculative to suggest that Sir Joh deliberately provoked the dispute, his 
previously stated attitudes towards union power, and statements made by him during the 
dispute, suggest that he was primarily concerned with curbing union power and 
radically changing the industrial environment. Indeed, Sir Joh regarded his fight against 
the Queensland power unions as a crusade as important as President Reagan's fight with
5 N. D. Kane, Letter, 17.4.86.
the air-traffic controllers and Mrs Thatcher's battle with the British unions. "We can’t 
afford to lose", he declared. "We will win and this will change the face of unionism in 
Australia".6 Some credence must therefore be given to the provocation theory on the 
grounds that the dispute served long-term goals. Whether ’deliberate provocation' can 
be asserted is another question altogether.
Sir Joh had suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the power unions in 1980. He 
had taken over negotiations himself and conceded gains that were much greater than even 
the unions had hoped for. Part of the deal was that the unions would not gloat over the 
defeat of the Premier and leave his 'tough-guy' image intact.7 During the SEQEB dispute 
in 1985, Sir Joh showed no signs of backing down. On the contrary, he challenged other 
unions to follow suit. "There's no way I’ll let up. The more unions they throw into the 
ring, the better", he said.8
Defeat of the unions was only part of the Premier's agenda. An election was imminent 
and it was acknowledged by Sir Joh that there could not be a better election issue "in a 
million years".9 The National Party had suffered a setback in the Rockhampton by- 
election in February 1985, where they had campaigned heavily on the strike issue. Sir 
Joh was dismissive about the defeat. The ALP stronghold was hopeless, he said, "It is not 
worth worrying about politically".10 Clearly (and correctly as it turned out), Sir Joh 
regarded the people of Rockhampton as unrepresentative of the rest of the State.
The agenda also included the economy. It is alleged that a report by Mike Ahern, the 
Minister for Industry, Small Business and Technology, showed serious structural 
problems in the economy and an over-dependence on resource-based industries such as 
mining and commodities.* 11 Another report, Queensland: Facing the Issues by Phil Day, a 
senior lecturer in regional and town planning, was also critical of the Government's 
performance in key areas.12 Peter Coaldrake, chairman of Griffith University's School 
of Social and Industrial Administration suggested that Sir Joh's latest battle involved 
more than the maintenance of Queensland’s power supplies, or crushing the union 
movement through draconian no-strike legislation. It also served to divert attention 
from the badly performing Queensland economy:
Both Sir Joh and the Queensland National Party have had a general wish to 
devise some strategy whereby the odour {sic) that the Government is
6 Canberra Times,, 21.2.85.
7 Loc.cit.
8 Courier-Mail, 20.2.85.
9 Courier-Mail, 14.2.85.
10.Sydney Morning Herald, 18.2.85.
11 The Age, 19.3.85.
12 Loc.cit.
getting on the economy could be deflected elsewhere. The power crisis has 
given it the opportunity to blame Queensland's economic problems on the 
unions, possibly right up to the election. 1 3
10.1.3.  Wayne Gilbert
Gilbert's appointment as General Manager of SEQEB was viewed with anxiety by unions. 
With experience in the public and private sectors, Gilbert had earned a reputation as a 
tough, anti-union negotiator, particularly in regard to battles fought and won at Carlton 
& United Breweries and Tooth's Kent Brewery. Tooth's, which Gilbert claimed had the 
worst industrial relations record of any brewing company in Australia, has since been 
likened by him to the situation on his arrival at SEQEB. Both, he says, "were highly 
unionised with strong malignant unions" .14 According to Gilbert, the Liquor Trades 
Union in NSW and the ETU in Queensland represented relatively extreme forms of 
unionism. Gilbert's view of his charter from his employers was that: "They wanted 
someone to restrain spiralling costs and someone who would question the whole activities 
of the organisation and not just work on the cost plus pricing system endemic in 
qangos".15
Not surprisingly, the unions and Gilbert were in disagreement over what the dispute was 
really about. For the unions, contract labour (a reduction in the permanent workforce) 
and safety were the issues. For Gilbert, it was "about the right of any public authority 
to maintain a balanced and flexible workplace and to allow it to supply an essential 
service at the cheapest possible price" .16
Since the dispute ended Gilbert has been quite outspoken on his attitude towards shop 
stewards. He has made statements which suggest that, from the beginning, shop stewards 
had been a special target. The unwillingness of management to improve conditions or 
take a stand against shop stewards was, he said, a "recipe for disaster". "I realised we 
weren’t dealing with rational people and a major barney was just a matter of time. The 
shop stewards....were like sharks at a feeding frenzy" .17 And, in an address to the 
inaugural meeting of the H.R. Nicholls Society, Gilbert maintained that even at the 
"eleventh hour" he felt "there was a goodwill amongst our individual employees, but not 
our shop stewards or union officials who were increasingly militant" .18 Gilbert's 
attitude was apparently shared by Sir Joh. Cabinet sources have quoted him as saying,
13 Loc.cit.
14 W. Gilbert, quoted in Business Review Weekly* 18.10.85., p.15. My emphasis.
1 5_Loc.cit.
16 Australian, 16-17.2.85.
17 Gilbert, quoted in Business Review Weekly, 18.10.85., pp.15-16. See also, Industrial 
Relations & Management Letter, Vol.3, Issue No.6 , 20.9.85.
18 W. L. Gilbert, The Queensland Power Dispute’, in Arbitration in Contempt1 Melbourne, 
1986, p.33.
"We are trying to tempt some of them back but we are not interested in the bad boys - 
the pommie shop stewards".19 Given Gilbert's stated hostility towards shop stewards, it 
was not surprising to hear from Wayne Randall, the assistant secretary of the ETU, that 
no shop stewards have been re-employed on Gilbert’s orders.20 An industrial officer at 
SEQEB denied that there is any policy on re-employment of shop stewards, although he 
agreed that none had been re-employed. Their unwillingness to sign the contract would 
be the only reason for their non-reinstatement, he explained.21
Gilbert acknowledged that unions would continue to exist. He was the overseer in the 
formation of what he has described as the forerunner to an industry-based union. The 
Queensland Power Workers' Association (QPWA), formed after the strike ended is not a 
traditional trade union. Gilbert has given it perhaps his highest praise by saying, "it 
does not see itself in the same light as traditional unions - it couldn't bring itself to be 
called a union." The QWPA has since become an acceptable model of trade unionism to 
conservative individuals and groups, one that embraces the 'right to manage' and abjures 
any recourse to direct action.
1 0 . 1 . 4 .  The unions
At the outset, the ETU approached the situation from the standpoint that defeat was 
literally unthinkable. Previous industrial action had resulted in success, and, as 
assistant secretary Wayne Randall pointed out to me, the ETU believed that because it had 
never suffered a loss, it could not happen.22 This naive belief in the ETU's infallibility 
may well account for the ETU's determination to direct the action in the beginning, 
declining the offer of the Queensland Trades and Labor Council (QTLC) to draw up a plan 
of action.
Support from other unions for the ETU was two-edged and to a large extent based on self- 
interest. While sympathy for the sacked workers was undoubtedly a strong factor, the 
recognition that other unions could ultimately suffer the same fate was a motivating 
force. In a newspaper advertisement placed during February 1985, entitled 'Open 
Letter to the People of Queensland re Power Dispute', eight unions declared their support 
and fears. The advertisement stated in part:
The public should be under no misconception that the present belligerent 
attitude of the Premier is confined to the power unions. The outcome of the 
present dispute, which has been inflamed by the Premier, will affect all 
Queensland workers and may destroy the independence and integrity of this 
state's Industrial Commission....
19 Courier-Mail, 13.2.85.
20 W. Randall, Interview, 18.4.88.
21 J. Wilkinson, Interviewt 19.4.88.
22 W. Randall, Interview, 18.4.88.
Already contract and temporary employment are replacing jobs for 
teachers, solicitors, draughtsmen, architects, surveyors, railway 
employees, nurses and scientists.2 3
Further support came from members of the Printing and Kindred Industries Union 
(PKIU) working for the Brisbane Courier-Mail, who refused to handle State Government 
advertisements. On February 20, the paper was produced by staff labour.24 It was at 
this time that key trade union leaders met in Sydney to consider a national economic 
boycott involving a transport industry blockade of Queensland. They decided that unless 
Prime Minister Hawke's attempts to resolve the row were successful, the unions were 
prepared to cut Queensland off during the following week. Meanwhile, Telecom 
employees placed statewide bans on the installation and maintenance of telephone 
equipment at SEQEB, the Queensland Electricity Commission (QEC) and other government 
instrumentalities.25
By this time, the QTLC was actively involved. That evening (February 21), a peace plan 
was accepted. It was the first time the Premier had given ground during the dispute, 
having previously refused under any circumstances to re-employ the 1000 ETU 
members sacked from their jobs. Ray Dempsey, secretary of the QTLC announced that 
power would be restored immediately and further negotiations would take place with the 
Government. Members of the MOA who had been on strike in sympathy with the ETU, 
returned to work and commenced load shedding operations. As it turned out, the offer of 
re-employment was conditional on the signing of a no-strike agreement and a 38-hour 
week. As the ETU had pioneered the shorter working week in Queensland, an agreement 
to return to work under the Government's conditions would have been seen as 
undermining the national shorter working week.
The return of the power operators was an important event on two counts. First, they had 
been placed in a difficult position through the Government's application to the Supreme 
Court under the State's secondary boycott law. They faced fines of up to $50,000 
individually if they continued their strike in support of the ETU. The intention of the 
Government to use every legal avenue available to restore power was obvious. Secondly, 
the QTLC was receiving feedback from unions whose members were resentful because 
they had been put out of work because of a dispute that was not their own.
By early March, some of the dismissed ETU members had returned to work and with the 
power operators back, the ETU felt that it had been abandoned by the trade union
23 The unions involved were the QTU, QSSU, QPOA, ARU, QREU, QNU, HEF, FCU. Sunday Mail, 
17.2.85.
24 Courier-Mail, 20.2.85.
25 The Australian, 21.2.85.
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movement. An attempt to persuade other SEQEB employees to join the strike had failed, 
while coal miners and Mt. Isa copper miners ended their sympathy strike. The only 
support in the form of industrial action remaining from other unions were bans imposed 
by maritime unions, Telecom and Australia Post employees.26
Not only had the ETU failed to win the dispute but the actions of the Premier left little 
doubt that the trade union movement was under attack. At this point, the reinstatement 
of the sacked linesmen was paramount and the ACTU geared up for a protracted national 
campaign following the rejection of a peace package by the Queensland Government. The 
peace package which proposed a moratorium on threatened industrial action was viewed 
as "blackmail" by Sir Joh who repeated his stand that no sacked ETU members would be 
re-employed unless they signed no-strike contracts. Simon Crean, who was then a 
senior vice president of the ACTU (with the presidency well in his sights) determined 
that the trade union movement could not allow the Queensland Government to overturn 
decisions made by its own industrial commission and that action against the Government 
in other states was a distinct possibility. Crean believed that if the union movement 
allowed the Queensland Government to "get away with it", it would set a precedent for 
"conservative forces" in other states which had the potential to form governments in the 
future.27 The ACTU formed a national support committee to co-ordinate union support 
in other states in addition to establishing a national fighting fund. At least $1m dollars 
was expected to be raised. The Federal Government was approached to ensure that 
overseas workers were not allowed to take the jobs of sacked SEQEB workers and a call 
was made to all unions requiring their members not to apply for the jobs.28 The then 
president of the ACTU, Cliff Dolan announced a 'hit list' of private businesses and 
industries which had given money to the Bjelke-Peterson Foundation (the National 
Party’s fund-raising body). He further warned that Queensland's farmers could expect 
industrial trouble, apparently because of strong support for National Party candidates in 
rural electorates.29
The Federal Labor Government, while refusing to endorse plans for industrial action 
indicated support for an application for federal award coverage by the ETU. The problem 
with the plan to achieve a federal award was that, even if it did succeed in the long-term, 
it would be too late for the sacked workers. State Labor MPs were annoyed by statements 
made by Hawke who called on "all of the unions taking action in support of the Electrical 
Trades Union to return to work and cease any retaliatory action"30 From the opposite
26 Sydney Morning Herald, 2.3.85.
27 The Age, 14.3 .85.
28 The Age„ 14.3 .85.
29 Canberra Times, 22.3.85.
30_Canberra Times, 21.2.85.
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perspective, Hawke's refusal to endorse the blockade was regarded as inadequate. As one 
newspaper editorial surmised, the Federal Government was seen to be "implicitly 
condoning an illegal action by its de-facto coalition partner, the ACTU, and its union 
affiliates".3 1
At midnight on April 19, the blockade began. No trains, planes or ships were allowed in 
or out of Queensland for 24 hours, although plans to blockade all road entrances to 
Queensland were abandoned by the ACTU after considering the difficulties in manning 22 
route blocks. The blockade was seen to be a 'face-saving' exercise and a 'one-day 
wonder'.32 The Premier dismissed the blockade as a "union disaster" which did not 
amount to anything other than an opportunity for the State Government to take the 
Federal Government to court over its failure to allow interstate mail to be delivered to 
Queensland; action that was illegal under Section 94 of the Postal Services Act> 197533 
An industry spokesmen for the Queensland Confederation of Industry also declared the 
blockade a failure. Other than keeping the dispute before the public's eye, it had been 
"totally ineffective". The ACTU industrial officer who co-ordinated the campaign, Ian 
Court, disagreed. He said:
By any reasonable measure the blockade has to be judged as successful in 
showing the Queensland Government that unions do have the power and 
resources to carry out effective industrial action...
It was also effective in focussing attention on the issue on a national basis 
and as a morale booster to the SEQEB workers and unionists throughout 
Queensland. 3 4
Undeterred, on the following day the Queensland Government renewed legal action against 
the power station operators. With Queensland operating on 50 per cent electricity 
supply, blackouts and rationing had resulted in standdowns and losses to industry and 
commerce. An application was lodged with the Supreme Court for an injunction which 
would require 150 unionists to restore full power under the Industrial (Commercial 
practices) Act 1984. Fines of up to $50,000 for individuals and $250,000 against the 
union were possible.
At the same time unions made a concentrated effort to isolate the State Government. They 
cut off oil to Parliament House and executive building generators; liquor supplies to 
government departments; and state-wide postal and telecommunication services to the 
Government, its statutory authorities, SEQEB and the QEC. On April 21, a QTLC 
deputation met the secretary to the Governor of Queensland, Sir James Ramsey, to
31 Canberra Times, 18.4.85.
32 The Age, 19.4.85.
33_Courier-Mail, 20.4.85.
34 Courier-Mail, 20.4.85.
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present petitions warning of the dangerous situation that would develop if untrained 
people were allowed into the State’s power stations. The QTLC maintained that the 
Governor should step in because of the threat to the power system.35 This was quite an 
extraordinary and desperate measure on the part of the QTLC, bearing in mind the 
"constitutional crisis" of 1975.36
Perhaps an even more extraordinary event was the sight of Crean on television on April 
22 pleading for the sacked workers: "You should give us one more chance, Mr Minister, 
just one more chance" 37
Over the following two weeks, the union campaign continued. A rally of three thousand 
construction workers outside Parliament House was addressed by the then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden, and Senator George Georges.38 Bans were imposed by the 
Seamen's Union (SUA), the WWF and bank employees (ABEU). Labour Day Rallies 
protesting the Queensland legislation were held in Melbourne, Sydney, Perth and 
Adelaide.39 Support for the striking electricity workers came from a wide cross- 
section of the community and represented a variety of attitudes. A Catholic priest, 
Father Dick Pascoe celebrated mass outside a SEQEB depot and was a familiar face at 
demonstrations. His station did not protect him from being arrested. In his view, it was 
wrong for Catholics to 'scab'. He claimed the verbal support of the Pope and two 
archbishops, and the moral support of Jesus Christ. Father Pascoe was the spokesman 
for the Concerned Christians, a group formed in 1976 in response to Aboriginal land 
rights and street march issues.40 Other regular demonstrators belonged to a group 
called Citizens For Democracy. These and other groups doggedly attended pickets and 
demonstrations even though they had no connection with the dispute itself.
On May 13, the industrial campaign was suspended after the Federal Government agreed 
to intervene in the dispute by passing legislation to resolve the crisis. All bans were 
lifted and a planned airline stoppage on May 15 was cancelled. The proposed legislation 
aimed at forcing the power industry out of the Queensland Government’s jurisdiction and 
into a federal industrial award. Concurrently, the Queensland Minister for Employment 
and Industrial Relations, Vince Lester, moved to take Federal Court action under the
35 Courier-Mailt 21.4.84.
36 Sir John Kerr's dismissal of the Whitlam Labor Government in November 1975 was widely 
viewed by the labour movement as an unjustifiable act that exceeded the vice-regal role.
37 Crean quoted in The Age* 23.4.85.
38 Bill Hayden, now Governor-General of Australia was then the federal member for Ipswich, a 
working class mining district close to Brisbane. Senator Georges has since resigned his 
parliamentary post in protest at the Labor Government, especially its handling of the SEQEB 
dispute. At the time he was a Labor Senator for Queensland.
39 Canberra Times, 2.5.85.
40 The Courier-Mail, 19.4.88.
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secondary boycott provisions of the TPA against the TWU and the ACTU's Ian Court. 
According to Lester, the ACTU's decision to suspend the proposed blockade was a major 
backdown because 20,000 people were destined to be stood down as a result. He accused 
the Federal Government of supporting law breakers with its new legislation.41
Lester's assertion that the ACTU's decision was a major backdown would probably be the 
only point of agreement between the Government and the ETU. Bitterly disappointed at 
the calling off of the blockade, the ETU declined to give the no-strike undertaking 
required by the Australian Democrats to ensure their support for the Conciliation and 
Arbitration (Electricity Industry) Bill. Nevertheless, the Queensland power industry 
unions were prepared to give assurances that continuity of power supplies were ensured. 
On May 29 the Federal Government's legislation passed through the Senate with the 
support of the Australian Democrats. Predictably, the Queensland Government and 
electricity boards immediately filed a challenge to the validity of the legislation in the 
High Court.
Over the next two months, although picketing continued outside Queensland power 
stations, support from other unions was minimal. The loss of impetus in the ETU's 
industrial campaign was blamed firmly on the ACTU where the legislation was widely 
regarded as letting the ACTU "off the hook" (sic).42 On July 16, the QTLC ratified a
disputes committee decision to act over delays in the High Court's decision. It was 
intended that unions would strike at businesses whose owners were supporters and 
advisers to the State Government on industrial relations policy. At the same time, the 
dispute at Mudginberri in the Northern Territory had also started to receive publicity. 
On occasions the two disputes were linked by the Premier and in the newspapers 43
On August 20, at a rally attended by 13,000 workers, a mandate was given for 
resumption of the industrial campaign against the State Government. Addressing the 
meeting by landline from Canberra, ACTU secretary, Bill Kelty, said the the ACTU was 
committed to the sacked SEQEB workers and supported their resolution. Meetings 
elsewhere attracted 10,000 people who endorsed the resolution.44 On the same day, a 
demonstration took place outside Parliament House, partly in support of the sacked 
workers, but also because of an announcement by the Government that it was planning 
new laws to de-unionise half the State's workforce, wiping out penalty rates in the 
process.45 Over 100 demonstrators were arrested, provoking a strange response from
41 The Age, 14.5.85.
42 Financial Review, 23.5.85.
43 Courier-Mail, 17.7.85.
44mCourier-Mail, 21.8.85.
45 In April 1987, amendments to the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (1961-86) and 
the Industrial (Commercial Practices) Act (1984-85) was introduced into the Queensland
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Dempsey who said, "The union movement disassociates itself from those demonstrators 
who are not fair-dinkum unionists".46 On other occasions Dempsey had decried the 
support of the 'Concerned Christians' group which is a curious attitude given the need for 
public awareness of the issues involved, and the principles at stake in the dispute.
Indeed Dempsey's outburst becomes even more incongruous by his own evidence. On 
trips around the State, he acknowledged that there was little sympathy for the SEQEB 
workers, but some concern for the Government's proposals to attack penalty rates and 
other award conditions.47
By October, the ETU had become totally disconsolate. The ACTU's national tactics 
committee refused a request from ETU national secretary, Ray Perriam to again blockade 
the state. The committee resolved to take no action over the Queensland power dispute 
while the ETU's federal award application was before the Australian Arbitration 
Commission.48 Then, on October 7, the powerful Building Trades Group of unions which 
had been a leader in union battles with the the State Government over the preceding eight 
months, called for an end to efforts to have SEQEB workers reinstated. Unions from that 
time were directed to try and find the sacked workers other jobs. The Group's honorary 
secretary, Hugh Hamilton pointed out that the present methods of fighting the State 
Government only highlighted the trade union movement's weaknesses. He stressed the 
need for unity and solidarity to be built up among workers and the great need for unions 
to assess political and industrial situations on a scientific basis instead of relying on a 
'gut reaction*. Hamilton concluded that it was obvious the trade union movement on a 
state and national basis did not have the capacity to organise a blockade "of a character 
that may be required to get SEQEB workers their jobs back" 49
What had been generally recognised for some time by realists in the trade union 
movement - that the sacked workers had virtually no chance of regaining their jobs - 
was evident to all at this point. The ETU maintained that the fight should continue, bitter 
over the union movement's capitulation to Sir Joh. According to ETU state organiser 
Dinny Madden, at least 200 sacked workers over the age of 50 and nearing retirement, 
had had their futures destroyed. The sackings had cost them their full superannuation 
and other benefits, while there was little chance for their re-employment elsewhere. 
They were the reason why the campaign for reinstatement had to continue.50 His
Parliament. Public servants were excluded from the provisions in the former Act in its final 
form.
46 Canberra Times, 3.9.85.
47 Canberra Times, 3.9.85.
48 Courier-Mail, 4.10.85.
49 Courier-Mail, 8.10.85.
50_Courier-Mail, 10.10.85.
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arguments fell on deaf ears. Unions had become concerned about the way in which the 
dispute had put other unions in a bad light and made signing up members difficult. The 
QTLC strategy was to get away from pickets and bans type tactics and concentrate on legal 
and political manoeuvres which would make the Queensland legislation irrelevant.51
In any case, there is a strong argument for suggesting that the involvement of the ACTU, 
the Federal Government and Queensland unions was only partially out of concern for the 
sacked ETU workers. It was widely believed that the workers had acted precipitately 
from the beginning, were unwilling to take advice, and lacking in judgement. The major 
issues of concern were the legal initiatives taken by the Queensland Government and the 
projected move towards the widespread introduction of contract labour throughout the 
State.
It was a major defeat for the trade union movement that had enduring ramifications. It 
marked the start of a nation-wide trend towards anti-union behaviour by conservative 
forces that was personified by aggressive and confrontationist approaches to industrial 
relations. Wayne Gilbert opened his address to the H.R. Nicholls Society with these 
words:
I am delighted to be invited to speak....on what I regard as one of the most 
important and historic activities occurring in the Australian industrial 
arena today. That, of course, is the deregulation of the hitherto bound up 
industrial society and, hopefully, the demise of rampant and militant union 
control of this country that we have all seen probably since the beginning of
this century.5 2
He went on to say that he was "also pleased to be part of what I think is a watershed in 
industrial relations in Australia" .53 The new union structure at SEQEB reflects 
Gilbert's vision of how unions should function on enterprise-based lines. The QPWA 
enjoys, ironically, a privileged position. Ironically because, while the principle of 
'preference' and rights of entry have been abolished by SEQEB, the QPWA leaders enjoy 
preference and rights of entry over other unions.
1 0 . 1 . 5 .  The industrial climate
During the dispute questions arose about rights, the development and application of the 
law, policing and the role of the judiciary. The polarisation of public opinion can be seen 
in the context of fundamental conflict about these issues. It is easy to assert but 
sometimes difficult to substantiate political links between governments, the police and
51 Canberra Times, 23.10.85.
52 Gilbert, op.cit., (1986), p.29.
53 Loc.cit.
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judiciary. There does however appear to be evidence that links do exist between police 
and the former conservative Government of Queensland.54
The notion that the electricity workers represented a challenge to the rule of law and 
democracy was used throughout the dispute to explain and legitimise the rigorous 
enforcement of law and order. Lester engaged in colourful analogy when he said, "To put 
it crudely, the leaders of the ETU in Queensland have achieved as much for their SEQEB 
members as the Yorkshire Ripper did for night shoppers in Leeds".55
Critical to the Government was the depiction of picketers as unlawful. Equally critical to 
the electricity workers was the necessity to inform fellow workers of the issues 
involved. Picketing has always been a touchy issue because of the distinction between 
'informational' picketing and 'intimidation' (watching and besetting). As such, unlawful 
picketing has not always been easy to establish.56 The question of the 'right to picket’ 
and the legality of picketing became paramount in the conflict that followed in the 
dispute. Laws were enacted to restrict militant unions (particularly in public sector 
industries) and penalise workers on an individual basis.
The law was used extensively throughout the dispute. Both the State Government and the 
Federal Government engaged in legal techniques (and not a few legal technicalities) in 
order to achieve their desired, albeit different, goals. Whether either Government could 
claim that their tactics were aimed principally at dispute resolution is highly 
questionable. As far as the Queensland Government was concerned, no dispute existed 
once the power operators had ceased load shedding and SEQEB was fully manned and 
operational again. For the Federal Government, the Accord was placed under pressure. 
The Government was under a moral obligation to assist the ACTU when union power and 
principles were at stake. However, the Queensland Government was able to achieve 
political mileage out of law and order issues and undertake legal action to deflect every 
move made by the ACTU, Federal Government and unions. Prime Minister Hawke's 
dilemma was summed up succinctly in a Sydney Morning Herald editorial which said:
He knows too, that the industrial movement cannot allow Sir Joh's 
legislation to remain on the statute books. It provides too seductive a 
precedent for a future conservative government to copy. In the short
54 There has been overwhelming evidence presented to the Commission of Inquiry into Possible 
Illegal Acticities and Associated Police Misconduct (cmmonly known as the Fitzgerald Inquiry) 
that this is the case, although no evidence was presented that has any direct bearing on the 
SEQEB dispute.
55 Courier-Mail, 2.5.85.
56 See E. I. Sykes, Strike Law in AustraliaA Sydney, 1982, pp. 140-2 and W. B. Creighton et 
al, op.cit., pp.781-191.
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term, it threatens the Accord, the centrepiece of the Federal Government’s 
economic strategy, by placing industrial harmony at risk.57
1 0 . 1 . 6 .  The legislation
The Industrial (Commercial Practices) Act 1984, outlawed secondary boycotts and 
primary boycotts in relation to demarcation disputes; strikes without seven days clear 
notice; and preference disputes. The Act provided for injunctions and fines of up to 
$50,000 for individuals and up to $250,000 for organisations. The power operators 
were induced to return to work and subsequently to discontinue load-shedding after being 
threatened with this Act.
The Electricity (Continuity of Supply) Act 1985, formalised provisions made under the 
state of emergency proclaimed under the State Transport Act 1838-61. The Bill was 
passed into legislation after only three and a half hours discussion in the Queensland 
Parliament.58 The Act gave to the Electricity Commissioner civil conscription powers 
with authority to direct any person to carry out the necessary work to ensure a supply 
of electricity. As such, virtual state-of-emergency powers belong to the Electricity 
Commissioner at all times. Police are empowered to arrest picketers if it is considered 
that, by doing or omitting to do any action, they are seeking to "Harass, annoy or cause 
harm or distress to any person in relation to the performance of duties associated with 
the supply of electricity".59 In addition, the Act contained a reversion to the 38-hour 
week. The Act is unique in that full legal effect is given to the dismissals of the SEQEB 
workers.60 The removal of the electricity industry from the jurisdiction of the State 
Industrial Commission was also included in this Act.
Introduced and debated within two hours, with no introduction and no Opposition 
members having time to read its contents, an amendment to the Act was passed in March 
1985. Ancillary powers under the amended Act allowed police to arrest without warrant 
(for example, persons harassing electricity workers or persons whom police believe on 
reasonable grounds to have committed an offence). Labor opposition leader Neville 
Warburton said of the Act; "...the same workers were subjected to a National Party 
Vendetta to make them look like lawless thugs even though the majority had participated 
in only one or two strikes in their working lives."61
Even the Liberal Party, which had supported the Government's stand and voted in favour 
of the legislation, protested at its urgent introduction. The Opposition spokesman for
57 Sydney Morning Herald, 15.4.84.
58 Queensland Times, 6.3.85.
59 No definition of harass or distress etc. is tendered.
60 P. McCarthy, The Queensland Electricity Dispute. A Chronology, the Legislation and Its 
Ramifications, Brisbane, 1986, p.14.
61 Courier-Mailt 6.3.85.
208
Mines, Kenneth Hamilton Vaughan said that the introduction of the amendments 
exemplified the Government's lack of understanding of industrial relations. He went on 
to say:
We have a position under this legislation of virtual industrial slavery, a 
situation where workers are being forced into industrial slavery....! feel 
sincerely there is nothing this Government won’t do to suppress working 
people. Strikes are a safety valve, and with the Government introducing 
this type of legislation, we are heading for trouble whether it is warranted 
or not. 0 2
The amendments to the Act received some admiration. Les Priddle, a lawyer and head of 
the University of Queensland's Commerce Department said:
It's a nasty law. It's a shinkicker's law. But it's kicking the shins of 
shinkickers. Unions have been blackmailing this State and these laws are 
intended to stand up to that. 3 3
The perceived failure of the judiciary to control the ETU in the Industrial Commission 
was the justification used by the Premier to absolve it of all responsibility in energy 
matters. This decision was met with anger by the President of the Industrial Court, Mr. 
Justice Mathews. At a brief, public sitting of the Court and Commission Justice Mathews 
expressed concern at the "loose and inaccurate statements" that had been made in 
criticism of the Commission. He described as absurd the Premier's remarks that the 
Commission as a dispute settling tribunal:
....has never settled anything very much other than giving it exactly what 
the unions want; they have always got what they want simply because 
they will never accept anything until they get what they want.5 4
The President pointed out that since rationalisation of the electricity industry in 1977:
the most significant industrial gains achieved by union members employed 
by the electricity boards have not been ordered, recommended or suggested 
by the Commission but have resulted from and are attributable to direct 
negotiations between unions and the employers; the latter acting with the 
approval of government. 5 5
Fundamental legal maxims underwent change. The rules of evidence have been turned 
around. One section provides that "Proof of publication in any newspaper of any speech 
to any person...should be admissible or conclusive evidence that the speech was made by 
the person to whom it is attributed".
62 Courier Mail, 27.3.85.
63 Sydney Morning Heralds 4.4.85.
64 Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson, quoted by Justice Mathews, Statement by the Presidents
Brisbane, March 5, 1985.
65 Loc.cit.
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Under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amendment Act 1985, the maxim of 
"innocent until proven guilty" was reversed. This Act also widened the definition of 
strike to include 'go-slows' and otherwise doing work in a way not usually done. Non­
union workers are not to be prejudiced or threatened in any way. Incitement or 
counselling by definition included a publication, by or on behalf of a union, statements on 
television or radio and statements in a newspaper. In addition, the Act provided for a 
secret ballot at the direction of the Industrial Commission and widened the grounds for 
union de-registration. The debate over this Act was gagged by the Government after less 
than three hours, causing the State Opposition to storm out of Parliament in protest.66
The Electricity Authorities Industrial Causes Act 1985, replaced the jurisdiction of the 
state industrial commission with the Electricity Authorities Industrial Causes Tribunal. 
The Act also removed preference provisions; declared participation in, inciting, 
counselling or abetting a strike, illegal; and made a strike a fundamental breach of 
contract providing automatic penalties. A list of guidelines for the tribunal does not 
include the interests of employees in the electricity industry.67
While many of the arrests during the dispute were made under s 5 of the Electricity 
(Continuity of Supply) Act, convictions have not necessarily followed. Many charges 
were later dropped or dismissed by magistrates. Some convictions were later set aside 
by the High Court.68 Nevertheless, the imposition of bail conditions served the purpose 
of keeping many picketers away from picket lines. Arrests were also made of persons 
not actively involved in picketing. On one occasion a number of solicitors, who were 
standing separately from pickets and acting only as legal observers, were arrested.69 
An illuminating insight into how picketers may have expected to be treated is provided 
by the legal advice given to the ETU by their solicitors which said, in part: "It would 
always be advantageous to have an independent person present so that it will minimise 
the tendencies of Police fabricating any evidence to the contrary".70
It is interesting to note that despite the range of new laws, successful prosecutions were 
more likely to occur under existing laws. Indeed, a number of Acts were used during the 
dispute when picketing or a procession was taking place. Arrests were made under the 
Traffic Act for offences such as disobeying a lawful direction and taking part in a 
procession. The Vagrancy, Gaming (and Other Offences) Act was also used (including the 
arrest and conviction of Senator Georges as a vagrant). In other cases the Radio
66 Courier-Mail, 20.3.85.
67 P. McCarthy, op.cit., p.16.
68 O'Sullivan v. Lunnon (1986) 67 ALR 423
69 Courier-Mail, 24.4.85.
70 Grasso Searles & Romano, Letter to ETU Executive Officer, 29.3.85.
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Communications Act 1983 and the Telecommunications Act 1975, (for illegal use of a 
telephone) were utilised.
Most of the discussion concerning the SEQEB dispute has centred on the legislative 
initiatives of Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson. While that is understandable, it must also be 
noted that the Queensland Government, with great confidence, pursued every legal avenue 
available to defeat any federal or constitutional challenges. Many of these were decided 
long after the dispute had ceased to be active. Moreover, statements from the Federal 
Government, the ACTU and civil liberties organisations that accused the Queensland 
Government of contravening international treaties through breaches of the ILO 
Conventions 29, 87, 98 and 105, the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights, and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were 
summarily dismissed. All these conventions had been ratified by the Commonwealth 
Government. There was some debate at the time about the possibility of mounting a 
Constitutional challenge by invoking the External Affairs Powers. I was advised by a 
Constitutional lawyer that such a challenge would be possible under section 52 of the 
Constitution and that there was legal precedent which could lead to it being successful.71
Nor were the findings of the Human Rights Commission heeded. For example, the 
Commission found "that the Queensland Electricity (Continuity of Supply) Act 1985 is 
inconsistent with Article 8 of the ICCPR, which prohibits forced or compulsory labour 
and with Article 22 of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right to freedom of 
association...."72 One possibility open to the Federal Government in this regard was to 
challenge the legislation in the High Court under Section 52 of the Constitution. Although 
the legal precedents existed for such a move, the judicial composition of the bench at that 
time would probably have resulted in a split decision.73 While this is an interesting 
aspect in appraising the actions taken, and not taken, by the Federal Government, it has 
little relevance to the context of discussion here.
10.1.7 .  Conclusion
There are a number of aspects to the SEQEB dispute which have far-reaching 
implications for industrial relations in Australia. The notion that trade unions have too 
much power, while not new, has been embellished. Bjelke-Peterson paved the way for
71 Crispin Hull, Inteview, 10.4.85. He explained that under section 52, the Commonwealth 
had the power to make laws in regard to foreign affairs, He cited the Whitlam Government's 
Race Relation Act which was upheld in the High Court. Hull suggested that one of the reasons 
why a challenge was not mounted was that, in the absence of Justice Murphy, there would be a 
three-split decision.
72 Human Rights Commission, The Queensland Electricity (Continuity of Supply) Act 1985, 
Report No.12, Canberra, March 1985, p.17.
73 C. Hull, 'High Court tied, but all's fair in 'war' with Joh’, Canberra Times, 7..4.85.
an attack on trade union power by setting up a model for change. Tempting though it is, I 
have omitted from this discussion the highly colourful language used by Sir Joh during 
the dispute. On the printed page, many of Sir Joh's remarks appear infantile and 
frequently ridiculous. I believe it would be a mistake to allow his vernaculous use of 
language to detract from the substantive arguments he was making, no matter how 
amusing it may be. His attacks on trade union power were motivated by an ideological 
commitment to alter the fabric of industrial society. His success, both in terms of 
winning the dispute and later being re-elected to Government are testimony to an acute 
political awareness.
Another aspect of the dispute which has had enduring implications is the notion that the 
'right to manage' has been eroded by unions, and that greater productivity and efficiency 
can only be achieved by that right being regained. As will be seen in the following two 
case studies, the 'right to manage' was central to the principles involved in actions taken 
by the respective managements.
Contract labour was an issue with the union movement prior to the SEQEB dispute. 
Subsequent measures taken by the Queensland Government to introduce a system of 
voluntary employment contracts have not always met with success. Nevertheless, 
contract labour has increased markedly since the dispute. It is an important feature of 
the Mudginberri and Robe River disputes which follow.
The legal initiatives of the Queensland Government have been documented earlier. The 
challenge to the industrial relations system as a viable forum for solving the problems 
endemic to an industrial environment, cannot be understated. One further aspect that 
should be noted is that the Mudginberri dispute was underway before the SEQEB dispute 
finally concluded. In August 1985, Sir Joh announced: "I have supported the owner of 
the abattoir and organised that he be funded and there is no problem in that regard....We 
have determined that he (Jay Pendarvis) is not going to lose, and he's winning all 
along".74 The Queensland Government moved to introduce legislation which would 
legitimise the type of industrial agreement at the heart of the Mudginberri dispute and 
make the Mudginberri agreement a legislative model.
74 Financial Review, 20.8 .85.
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Chapter Eleven
THE MUDGINBERRI DISPUTE
11.1.1.  Background
Small abattoirs in the Northern Territory like Mudginberri are geographically isolated 
and have developed without regulations imposed by unions or industrial tribunals. With 
high operating costs, these sheds employed fewer workers than would be required in 
union establishments and had unusual employment arrangements. Under a contract 
system, the abattoir operators were not the employers of the process workers. Instead, 
a contractor, having reached agreement with the operator on a price for the season, 
provided the labour force and was responsible for the payment of workers, some of 
whom set themselves up as companies.1 At Mudginberri, the agreement entailed a 
payment by results system. The AMIEU wanted the union tally system adopted in line 
with the Meatworkers' Award. Ironically, the tally system had originally been adopted 
by employers against union opposition. Small abattoirs like Mudginberri, under the 
contract system were competitive despite paying higher rates, because unit labour costs 
were low. The workforce was smaller, and entitlements such as workers compensation, 
weekend penalty rates, and waiting time were non-existent. Nor was payment made for 
meat rejected for quality reasons. In August 1983, the AMIEU served a log of claims on 
meat processors in the Northern Territory seeking a federal award.2 3 As a result, the 
Meat Industry Award 1981 was applied in the Northern Territory with the consent of all 
parties. However, the method of payment issue remained unresolved.
The AMIEU, committed to obtaining agreement on the tally system, in July 1984 placed a 
picket line on the road to Mudginberri Station which caused the operation to close when 
meat inspectors refused to cross the picket line. An application for injunctive relief 
under Section 45D of the TPA was granted. A Full Bench of the ACAC refused to hear the 
matter until all industrial action ceased. The picket line was called off and the AMIEU 
undertook not to take any further industrial action while the making of the award was 
before the Commission. The parties agreed to "accept and work to any such award".2 The
1J Kitay & R Powe, 'Exploitation at $1,000 per Week? The Mudginberri Dispute'. The Journal 
of Industrial Relations, No.29, September 1987, p.370.
2 Norwest Beef in Katherine and Angliss in Darwin were not included. M. J. Pittard, 'Trade 
Practices Law and the Mudginberri Dispute', in Australian Journal of Labour Law, Vol.1, p.26.
3 Loc.cit.
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union was encouraged in its efforts to apply award standards by the Norwest Beef 
Abattoir at Katherine, which was working under a registered agreement and hoped to 
raise the labour costs of firms like Mudginberri to its own level.4 5
The main issue before the Commission was whether the existing "contract system" 
should continue or a new unit tally system be adopted. With some reservations, the Full 
Bench of the Commission supported the "contract system" and referred the matter to 
Commissioner McKenzie for the appropriate award to be made. On April 29 1985, the 
Northern Territory Meat Workers Award was handed down. It contained a system of 
payment by results, to be negotiated between employers and the majority of employees 
or their nominated representatives.6 The crucial factor for the AMIEU was that the 
award contained no provision for mandatory union involvement.
Mudginberri subsequently negotiated an agreement with its employees who did not 
nominate the union as their representative. Jay Pendarvis, the proprietor and managing 
director of Mudginberri had been informed during the award hearing that the rules of the 
AMIEU now required that employees could not negotiate on their own behalf, but only 
through the union. It is not certain how many of the Mudginberri employees were 
members of the AMIEU, but expulsion followed for those who were.6
Slaughtering commenced on May 10 1985, the agreement's starting date. The AMIEU, 
still committed to the unit tally system, once again placed a picket on the road leading to 
the station. It remained in place until September 8, 1985. Subsequently, government 
meat inspectors refused to cross the picket lines. Legal proceedings were instigated with 
the aim of both stopping the industrial action and achieving compensation for 
Mudginberri's losses. The litigation lasted for two years and shifted from the industrial 
tribunal to the courts, with the emphasis on enforcement and penalties rather than 
settlement.7 The dispute eventually gave rise to a complicated set of legal proceedings in 
the Federal Court and High Court of Australia.
There are three aspects of the Mudginberri dispute which I will consider. The most 
memorable, or to be precise, the one for which Mudginberri has become most famous 
was the legal action which ultimately resulted in the record damages awarded against the 
union. (Initially $1.76 million was awarded, later reduced on appeal to $1.44 million.) 
Secondly, and also of considerable importance, has been the impact that the judgement 
has had on the trade union movement, where it has come to be regarded as part of a
4 Kitay & Powe, op.cit., pp.370-371.
5 Pittard, op.cit., p.27.
6 Ibid., p.28.
7 Pittard, op.cit., p.24.
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continuing assault on unions and their right to engage in direct action. This, 
notwithstanding only limited support during the dispute from the ACTU. The principle 
has become much greater in importance than the dispute itself. Finally, the legal action 
taken by Mudginberri was a concerted effort on the part not only of the station 
proprietor, Jay Pendarvis, but also the Meat and Allied Trades Federation of Australia 
(MATFA), the National Farmers Federation (NFF), the Westpac Banking Corporation, 
and the Northern Territory and Queensland Governments. It has since been held up by 
the New Right as a beacon for other employers, and as an example of the possibilities 
contained in Sections 45D and 45E of the TPA, should they be used to their full potential.
11.1 .2 .  The union
The extent to which the AMIEU was prepared to go in pursuing its demands and risking 
punitive damages could be seen as bordering on the obsessive if their actions are viewed 
only in terms of their dispute with the Mudginberri Station. A great deal more was at 
stake. With a declining workforce in the meat industry, membership and the inclusion 
of preference clauses in awards was of paramount importance to the AMIEU. In addition, 
the union opposed contract labour which, it held, eroded the standards of wages and 
conditions of employment in the industry. There was some substance in this claim 
according to the ACAC which, while declining to impose the Queensland Award or 
Katherine Agreement on unwilling employers, nevertheless stated that the contract 
system did not provide adequate award coverage. The Commission mentioned annual 
leave, sick leave and payment for waiting time as desirable benefits not currently 
enjoyed by workers.® Contract labour, in the union's view could not be regarded as the 
coming together of two equal parties. Jack O’Toole, federal secretary of the AMIEU 
argued before the Commission:
It was put rather forcibly that all of these things were agreed between 
parties and that the whole thrust of the employers or the federation's 
approach to this question of piecework is that it would be left to the 
parties: that they should be able to settle their differences. Sir, we would 
submit that the whole basis of the union's organisation and representation 
and provisions of the statute encouraging organisation is a recognition that 
a group of individual employees may not and almost certainly will not be in 
an equal bargaining position with the empioyer.g
While with hindsight the action taken by the AMIEU could not be regarded as successful 
given the substantial damages awarded against the union, at the time support from other 
unions aided and abetted the effectiveness of the campaign. Along with the Commonwealth 
meat inspectors, members of the Meat Inspectors Association (MIA), who refused to 
cross the picket line, other unions including the WWF and the TWU joined in a series of
8 J. Kitay & R. Powe, o p .c i t p.377.
9 Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission,„Transcript, 14.11.84, 585.
215
24-hour strikes nationally, in support of the AMIEU during July and August 1985. As a 
consequence, the Mudginberri Station lost a $2 million contract to Taiwan.
Support also came from the ACTU who regarded the dispute as an attack on the right to 
organise and take industrial action and an attempt to erode terms and conditions of 
employment. Moreover, the union, in refusing to pay any fines, was obeying the ACTU 
policy against the use of courts, as distinct from the Arbitration Commission in 
industrial disputes."^ Even so, the ACTU was under duress at the time. Not only was the 
SEQEB dispute lingering with no visible signs of victory but the Accord had been placed 
under great strain by the Federal Government's stated intention to de-register the 
militant Builders Labourers' Federation (BLF), an action which, however justifiable, 
could not be condoned by the trade union movement. It was the issue of the BLF that was 
receiving most attention from the Federal Government, the ACTU and the media.
The ACTU Congress of September 1985, passed a resolution that supported the legal 
battles against the Queensland Government by the ETU; the AMIEU against the TPA and the 
new negotiable system of wage setting in the Northern Territory. All were viewed by the 
ACTU as an attack on the Accord. Alan Boulton, an ACTU legal officer appeared before the 
Commission representing the union in December 1985. By that time, the union was no 
longer questioning the 1984 Full Bench decision to reject a tally system. Public opinion 
was clearly on the side of Jay Pendarvis who was being hailed as a hero. More 
importantly, the workers at Mudginberri themselves were right behind him. As well, 
by December 1985, outstanding fines of over $100,000 were owing in addition to 
orders for the sequestration of the union's funds. Instead Boulton emphasised two issues: 
The fear on the part of unionists that employers would seek to use the new award 
provision to erode terms and conditions of employment elsewhere; in other words, that 
the developments in the Northern Territory could spread to other awards in other 
industries. His second concern was the union's exclusion from the new award. He 
argued, Hit would be contrary to the spirit of the CAA and of the conciliation and 
arbitration system to exclude the union".* 11
The union's ultimate and total defeat was only predictable up to a point. Failure to obtain 
the co-operation of the workforce at Mudginberri must have been a decisive factor. It is 
difficult to imagine a situation where a prolonged picket will have a favourable outcome 
for the union when all the workers are squarely behind the besieged employer. Also, 
while the decision to seek injunctive relief under the TPA could have been predicted, 
given that Mudginberri had resorted to the same tactic earlier, in 1984, the outcome
10 The Age, 12.9.85.
11 A Boulton quoted by Kitay and Powe, o p .c i t p.391.
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would have been more difficult to foresee. The full range of legal tactics employed by the 
Mudginberri Station, made possible by the substantial backing it received from outside 
sources, could not have been predicted when the AMIEU first began its campaign.
1 1 . 1 . 3 .  The concerted effort
Jay Pendarvis has assumed the mantle of a hero because of his determination to defeat the 
union, and his ultimate success. For many, he has become the symbol of the aggressive 
and uncompromising attitude that employers disenchanted with the industrial relations 
system wish to personify. This was the case even while the dispute was in progress and 
victory was by no means assured. He was named Australian of the Year by The Australian 
newspaper. During and subsequent to the dispute he has received standing ovations from 
meetings of farmers that he has been called upon to address. Pendarvis has since 
disposed of Mudginberri and moved to Western Australia and a quieter life. Despite the 
huge damages he was awarded, he has a limited sense of victory. "Even though we won, 
we didn't win" he has since remarked.12 "it was the most soul-destroying thing which 
could have happened - I am not sure I will ever recover from it".13 Whether or not he 
is a reluctant hero is not for me to ponder, but his stature could be more symbolic than 
actual. In any case, it is extremely doubtful that Pendarvis could have pursued his 
matter through the courts to the point that he did, without the financial and moral 
support of a number of organisations.
The conservative Northern Territory government provided Pendarvis with a credit of $1 
million to fight the union with no security arrangements, or plans for repayments. 
When these funds had been spent, the Westpac Banking Corporation after initially 
refusing a loan of $200,000 to Pendarvis changed its mind and made a loan with no 
ceiling to the amount. The eventual loan amounted to $2 million, part of which went 
back to the office of the Northern Territory's Chief Minister, who has since resigned. 
Westpac explained^ "with the Legislative Assembly now in session, the Government is 
anxious to have the advances (of $992,000) refinanced to avoid any embarrassment at 
question time".14 One explanation of Westpac's involvement has been that the bank was 
actively seeking to obtain a larger share of government business. As the original 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Northern Territory Government and 
Mudginberri for the loan required Mudginberri to pursue the damages claim against the 
union, Westpac's financing of the loan is thought to have the same explicit condition.15 
Criticism of the bank's role came from a number of sources including Westpac's internal
12 Canberra Times, 24.6.89.
13 The Australian, 14-15.11.87.
14 The Mudginberri dispute, What does Westpac have to do with it?', ACOA Journal, No,829, 
September 1986, p.11.
15 Ibid., p.12.
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staff and even the party president of the governing Country/Liberal Party of the 
Northern Territory government who said he was:
staggered at the way the deal had been handled and the secrecy surrounding
it....a special relationship has been developed between the Government and
the Bank....and as a result of that relationship....Westpac Banking 
Corporation achieved an unfair advantage over the other banks.ig
This view, it is claimed, has also been supported by the National Australia Bank 
Limited.17 The argument could be made that Westpac's involvement was fundamentally 
commercial; that its advancement of a loan on unsecured grounds at the behest of a 
government was a calculated risk if the attainment of government business was the 
prize. However, there does seem to be a suggestion that Westpac’s role exceeded market 
considerations. The Chief General Manager of Westpac, after maintaining that Westpac 
was "pushing to make sure we got a fair share of Australian Government business in the 
future", advanced the opinion that one of the most frightening challenges facing business 
in Australia was the drive by unions for a role in the provision of superannuation. He is 
also quoted as saying, "just imagine if funds of that kind across the country are 
controlled by unions...God help us".18 (In fact, neither unions or any other 
organisation can control superannuation funds which are always handled by Trust Deeds 
and authorised Trustees.) In the aftermath of Mudginberri, Westpac has provided a new 
product for corporations called 'litigation loans’.
Important though contributions in the form of financial and moral support from 
governmental and corporate banking sectors were, the role of the NFF was pivotal. 
Spearheading the campaign was Ian McLachlan, the NFF president who pursued 
Mudginberri's interests with a fervour consistent with a political commitment to 
challenging the nexus between trade union power and the industrial relations system. 
Mudginberri was not McLachlan's first stand. In 1978 he had been the mainstay in 
organising farmers engaged in a battle with the AMIEU over the right to export live 
sheep to the Middle East markets. McLachlan represented the NFF in the 1984 National 
Wage Case where he argued that the main criterion in wage fixation should be the 
capacity of employers to pay. He added that "the regulation of relations between 
employer and employee must be conducted at the level where the profit is made or the 
jobs lost", in individual enterprises.1 ^ The NFF had successfully pursued this 
argument on capacity to pay in arbitration hearings since 1983. In 1985, the NFF was 
calling for the abandonment of all penalties from the CCA. Violations of awards by
16 Loc.cit.
17 Loc.cit.
18 Loc.cit.
19 Kitay & Powe, op.cit., p.373.
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employers or employees, it claimed, should be dealt with under common law. The 
Federation stressed that all breaches by unions would be prosecuted vigorously. 
According to Kitay and Powe, by 1985, the NFF was the most hardline of any major 
employer group. "Their policies were more in keeping with the New Right than with 
more traditional Australian conservatism".20 One NFF official has stated that prior to 
the Mudginberri situation, the "organisation had been gearing up for a national campaign 
and was looking for an issue".21
In the following passage, Paul Houlihan, industrial-relations director of the NFF 
describes the Federation's early involvement:
Mudginberri had been simmering along for about two months when Jay ran 
out of money and the NFF didn't have any.
We were racing around knocking on doors and going to functions all over the 
bloody country auctioning sheep and anything else we could get our hands on 
to try and keep Mudginberri going.
The banks were telling us there wasn't any money for miles and people 
were going broke in front of our eyes but somehow money kept coming out 
of the woodwork and over a period of about nine months we raised about 
$1.25 million.
I'd talked myself hoarse from one end of the bloody country to another 
along with Ian (McLachlan) and a couple of others to raise $1.25 million.
That seemed a hell of a lot of money to me.22
It is not possible to quantify the value of the moral support given to Pendarvis by 
these activities, but the financial contribution must have been critical, if not 
decisive. Houlihan went on to describe their later efforts:
Then McLachlan stood up at a rally and suddenly announced that we were 
going to raise $10 million. My first reaction was this is lunacy. I went to 
Ian and said "Look Ian, you've gone out publicly and said we're going to 
raise $10 million. If we raise $8 million that'll be a magnificent 
achievement but everyone will see it as a failure because you've gone out 
and shot your mouth off and said we're going to raise $10 million". He just 
looked at me and said, "Yeah, that's right, $8 million will be a failure".
We went out and raised $12 million.23
There is no doubt that the NFF campaign was genuinely sympathetic to Pendarvis and his 
situation, but, the crusading element is unmistakable. Without being unduly cynical, it 
is fair to say that if the NFF was pivotal to the successful litigation by Mudginberri; it in
20 Loc.cit.
21 Loc.cit.
22 P Houlihan, quoted in Canberra Times* 24.6.89.
23 Houlihan, quoted, Canberra Times, 24.6.89.
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turned served the purpose of promoting the political and industrial objectives of the 
Federation. The campaign was the genesis of an NFF fighting fund aimed at providing 
financial aid to employers involved in industrial disputes and has since been used for 
that purpose on a number of occasions.24 McLachlan has subsequently taken steps 
towards a political career by gaining pre-selection for the Liberal Party in the 'blue- 
ribbon' seat of Barker in South Australia. His participation in the Mudginberri dispute 
has been a positive factor in conservative circles, one that has served to promote his 
candidacy for political office.
11.1.4.  The legalities
Mudginberri was the first case in which an employer used the provisions contained in 
the TPA to pursue damages against a union. Until then, Section 45D had not operated as a 
punitive measure, although its very existence acted as a deterrent. According to a 
Commissioner of the Industrial Commission of NSW, C. J. McArdle, in his experience, 
people were frightened off "even when the action being taken was quite justified".25 
(Incidentally, McArdle’s use of the word "justified" explicitly accepts that some 
secondary boycotts in his view are a proper course of industrial action.)
Pittard has identified three central aspects to the legal proceedings:
(i) The proceedings to obtain damages and injunctive relief (both interim and 
permanent) against the AMIEU and its officers for breaches of s 45D of the 
TPA.
(ii) The proceedings to compel obedience to the courts' orders: the imposition 
of fines on the union and sequestration of union funds to enforce payments 
of the fines.
(iii) The administrative law aspect which gave rise to questions concerning the 
role of the Commonwealth Department of Primary Industry in the provision 
of meat inspectors during the currency of the dispute.2 6
In addition, there were legal proceedings peripheral to the three central aspects 
to the litigation. These proceedings according to Pittard:
reveal the extent to which the processes of law and avenues of redress and 
appeal were used to the full by the parties involved. These included 
litigation about whether a judge should be disqualified from certain 
proceedings, whether the discretion in a judge of the Federal Court not to 
adjourn one of the cases has been properly exercised and an application for
24 The Australian, 28.4.87.
25 Sydney Morning Heralds 18.12.86.
26 Pittard, Loc.cit., p.24. A summary of the main legal events in chronological order is 
contained in Appendix A
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the assessment of costs on a solicitor-client, rather than party-party, 
basis.27
While it is not possible here to detail all of the legal proceedings (see Appendix £), I 
wish to make some points in their regard. First of all, and this may be a moot point, the 
first legal proceeding undertaken by Mudginberri in June 1985 was to seek an interim 
injunction under the secondary boycott provisions in the TPA. No approach was made to 
the ACAC seeking an order to have the picket line removed. It could be argued that this 
was a practical decision on the part of Pendarvis, based on the supposition that the 
AMI EU would not have obeyed the order in any case. However on the previous occasion in 
July 1984, the AMIEU had obeyed the Commission's order, albeit so that the hearing 
could take place. Having regard to the stated position of the AMIEU it is probably 
reasonable to assume that the picket line would not have been removed. Nevertheless it 
was unusual for an employer to seek legal redress before the avenues existing in the 
industrial relations system had at least been tested, if not exhausted.
In the second strand identified by Pittard relating to the imposition of fines and 
sequestration of union funds, the AMIEU was immutable. Every successful legal step 
taken by Mudginberri was appealed unsuccessfully by the union, right up to the High 
Court. The financial costs to both parties were enormous, but at least Pendarvis had 
considerable support from outside interests. Remembering that by September 1985 the 
AMIEU no longer held out any hope for the tally system being adopted at Mudginberri, 
their intransigence in refusing to pay their fines for contempt of court (and by doing so, 
incurring additional penalties) is attributable to a number of possible reasons. The 
union was taking a principled stand in line with ACTU policy against the imposition of 
pecuniary penalties imposed by courts outside the industrial relations system. The 
AMIEU's legal officer Philip Morgan confirmed that this was partly the case, although 
the union’s relationship with the ACTU was not particularly good at this stage. Earlier, 
according to Morgan, the AMIEU had been publicly castigated by Simon Crean for not 
withdrawing the picket line. The principle, in which case, may have been more in 
keeping with the communist-led AMIEU Queensland branch than the ACTU.28 Another 
reason could be that the union expected to win. Morgan agreed that the lack of precedent 
was a factor. He suggested that in the absence of any experience, the AMIEU decided to 
take the case as far as it could go and see what happened.29 Historically there were some 
grounds for the latter belief, not in terms of past legal decisions, but because the 
situation was without precedent. Pittard summarised it thus:
27 Loc.cit.
28 P. Morgan, Interview, 1.3.90.
29 Loc.cit.
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The significance of the legal proceedings in the second strand lies in the fact 
that for the first time the Federal Court was called upon to fine for 
contempt of court in respect of disobedience of orders made pursuant to 
provisions dealing with secondary boycotts in the Trade Practices Act and 
that union funds were subject to sequestration orders.3 0
Pittard concluded that Australian unions were realising, for the first time since the 
1960s, the full impact that the use of existing law had upon the unions. I believe this 
assessment to be only partially correct. Although the particular circumstances of 
Mudginberri were unique, the notion that existing laws could be used efficaciously in the 
courts against trade unions was be no means new. That they had not been used for this 
particular purpose to date, was not decisive. In fact, SEQEB was a very recent example 
of every appropriate law and court being used to the fullest extent. Even without the 
financial and moral support of Sir Joh Bjelke-Peterson, the SEQEB dispute provided 
some warning to the ACTU and AMIEU of the dangers involved in pursuing the matter to 
its limits. Both disputes, also, were ideologically based in their concentrated attacks on 
trade union power.
One further explanation may be that the proceedings produced a 'roller-coaster' effect, 
and once they had started there was no way of stopping them until they had reached a 
conclusion. I suggested this possibility to Morgan, who was of the opinion that this may 
well have been the case 21 I am inclined to this point of view myself, although I do not 
believe that it was a conscious factor. Nevertheless, it is significant in the wider context 
when we consider disputes that go on past the point at which one of the parties should 
logically, or strategically, withdraw.
As for the remaining issues raised by Pittard, the administrative law aspect is one that I 
have chosen not to discuss, although it is not without importance in the political context. 
Briefly, it entailed Federal Court proceedings under the Administrative Decisions 
(Judicial Review) Act 1977, in which an order was sought to review the decisions taken 
by officers of the Department of Primary Industry and the Export Inspection Service. 
They had refused Mudginberri’s request that authorised inspectors who were not 
members of the MIA be provided to carry out the inspection function. The application 
was dismissed. An appeal lodged with the Full Court of the Federal Court was later 
upheld on the basis that the department had a duty to provide inspectors.22
The final aspect also had little relevance to the merits of the case. It involved 
proceedings in the High Court by the AMIEU to disqualify Morling J of the Federal Court
30 Pittard,_op.cit., p.34.
31 Morgan, op.cit;
32 Pittard, op.cit., pp.34-35.
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from hearing the claim for damages in the dispute, on the grounds that he had made 
statements earlier which precluded him from hearing the damages claim with an open 
mind. The High Court refused the prohibition and the decision was subsequently affirmed 
by the Full Court of the High Court. The AMIEU continued to appeal against judgements 
made by Morling J without success .33
One final point should be raised in regard to the legal proceedings. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the resources of Mudginberri were considerable. With the financial 
backing of Westpac, the Northern Territory and Queensland Governments, as well as the 
NFF, Mudginberri was in a secure position to pursue protracted proceedings. The AMIEU 
on the other hand paid all of its legal costs. Unlike SEQEB, no fighting fund was raised by 
the ACTU, and no financial support was forthcoming from other unions.
11.1.5.  Conclusion
The Mudginberri dispute has assumed an important place in Australian industrial 
relations history. Seldom is the subject of trade union power mentioned in the media or 
elsewhere without some reference to the dispute. When that happens, the stress is 
invariably made on how Mudginberri demonstrated one way in which trade union power 
can be defeated. The dispute has also become part of a contemporary stratagem for 
providing an alternative to the conciliation and arbitration route. Plainly speaking, it 
heralds an attack on the industrial relations system: Houlihan in his address to the H R 
Nicholls Society said: "I believe the lesson for the trade union movement from
Mudginberri is that there is a system of real law, of courts whose decisions are to be 
observed and whose penalties are enforceable".34
Commissioner McArdle has perceived it as a warning to the trade union movement. He 
cites the common ingredients of the Mudginberri and Dollar Sweets disputes: "small 
employer, powerful and immune union and third-party-financed action against the 
union before civil courts". Unions, he says, must accept that the immunity of the 1970s 
and early 1980s has ended. They must accept penal sanctions, because the alternative is 
worse and "no amount of brave rhetoric will stop the bailiffs if the civil courts become 
established arbiters in industrial disputes". In his view:
If the non-industrial courts become the established venue for sanctions - 
which is the American system - the union may dissipate as a force very 
quickly. For this reason they need to choose the option which will ensure
33 Ibid., p.36.
34 P. Houlihan, ’A Brief History of Mudginberri and its Implications for Australia's Trade 
Unions' in Arbitration in Contempt, Melbourne, 1986, p.100.
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their long-term survival. This can only be reinstatement of the policing 
role of the industrial courts. 3 5
Not surprisingly, McArdle's prescription, however well-intentioned, has not been 
embraced by the union movement. The lessons however have been taken very seriously. 
In the ACTU's Future Strategies For The Trade Union Movement, a number of steps are
itemised to avoid similar encounters with the law in the future - or at least to minimise
the risk. They include, in summary:
• exercising restraint in the use of boycott tactics; careful selection of targets;
• developing defensive (and offensive) tactics which can minimise the risk of legal 
intervention or its effectiveness;
• establishing 'early warning' systems to try to head off the possibility of legal 
action;
• ensuring that members follow a dispute-handling process;
• seeking support from members, officials and other unions before industrial 
action commences;
• developing the concept that an attack against one is an attack against all;
• being prepared to beat a strategic retreat where that is the prudent course;
• trying to keep disputes within the framework of the relevant conciliation and
arbitration system;
• establishing and maintaining substantial fighting funds which can be used to 
prosecute the dispute, and to help defend legal proceedings where they become 
inevitable; and
• recognising that legal action can destroy a union.
The ACTU's prescription:
There is no doubt that these responses could reduce the risk of future 
Mudginberri or Dollar Sweets cases, and/or would lessen their impact if 
and when they do occur. The Robe River dispute(s) of 1986-87 provide an 
interesting illustration of some of these tactics in operation.3 g
35 Sydney Morning Herald, 18.12.86.
36 ACTU op.cit., (1987), pp.27-29.
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Before going on to Robe River, there is one final point that needs to be made. 
Mudginberri was unusual, even unique in some aspects, not the least of which was the 
relationship between the workers and the union. Perhaps the above ACTU list should 
have included a recommendation that the workers involved at the targeted workplace be 
at least sympathetic to the union's position, if not committed. In the case of 
Mudginberri, the take home pay under the new award was $1000 per week compared to 
the union advocated tally system which would have brought them about $500 per 
week.37 When Jay Pendarvis received his damages payout, $148,000 of it was shared 
out amongst the workers ($8,000 each) who had remained loyal to him throughout the 
dispute. Mudginberri's head stockman commented that the AMIEU had black-banned the 
men for life but they were proud they had beaten the union. "We had people threaten us, 
even with guns, but we stood our ground". He went on to say, "Jay Pendarvis did a lot for 
us and everyone here felt he was worth supporting so we fought the union".38 Without 
discussing the merits of that view vis a vis the union's view, it would appear to be a 
severe handicap for a union to proceed aggressively against an employer, who is not only 
a hero to farmers across the nation, but to his own workers as well.
37 The Australian, 1.8 .85 .
38 The Australian, 14- 15 . 11 .87 .
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Chapter Twelve
THE ROBE RIVER DISPUTE
12. 1 . 1 .  Background
In 1985, Peko-Wallsend acquired the controlling interest in Robe River Iron Ore 
Associates (RRIA) and took over all managerial responsibility. Previously, the company 
had been owned by an American-managed consortium with significant Australian and 
Japanese shareholdings. Because of RRIA's Japanese shareholding, it had been considered 
favoured in its capacity to negotiate with an affluent Japanese steel industry. Of its total 
output, between 75 and 85 per cent was sold directly to Japan. This represented about 
one-half of Japan's iron ore imports.1
During 1986 it was predicted that a large reduction in Japanese steel production 
capacity would take place in the following three years and this would have severe 
consequences for Pilbara producers. This, in conjunction with the impact of intensive 
competition from Brazil and India for iron ore markets, according to Thompson and 
Smith, provides "the essential background for understanding the pressure and tension 
which underlay the Robe River dispute".2 While I would not disagree with their
analysis on this point, I believe that another important factor in the dispute lay in the 
isolation of the Pilbara region from the cities in which decisions were being made. 
Situated in the north of Western Australia, workers in the Pilbara region are subject to 
isolation from urban centres where decisions are made and also to extreme 
temperatures. Both, as I will demonstrate later, were factors in the difficulties 
experienced by the ACTU to intervene successfully. The dispute occurred in two stages: 
The first was a lockout lasting for three weeks; and the second a strike of forty days 
duration.
12. 1. 2 .  Stage I - The Lockout
Following an independent audit of RRIA between January and July 1986, the board 
determined that site management was not moving quickly enough to control union 
demands, cut back overstaffing and reduce the number of restrictive work practices. 
Peko-Wallsend's chief executive, Charles Copeman acted swiftly. Four key executives 
were dismissed and workers were simultaneously notified that, with a new management
1 H. Thompson & H. Smith, 'The Conflict at Robe River', in Arena 79, 1987, pp.78-79.
2.Ibid., p.79.
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in control, major changes in the company's operation would take place immediately. 
RRIA also served notice that it wanted 185 voluntary redundancies by August 20. If they 
were not forthcoming, a redundancy agreement would be implemented which empowered 
the company to sack its employees on a "last-on, first off" basis.3
A conference before the WAIC (following the unions' application), resulted in an order 
that from August 4 the status quo existing on July 31 should remain for thirty days 
while conferences were convened to discuss the changes demanded by the company. The 
order was issued after the company had indicated it would not obey the Commission's 
request for a thirty day moratorium. Unions were ordered to refrain from any 
industrial action.
Notwithstanding the Commission’s orders, during the following week a log of claims was 
served on unions. The company required a wage cut of up to 30 per cent, an end to 
restrictive work practices and a new set of charges for the housing accommodation 
provided. In addition to a complete overhaul of working arrangements, the company 
wanted to replace the State award with a Federal award to take in all Peko-Wallsend's 
mining interests across the country.3 4 56 The unions responded by advising members that 
they should not carry out unlawful instructions which would negate the order of the 
commission. The company in turn sacked sixty workers who acted on the unions' advice. 
The situation was further exacerbated when police were called in to enforce the sackings. 
Reinstatement of the sacked workers was ordered by the Commission who insisted that 
the company abide by the original order. Management’s response was to lockout the 
entire workforce of 1,160 workers on August 11, thereby closing down the mining 
operation at Pannawonica and the port site of Cape Lambert. "The battle lines had now 
clearly been drawn by the company, not only against the workers and trade unions, but 
against the authority of the State Industrial Commission".®
From the beginning of the dispute, both the State and Federal Governments had expressed 
concern at the damaging implications the lockout could have for Australia's export 
markets in iron-ore, particularly with Japan. The then Federal Minister for Trade, 
John Dawkins was at the time in Japan trying to persuade the Japanese to take more iron
ore from the Pilbara. Said one commentator, "..... Mr. Dawkins has been left in the
ridiculous position of having to wander around Tokyo explaining that the sudden closure 
of the entire mine is no more than an aberration in a region that has really become a 
picture of industrial peace and tranquility".® A further source of embarrassment was
3 The Australian, 12.8.86.
4 The AustralianA 14.8.86.
5 Ibid., p.80.
6 The Australian, 14.8.86.
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the failure of Peko-Wallsend to inform its Japanese partners, Mitsui and Company, 
Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Corporation, of its intentions. Representatives of Mitsui and 
Company in Japan contacted the president of the Mining Unions Association two days after 
the lockout to clarify what impact the Rover River dispute would have on the rest of the 
Pilbara.7 (The two other major mining operations in the Pilbara, Mt. Newman and 
Hammersley Mines, were not involved in the dispute.)
On August 22, the company, by lodging an appeal for a stay, successfully thwarted an 
order from the Full bench of the Commission ordering the reinstatement of all the sacked 
workers. The Industrial Appeal Court consists of judges from the Western Australia 
Supreme Court. The company's decision had the automatic effect of suspending the 
Commission's ruling until the appeal was decided.8
Three weeks into the dispute, Peko's Japanese partners had still not received any formal 
explanation for the lockout or been notified how long iron ore shipments were to be 
suspended. Mitsui executives at this stage urged Peko to have talks with the Western 
Australian Government.9 Charles Copeman did meet with the State Minister for 
Minerals and Energy, David Parker, but after initial agreement, negotiations broke down 
and were followed by a vitriolic public exchange.1 0
The extent to which the three Japanese partners were concerned is evident from the 
stiffly worded three-point teleprinter message sent to Copeman stating: that the
companies wanted the dispute solved as quickly as possible; that this should be done 
within the established institutions; and that it should be in close co-operation with the 
Western Australian Government. As Thompson and Smith point out, the "fact that the 
Japanese are normally very restrained about direct criticism implies that the telex 
signalled serious disapproval of Management's actions"* 11
Ten days later, on September 3, the lockout ended following the failure of RRIA’s appeal 
to the Industrial Appeals Court to have the Commission's reinstatement order 
overturned.
1 2 . 1 . 3 .  Interval
An uneasy peace followed the mine’s re-opening. In protracted proceedings before the 
Commission which resumed sitting on September 5, the company refused to enter into
7 Financial Review, 14.8.86.
8 Financial Review, 25.8.86.
9 Thompson & Smith, op.cit... p.81.
10 Loc.citt
11 Loc.cit.
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conciliation and insisted that every issue be arbitrated. Sixty days later, only thirty- 
two of the 220 work practices had been heard. Regarding these the Commission brought 
down a decision in favour of the company and, as far as the remaining work practices 
were concerned, ruled that all of the company changes would stand unless the unions 
could prove that specific matters "required the Commission's interference with the 
general prerogative of the respondent (the Company) to manage its affairs".12
Somewhat paradoxically, although emerging as the clear victor from the proceedings, the 
company was strongly criticised and blamed by the Commission for the dispute. Earlier, 
in October, while still deliberating over the issues involved, the Commission ordered 
Peko-Wallsend to pay approximately $1.5 million in compensation to the workers who 
had been locked out. Commissioner Collier explained that this award, which equalled the 
lost earnings, would have been more "except for the fact that in the past workers have 
involved themselves in reckless industrial action with scant regard for its effect on the 
employers".1 3
In the meantime, the situation at the mine itself was tense. At least one-third of the 
labour force resigned, while the townspeople split into two communities consisting of 
staff and wage labour. The company created a 'grot squad' consisting of militant shop 
stewards who were directed to perform menial tasks like picking up paper and pulling 
weeds. Some skilled tradespeople were reclassified as labourers while staff members 
did union-related work. After a company newsletter which threatened to ’get' diehard 
unionists, workers booked off on sick leave.14 Tense though the situation remained, 
production picked up in September, although October was not a good month. During 
November, there were record levels of productivity. Whenever Copeman or the 
Japanese participants went to the Pilbara, workers would go off sick and there would be 
rolling stoppages.15 in an atmosphere where morale was low, with the community 
isolated and divided, the conditions for a potentially explosive situation had been created.
12.1.4.  Stage II - The strike
On December 10, members of the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association 
(FEDFA) went on strike over a manning issue, followed six days later by the rest of the 
workforce. When the company used staff labour for transport, members of the maritime 
unions, who had not previously been involved in the lockout or the current dispute, 
joined the strike. By December 16, both the mine and port were totally on strike.1®
12 Thompson & Smith, op.cit., p.82.
13 The Australian, 31.10.86.
14 Thompson & Smith, op.cit., p.82.
15 The Age, 9.1.87.
16 West Australian* 17.12.86.
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On January 5 1987, four weeks after the strike's beginning, RRIA announced its 
intention to serve writs against individual unionists. These were in addition to company 
writs issued for millions of dollars in damages the week before against the ten unions 
involved in the strike.1 7 The Federal Government intervened, calling on RRIA to 
withdraw its court action, for the miners to return to work and the acceptance of all 
parties to the decisions of the Western Australia and Industrial Commission. (WAIC) On 
the same day in Sydney, the Arbitration Commission refused RRIA's application for a 
return to work order for tugboat crews. Whereas RRIA claimed they were on strike, 
Commissioner Turbet understood them to be stood aside with pay.18
The following day, RRIA served writs on five workers, all vocal union supporters who 
had been active on the picket lines. Threatened writs against all nine hundred strikers 
were withheld.
Copeman then offered to meet Simon Crean, president of the ACTU without setting 
preconditions for talks. Crean, in Melbourne, responded by telexing a proposed peace 
plan which was rejected by Peko because they could not accept the two key points: that 
RRIA must withdraw its common law actions; and that the status quo prevail on disputed 
staffing levels at the company’s Pannawonica mine until the WAIC ruling.19 January 7 
also saw the unusual step by Chief Commissioner Collier of summoning both sides to a 
conference. Copeman failed to appear, leaving himself open to a fine of $2,000, although 
Collier said he was unlikely to take the matter further than seeking an explanation.29
Peko did, however, agree to conciliation talks with mining union leaders over the dispute 
at Cape Lambert. This appeared to be an important breakthrough at the time, given 
Peko's refusal to enter into conciliation for the past five months. It was also the first 
time that the parties had agreed to negotiate independently of the Commission. On the 
evening of January 8, at the meeting's conclusion, the parties expressed restrained 
optimism.21
On the following day, eighteen more writs were issued against individual unionists 
bringing the total to twenty-four, in addition to the ten previously served on unions. 
During the weekend, the company placed full-page advertisements in newspapers 
explaining their actions and accusing the unions of unlawful and damaging behaviour.22
17 Financial Review, 5.1.87. The ten unions involved were the PGEU, BWIU., ETU., FEDFA., 
OPDU., AMWU. and three maritime unions, including the SUA.
18 Sydney Morning Herald, 6.1.87.
19 The Age, 7.1.87.
20 Sydney Morning Heralds 8.1.87.
21 Sydney Morning Heralds 9.1.87.
22 The Weekend A us tra lian 10-11.1.87.
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The original dispute over manning levels and staff labour had by now been eclipsed by 
the issue of common law writs.
The meeting between Copeman and Crean which took place on January 13 resulted in a 
conditional acceptance by Peko of all the ACTU's negotiating points. A blueprint for the 
resolution of the dispute now existed by mutual agreement. Copeman agreed to withdraw 
the writs (conditional on a return to work). Both agreed that the basis for any 
agreement between the company and workers was the establishment of a new dispute 
settling procedure.
While Crean was satisfied that the dispute was well on the way to being resolved, a 
meeting of shop stewards the next day indicated that the peace plan would not succeed. 
One shop steward, Kim Metcalfe from the AMWU stated that Crean should have consulted 
the workers before making comments about going back to work. He went on to say:
We want more than a new dispute settling formula, I can tell you There's
no way we'll go through those gates 'til every one of our claims is
settled . 2 3
Meanwhile, in temperatures well into the 40s°c, pickets at the mines had increased. 
Although extra police were called in, no arrests were made, and no violence reported by 
police. Solidarity within the Pilbara region also increased. At one meeting at 
Hammersley, 200 unionists voted $10 per week for the next five weeks in aid of the 
Robe River strike fund.24
Jack Marks, president of the Western Australian Mining Unions Association (WAMUA) 
was sceptical about the peace plan. Of Crean's intention to fly to the Pilbara, he 
remarked, "There is no way in the world that anyone has got a magic wand that is going to 
leap off the plane and say hi, ho, back to work we go".25 Crean remained confident that 
his plan would be accepted by the workers, and on January 16, he flew to the Pilbara.
Crean's first meeting was at Wickham. After four hours of intense and often heated 
discussion (no pun is intended here although the temperatures were very high) a vote 
was taken which rejected Crean's recommendation and decided to stay out indefinitely. 
Another four hour meeting at Pannawonica carried the same resolution.
An amended proposal, negotiated during the week between Crean, local union officials and 
Peko management was accepted by a mass meeting on January 24, with very little 
opposition. The document itself varied only slightly from the original peace proposal.
23 K. Metcalfe, quoted in The Age, 15.1.87.
24 Loc.cit.
25 _Loc.cit.
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One sentence had been added which read: "After normal operations have resumed the 
Company will clarify its position in meetings with representatives of the Unions on the 
matters raised by them on 21 January 1987" 26
12.1.5.  Management
Charles Copeman, chief executive of Peko-Wallsend stands out as the major figure in the 
dispute. It was Copeman who was primarily responsible for the ethos which came to 
dominate the dispute. His personal beliefs and allegiances are fundamental to 
understanding how the dispute developed. A member of the Liberal Party, Copeman did 
not rule out the possibility that he may one day throw his cause into the political arena if 
the opportunity arose.27 At the time he openly admitted he would like to see a change in 
government, partly because he believed that union power was driving the dollar and the 
country "down the tube".2® But it would be a mistake to suggest that Copeman’s 
political aspirations were a major factor in how he behaved as Peko’s chief executive, 
although his decision to act can easily be interpreted as being motivated by a personal 
commitment to bring about change. From the start of stage I of the dispute, he made it 
clear he held the industrial relations system responsible for the situation at Robe River. 
The company, according to Copeman had decided to act because the time was right to call 
the bluff of those, including the Arbitration Commission who took the curious view that 
management regarded executive decisions as a privilege. 29 Copeman contends that he 
did not set out to challenge the industrial relations system when he sacked the workforce; 
"what has happened is the result of the commissioner giving an unwise order".30 While 
he does not regard himself as a trail blazer, and firmly rejects the title 'Rambo of the 
Pilbara', Copeman's refusal to abide by the WAIC's orders was grounded in his belief that 
the 'right to manage' was a prerogative that could not be subjugated by decisions of the 
Commission:
We believe they (the Industrial Commission) do not have jurisdiction to give 
orders to management. What they are trying to say is that management 
must work in accordance with a whole lot of practices which have not 
themselves been the subject of the commission's investigations. 3 1
What is left unclear here is, just what did Copeman and the Peko management regard the 
Commission's proper jurisdiction? As some company executives blandly explained,
26 Thompson & Smith, op.cit., p.82.
27 In fact, Copeman has since sought and gained Liberal Party pre-selection for the seat of 
Phillip in NSW. (Currently held by Labor)
28 Financial Review, 26.8.86.
29 The Age, 13.8.86.
30 The A ustra lian 14.8.86.
31 Financial Review, 26.8.86.
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Peko disobeyed the umpire's position because it was wrong.32 If the Commission had 
not issued orders for an end to the lockout, and a moratorium period, would its 
jurisdiction then have been questioned? The logical extension of that view is that unions 
should not have to abide by commission decisions which they believe to impede their 
proper functions. Another dubious feature of the company's reasoning was its antipathy 
to industrial democracy. Peko executives maintained that unions had acquired too much 
say in management, despite a dramatic drop in working days lost in the iron ore industry 
which had accompanied a system of workplace industrial democracy which had evolved in 
recent years.33 It seems therefore that short-term losses were a sacrifice the company 
was prepared to tolerate in order to achieve the long-term objective of management 
prerogative. The principle involved assumed paramount importance.
Copeman, a founding member of the H R Nicholls Society, and regarded as a standard 
bearer of the New Right, is sceptical about the role of the State, believing that "Even Mrs 
Thatcher can't do a great deal to affect what happens". The salvation of Australia 
therefore lies in the hands of individuals and business, especially business. Although he 
sees the importance of the H R Nicholls Society as being exaggerated, he draws strength 
from the knowledge that "kindred spirits" agreed with his general outlook.34 While 
Copeman actively promotes the New Right attitudes on deregulation and a free market, 
according to the Robe River Report (a trade union publication), he has shown no 
reluctance in the past to accepting government intervention in the form of financial 
aid.35
12.1.6 .  The unions
One of the dilemmas facing union officials was the difficulty in deciding what action, if 
any, could be taken once Peko-Wallsend had decided to lockout and sack its workers, and 
not obey the WAIC’s order to reinstate them. One option open to them was to call all 
Pilbara workers out on a general strike. This would have been counter-productive as 
they well recognised. It would have alienated the Hammersley and Mt. Newman 
managements who thus far had supported the need to respect the Industrial Commission.
32 The Age, 14.8.86.
33 Loc.cit.
34 The Age, 30.1.87.
35 Between 1977-80, Mt. Lyall Mining received cash payments of around $6 million. Copeman, 
then chairman of directors had pleaded before the Industries Assistance Commission for 
government help in covering losses. Peko-Wallsend, as well as claiming tax deductions on plant 
and equipment, can, as a mining company also claim rebates for expenditure on site preparation 
and clearing, buildings, electricity, water and roads, housing and health facilities for 
employees, as well as equipment and buildings for the treatment of minerals. In addition, Peko 
reaps tax-free profits from its gold mines in the Northern Territory and also profits from 
government expenditures on infrastructure such as ports, railways, roads, water and 
community facilities. Robe River Report, February 1987, p.2.
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The real cost would be in a fewer number of jobs in a smaller industry once the strike 
was over, and more difficulties in selling to Japan. "We'd just be cutting our own 
throats", said one union official.38 Another aspect was the unions' perception that the 
company was determined to set up an entire workforce using contract labour the 
following month.37 The extent to which the unions involved were in a defensive position 
cannot be underestimated.
The ACTU was suspicious of the company's motives. Crean found it difficult to understand 
why a confrontationist stance was being taken when unions at Robe River had indicated a 
willingness to discuss the issues of work practices.38 There are definite grounds for 
believing that industrial peace was not, at that time, a priority on the company's list of 
objectives. If industrial peace was an objective, the company's action in keeping three 
hundred white-collar staff (foremen and supervisors) on full wages during the lockout 
is mystifying. The intention was to replace the 1,160 sacked workers with the white- 
collar workers, pending the Appeals Court decision, but the company must have been 
fully aware of the potentially explosive effect of such a move. Certainly, the unionists 
involved had no doubts about the possible consequences. A spokesman for the Association 
of Draughting, Supervisory and Technical Employees (ADSTE) made it clear: "Our people 
are scared and there is no way that six cops in Karratha and Copeman's millions will be 
able to protect them if they are ordered to do this work"39 Although the Appeals Court 
decision resulted in RRIA re-employing the sacked workers, the demarcation lines had 
been clearly drawn. During the intervening period, the communities in which the sacked 
workers and white-collar staff lived became divided again along lines that had been 
created during the lockout.
During the early part of the dispute's second stage, the ACTU was reluctant to become 
involved in what it regarded as an unpopular dispute.40 The company’s decision to sue 
striking unionists was regarded as an attack on the fundamental rights of workers and 
caused the ACTU to become actively involved in finding a resolution. Crean, who was 
seriously concerned about the wider ramifications of RRIA’s legal initiatives, approached 
the company with a peace proposal. He did not rule out a national campaign to protect the 
right to strike if the company refused to accept his overtures. He described RRIA's 
tactics as "quite stupid". The use of common law legal action was a direct threat on the 
right to strike, and in his view:
36 Financial Review, 15.8 .86.
37 Financial Review, 13.8 .86.
38 Financial Review, 14.8 .86.
39 The Age„ 3 .9 .86.
40 Financial Review, 5. 1.87.
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Most people in the community would agree that there should be the right to 
strike. It is the fundamental right in a democratic society. 4 1
Although Crean maintained that the unions had done nothing wrong at Robe River, and 
indeed said he could not understand why they had stayed at work so long,42 his concerns 
were much more attuned to the wider picture - the possible ramifications should the 
legal actions be pursued. In some respects, he appears to have regarded RRIA's actions as 
a challenge which had to be met. He accused the New Right of wanting a return to the 
early 1900s, when the work force had to deal individually with employers without the 
protection of established unions.42 If this was the "hidden agenda", and this great game 
plan to try and take on the trade union movement was one of the issues, then, said Crean, 
"we have to respond" 44
The unions directly involved in the dispute were, not surprisingly, more concerned with 
the immediate situation. While he would not comment on the conference that took place 
between the company, ACTU and union officials on January 8, Marks pointed out that the 
unions had been ready to talk for five months. "We are not the mad dogs the New Right 
present us as", he said, "We know we are doing Australia no good the longer we are locked 
into the dance macabre with this company".45
Union officials concede that many of the work practices could not be defended. A 
spokesman for FEDFA allowed Peko had some justification early in the dispute:
It had some right to change work practices which senior union people like 
myself did not even know about. Some practices had to go. But the manner 
in which they tried to get rid of the practices, no self-respecting unionist 
or trade union official could condone.4 g
Having negotiated a peace proposal with the company and union officials in Perth, 
Crean's failure to convince the on site workers came as something of a disappointment. 
While he may not have been expecting this setback, the union officials were less than 
surprised. After the Pilbara meetings, Marks commented: "They saw us as a gang of 
carpetbaggers flying in with our own brand of snake oil - we should have spent more 
time explaining things to them".4^ Amalgamated Metal Workers and Shipwrights' Union 
(AMWSU) shop steward, Neill Flynn said of the peace plan: "We understand the macro-
41 The Age, 6.1.87.
42 Financial Review,k 7.1.87.
43 Sydney Morning Heralds 8.1.87.
44 Financial Reviewt 8.1.87.
45 West Australian, 8.1.87.
46 The Agek 9.1.87.
47 The Age, 19.1.87.
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economic debate, how employment in the iron-ore industry depends on productivity but 
we are playing for the highest stakes workers can play for - our own jobs".48
The subsequent approval of the peace plan, which as explained earlier, was different 
only by one sentence to the original, can be explained according to Thompson and Smith 
by three reasons:
(i) The amended document did explicitly take into account the
specific requests of the membership. The rank and file now saw 
themselves as having actually participated in determining the 
agreement.
(ii) The needs and objectives thought to be important by the 
membership were to be pursued in further meetings even though 
very few of the workers felt that much would be gained by any 
clarification of the company's position.
(iii) The union officials were able to control the membership by 
persuading them of new circumstances which had greatly 
enhanced the company's position of power.49
By this time also, the three maritime unions had received orders to return to work from 
the ACAC. Refusal to obey would have left them open to proceedings under Section 45D of 
the TPA. An additional, if not decisive, factor was the advice given by a solicitor that any 
support action from unionists in the Pilbara or elsewhere would incur legal actions that 
would be carried by the entire union movement. This was related to the readiness of 
other unionists on work sites in the Pilbara to broaden the struggle if requested. Legal 
advice that such united action should be averted, was accepted.50
12.1.7.  The legalities
Peko's decision to disobey the WAIC’s order during stage I of the dispute was not merely 
an expression of protest at the perceived denigration of managerial prerogative. 
Directly related to that protest was a challenge to the industrial relations system. The 
challenge had as a philosophical basis, the denial of fundamental tenets that were 
established in 1907 by Justice Higgins in the Harvester judgement. Copeman questioned 
the notion that a company should go broke if it could not pay award wages. He contended 
that the Higgins judgement had enabled the Arbitration Commission to force onerous 
conditions on companies such as Robe River. The intention therefore was to challenge 
this "illogical 1906 {sic) precedent" as an affront to natural justice. To that end, the
48 Flynn has been described as one of the 12 notorious 'warlords' of the Pilbara, "demon 
figures blamed by some state-level union officials and management alike for prolonging the 
dispute". Loc.cit.
49 Thompson & Smith, op.cit.,p.86.
50 Thompson & Smith, op.cit., pp.86-87.
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company was prepared to seek relief in the Supreme Court of Western Australia or 
another appropriate 'real' court.51
Copeman's reasoning here is indicative of one of the issues raised in the previous chapter 
in regard to the 'New Right". It involves the acceptance of a statement (or maxim) to the 
effect that the present system represents an affront to natural justice that would not 
occur in other 'real' courts. In fact, it is difficult to see how natural justice in its legal 
context may have been affronted by the Harvester or later judgements, and the notion 
that within the legal system 'real' courts would make up for the lack, is problematical. 
Two rules apply to satisfy that natural justice has been served. The first is the audi 
alteram partem rule which requires that both sides should be heard before a decision is 
given. The second is the nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa, which requires that 
hearing should be given free of bias; nobody can be both suitor and judge. Campbell and 
Whitmore suggest that a third rule may also be emerging whereby a right exists to a 
reasoned decision after a hearing.52 However critical Copeman may be of the industrial 
relations system, the accusation that it is an affront to natural justice cannot be 
justified on either ground.
Be that as it may, the challenge to the industrial relations system in general and the 
Commission in particular were not without effect. Justice Brinsden effectively endorsed 
the company's action pending a hearing by the Appeals Court on which he was to sit. He 
maintained that the effect of the Commission's order would be to reinstate the employees 
on almost the same terms as the company found unacceptable. "If the company is 
successful in its appeal, it may then have to take steps to discontinue their services 
again", he said. "One can see immediately that if it did take such actions, the industrial 
harmony in the north would be hardly enhanced"52 Brinsden, prior to the hearing had 
left open the possibility that the Appeals Court would override the decision of a full 
bench of the Commission which would have represented a severe blow to the 
Commission's authority.54
Peko demonstrated that it was also prepared to be tough on its detractors. The company 
during stage I issued defamation writs in the Supreme Court against the Minister for 
Minerals and Energy, David Parker and some news organisations. The writs were 
concerned with two matters: (i) statements made on the alleged breach of agreement, and 
(ii) reported statements about Herbert Larratt, Peko-Wallsend's corporate manager for
51 The Australian, 13.8.86.
52 E. Campbell & H. Whitmore, Freedom in AustraliaAdelaide, 1973, p.417.
53 Financial Reviewk 25.8.86.
54 Loc.cit.
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industrial services.55 The State Government was also in a litigious frame of mind. On 
August 12 it announced that it would take legal action and seek "substantial damages" 
from the company for breaching its contract to supply electricity to the Pilbara grid via 
its operation at the site 56
During stage II of the dispute, Peko expanded its use of the legal system. The executive 
director of RRIA explained that there were several areas of common law which could be 
applied more successfully than section 45D of the TPA. The writs issued against the shop 
stewards on January 6 sought damages arising out of the men's conduct, alleging they had 
procured, incited, and/or persuaded Robe River employees to breach their contracts of 
employment. It was also alleged the men had interfered with the contractual relations 
between Robe River and the companies to which it was contracted to supply iron ore, and 
that they further interfered with the supply of goods and services to and by RRIA. 
Damages were also claimed for alleged conspiracy to cause harm to the company's 
business and in respect of alleged nuisance arising from the conduct of picketing of the 
company's premises. While no amount was specified in the claims, the company 
estimated the cost of the strike to be $500 a minute.57 Further into the dispute,the 
three main areas of redress were damages against the Seamens' Union for loss of revenue 
because the ore could not be shipped; damages from the subsequent loss of sales to 
customers; and damages resulting from the inability of contractors to go on site 55
It is not possible here to go into all the legal actions that were taken by the company and I 
think the above two examples demonstrate the way in which the company was intending 
to go. There is just one more action which should be noted, and that is Peko's application 
for a Federal award in place of the State award. With the Western Australian 
Government's declared intention to intervene and oppose the application, it was unlikely 
to succeed. Nevertheless, Peko’s move would force the unions to spend time and money 
fighting the attempt.59
12 . 1 . 8 .  Epilogue
Thompson and Smith, writing in 1987, asked what would happen in the long run. Their 
prophesy was that RRIA from a management perspective would need to get rid of a large 
number of workers and replace them with people not involved in the dispute. 
"Otherwise, in one way or another, the workers who remain will be resistant to the
55 Financial Review;  26.8.86.
56 Financial Review, 13.8.86.
57 West Australiani* 7.1.87.
58 Financial Review, 5.1.87.
59 Financial Review, 15.8.86.
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extension of managerial prerogative".66 To some extent their forecast was correct. 
The workforce over the following few months decreased by four hundred. Working 
conditions for committed unionists were made extremely difficult with the creation of 
’grot squads' and the use of non-union labour for skilled work. Unionists who stepped 
out of line were threatened with eviction from their homes. Copeman, while not 
commenting on specific allegations, admitted that "dedicated troublemakers" were being 
"to a degree isolated" from the workforce. An ETU shop steward pointed out a clause in 
the tenancy agreement which enabled management to evict workers from their company- 
owned homes "for any purpose which in the opinion of the landlord is inconsistent with 
accepted moral or ethical standards". Evictions in turn forced workers to leave the area 
without actually being sacked. Copeman agreed that steps were being taken to isolate 
some employees, "those people it is difficult to remove from the workforce’’^ 1
In this atmosphere, the uneasy peace continued. Towards the end of the year, Peko 
informed mining unions of its intentions to withdraw from the registered industrial 
agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment. Herb Larratt, the general 
manager of corporate and industrial services, said that the decision was part of the 
company's continuing objective to win "the right to manage" and this objective had not 
been deviated from since last year.62
Early in April 1988, RRIA stepped-up a campaign to get workers to sign individual 
productivity contracts. Negotiations for the second-tier wage increase were used as a 
bargaining tool in the process. The WAIC ordered the company to withdraw its contract 
requirements.62 Amid the renewed tension, a 48-hour strike by tugboat operators 
occurred. The operators had been protesting at delays in negotiations for the second-tier 
wage rise and superannuation agreement. They returned to work in obedience to an order 
from the Arbitration Commission. On April 18 RRIA instituted legal action against 29 
tugboat operators as individuals. The unions on site were not targeted. This legal action 
consisted of two components. The company filed actions for breaches of employment 
contracts as well as a range of common law actions. The civil writs sought damages for 
delays and loss of profits. In addition, criminal writs were lodged under Section 81 of 
the Police Act which deals with the unauthorised use of boats. Offences under the Act 
carry penalties of $2,000 fine or two years in jail, as well as provision for damages.
The ACTU called on the company to immediately withdraw the writs which appeared to 
represent a return to the confrontationist tactics of 1986. Crean warned that
60 Thompson & Smith, op.cit., p.87.
61 Sydney Morning Heralds 27.4.87.
62 Financial Review, 23.12.87.
63 West Australianix 2.4.88.
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sympathetic action by other unions could result. Understandably, he voiced some 
concern at the involvement of the three Japanese partners.64 Peko had not made the 
same mistake it had in 1986. This time the Japanese partners were involved in the 
decisions. Commissioner Turbet in the Arbitration Commission urged the company to 
defer action. He added, "I am of a personal view that industrial and civil remedies to 
industrial issues is a very dangerous mix which make the task of the industrial 
arbitrator obtaining a lasting settlement more difficult".65 Of course, that may well 
have been the company's intention. Outside the Commission, a company spokesman 
responded that the legal action was "part and parcel" of the company's arbitration 
claim.66 He would have been well aware that the functions of the Commission abrogated 
any formal links between the two processes.
Despite insistent requests from the Western Australian Government, RRIA remained 
immovable and far from trying to placate the concerned parties, attempted to recruit tug 
crews from New Zealand.67 Nor was the company particularly concerned with keeping 
the State Government 'on-side'. In a thinly disguised warning, RRIA announced it had 
legal advice that anyone trying to pressure the company to drop its civil and criminal 
writs against the tugboat operators would be in contempt of court.68
Some considerable time later, following the intervention of Crean, RRIA had a 'change- 
of-heart' about the legal proceedings against the tugboat operators. The criminal 
charges were dismissed after RRIA offered no evidence in court on the matter. A notice of 
discontinuance was filed in regard to the civil writs.69
Relations between the company and workers at Robe River remained strained. Pam 
Buchanan, a Labor backbencher and Government Whip, itemised in the State Parliament 
the working conditions that existed under RRIA's contract agreement. The company, she 
said, was victimising its workers and treating them like slaves. Examples Buchanan 
gave were that the company could transfer a worker to the other mine site several 
hundred kilometres away with only a week's notice and change a worker's duty without 
suitable training. One of the worst aspects of the employment contract employees had to 
sign, she said, was that the company had the right to conduct body searches.70
64 West Australian, 20.4.88.
65 West Australian, 20.4.88.
66 West Australian„ 20.4.88.
67 West Australian, 27.4.88.
68^Canberra Times, 29.4.88.
69 These matters are unreported. I obtained this information from one of the solicitors,
Philip Laskaris, who had some involvement with the cases. Unfortunately, he was unable to 
recollect the correct dates but was adamant that these events took place "a very 
considerable time" after the dispute had ended.
70 West Australian, 7.9.89.
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In September 1989, after a hearing that lasted almost a year (from July 1988 to June 
1989), the WAIC handed down an award to the Robe River workers which was 
immediately hailed as a victory by the unions. The award protected the workers' right to 
union representation, established complex dispute settling procedures and prevented 
white-collar staff from performing blue-collar duties, even during strikes. 71
12.1.9.  Conclusion
The industrial relations conflict at Robe River cannot be attributed to any single issue. 
Obstensibly it was over the excessive work practices that had built up over the years, 
but when considering the company's attitude from the time Peko-Wallsend acquired the 
controlling interest, it becomes clear that a whole new philosophy was being instigated. 
The work practices issue provided the reason for putting that philosophy into action. 
The company's stand on work practices requires no discussion here; after all, even the 
unions admitted that the case against them in that respect was justified.
The disputes in their first and second stages were motivated by one overriding first 
principle, and that was the 'right to manage'. Subservient to that principle were two 
axioms from which RRIA proceeded. The first was that trade unions have too much power 
and need to be subjugated to the first principle. As such, the prior company practice of 
consultation with unions needed to be eradicated. Industrial democracy in Peko's view 
was inconsistent with management prerogative. The second axiom was that industrial 
tribunals, particularly the State tribunal, played negative roles in both their 
conciliatory and arbitrary functions. Peko was not unwilling to participate in the 
system, but was not prepared to abide by any findings which it believed subordinated the 
company's 'right to manage'.
The role of Copeman was important. He provided yet another hero for the exponents of a 
de-regulated industrial relations system based on free-market precepts. By attacking 
the system and resorting to legal actions in what he termed, the 'real courts', the legal 
possibilities created by SEQEB, Dollar Sweets and Mudginberri were further enhanced. 
Copeman's aggressive approach was nevertheless the target of widespread criticism. For 
example, when the strike ended in January 1987, Copeman’s 'capitulation' was 
applauded somewhat cynically in an editorial in The Age newspaper, which said:
The New Right eager for another industrial victory to add to the stale and 
limited list of Mudginberri, Dollar Sweets and the South-East Queensland 
Electricity Board, will have to wait a little longer. This must be a little 
worrying for them. The more dust that settles on their scoreboard of 
industrial waterloos, the more it becomes obvious that they are preaching 
irrelevant and simplistic policies which are bad for worker-management
71 West Australian, 7.9.89.
dealings. Mr Copeman, who several months ago was being paraded as the 
New Right's latest cult figure, is to be congratulated for choosing common 
sense and conciliation ahead of political grandstanding and confrontation.72
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Later events revealed it was not really a capitulation. Subsequent actions by the 
company left little doubt that the basic philosophy that Peko had instilled, was still a 
primary motivation in RRIA's attitude towards its workers. The action it took against 
the tugboat operators in April 1988, foreshadowed in one respect, the possibilities that 
became explicit in the later Brooking judgement in the pilots' case. In issuing writs 
against the 29 workers (as individuals) after they had obeyed a Commission order to 
return to work, a new phase in industrial relations had begun.
The unions' responses to Peko's attacks bear some analysis. Thompson and Smith point 
out that the 'passive resistance' offered by the unions in the first four months of the 
dispute, was very much out of character for Pilbara unions in general and Robe River 
unions in particular. The explanation for this is partly due to the unions being caught 
off-guard. The major reason they proffer is that Peko played on their fears. Union 
officials recognised a New Right imposition in the Pilbara which carried with it not only 
lessons but also fear of the results found in Mudginberri, SEQEB and Dollar Sweets.73 
This view is confirmed by the ACTU to the extent that the union response was based on a 
strategy formulated out of lessons learnt from the earlier disputes. (I have briefly 
itemised the strategy in the Mudginberri case study) The tactics used by the unions and 
ACTU during the dispute were thus seen to be vindicated. Future Strategies concluded:
It is important that the disputes were settled within the existing, formal 
industrial relations structure. The Company would clearly have preferred 
it otherwise. But in the final analysis a combination of legal, social, 
political and market forces obliged them to agree to operate within the 
parameters of the existing system. This is not any easy or efficient way 
to run an industrial relations system, but it does show that carefully 
planned and executed strategies can be used to defeat even a determined 
and well-resourced opponent.74
As subsequent events revealed, the ACTU may have been a little premature in its 
analysis. True, the unions did achieve a significant victory in bringing the company 
back to the negotiating table and remaining within the industrial relations system. The 
company’s agenda, however, remained unchanged. Only the tactics were altered to 
accommodate its programme. A campaign towards a workforce consisting of non- 
unionised, contract labour was systematically instituted. To that end, delaying tactics in 
negotiations for a second-tier wage agreement were used by the company as a bargaining
72 The Age, 27.1.87.
73 Thompson & Smith, op.cit., p.90. 
74ACTU, (1987) op.cit., p.30.
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tool. When the tugboat operators took strike action in protest at the delays, the company 
ignored the union and issued writs against the individuals involved. With hindsight, the 
so-called 'capitulation' of RRIA can be seen as a strategic retreat. The work practices 
issue was resolved in the company's favour, and the 'right to manage' principle continued 
to be the dominant factor in RRIA's relationship with its workforce.
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IN CONCLUSION
Two theoretical propositions were posited in the introduction to this thesis. The first 
was that law can be a two-edged sword in the prevention and resolution of conflict. 
The second, was that industrial peace and the absence of industrial conflict are not 
necessarily contemporaneous. Implicit in the latter proposition is the premise that, 
the absence of measurable or identifiable manifestations of industrial conflict may be 
due to a number of reasons including law and the prevailing political and economic 
climate.
Some of the literature on industrial relations from the US, UK and Australia was 
examined in Chapter One with a view to developing a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of industrial conflict. To gain some perspective, systems and collective 
bargaining theory were focussed upon with particular emphasis on Dunlop’s theory 
and subsequent modifications; and the pluralistic and unitary frames of reference 
approaches. These were considered most helpful in contributing to a theoretical 
framework that would serve my field of research.
Dunlop's premise that industrial relations systems are held together by an ideology 
or a common set of beliefs provides a ’jumping-off’ point for constructing a model 
that is adaptive to industrial conflict in Australia. The pluralistic frame of approach 
accepts a diversity of interests and aspirations and, importantly, holds that 
industrial conflict is both normal and to be expected. A common set of ideas and 
beliefs in the system will provide its sustenance even though the ideologies and 
participants may differ in theory and in practice. Systems theory, I concluded could 
also accommodate without contradiction a unitary approach, on the understanding that 
a unitary ideology will have consequences if it is put into practice by opting out of the 
system. This was illustrated later in the thesis with reference to some of the 
proximate and contingent parties in the case studies.
In the overview of collective bargaining theory, the framework put forward by Begin 
and Beal was considered somewhat rigid, at least for Australian analysis. The four 
sub-processes outlined in Walton and McKersie's model proved useful, particularly 
the attitudinal structuring sub-process which defines the quality and type of 
relationship between labour and management; and encompasses the efforts, intended 
and unintended, by parties to shape their opponents’ behaviour. Because much of the
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analysis in the thesis was concerned with the personalities involved, this sub­
process took on particular relevance. The revised theoretical framework of Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie sought to address some of the anomalies they perceived to occur in 
industrial relations theory and practice. Their model, incorporating the roles of the 
environment, values, business strategies, institutional structures and history in the 
analysis of industrial relations processes and outcomes seemed to be moving closer to 
an appropriate framework for analysing my data. An adaption of Kochan et al's model 
by Niland and Spooner for analysing industrial relations reform in Australia 
provided further inspiration.
The Weekly Reports and their efficacy as a source of data was also included in Chapter 
One. Problems with their use were identified by a number of industrial relations 
analysts including Coolican, Niland and Hay. Some doubts were also recorded by 
officers from the collecting agency (DEIR) itself. Nevertheless, there seemed to be 
general agreement that the Weekly Reports provide the most fertile source of data 
that exists. This is a view with which I concur (along with ABS) notwithstanding the 
problems.
A brief outline of the development of labour law in the US and UK was provided in the 
final part of Chapter One. The British legal tradition has had enduring influence on 
the evolvement of labour law in Australia. This has been the case despite the 
existence of a body of industrial relations law and a centralised wage-fixing system 
in Australia that does not exist in the UK. Parallels may be seen between the 
legislation enacted by the Thatcher Government and that of Joh Bjelke-Peterson's 
National Party Government in Queensland. Furthermore, the present federal 
opposition (the Liberal/National Parties) propose similar legislation in their joint 
party platform. Nor does the absence of a centralised industrial relations system in 
the US preclude parallels. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act 1947 featured 
prohibition of secondary boycotts. Efforts to repeal this Act have been as 
unsuccessful as attempts to repeal the secondary boycott provisions in the TPA, the 
Australian counterpart. All three countries engage in collective bargaining, and it 
seems that, while the system is important, it does not necessarily prescribe the legal 
environment. Clearly, in Australia the existence of a body of law which regulates the 
practice, and protects the participants in industrial relations is a fundamental 
deviation from the other two countries. Nevertheless, the pursuit of demands 
through collective direct action in Australia is in many ways subject to the same 
restraints that apply in the non-centralised systems operating in the US and UK.
Attitudes to industrial conflict were also considered. I argued that there are two
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basic attitudes towards industrial conflict - that it is a 'bad thing' or it is 'not a bad 
thing'. The attitude that industrial conflict is a 'bad thing' was considered from a 
number of perspectives, namely that: it is "rude and barbarous"; it is an attack on 
managerial prerogative; and it is, in some forms (strikes, secondary boycotts and on 
occasion picketing), illegal. Attitudes in which the notion that conflict is 'not a bad 
thing' were implicit, held that: it is part of the bargaining process; it is located in 
the social and political structure; it is inevitable but subject to regulation and 
institutionalisation; and it is part of the nature of the employer/employee 
relationship. While these do not present a comprehensive range of attitudes towards 
industrial conflict, they do serve to illustrate the division between two broad 
categories of thought. I refer back to the Latham quotation in the Introduction, 
critical of arguments that "the object of industrial legislation should be to promote 
peace in industry". He surmised that, "Industrial peace, if regarded merely as the 
absence of strikes and lockouts, is but accidental and precarious".1 There is also 
some irony perhaps in the quotation given that Latham was a conservative Attorney- 
General and was being quoted by Hawke (in his days as President of the ACTU) clearly 
with approval. Hawke's later actions and postulations tend to place some doubt on his 
continuing belief in the Latham perspective.
In the final section, on application of the law, I indicated some of the historical 
references on industrial disputes that were used, particularly those where law was 
featured. Contemporary sources for the research period were also outlined, 
including books, journals, trade union and employer material and newspapers. It 
was pointed out that only a small percentage of labour law research is concerned with 
industrial relations conflict, with the greatest concentration being on structures and 
systems. It was explained that, personal interviews were conducted where possible.
In Chapter Two, the analytical framework I devised for analysing patterns in 
industrial conflict in Australia was explained. Drawing from much of the theoretical 
literature already in existence on industrial relations systems and collective 
bargaining theory, a simple model was constructed which focussed on the conflict 
elements in industrial relations. It consisted of six parts: background, the climate, 
the legal environment, proximate parties, contingent parties and dispute resolution. 
All of the components in the thesis fit somewhere into this framework. Although it is 
structured in its presentation, the analysis takes up those elements in the framework 
which were of most relevance to the topic under discussion and there was no attempt 
to apply equal weight to them. For example, while the background to each dispute has 
been outlined, the prevailing political and industrial climate is discussed more
1 J Latham, quoted by RJL Hawke, op.cit., p.50.
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generally in earlier chapters. Analysis of the levels, causes and forms of collective 
direct action which provide both background and statistical evidence of the industrial 
climate, were included separately.
In Chapter Three the methodology was explained. The first part discussed the data 
analysis: the aims, methodology, limitations, definitions, recording of disputes and 
the forms. It also included a brief discussion of the Hancock Report in respect of the 
data. The use of bans data was placed in context vis a vis other forms of industrial 
action. The relationship between strikes and bans over the survey period has 
provided a central focus to my analysis both of the data and of the industrial climate.
I was once asked whether bans were a feature of nineteenth century conflict. While 
unable to answer that question, I believe that it raises a significant point. Legislation 
in Britain against workingmen originated in 1351.2 It seems reasonable to assume 
that some form of dissent was being expressed in order for there to be a legal and 
political response. Further legislation has continued to be enacted until the present 
day. There are a number of reasons why this has occurred, such as increased worker 
militancy; recognition of certain rights and obligations on the part of both employers 
and employees; and changes in industrial relations systems. Another reason is 
founded on Hyman's premise that "...the very structure of work in industry generates 
conflict...the strike is only its manifest form of expression"^ The very nature of 
the relationship between employers and employees produces conflict, or at the very 
least dissent. The need to continually alter laws and introduce new ones represents a 
political response to the fact that conflict is both changing in form and unavoidable. 
In other words, given a situation in which one form of dissent is outlawed, another 
way of expressing dissent will appear. The making of a law does not remove the cause 
of a problem, it merely prescribes in what way actors in the relationship may 
respond to it. Bans in this context can be seen as the creative result of a need to 
combat anti-strike legislation.
As I have also argued, bans are an efficacious form of industrial action for other 
reasons. Keith Marks was not surprised by the increase in bans during the 1980s. 
Bans, he said, did not cost a day's pay and for the most part avoided the industrial 
tribunals. He also made the point that bans were extremely difficult to include in
awards and also difficult to enforce.2 34 Other ways in which conflict may be expressed
*
were also suggested, such as go-slows, co-ordinated acts of industrial sabotage, and
2 Statute of Labourers, 1351
3 Hyman, op.cit., p.59
4 K. Marks, Interview, 8.11.89.
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absenteeism. The latter usually involves an individual rather than a collective 
response to discontent. Other variations which were also mentioned were the co­
ordinated campaign of sick leave by Queensland police compounded by the excessive 
issue of parking tickets to overload the accounting department. While all these 
alternative forms of direct and indirect action may be extremely effective, no 
statistical measurement of their incidence is possible. Measurement of strikes and, 
in a limited way, of bans is possible because they are recorded as industrial action.
The second part of Chapter Three described the aims, methodology, and interviews 
undertaken in respect of the legal framework. Included also was a brief discussion on 
some of the problems encountered in gaining access to some of the parties.
BACKGROUND
Industrial conflict does not occur in a vacuum - it has both history and context. A 
strike, for example, will take place in the context of the organisation in which it is 
happening and in the wider political and industrial contexts. These are largely 
created by historical factors. In the case of a single dispute, the organisational factor 
may have a history of only five minutes, but in the wider context, the political and 
industrial climates will consist of a combination of historical and contemporary 
influences. Both the organisational and the wider contexts have been considered in 
this thesis. The part that background plays in the organisational context were 
demonstrated in the case studies in the final three chapters; the wider political and 
industrial contexts were discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine; while Chapters Four 
to Seven provide an empirical overview based on the analysis of some nine thousand 
industrial disputes. I will turn to the empirical analysis first.
Data analysis
I have argued in Chapter Four that there are good reasons for including bans as well 
as strikes in dispute analysis. One dispute, which occurred during 1986 and lasted 
for several months, demonstrates the effectiveness of long-term bans and their 
relevance to dispute analysis. In August 1986, the Plumbers and Gasfitters Union 
(PGEU) began a campaign of bans on large building projects in New South Wales and 
Victoria in support of claims for a $70-a-week pay rise, a 36-hour week and a 
27.5 per cent annual leave loading. Although only a relatively small number of 
workers was involved, the bans which covered the installation of fire sprinklers and 
toilets had a severe effect. Members of other construction industry unions would not 
work because PGEU members also refused to install temporary toilets on site.5
5 Australian Financial Review, 20 .2.87.
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In February 1987, seven companies, all members of the MBA lodged Federal Court 
applications under Section 45D of the TPA. In March 1987, the PGEU was ordered by 
a Federal Court judge to lift all bans. The union did not immediately comply and faced 
the possibility of contempt of court charges which could have resulted in heavy fines 
as well as the gaoling of key officials. The campaign was characterised by the small 
number of workers involved, and its maximum impact on the employers. The cost to 
the building industry of the PGEU bans was estimated to be $380,000 per week.6
While the plumbers' dispute was longer and more costly than is perhaps usual, it 
would be a mistake to regard it as aberrational. That a dispute existed is beyond 
question. That the bans were effective in terms of impact and importance to 
employers is demonstrated by the legal measures that were taken to have them lifted.
As the data included in Chapters Four, Five and Six has already been summarised in 
Chapter Seven, I will not repeat the exercise in detail here. The findings in Chapter 
Four revealed the relationship of strikes and bans by state and industry. With the 
exception of South Australia, the Northern Territory and ACT, the incidence of bans 
increased from 1984 onwards, in most states to unprecedented levels. As the 
deviations in the Northern Territory and ACT are understandable (given that bans 
were the preferred form of industrial action in most years of the survey) a national 
trend was thus revealed.
A national decline in the number of strikes over Pay, Allowances and Log of Claims 
(in aggregation) after 1981-82 was revealed in the first part of Chapter Five. The 
overall decline in strikes in most states during this period would explain this result. 
However, the findings also showed that the three issues also accounted for a smaller 
percentage of overall disputation in all states. When the issues were disaggregated a 
more subtle picture emerged in which a decline in strikes over Pay and Log of Claims 
was in contrast to the incidence of strikes over Allowances, which remained constant 
and in some states increased both in numbers and as a percentage of disputation.
In Chapter Six which looked at the major issues in each state, a change from 1982 
onwards was also evident. This of course would be expected given that Pay as a major 
issue had ceased to be pre-eminent. The emergence of issues concerned with security 
of employment was marked in most states between 1983-87.
Further analysis of the data, which was not presented in any detail, indicated that 
there were significant differences between the patterns of industrial activity in the
6 Sydney Morning Heralds 18.3 .87.
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various industries with the result that the larger industries numerically dominated 
the findings. As a consequence, most state trends tend to be the determined by 
Manufacturing while trends in strike and ban activities in other industries are 
overlooked because of their lower numbers. In the same way, trends which are 
suggested by composite state figures will not disclose those industries which do not 
conform to the state trends. Likewise, where the issues were concerned, 
Manufacturing tended to dominate the overall state results, although all industries in 
every state corresponded closely with the major state issues in Chapter Six.
A core set of issues was identified which included Pay, Allowances, Job Maintenance, 
Union, Demarcation, Managerial Policy, Conditions and Log of Claims. I also 
extricated many of the issues which are normally placed in Managerial Policy. The 
results indicate that even when issues like Dismissals are omitted, Managerial 
Policy remains a major issue. R R Nelson argues:
How workers feel about their job, about fellow workers, about 
management, and about the organization, may be more important in 
influencing productivity than is the particular way they are instructed to do 
their work, the formal organization structure, or even financial 
incentives.......7
As the 'right to manage' principle becomes a fixed attitude amongst an increasing 
number of employers, it is easy to see why disputation over Managerial Policy has 
remained prominent. To some extent there has probably been some balance between 
those employers who have adopted radical attitudes towards managerial prerogative 
and those who have instigated programmes of industrial democracy. Unfortunately, 
for the purposes of this analysis, I was unable to look in any detail at the issues 
which were consigned to Managerial Policy. Such an exercise would be useful in 
determining any trends which have occurred as a result of these changes.
Another major set of issues which were identified were those concerned with 
employment security. They included Job Maintenance, Contract Labour, 
Classifications and in some instances, Manning issues.
The case studies
All three disputes had a background of periods of conflict and tenuous peace. Since 
1978, Queensland's electricity industry had undergone eleven major strikes 
involving the cut of power supplies. Twice, the Government had declared a state of 
emergency due to strikes. Unions had been threatened with deregistration and fines.
^ R. R. Nelson, 'research on productivity growth and productivity difference: dead ends and 
new departures', in Journal of Economic Literature, 19, 1981, p.1036.
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With the introduction of rationalisation in 1977, contract labour became an 
increasingly contentious issue. For the unions, job security and safety were involved 
(and the principle of unionism no doubt), while for SEQEB and the Government, 
managerial pregative and industry rationalisation were paramount. Another feature 
that had bearing on the subsequent dispute was the entrenched view held by the ETU 
based on previous experience, that it could not lose. That experience, however, was a 
prime motivation in the Government's intransigent position. The dispute was not 
just about sorting out a contract labour problem. Rather, it was to do with 
challenging and diluting trade union power, and to some extent, the role of the 
industrial tribunals.
The background to the Mudginberri dispute had its foundations in the adoption of a 
tally system for the meat industry and the making of awards for industry-wide 
coverage. Central to the dispute was the introduction of a contract system whereby 
abattoir operators were not the employers of the process workers. Instead, the 
labour force was provided by a contractor who was responsible for the payment of 
workers. This system made small, isolated abattoirs like Mudginberri competitive. 
One of the problem for the AMI EU was that the wage agreements undermined award 
conditions in that they did not contain entitlements such as workers compensation, 
weekend penalty rates and waiting time. The crunch came when an agreement was 
reached between Jay Pendarvis, the proprietor and managing director of 
Mudginberri in which the employees did not nominate the union as its representative. 
This set the scene for the events which followed.
At Robe River, a long history of industrial action and restrictive work practices 
provided the background to the dispute. The controlling interest in RRIA by Peko- 
Wallsend in 1985 was followed by a prediction during 1986 that a large reduction in 
Japanese steel production would have severe consequences for Pilbara producers. 
Charles Copeman, Peko's chief executive insisted that issues of overstaffing, the 
number of restrictive work practices and union involvement in management 
decisions needed to be addressed. A new management was put in place to oversee the 
required changes. All of the ensuing conflict flowed on from this point. This dispute, 
unlike the other two, involved first a lockout and then a strike. The relationship 
between the union, Pilbara management and Charles Copeman were critical in the 
conflict which ensued, as was the physical isolation of the workers involved.
Needless to say an understanding of all three disputes would not be complete without 
some knowledge of their background, the relationships between the proximate parties 
and the political and industrial environment in which they occurred.
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THE POLITICAL CLIMATE
Following a brief background on the Whitlam and Fraser periods, the Prices and 
Incomes Accord was discussed in Chapter Eight. From 1983 onwards, this agreement 
provided the basis for, not only the conduct of industrial relations on a policy level, 
but also for the interaction between all parties, both proximate and contingent in the 
industrial relations arena. Given the scope of the document and its subsequent 
modifications, it is not surprising that it has had profound implications on the 
political and industrial climate. There has been a decline in industrial disputes and a 
concomitant reduction in pay demands. Real wages have been contained to an extent 
which was hitherto regarded as beyond attainment. But this has occurred against a 
background of a range of anti-union strategies adopted by state governments, private 
companies and employer bodies. Some of these were illustrated in the case studies. 
The range of strategies were depicted in the 1985 strategy document Anti-Union 
Attack and they are itemised in Chapter Eight. Significantly, many of the concerns 
raised in the ACTU document were reflected in my data on causes and in analysis of 
the impact of common law and civil actions against trade unions and their members.
I have argued that the extent to which the Accord is viewed as a responsible, 
progressive and economically viable concept depends on the degree to which it is held 
accountable for the positive achievements of the Labor Government. Another 
perspective is that the Accord is also viewed in sceptical quarters as being a 'noose 
around the trade union movement's neck'. One of the manifestations of this may be 
seen in the proportionate increase in disputes over Allowances as an Accord 
avoidance. A further manifestation may be construed by the overall increase in bans 
as a form of direct collective action during the Accord period. Yet another 
perspective is added by the New Right in that the Accord represents a coalition 
between government and labour which creates an imbalance in policy-making in 
favour of the ACTU.
At the time of writing, the pilots’ dispute was in progress. The pilots' dispute was 
not a strike (as it is publicly called, although not, I note, by the informed media). 
Rather, the pilots' dispute began with bans placed on the airlines, restricting flying 
time to between 9 am and 5 pm. The dispute demonstrated the crucial point that the 
industrial relations system is only as good as its participants’ commitment to it. The 
pilots' decision to step out of the system was a threat, not only to the wage-fixing 
principles agreed to under the Accord, but also to the more fundamental agreement 
that industrial relations in Australia be regulated in a particular way. Agreement is 
fundamental because, unless the parties register themselves and conduct their 
industrial relations business under the umbrella of the system, there is no system.
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If the pilots had been successful in opting out of the system, that is in negotiating 
directly with their employers and receiving wage rises outside the national wage­
fixing principles, it would have served as an example to other unions, especially 
those which, like the AFAP believed that their members had lost relativities as a 
result of National Wage Case decisions over the Accord years.
One of the aspects of change which was looked at was the influence of the New Right, 
its ideology and adherents. It is easy to dismiss the New Right as extremist. Indeed, I 
have attempted to demonstrate in Chapter Seven some of the more irrational and 
simplistic arguments that have emanated from some of the most prominent members.
I do not however, dismiss them. Some of the ideas which they have promoted have 
become widely accepted to the point where they are no longer attributed to the New 
Right. In particular, the notion that enterprise-based unions are the most acceptable 
form of unionism has gained ground.8 While the Labor Government and ACTU do not 
endorse the radical changes called for by members of the New Right, there has 
undoubtedly been some movement in that direction. Although, Australia would not 
accept enterprise unions on the Japanese lines, the Treasurer, Paul Keating has 
predicted that the union movement was working towards fewer unions with a single 
bargaining unit for each enterprise. This represents a major change from the 
present situation.9
It will be recalled that in the first week of the pilots' dispute, Prime Minister 
Hawke, himself a former ACTU president, advocated the use of common law writs 
against the pilots. His later backdown does not negate the extraordinary situation 
whereby a Labor Prime Minister, particularly one with Hawke's background, adopts 
an attitude which is anathema to Labor/labour principles. Helping the airlines out 
with military planes is not exactly traditional Labor either. Even so, these are just 
symptoms of a much greater change which has taken place.
As I have suggested at various points in this thesis, the much-vaunted Accord has 
been widely attributed as the mainstay of Government policy. Both the ACTU and 
Government hold the Accord solely responsible for the decline in industrial 
disputation during the period. I have maintained that in addition to the Accord, other 
factors have contributed to the downward trend. As my data indicated (along with that 
of the ABS) the decline in strikes was already evident prior to Hawke's election in 
1983. Whether this trend would have continued is beyond prediction, but given the
8 See for example, Business Council of Australia, Enterprise-based Bargaining Units A 
Better Way Of Working, Melbourne, July 1989.
9 The Sunday HeraldL 19.11.89.
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unemployment situation there is some reason to believe that this may have been the 
case. In any case, I would argue that the overall increase in bans provided an 
alternative form of industrial action that was antidotal to the decline in strikes. The 
role of the ACTU cannot be underestimated either. Although it has continued to 
promote trade union principles, the Accord has not infrequently placed the 
organisation in a crisis of identity. On the one hand, the ACTU continues to represent 
the interests of its members, while on the other, it remains firmly committed to 
supporting the Labor Government's economic policies, despite claims that working 
people bear the greatest costs of these policies. One example of the ACTU's dilemma 
was demonstrated in the case study of the SEQEB dispute, where, although the Federal 
Government was against the employer, there was a tension between the ACTU and 
Government over what action should be taken. Ultimately, the ACTU followed the 
Federal Government's direction after initially participating in a campaign of direct 
industrial action.
The case studies
In presenting the case studies there were some features which have relevance to the 
political climate which were not discussed and should be noted. The first, and by no 
means unimportant omission, has been the level of debate over the disputes in the 
federal sphere. My depiction of the three disputes has concentrated on the arena in 
which they have unfolded and the actions which have had a direct affect on the 
outcomes. When the role of the Federal Government was a factor in the handling of a 
dispute, it has been noted; otherwise I have steered clear of federal politics. To do 
otherwise would have enlarged the case studies considerably. As a result, the attitude 
of the Federal Opposition has been largely ignored. The Liberal/National Party 
Coalition was firmly behind the employers in all three disputes and publicly stated 
their support. One example from the Robe River dispute provides some indication of 
their position: When Peko began legal action against the striking workers during 
stage II, the then Opposition spokesman on Industrial Relations, Neil Brown stated 
that the Opposition fully supported Peko's legal action against the unions. He 
maintained that every person and company that suffered loss and damage as a result 
of illegal actions was entitled to sue. From the Opposition's viewpoint, the use of 
common law action showed how industrial tribunals had failed to bring unruly trade 
unions under control.10 Brown's statement speaks for itself. However one 
comment needs to be made in relation to his suggestion that Peko had suffered losses 
as the result of "illegal actions" on the part of Robe River workers. At the time he 
said this, the workers had not been ordered back to work by the WAIC so the
10 Canberra Times  ^ 7. 1.87.
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assertion that the tribunal had failed to bring "unruly trade unions under control" 
was clearly wrong in the context of the industrial relations system. Brown was 
attributing lawlessness to trade unions, in this context without foundation, in much 
the same way that Copeman, for example, said industrial tribunals were an affront to 
natural justice. The statement is taken unquestioningly as one of fact. As such, he 
endorsed the belief that trade unions are a power* unto themselves, a notion that has 
been a chief source of propaganda during the disputes.
If on the other hand he was suggesting that strikes are unlawful actions at common 
law, regardless of the orders or recommendations of industrial tribunals, he was 
raising a completely different question. Sturt Glacken, an aide to Brown believes 
that this was the case. He pointed out that, as a former industrial relations lawyer, 
Brown was well aware of the common law on conspiracy and breach of employment 
contract.11 Just about any strike in this view would be considered an illegal 
activity which entitled an employer to seek redress at common law. The accusation of 
lawlessness in this case becomes a statement of fact. Without seeking to trivialise 
the Opposition’s policies, it is my belief that support for the employers in all three 
disputes encompassed both attitudes outlined above. The two approaches outlined 
above are implicit in the Liberal/National Party policy. Under the section 'Common 
Law', the policy says: "We will encourage the use of the common law in the civil 
courts in appropriate cases as a means of obtaining redress for unjustified industrial 
action".12 In the following section headed 'Compliance with Commission Decisions' 
which deals with effective sanctions for non-compliance with the Commission's 
decisions and orders, the policy states: "In addition, any person who suffers loss or 
damage as a result of industrial action in breach of a direction would be able to sue 
the responsible organisation for damages in the Federal Court".13
The second omission concerns the role of the media. While I have used newspapers 
very extensively for information on all three disputes, the part played by the media 
in influencing public opinion has been, for the most part, avoided. It is an 
unfortunate omission because the role of the media needs to be subjected to critical 
analysis, particularly in Queensland where the print media is de-centralised and has 
strong links with the National Party. Again, the size of the case studies would have 
reached impractical proportions had the media been included.
11 Sturt Glacken, Interview, 7.3.90.
12 Liberal/National Party, Industrial Relations Policy, 29.6.88., p.7. 
13 Ibid., p.8.
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THE INDUSTRIAL CLIMATE 
Job Maintenance
In Chapter Nine the subject of Job Maintenance came under scrutiny. Although the 
discussion was not placed in the context of the. Accord, its influence could not be 
missed. While the ACTU does not endorse job losses, award restructuring effectively 
accepts that they must and will occur if the Accord's objectives are to be achieved. 
The selected examples used in the section on Job Maintenance demonstrated that both 
the Federal and state governments (of whatever political colour) have shown 
determination in implementing rationalisation programmes, despite quite intense 
opposition from employees. It appears (on admittedly insufficient evidence) that 
greater conflict is likely to occur when the government concerned is Labor.
It would also appear that award restructuring has met with a greater degree of co­
operation in the private sector than in the public sector. Part of the reason for that 
may well be the opportunities available in the private sector for 'trade-offs'. For 
example, while complying with wage-fixing principles, some unions have 
successfully negotiated allowances or bonus payments outside the centralised wage 
fixing process. One example of this was provided by the Miners' Federation whose 
members have obtained increases in bonus payments during the Accord period that 
are now at least equivalent to their base wage. Their take-home pay, according to a 
Federation officer, has increased during the Accord period at a very high rate J 4 
While miners (for reasons which I will not go into here) are frequently regarded as 
a "special case", the results from my data indicates that Allowances have been 
responsible for a significant proportion of disputation in other industries, 
particularly Construction and Transport and Storage. It would be naive to assume 
that at least some of those disputes were not successful, bearing in mind that on many 
occasions the disputes were over increases to existing allowances.
There are some grounds therefore on which to base at least a prima facie conclusion 
that public sector employees who are unable to negotiate through collective 
bargaining for allowances or bonus payments, are bearing the brunt of the Accord.15 
Marks was not surprised by my findings on allowances. He agreed that they were
14 Allowances as a component in the wage package is firmly entrenched. One aspect is that 
some allowances are paid in duplicate. For example, a 'disability allowance' is paid to all 
miners and when an actual disability occurs, then a double allowance is paid. The same 
applies to the \vet allowance' and others. M. Lee, Interview, 30.10.89.
15 Some public sector employees in blue-collar trades, for example electricians do receive 
allowances, however they are not obtained through collective bargaining but as part of 
award negotiations,
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probably negotiated independently of the award structure as an Accord avoidance. In 
any case, this may provide part of the reason why there has been an increase in 
public sector union membership during a period of proportional decline in the 
private sector.16
Chapter Nine looked also at the increase in civil and common law legal actions during 
the 1980s. The Dollar Sweets case was briefly outlined because it was, and remains, 
a landmark case; partly because of the damages payout by the union but more 
importantly, because it became an example to employers of the remedies at law 
which are available to them. Justice Brooking's decision in the pilots' dispute was 
also examined. Once again, this landmark decision has enormous implications for the 
trade union movement. A brief outline was also included on the common law and 
legislative environment in respect to industrial relations.
T H E  LE G A L E N V IR O N M E N T
A feature of change which I have sought to demonstrate has been the impact of civil 
and common law actions against unions. As I have said earlier, it is not possible to 
quantify how great the impact has been. Certainly, some of the unions that I spoke to 
agreed that they are now much more cautious about taking industrial action. That the 
threat of legal action has deterred, or cut short some industrial action is, I believe, 
an inevitable consequence of the prevailing political, legal and industrial climate. 
Examples were given of strikes brought to an end by the threat of common law action. 
It was not suggested that the issue of common laws writs has become an everyday 
practice. Rather, that they have come to be regarded as a measure which employers, 
should they choose to use it, can do so with some expectation of success. The Brooking 
judgement confirmed this although the common law in relation to breach of contract, 
intimidation and conspiracy does not relate only to trade unions. Its importance lies 
in the reaffirmation that trade unions are not immune from tort actions.
The consequences for the AFAP following the Brooking judgement have been 
considerable. In addition to the prospect of huge damages payouts, they must also 
contend with the possibility of being a union without a membership employed in the 
industry. For the AFAP, the overall cost of attempting to opt out of the industrial 
relations system and conduct pay negotiations on an enterprise basis, have been 
disastrous.
16 See D.W. Rawson, Public Sector Relations in Australia^ unpublished work-in progress 
paper, Canberra, 28.4.87. and D.W. Rawson, What People thought about unions in January 
1990: A very brief background paper, unpublished work-in-progress paper, Canberra, 
2 7 .3 .90 .
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I also raised in Chapter Nine the actions of the Prime Minister, Bob Hawke during the 
dispute. His adamance that the AFAP should not succeed was stated at the very 
beginning of the dispute and constantly re-stated thereafter. His endorsement of the 
issue of common law writs during the first week represented a departure from both 
labour and Labor Party principles. Paradoxically, his position was also in direct 
conflict with the principles set down in the Accord agreement while his justification 
was in upholding the Accord's wage-fixing principles.
The case studies
As the three case studies showed, the law was a vital element in each dispute. During 
SEQEB, new legislation was enacted by the State Government; at Mudginberri, 
section 45D of the TPA was taken to its limits; in the case of Robe River, the common 
law was utilised more than once in an attempt to defeat the workers. Each of these 
cases in its own way was portentous. In all, the role of the industrial relations 
system was challenged as the most efficient means of dealing with industrial 
disputation.
I have already provided discrete r6sumes of the legal proceedings which took place 
and there is no need to enlarge on them further. What is of interest in summary, is 
the development from one dispute to another. Taking the 'right to manage' as the first 
principle, the notion that trade unions have too much power was a prime motivation 
when Sir Joh engaged the ETU in a protracted dispute. The subjugation of the unions 
to the principle formed the basis of the Queensland Government's legislation. An 
essential ingredient was the depletion of the role of the industrial tribunals as a 
factor in dealing with recalcitrant unions. They retained their functions, but the 
immediate aims of the employer were better served through the normal courts. 
Mudginberri started while the SEQEB dispute was still active. By the time the AMI EU 
placed the picket line on the road to the property in May 1985, the Queensland 
Government had already demonstrated the efficacy of using courts outside the 
industrial system to curb industrial action. In addition, Sir Joh was hailing the 
agreement obtained by Mudginberri as a legislative model for Queensland. He also 
provided financial backing to Jay Pendarvis along with the conservative Northern 
Territory Government, the Westpac Banking Corporation and the NFF. The impetus 
created by the SEQEB dispute in threatening damages against unions was taken up by 
Pendarvis, for whom proceedings under Section 45D of the TPA was the logical step 
to take. SEQEB provided Mudginberri with an example of how union power can be 
defeated when the industrial tribunals are dispensed with as the sole arbiter of 
industrial disputes. Mudginberri went one step further than SEQEB by instituting 
legal proceedings against the union before even seeking orders from the ACAC. The
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question of whether the union would have obeyed an order is unanswerable.
Robe River followed on from, not only SEQEB and Mudginberri, but Dollar Sweets as 
well. Damages awarded against unions through civil actions had gained ground. (In 
the case of Dollar Sweets, the damages were settled out of court, no doubt because the 
union anticipated a greater payout from the court'-s decision.) When Peko-Wallsend 
decided to take up the cause by temporarily opting out of the industrial relations 
system, the legal actions became a cause cäldbre. Even when Peko co-operated with 
the WAIC the issue of the writs remained fundamental to their industrial policy. 
This was the case in both Stage II and later with the tugboat operators. The belief 
that courts outside the system would place a stranglehold on union power was 
axiomatic.
Two aspects of the legal actions taken by the company bear mentioning here. The 
first relates to the issue of writs against individual employees rather than unions or 
union officials. This had worked very effectively in Queensland. The occasion when 
RRIA took this course of action was against the tugboat operators in April 1988. 
(They had served writs on individuals in the 1987 strike in addition to union 
officials) In this instance, unlike the earlier ones or the SEQEB writs, the purpose 
was not to obtain a return to work. Their sole purpose was to sue the individual 
tugboat operators for their 48 hour strike and receive damages for lost income. The 
second aspect relates directly to the first. Whereas Mudginberri had taken legal 
action without seeking a remedy from the ACAC, RRIA went one step further and 
served writs on the tugboat operators after they had returned to work on an order 
from the Commission. In doing so, the company was clearly indicating that obedience 
to the industrial tribunals was not a factor that merited any favour in its 
relationship with the workforce. While during the SEQEB dispute it was within the 
Government's capacity to change the system, at Mudginberri the system was by­
passed and at Robe River the system was ignored.
From the standpoint of the unions involved, SEQEB and Mudginberri are notable for 
their failures. As the case studies have shown, there were reasons unique to both 
disputes. My concern here is with those activities which gave rise to defeat in both 
disputes. The first relates to their departure from the industrial relations system. 
When the ETU workers refused to obey the orders of the WAIC and return to work, 
they provided the opportunity for the State Government to proceed through the 
normal courts. Likewise at Mudginberri, the AMIEU's refusal to accept the award 
handed down by the Commission led to its prosecution in the civil courts under the 
TPA. Although in both cases the unions continued to pursue their aims through the
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industrial tribunals (in the case of SEQEB by applying for a federal award), their 
other activities left them open to civil proceedings which were integral to their 
ultimate defeat. The second reason which they held in common was their 
intransigence. With both, strong principles were involved. These appear to have 
blinded the unions to the consequences of their actions and to the wider ramifications 
their defeat would have for the entire trade union movement. There is surely a 
psychological factor involved here that forbids a backdown in the face of a formidable 
opposition and almost certain defeat. In both cases, there must have been a time 
when a strategic withdrawal was the most practical move in terms of costs (financial 
and human) and outcomes. That neither union appears to have considered a 
withdrawal at any stage is an indication of their commitment to winning at any cost.
By the time the Robe River dispute was underway, Dollar Sweets had been added to 
SEQEB and Mudginberri as examples of the problems that can arise when unions 
forgo the protection offered by the industrial relations system. The lessons learnt 
from these three disputes were applied by unions during the Robe River dispute. 
Despite provocation from the company, which itself disobeyed orders from the WAIC 
the unions remained firmly committed to seeking remedies through the industrial 
relations system. Legal proceedings undertaken by the company in the 'real courts' 
became a bargaining issue during the 1987 strike. Ultimately, the company 
withdrew the writs and itself returned to the system.
When, after a marathon sitting, the Commission finally handed down an award in 
September 1989, it was claimed as a victory by the unions. It could also be seen as a 
reward for abiding with the system in the face of company provocation to do 
otherwise. But if that was the case, some account must be taken of the costs involved. 
The workforce was reduced, contract labour had become a company policy and living 
conditions for unionists were subject to stringent requirements. Both the mining and 
port communities remained divided with demarcation lines drawn between unionists, 
non-unionists and staff labour. Finally, the company's attitude towards the 
industrial relations system left little doubt that any action taken by workers would 
be met, not by an appeal to the relevant commission, but by recourse to the common 
law.
One interesting development has been the change in attitude of at least one union. The 
secondary boycott provisions of the TPA are particularly distasteful to most unions. 
There has been a recent case where a union, the FIA undertook proceedings against 
another union, the BWIU, using section 45D. It has been described as an
"unprecedented and embarrassing" dispute.17 I would not like to suggest that this 
case presages a spate of similar actions in the future, but, like Hawke's remarks to 
the airlines, it would have been inconceivable in 1983.
PROXIMATE PARTIES
There are occasions when industrial action occurs for reasons that are outside the 
employer/employee relationship. Examples of such instances are ACTU led political 
strikes called in protest at government policy; solidarity actions which are in 
support of workers in other workplaces; and demarcation disputes between unions. 
For the most part though, industrial disputation is the result of a seemingly 
irreconcilable difference between the rank and file at the workplace and the 
employer. It is at the point where the rank and file, usually represented by their 
union(s) and the employer cannot reach agreement that direct action may occur. 
Their relationship past and present will be a strong determinant in whether this 
happens as will the resolve of the parties to either enter into or avoid conflict. Other 
factors which enter into the picture are the adequacy of dispute settling procedures 
and the commitment of the parties to reach a solution at the enterprise level. The 
economic strength of the enterprise (or industry) to withstand losses in productivity 
may also be a factor, particularly when permanent job losses may result from strike 
action. As I have argued elsewhere, an increase in bans as an alternative to strike 
action is in part, a reflection of concern over job security. The industrial strength of 
the union(s) involved will also figure at the point where a decision is either taken or 
not taken to engage in direct industrial action.
For the proximate parties to a dispute, there is at least one issue upon which they 
have been unable to reach agreement. It will usually be that issue which will give the 
dispute meaning for them. In the case of the pilots' dispute, the primary issue was a 
wage claim in excess of the amount set down in the wage-fixing principles. For the 
airlines, their commitment to the wage-fixing principles was grounded in the 
economic necessity of wage restraint throughout the industry. However, other 
secondary issues are frequently involved. In the case of the pilots' dispute it was 
whether the pilots were entitled to enter into negotiations at the enterprise level, 
while in other disputes, the principle of managerial prerogative may be the 
secondary, but guiding factor.
The case studies
Characteristic of all three disputes in the case studies was a pronounced crusading
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17 The Australian, 30 .5 .89 .
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element on the part of the employers and their supporters. Paramount was the 
principle of management's 'right to manage'. According to Roy Kriegler, Australian 
managers have a deep-seated fear of:
losing prerogatives in decision-making, together with doubts that workers 
can make worthwhile and constructive contributions, and concern that 
giving workers a voice will strengthen *the union’s bargaining position.
Most Australian managers feel much safer operating as the traditional 
supervisor within a hierarchial organisational structure.-j g
This assessment appears to be true for the three disputes in question, although some 
reservations have to be drawn in relation to Mudginberri, where the manager's 
prerogative was not in question from his own workforce. For the purposes of this 
discussion, Kriegler does not go far enough. When considering SEQEB, Mudginberri 
and Robe River, it is necessary to look at the lengths to which employers are 
prepared to go in order to achieve those ends.
An underlying assumption of all three employers was that the industrial relations 
system was inadequate to their managerial and industrial requirements. With 
SEQEB, the Government decided that the state industrial tribunal was no longer 
capable of handling the dispute. A new set of laws was enacted to complement those 
existing, with the intention of gaining absolute control over the workforce. With 
Mudginberri, the Federal and High Courts became the focus for legal activity even 
though the ACAC continued its involvement. With Robe River, the company stepped 
outside the industrial relations system rather than comply with orders which 
undermined its managerial prerogative. Common to all three was a direct challenge 
to the prevailing industrial relations system.
All three disputes involved future or active adherents of the New Right. SEQEB's 
Wayne Gilbert was a foundation member of the H R Nicholls Society, and Sir Joh 
Bjelke-Peterson, while not a member, was strongly supported then and later by 
sections of the New Right; Paul Houlihan, the NFF industrial director was also a 
foundation member of the Nicholls Society. In addition, Ian McLachlan’s reputation 
amongst the New Right is heroic; Peko-Wallsend's Charles Copeman is also 
associated with the New Right in ideology and personal associations, one of whom is 
Peter Costello who was a lawyer for Dollar Sweets and an adviser to Copeman during 
the Robe River dispute. I cannot account for the degree of coincidence that marks the 
careers of some of these individuals, but it is worth noting that Ian McLachlan, 
Charles Copeman and Peter Costello are all candidates for the Liberal Party in the
18 R. Kriegler, Technological change, personnel practices and industrial relations', in R. Blandy 
& J. Niland (Eds.), Alternatives to Arbitration, Sydney, 1986, p.56.
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1990 federal election. All have sought and gained pre-selection since their 
involvement in the disputes. Bjelke-Peterson has retired from the state parliament 
after an abortive attempt to move into the federal sphere, largely on the urging of 
sections of the New Right.
CONTINGENT PARTIES
The roles of the contingent parties - executive government, the industrial tribunals 
and the peak union and employer bodies - in industrial conflict are inextricably 
linked with the prevailing political and industrial climate. Industrial conflict while 
still at the proximate party stage will be focussed on the issues as determined by 
those parties. Once the contingent parties become involved the issues frequently take 
on other dimensions. This was illustrated in the pilots' dispute where, for the 
Government the issue was clearly that the Prices and Incomes Accord would be 
undermined by the pilots' wage claim. For the Industrial Relations Commission, the 
issues were whether its determination of six per cent in accordance with the wage­
fixing principles would be disregarded with widespread consequences as other unions 
followed suit, and the challenge to the industrial relations system itself by the 
Federation's decision that it could and should be by-passed. For the ACTU the issues 
were complex in that on the one hand the AFAP's action threatened the Accord while 
on the other, the legal actions taken against the union were in violation of both union 
principles and the Accord. The issue for the ACTU was further exacerbated by a 
long-standing tension between itself and the non-affiliated AFAP. For the peak 
employer bodies, their tacit approval of the Accord and wage restraint placed them 
firmly in the Government and airlines' camps. At the same time there was 
considerable pressure applied on the Government to take a more conciliatory role 
while at the same time standing firm.
I do not mean to suggest that the pilots' dispute was typical, clearly it was not. I have 
mentioned it here to illustrate how, once the contingent parties become involved in 
industrial conflict the issues undergo a transformation, particularly if they are 
highly placed on the political and industrial agendas. There is a sense in which the 
proximate parties become unimportant in the larger picture.
The case studies
The role of the Queensland Government during the SEQEB dispute has been dealt with 
elsewhere. Suffice to say that as a public sector dispute, the Queensland Government 
was both a proximate and a contingent party. It was argued in Chapter ten that the 
involvement of the ACTU, the Federal Government and the unions was only partially 
out of concern for the sacked ETU workers. Tension during the dispute between the
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ACTU, the ETU and Queensland Trades and Labour Council erupted at times into public 
display of anger and frustration. Their main concern was the legal initiatives being 
taken by the Queensland Government and the attack on the industrial relations 
system. Conversely, there was widespread support from amongst peak employer 
bodies for the Queensland Government's actions because they were seen to represent a 
challenge to what was perceived to be excessive union power.
ACTU involvement in the Mudginberri dispute was as a principled stand against the 
pecuniary penalties imposed by courts outside the industrial relations system. 
There was little actual sympathy for the AMIEU which had been publicly berated by 
the then President of the ACTU, Simon Crean, for not withdrawing the picket line. 
The other contingent parties involved in this dispute were considerable. 
Mudginberri Station received financial support from Westpac, the Northern 
Territory and Queensland Governments and the NFF. The larger issues for the 
contingent parties in this dispute, were not the tally system (the issue behind the 
dispute) but testing the provisions under the TPA to defeat the union. It was a 
statement about trade union power and how it could be defeated by a concerted effort. 
The successful outcome for Mudginberri provided an example of how unions could be 
taken on from outside the industrial relations system.
In the case of Robe River, the Western Australian Government and the Federal 
Government were both concerned about the potential cost the dispute could have for 
Australia's export markets in iron-ore. There was further consternation expressed 
by all the contingent parties at the attack on the industrial relations system by 
Charles Copeman, although he received considerable support from some members of 
the New Right. Others, like WMC's Hugh Morgan were critical of Copeman's actions. 
The ACTU with SEQEB, Dollar Sweets and Mudginberri as background were concerned 
about yet another dispute where the industrial relations tribunal was being by­
passed in favour of court actions. There was considerable sympathy for the workers 
at Robe River and their treatment at the hands of the company. The ACTU had fully 
endorsed the union's response to the company's action and made determined efforts to 
negotiate an agreement under conditions that were both difficult and hostile. For the 
ACTU, it was a critical matter of principle. If a union which had complied with all 
requests from the industrial tribunal; stated its intention to adhere to commission 
rulings; and had indicated its willingness to negotiate the issues (by already 
conceding a number of points), could be attacked from outside the system, then the 
precedent for the entire labour movement would be serious.
The contingent parties in all of these disputes were involved in the disputes for
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reasons other than those which precipitated the disputes. In all there were some 
common features - managerial prerogative, contract labour, trade union power and 
the use of law outside the industrial relations system.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
This thesis has not attempted to make any analysis of dispute resolution as such. It 
has been included in the analytical framework because it provides an obvious final 
point, and that, is that one way or another, all disputes come to an end eventually. 
The way in which they do this will be largely determined by the character of the 
dispute itself. All of the other elements outlined in the analytical framework, the 
background, the political and industrial climate, the legal environment, and the 
proximate and contingent parties, will to a greater or lesser extent be critical to how 
the dispute is resolved. There are three basic outcomes to dispute resolution. They 
are resolved by:
( i ) determination or decision by an industrial tribunal or the courts;
( i i ) capitulation of one of the proximate parties; or
( i i i ) agreement reached through negotiations between the proximate parties or 
with the intervention of one or more of the contingent parties.
The degree of conflict which occurs is subject to a number of factors, some of which 
have been outlined. But one of the aspects of dispute resolution which bears 
consideration is that, the not only will the intensity of the conflict have a significant 
impact on the way in which the dispute is resolved, it could also have implications 
for whether it has been resolved finally. Where capitulation is a factor, then the 
aggrieved (capitulating) party may merely be marking time until the next occasion. 
The Queensland Government during the SEQEB disputes serves as an example. The 
elements of conflict will be crucial determinants in the dispute resolution outcome 
and the immediate and subsequent consequences.
Conclusion
That the law can be a two-edged sword has I believed been clearly demonstrated. It 
protects and regulates* and it proscribes and punishes. For unions who have in the 
past gained some comfort from a perceived de facto immunity to penal provisions for 
direct action the revival and use of non-industrial laws has been a source of 
considerable concern. The protection offered by the industrial relations system has 
become critical and adherencG to its determinations and decisions can no longer be
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regarded as matter of choice. While I have not argued that the use of torts at common 
law and the civil law have become everyday practice, the importance placed on the 
disputes that have been discussed by government, peak employer and union bodies, 
and the trade union movement cannot be underestimated. The extent to which they 
have reduced disputation, increased commitment and adherence to the system is not 
possible to quantify. What I do suggest is that they have been integral in creating a 
changed industrial environment which is more sensitive to the legal framework and 
the political agenda.
I have put forward the proposition also that industrial peace and the absence of 
industrial conflict are not necessarily contemporaneous. As explained earlier, there 
are practical limitations in the recording of industrial disputation. My analysis has 
concentrated mainly on two forms, strikes and bans. The increase in bans since 
1983 may be explained in a number of ways. For example, by levels of 
unemployment and the Accord. I have suggested that the law and the prevailing 
industrial and political climate may also be reasons. But it is also possible that, 
these factors may only serve to conceal underlying conflict which cannot be easily 
identified or measured. One of its manifestations that I have sought to identify is the 
measurement of bans and their relationship to strike activity. It is hardly 
surprising that in the industrial and political climate that has evolved during the 
Accord period, there have been demonstrable changes in the incidence, character and 
causes of industrial conflict. Nor is it surprising that there have been changes in 
attitudes and responses to industrial conflict by the proximate and contingent parties. 
Industrial peace has a value which is expressed in terms of the low incidence of 
strike activity, and does not indicate the actual level of conflict that exists and may be 
manifested either through, other forms of direct or indirect action; or by no action at 
all.
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Appendix 2
Summary of main legal events in chronological order
12 June  1985 B eaum on t J o f the Federa l C ourt o f A us tra lia  g ran ted  in terim  
in junc tion  fo r b reach  o f 2 45D (1 ) o f T rade  P rac tices  A ct 
1974 (C th) (1985 ) 27  A ILR  pa ra  245 .
21 June  1985 Fine o f $10 ,000  p lus  $2 ,000  per day w as im posed  by Bowen 
CJ fo r con tem p t o f the co u rt's  o rde r g ran ting  the  in te rim  
in ju n c tio n  (1985) 27  A ILR  pa ra  3 1 1 ; [1 9 8 5 ] A T P R  4 0 -580
12 Ju ly  1985 M orling  J g ran ted  pe rm anen t in juc tions  to  res tra in  conduc t in 
b reach  o f s 45D (1 ) (1985) 61 A LR  280.
18 Ju ly  1985 O rder to sequestra te  the AMI EU 's p roperty  to en fo rce  paym ent 
o f the fine  w as m ade by Bow en CJ (1985) 61 ALR  291.
14 A ugus t 1985 A pp lica tion  by M udg inbe rri, to rev iew  d e c is ions  m ade by 
C om m onw ea lth  D epartm en t o f P rim ary Industry  in respect o f 
p rov is ion  o f m eat in spec to rs  to M udg inbe rri, d ism isse d  by 
N eaves J o f Federa l C ourt (No NT G 16 o f 1985).
16 A ugus t 1985 AM IEU  was found by Lockhart J to be in breach o f the o rder of 
M orling  J (1985) 94 FC R  398.
10 S e p te m b e r 1985 Full bench o f the Federa l C ourt uphe ld  the dec is ion  of M orling 
J g ra n ting  p e rm a n e n t in ju n c tio n s  (1985) 61 A LR  417.
11 S e p te m b e r 1985 Fine o f $100 ,000  on the AM IEU  w as im posed by Lockhart J 
fo r con tem pt of the pe rm anen t in junc tion  p lus a sequestra tion  
o rd e r (1985) 28 A ILR  pa ra  21.
17 D ecem ber 1985 A ppeal by the AM IEU  aga inst the fines and sequestra tion  orders 
m ade by Bowen CJ w as d ism issed  by the  full bench o f the 
Federa l C ourt (1985) 61 ALR  635.
19 D ecem ber 1985 A ppea l by M udg inbe rri aga inst o rde r o f N eaves J in respect o f 
w he the r there  w as an ob liga tion  to the D epartm en t o f P rim ary 
Industry  to p rov ide  m eat inspection  se rv ices . Full C ou rt of 
Federa l C ourt held the re  w as such an ob liga tio n  (1985) 68 
A LR  613.
21 F e b rua ry  1986 High C ourt re fused leave to appea l from  dec is ion  o f Full C ourt 
o f Federa l C ourt in re la tion  to dec is ion  about p rov is ion  o f m eat 
insp e c to rs  to M u dg inbe rri (no ted  in (1986) 28 A ILR  para  
1 0 0 ) .
14 A p ril 1986 A pp lica tion  by M udg inbe rri to G ray J o f the Federa l C ourt to 
d ism iss  app lica tion  by AM IEU  tha t o rders  o f the cou rt had been 
p rocured  by fraud o r fa lse  ev idence  o f the M anag ing  D irecto r o f 
M udg inbe rri, on the basis tha t the A M IE U 's  app lica tion  was 
fr ivo lous  o r vexa tious . Th is  w as d ism issed  by G ray J (1986)
65 ALR  683.
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21 July 1986
21 July 1986
13 August 1986
Application by AMIEU to challenged the grant of the permanent 
injunction on the basis that it had been procured by fraud or 
false evidence, was dismissed by Morling J (No VG36 of 
1986)(1986) 28 AILR para 444.
Morling J ordered that the AMIEU pay Mudginberri damages in 
the sum of $1,759,444 for engaging in conduct in breach of s 
45D(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth) (1986) 8 
ATPR 40-708 (noted in (1986) 28 AILR para 283).
The High Court of Australia upheld the power of the Federal 
Court of Australia to fine the AMIEU for contempt of court 
(1986) 161 CLR 98; 60 ALJR 608; 66 ALR 577.
15 December 1986 Full Bench of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed an appeal
by the AMIEU against the decision of Lockhart J to fine the 
AMIEU $100,000 for breach of its order (NSW G244 of 
1985; NSW G294 of 1985) noted (1987) 29 AILR para 203.
16 June 1987 Full Bench of the Federal Court dismissed an appeal by AMIEU
against the award damages by Morling J in respect of breach of 
s 45D of the Trade Practices Act but varying the quantum of 
damages to $1,458,810 (1987) 74 ALR 7.
Source: M. J. Pittard, Trade Practices Law and the Mudginerri Dispute', in Australian 
Journal of Labour Law. Vol.1, pp.29-30.
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